Chattisgarh High Court
Sohan Nath Yogi vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 27 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
CGHC010053262025 2026:CGHC:31935-DB
Digitally signed
NAFR
INDRAJEET by INDRAJEET
SAHU
SAHU Date: 2026.07.28
17:17:32 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 314 of 2025
1 - Sohan Nath Yogi S/o Motinath Yogi Aged About 24 Years R/o Gram
Sonpur, P.S. And District Kawardha Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Khamtarai, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant : Shri N.Naha Roy, Advocate.
For State : Shri Shalin Singh Baghel, Govt. Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
Judgment on Board
27.07.2026
Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ.
1 Though notice was duly served upon PW-2, father of victim, on
12.05.2025, but since no one appears on behalf of victim to raise
objection on the application filed by the appellant seeking suspension
of sentence and grant of bail and also considering the fact that
appellant is languishing in jail since 19.05.2021, with the consent of the
parties, the matter is heard finally.
2 The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
2
09.08.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, FTSC
(Prevention of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012) (in short, The
POCSO Act), Raipur, in Special (POCSO) Case No.118/2021 whereby
the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under :
Conviction Sentence
363 IPC RI for 07 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in
default of payment of fine, additional RI
for one month.
366 IPC RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in
default of payment of fine, additional RI
for one month.
376(3) IPC and 4(2) of POCSO RI for 20 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in
Act default of payment of fine, additional RI
for four months.
5(l)/6 of POCSO Act RI for 20 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in
default of payment of fine, additional RI
for four months.
3 Brief facts of the case are that, on 06.05.2021 a missing report was
lodged by the father of victim that her minor daughter is missing since
03.05.2021 and her whereabouts could not be traced out. Based on
written complaint, FIR Ex.P/7 was registered by the police against
unknown person for the offence under Section 363 IPC and started
investigation. During the course of investigation, on 18.05.2021 the
victim was recovered from the possession of appellant and recovery
Panchnama Ex.P/1 was prepared in presence of witnesses. The victim
was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Raipur where
she was medically examined by Dr. Sonam Deshmukh, PW-4, who
gave her report Ex.P/16. While medically examining the victim, the
doctor has not noticed any external injuries on her body, however her
hymen was found old ruptured and healed. The doctor opined that no
definite opinion can be given about recent sexual intercourse and
3
opinion depends upon chemical analysis of slides. Two slides of her
vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to police for
chemical examination. She also referred for X-ray for age
determination. Spot map Ex.P/2 was prepared by the police and P/8 by
the Patwari. The underwear of the victim was seized vide Ex.P/5. With
respect to date of birth of victim, the police seized school register vide
seizure memo Ex.P/14 and after retaining its attested true copy
Ex.P/15-C, the original was returned back. According to school register,
the date of birth of victim was 25.11.2006. The appellant was arrested
on 18.05.2021 and he too was sent for his medical examination to
District Hospital, Raipur, where he was examined by Dr. Ravindra
Chandrakar, PW-6, who gave his report Ex.P/18-A and found him
capable to perform sexual intercourse. The underwear of victim and
her vaginal slides and the underwear of appellant were sent for its
chemical examination to State FSL Raipur from where report Ex.P/32
was received according to which semen and sperms were found
present on the sent articles.
4 The statement of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and statement of
victim under Section 164 CrPC have been recorded and after
conclusion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed against the
appellant for the offence under Sections 363,366,376,376(2)(n) and
376 (3) IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act.
5 The trial court framed charge against the appellant for the offence
under Sections 363,366,376(3),376(2)(n) IPC and Sections 4(2) and
5(l)/6 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed
trial.
4
6 In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution
has examined as many as 8 witnesses. Statement under Section 313
CrPC of the appellant have also been recorded in which he denied the
circumstances appears against him, pleaded innocence and have
submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence.
7 After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the
prosecution, the trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced
him as mentioned in opening para of this judgment. Hence this appeal.
8 Learned counsel for respective appellant would submit that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
There are material omissions and contradictions in the prosecution
witnesses which cannot be made basis to convict him in the offence in
question. The entire conduct of victim is suspicious throughout the
proceeding. There is no cogent and admissible evidence with respect
to age of victim that she was minor and less than 18 years of age on
the date of incident. School record has not been proved by the
prosecution in accordance with law. In her medical examination, no
injuries have been found on the body and there is no sign of any
protest. The victim was major girl having love affair with the appellant.
She eloped with him on her own will and engaged in making
consensual physical relation with him. She resided with appellant in his
house without raising any objection or making complaint to anyone.
Thus, in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence against the
appellant, he cannot be convicted for the alleged offences. The
ingredients required for conviction under the offence of kidnapping and
5
rape are missing. Therefore, the appeal may be allowed and the
appellant be acquittal from all the charges.
