National Highway Authority Of India vs Garja (Deceased) Through Lrs & Another on 23 July, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

National Highway Authority Of India vs Garja (Deceased) Through Lrs & Another on 23 July, 2026

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
                               OMP(M) No.343 of 2026
                               Decided on: 23.07.2026




                                                                .

     National Highway Authority of India                    .... Applicant.





                               Versus


     Garja (deceased) through LRs & another                ...Respondents




                                        of
     Coram
     Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge

Whether approved for reporting?

rt
For the applicant: Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Varun Rana, Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral)

The instant application under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act has been filed for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal,

which is barred by 4 years and 119 days.

2. The facts, as emerge in the present case, are that the

land of the respondents was utilized for the construction of four-lane

road in Ner Chowk, Manali Section of NH-21. The applicant-appellant

initiated the acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act,

1956, from KM 126.500 to KM 188.917, Bilaspur Ner Chowk Section

for the land falling under revenue estate Dayohi, Tehsil Sundernagar,

District Mandi. The Competent Authority passed an award bearing No.

40 dated 17.10.2013 under Section 3-G of the National Highways Act,

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1956 and determined the compensation to the tune of Rs.12,00,000/-

per bigha, irrespective of classification of land. The compensation for

.

the structure was also awarded as per the report of the registered

Valuer duly verified by Executive Engineer, HPPWD.

3. Feeling dis-satisfied by the quantum of compensation,

the respondents/non-applicants filed claim under Section 3-G (5) of the

of
Act, 1956, before the learned Divisional Commissioner, Mandi,

appointed by the Central Government. The learned Arbitrator partly
rt
allowed the claim of the claimants/respondents and enhanced the

compensation amount of the land to the tune of Rs.26,35,000/- per

bigha and also granted statutory benefits vide impugned award dated

26.07.2017, however, the claim of the respondents/landowners for

enhancement of compensation for structure was rejected.

4. Feeling dis-satisfied with the award passed by the

learned Arbitrator, the applicant-appellant preferred petition under

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the learned

District Judge, Mandi, however, the said petition came to be dismissed

on 18.11.2021.

5. In the application which has been filed under Section 5

of the Limitation Act, it has been contended that the impugned

judgment was passed by the learned District Judge on 18.11.2021.

The counsel for the applicant applied for the certified copy on

20.01.2026, and the same was prepared and delivered on 10.02.2026.

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It has been stated that the appeals pertaining to Mohal Dayohi were

allotted/assigned to M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates. Despite repeated

.

requests, the then counsel for the applicant did not provide any update

regarding the filing of the appeal or its status. Various requests were

made to M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates to send the filing receipts and

the orders passed in the appeals. However, the same were never

of
received. It has been further stated in the application that M/s Mittal

and Mittal Advocates were directed to file the appeals; however, no
rt
order or update was given by the said law firm in any of the matters.

The applicant finally withdrew the appeals from the said law firm vide

letter dated 23.07.2025. Thereafter, the applicant again contacted its

counsel to procure the complete case file and requested the counsel to

provide the entire record along with the filing numbers. However, in

December 2025, the said M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates refused to

hand over the record to the applicant.

6. It has been stated that after obtaining the entire record,

legal opinion was sought so as to determine the future course of

action. The legal opinion was given by the Regional Office, and the

matter was discussed at various levels for the purpose of filing the

appeal, where it was decided to challenge the judgment of the learned

District Judge. In this process, a delay of 4 years and 119 days has

occurred in filing the appeal. It has been stated that the delay in filing

the appeal is neither intentional nor willful, but the same has occurred

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under unavoidable circumstances. Along with the application, the

applicant has placed on record Annexure A-2, the copy of the

.

communication addressed by the Project Director of the present

applicant to M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates, dated 23.09.2022,

whereby the applicant had requested the said law firm to challenge the

impugned order before this Court by filing the appeals under Section

of
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Annexure A-3 is the copy of

the communication addressed to the learned senior counsel of the
rt
present case dated 23.07.2025, whereby the cases were entrusted to

him. Thereafter, Annexure A-4 is the copy of the email addressed by

the counsel to the applicant for procuring the entire record, as they

were not in possession of the complete set of files.

7. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the

applicant that the delay in filing the appeal is on account of the fact that

the law firm, namely M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates, who were

entrusted with the cases, neither filed the appeals in time nor

communicated or responded to the communication addressed by the

applicant. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the present

applicant cannot be penalized for the negligence of the law firm.

