Allahabad High Court
Smt. Anjana And 5 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 24 July, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:153765
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 16240 of 2016
Smt. Anjana And 5 Others
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
Anil Kumar Tiwari, Anoop Trivedi, Anoop Trivedi (Senior Adv.)
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
Babban Prasad Dwivedi, G.A.
Court No. - 73
HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.
1. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking the following relief:
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court maybe pleased to allow this application and quash the proceedings of complaint case no. 96 of 2014 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Chibramau, District Kannauj as well as the summoning order dated 20.11.2015 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Chibramau, District Kannauj summoning the applicants herein to stand trial under section 380 I.P.C.
It is further prayed that this Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to stay the further proceedings of complaint case no. 96 of 2014 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Chibramau, District Kannauj under section 380 I.P.C. and / or any other and further order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”
2. The factual matrix of the case is that the complainant/respondent no. 2, Atma Prakash Dubey, lodged a complaint alleging that on 31.05.2014, at about 11:00 a.m., the accused-applicants trespassed into his house through the roof and, after breaking open the walls, committed theft by stealing cash amounting to Rs. 47,000/- along with gold jewellery. It was further alleged that upon raising hue and cry, nearby shopkeepers, namely, Udai Narain, Mahendra Singh, Ravi Kumar, Brijesh Kumar and Katori Devi, reached the spot and attempted to prevent the accused-applicants from committing the theft. However, the accused-applicants fled from the scene after abusing them. Thereafter, information was given to the police, who arrived at the spot but did not register the F.I.R. Despite repeated complaints made to the police authorities seeking registration of the F.I.R., no action was taken. Consequently, the complainant was constrained to institute a complaint case against the accused-applicants under Sections 380, 447, 454 and 427 I.P.C.
3. The complainant, Atma Prakash Dubey, examined himself under Section 200 Cr.P.C., while Ravi Kumar, Saurabh Tiwari and Katori Devi were examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. In his statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., the complainant stated that on 31.05.2014, he had gone to Kanpur to attend a marriage ceremony along with his son Aman Dubey, his daughters Meghna Dubey and Ritika, and his wife Sushma Dubey. At about 11:00 a.m., Ved Prakash, Anjana Devi, Vivek Kumar, Chanchal, Niranjan Prakash and Asha Devi, who are his relatives, broke open the lock of his house and committed theft. He further stated that Ravi Kumar informed him about the incident over the phone at about 11:15 a.m. on the same day. Upon receiving the information, he contacted the Additional Superintendent of Police, whereafter an inquiry was conducted by the Inspector. However, by that time, the accused persons had already escaped after committing the theft. He alleged that a one-gram gold chain, two gold rings weighing about 4-5 grams, and cash amounting to Rs. 47,000/- were stolen. He further stated that despite the incident, the police failed to register the F.I.R. and that the accused persons were continuously threatening him with dire consequences.
4. Ravi Kumar, in his statement recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C., stated that on 31.05.2014, at about 11:00 a.m., while he was present at his shop, Ved Prakash, Anjana Devi, Vivek Kumar, Chanchal, Niranjan Prakash and Asha Devi, with the intention of illegally occupying the house of Atma Prakash, demanded the keys of the house from him. When he refused to hand over the keys, the accused persons broke the wall, forcibly entered the house and after breaking the locks, committed theft of cash amounting to Rs. 47,000/- and gold jewellery. Upon hearing the commotion, he, along with Udai Narain, Mahendra Singh, Brijesh Kumar and Katori Devi, reached the spot and witnessed the incident. He identified all the accused persons and thereafter informed the complainant, Atma Prakash, about the occurrence over the phone.
5. Saurabh Tiwari, in his statement recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C., stated that on 31.05.2014, at about 11:30 a.m., while purchasing articles from the shop of Ravi Kumar, he saw the accused persons, namely, Ved Prakash, Vivek, Niranjan Lal, Ram Saran and their family members, forcibly entering the complainant’s house after demolishing a wall. He further stated that he, along with Katori Devi, Brijesh Kumar and others, entered the house and witnessed the incident. He also deposed that the accused persons abused them.
6. Katori Devi, in her statement recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C., deposed that at about 12:00 noon on the date of the incident, upon hearing hue and cry near the complainant’s house, she, along with Saurabh Tiwari, went to the roof of the house of Brijesh Kumar Srivastava. From there, she saw Ved Prakash, Anjana, Chanchal, Niranjan and Asha Devi breaking the glass of the staircase and trespassing into the complainant’s house. She further deposed that the accused persons broke open the safe, committed theft and also abused those present at the spot.