9 On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the
submissions made by the counsel for appellant and would submit that
prosecution has proved its case beyond doubt. But for minor omission
or contradiction, there are sufficient and overwhelming evidence
against the appellant to convict him in the offence in question. The
victim was minor on the date of incident which is proved from her
school record. Once it has been considered that victim was minor,
there is no question of her consent or elopement with the appellant on
her own will. The statement of appellant that victim eloped with him but
due to her minority she was unable to give her consent, itself is
sufficient to prove the offence of kidnapping and rape. Even if no
injuries were found on her body and her hymen was found old ruptured
and healed, but that itself does not dilute the prosecution case as
sperms and semen were found on the vaginal slide of victim which
strengthens the case of prosecution that appellant committed sexual
intercourse with her. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and
sentence is absolutely justified and not required to be interfered with.
10 We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the records of
the trial court.
11 The first and foremost question would be the age of the victim as to
whether she was minor on the date of incident or not?
12 The prosecution has mainly relied upon document Ex.P/15-C which is
the attested true copy of school register and sought to be proved by
PW-3 who is the Assistant Grade-III in the school. PW-3 has stated in
6
her evidence that police has seized the school register with respect to
date of birth the victim. After retaining its attested true copy Ex.P/15-C,
the police has returned back the original register. As per school
register, the date of birth of victim is 25.11.2006. The victim was
admitted in the school in Class-VI. In cross examination, she admits
that there is no endorsement in the school register as to who made
entry in the school register and in which year. She further admits that
there is no mention about the basis on which the date of birth of victim
is recorded in the school register. There is no document with respect to
birth certificate of victim annexed in the school register. She further
admits that record of school register of victim is not of Class-I, but of
Class-VIth.
From the evidence of this witnesses, it does not reflect that she
was the author of school register and further on what basis the date of
birth of victim was recorded. Further, the school register is not of her
initial schooling, but it is of Class VIth and there is no document with
respect to transfer certificate or any other document based on which
the date of birth of victim was recorded in the school register of Class-
VIth.
13 In the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by
Inspector of Police, 2011 (2) SCC 385, which is in respect of
admissibility of school records of a person, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government
school and is duly signed by the headmaster would be admissible in
evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the
admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary
7
value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on
the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon’ble Supreme court
held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would
have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or
who gave the date of birth is examined.
14 In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra),
the Supreme Court has observed as under:
“40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the
girl’s date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to
the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16
years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e.,
31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a
Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster.
Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the
Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document
would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in
the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was
recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would
have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or
who gave the date of birth is examined.
42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document
may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand
Purohit1, observed as follows:-
“The date of birth mentioned in the scholars’ register has no
evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave
the date of birth is examined….Merely because the documents Exs. 8,
9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of
documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9,
10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the
correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of
the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash
Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the
aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the
facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts
in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned
in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the
evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the
facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the
respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of
Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the
dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp)
SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned
therein could not be accepted.”
43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case
of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court
observed as follows:-
8
“The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking
of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof
of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence,
that is, by the “evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the
truth of the facts in issue”.”
44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been
discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the
transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been
examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not
be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of
the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by
applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In
this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made
by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4
held as follows:-
“The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise
may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission;
for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of
marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even
for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being
represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on
the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately
represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as
he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age
of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions
of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same
standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused
as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim
or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if
on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the
school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be
deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution,
as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.”
15 In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:
“33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid
catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the
provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would
have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as
to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age
of the person as nearly as may be.
XXXX XXXX XXXX
33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the
person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial
burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii),
and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-
9
section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima
facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid
documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age
of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by
the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing
as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ
Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal
court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion
but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of
section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence.
Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true
age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an
inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the
determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made
on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of
such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract
formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of
the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the
parties in each case.
33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should
not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in
support of the plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should
lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline
cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is
made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time,
the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by
persons to escape punishment after having committed serious
offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence
such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be
considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as
any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official
duty would have greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents,
such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the
JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as
per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other
provisions.
33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age
determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person
cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by
radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence
but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of
documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”
10
16 Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by
Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :
“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of
birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate
by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the
absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or
Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the
absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through
“an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination
test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e.
Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a
transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation
or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school
transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997.
Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the
prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges;
therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a
document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the
concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that
the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were
missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of
documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer
certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was
below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in
cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with
Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari
materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:
“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be
followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict
with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical
appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the
determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking
evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate
from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the
absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii)
and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly
constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It
was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit
could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower
side within the margin of one year.”
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially
the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in
Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:
“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the
school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021
11(12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the
same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii)
provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal
authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age
determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)
(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were
contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of
2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate
was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not
being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first
attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth
certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent
certificate are placed in the same category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal,
this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving
that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the
person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the
hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of
preference.”