7. From the statements of the complainant and the witnesses examined under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., it is apparent that the complainant, Atma Prakash Dubey, was not present at his house at the time of the incident and, therefore, is not an eyewitness to the occurrence. However, Ravi Kumar, Saurabh Tiwari and Katori Devi, in their statements recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C., have consistently stated that the accused persons forcibly entered the complainant’s house after demolishing the wall, forcibly opened the locks and thereafter, committed theft of cash amounting to Rs. 47,000/- and gold ornaments. It is also undisputed that the complainant and his family members were away from the house at the relevant time.
8. The scope of interference under Section 482 CrPC in relation to an order issuing summons is well settled. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is required to be exercised only in exceptional cases where continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law or where the complaint fails to disclose the commission of any offence. This principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others (1998) 5 SCC 749. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:
“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”
9. The Apex Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Goyal and Others vs. State of UP and Another (2019) 14 SCC 318 held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court may consider defence material only if it is of sterling and unimpeachable quality and is sufficient to completely displace the allegations contained in the complaint. Where adjudication of the defence requires appreciation of disputed facts and evidence, the same must necessarily be left for trial. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under:-
“12. While dealing with the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings at the stage of issuance of process, or at the stage of committal, or at the stage of framing of charges, that is to say before the commencement of actual trial, in the light of material placed on record by the accused, this Court in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 330 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 158] laid down as under : (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 28-30)
?28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held.
29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.
30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:
30.1. Step one : whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2. Step two : whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?
30.3. Step three : whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
30.4. Step four : whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.?
(emphasis supplied)
10. The Apex Court in the case of Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu and Another vs. State of A.P. and Another (2020) 17 SCC 595 while delineating the scope and ambit of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, held as under:-
“15. In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it were a trial court. The court is only to be prima facie satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the court can evaluate materials and documents on record, but it cannot appreciate the evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.
16. The High Court should not, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482, embark upon an enquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not, or whether on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the allegations are not sustainable, for this is the function of the trial Judge. This proposition finds support from the judgment of this Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283] .
17. The High Court may have an obligation to intervene under Section 482 of the Code in cases where manifest error has been committed by the Magistrate in issuing process despite the fact that the alleged acts did not at all constitute offences. Reference may be made to S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] . However, it is important to remember that while exercising powers under this Section, the High Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
18. The power under Section 482 CrPC should not be exercised to stifle legitimate prosecution. At the same time, if the basic ingredients of the offence alleged are altogether absent, the criminal proceedings may be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.
19. It is well settled that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, it is open to the High Court, exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Reference may be made to M.A.A. Annamalai v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 8 SCC 524 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 950] , Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 132] and Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] . The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure the ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. Reference may be made to Dharampal v. Ramshri [(1993) 1 SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333] .
20. In rejecting the application, the High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] where this Court laid down the following guidelines for exercise of power under Section 482 : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
?(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.?
21. In Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, 1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] , cited by the High Court, this Court held that : (SCC p. 687, para 3)
?3. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court.?
22. The High Court also relied on State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404] , where this Court considered the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and held : (SCC p. 703, para 7)
?7. ? In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.?
(emphasis supplied)
11. It is well settled that at the stage of taking cognizance or summoning, the Court is only required to examine whether a prima facie case is made out on the basis of the material placed by the complainant. The defence of the accused is neither required to be considered at that stage, nor is the Court expected to examine whether the evidence on record is sufficient to ultimately secure the conviction of the accused.
12. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the complainant and the accused persons are close relatives and that, on account of a dispute relating to ancestral property, the accused-applicants have been falsely implicated in the present case. However, such a defence cannot be examined at the stage of summoning while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Therefore, no ground is made out for interference with the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the accused persons for offence punishable under Section 380 I.P.C.
13. Accordingly, the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
14. The interim order, if any, stands vacated.
15. The trial court is directed to expedite the trial and conclude the same, preferably within a period of six months, without granting unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties. It is made clear that the observations made herein are confined solely to the adjudication of the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and shall not influence the trial court while deciding the case on its own merits, strictly in accordance with law.
(Sandeep Jain,J.)
July 24, 2026
Mayank
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