17 Reverting to the facts of present case, the victim PW-1 have stated her
date of birth as 25.11.2006 and at the time of incident she was about
14 years of age. In cross examination, she shown her ignorance about
her date of birth certificate and stated that she has not seen her birth
certificate. Her elder brother is 23 years of age and her another brother
is 18 years and she is third child of her parents.
18 PW-2, the father of victim, have stated that he could not remember
date of birth of victim.
19 From the evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to age of
victim, it could not be established that she was minor on the date of
incident. When the victim has stated that she has not seen her birth
certificate and her father also states that he could not remember date
of birth of victim, further the entries made in the school register has not
been proved by its author and there is no other oral evidence to prove
her date of birth, it cannot be said that there are cogent evidence
produced by the prosecution with respect to age of victim, yet the trial
12
has held her minor based on school records which has not been
proved by the prosecution in accordance with law. Thus, this court is of
the opinion that prosecution could not establish that victim was minor
on the date of incident.
20 So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, we again
examine the evidence of victim PW-1.
21 The victim has stated in her evidence that she knew the appellant
since she was studying in Class-VIIth. The appellant was residing in a
rented house situated near burial place. He gave his mobile number to
her and she used to talk him through mobile phone. He used to take
her inside the burial place and at that time he was intoxicated. He
informed her that he is addicted of Ganja, adhesive Solution and
intoxicated tablets and he made forcible physical relation with her. He
took her with him towards Sonpur-Kawardha and kept her in a field in
the night. In late night he took her to his house and in the next morning
his mother saw her and inquired about her. He kept her in his house for
about 15 days and regularly made physical relation with her. After
about 15 days, her parents came there in her search and recovered
her.
In cross examination, she contradict her 164 CrPC statement
that while she was going to school, the appellant tried to outrage her
modesty and appellant gave his mobile number to her. In paragraph 21
of her cross examination she admits that the appellant has not allured
her to go with him. She further admits that appellant did nothing wrong
with her. When she was confronted by the court as to whey she made
statement against the appellant about kidnapping and rape, she
13
answered that under fear of police she made earlier statement against
the appellant. She further disclosed that in the last year when she was
in Durg, the police threatened her to give statement as per their own
wish. In cross examination she conclusively stated that under the fear
of police and threaten given by them, she made statement against the
appellant, by which her evidence has become shaky. She denied the
allegation against the appellant that he kept her and committed forcible
sexual intercourse with her.
22 When the evidence of victim itself is shaky and she did not remain firm
in allegation levelled against the appellant and made statement that
appellant has neither kidnapped nor committed any wrong with her, her
evidence cannot be believed for maintaining conviction of the appellant
for the alleged offences of kidnapping or rape.
23 PW-2, the father of victim is the witness of her missing report only and
later he too was declared hostile.
24 The other evidence produced by the prosecution are procedural
witnesses i.e. doctor and police officers who conducted the
investigation. From the evidence of victim as well as her father, there
does not appear to be any cogent and clinching evidence against the
appellant for his conviction for the alleged offences. Even no external
injuries were found on the body of victim regarding protest or any
struggle while kidnapping or committing sexual intercourse with her.
25 In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: –
“9. It must however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction
between “taking” and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The
two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard
14ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstances can
the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of
Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a
case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by
the accused person left her father’s protection knowing and having
capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins
the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused
can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful
guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and
that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an
active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor
to leave the house of the guardian.
10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that
though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father’s protection no
active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage
solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our opinion, if evidence
to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to
infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of
the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her
guardian’s house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined
the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to
her guardian’s house by taking her along with him from place to place.
No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as
facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our
opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the
keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to
“taking”.”
26 Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Tilku @ Tilak Singh
Vs. State of Uttarakhand has also relied upon the aforesaid judgment
of S. Varadarajan (Supra) in its judgment dated 06.02.2025 passed in
Criminal Appeal No.183 of 2014.
27 Since the prosecution has failed to establish that victim was minor on
the date of incident, the victim herself admitted that the appellant has
not kidnapped and did nothing wrong with her and that the evidence of
victim as well as her father are not found sufficient to convict the
appellant for the alleged offence, the conviction of the appellant cannot
be sustained.
28 The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be
maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However,
there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim
15
must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not
required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the
accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the
charges levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which
the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case.
29 As a fallout of aforesaid consideration, the appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is hereby set aside.
The appellant is acquitted from all the charges. The appellant is
reported to be in jail since 19.05.2021. He be released forthwith, if not
required in any other case.
30 Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of B.N.S.S. 2023, the
appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of
Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the sum
of Rs. 25,000/- with one reliable surety in the like amount before the
court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months
along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave
petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid
appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
31 The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back
immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary
action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
inder