Therefore, though the delay is on the higher side, however, keeping in

view the attending facts and circumstances of the case, the same

deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.

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8. On the other hand, the application has been vehemently

opposed by Mr. Varun Rana, learned counsel for the non-applicants,

.

on the ground that the delay in filing the present appeal is intentional,

deliberate, and willful. Since there is a huge delay of more than four

years, therefore, in the absence of any plausible explanation, no relief

can be granted to the present applicant. He further submits that on

of
account of the inaction and negligence of the applicant, the valuable

rights which have accrued to the non-applicants/respondents cannot
rt
be taken away lightly. He further submits that the respondents are poor

villagers and their land was utilized by the NHAI for the construction of

the road way back in the year 2012. He further submits that for more

than the last 13 years, the claimants are running after the present

applicant for the payment of just and fair compensation. He further

submits that in case the present application is allowed, a huge

irreparable loss shall be caused to them, and they shall be dragged in

another round of litigation.

9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and

have gone through the case file carefully.

10. In the present case, the thrust of the applicant’s

argument is that the entire delay in filing the present appeal occurred

on account of the fact that the case in hand was entrusted to M/s Mittal

and Mittal Advocates, vide its letter dated 23.09.2022. Though various

averments have been made in the application explaining the reasons

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for not filing the present appeal, admittedly, from 23.09.2022 till

23.07.2025, no material or document has been placed on record to

.

demonstrate what steps were taken by the applicant for filing the

present appeal. Even otherwise, Annexure A-2, the letter which has

been addressed by the Project Director of the NHAI to M/s Mittal and

Mittal Advocates, reveals that the impugned judgment was passed on

of
18.11.2021. However, there is no explanation as to what steps were

taken by the applicant from the said date, i.e., from 18.11.2021 to
rt
23.09.2022. The said gap is missing, and no explanation has been

offered by the present applicant. To the similar extent, after entrusting

the cases to the learned senior counsel who is representing the

applicant before this court since 23.07.2025, the applicant has not

been able to establish and substantiate what steps were taken by them

and what prevented them from filing the instant appeal from

23.07.2025 to 23.02.2026. The gap of nearly three years between

23.09.2022 and 23.07.2025 is missing and has not been explained, as

a result of which a right has accrued to the respondents/non-

applicants, which cannot be taken away on the basis of the bald

assertions made in the application.

11. This court is conscious of the fact that the land of the

respondents/non-applicants, who are villagers, was utilized for the

construction of the road way back in 2012, and despite passing of

more than 13 years, they are running from pillar to post to get fair

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compensation. No plausible or cogent reasons have been assigned or

have come forward to show what prevented the present applicant from

.

filing the instant appeal within time. Though the applicant has tried to

put the entire blame on M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates, but when

specifically asked by this Court what action has been taken against the

law firm, the counsel for the applicant failed to answer.

of

12. Generally, the Courts have adopted a very liberal

approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5
rt
of the Limitation Act, in order to condone delay to enable the Courts to

do substantial justice and to apply the law in a meaningful manner that

sub-serves the ends of justice. Notwithstanding the above, no matter

how liberal an approach is adopted in condoning delay, the existence

of sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time is a condition

precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay.

The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’, and ’cause

for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to

defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or, as a matter

of fact, dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must always be borne in mind, while

construing sufficient cause in deciding applications under Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation

prescribed for filing an appeal, a substantive right accrues in favour of

the decree-holder, and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed.

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13. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that even

after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal

.

within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as

a matter of right, as excusing the delay is within the discretionary

jurisdiction vested in the court. The Court, despite the establishment of

sufficient cause, may for various reasons refuse to condone the delay,

of
depending upon the bona fides of the party. The liberal approach in

considering the sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to
rt
override the substantive law of limitation. The concept of a ‘liberal

approach’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of

limitation. It is a well-settled principle of law that though limitation may

harshly affect a particular party, it has to be applied with all its rigour

when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the

period of limitation on equitable grounds. Where a case has been

presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain to

the court what the sufficient cause was which means an adequate and

enough reason that prevented him from approaching the court within

the period of limitation. No court would be justified in condoning such

an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever, as in the

present case where there is a delay of more than 4 years and 119 days

14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Pathapati

Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others vs. The Special Deputy

Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, has

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laid down the parameters for condonation of delay in the following

manner:

.

“12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which

is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be
dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid

provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject
to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and
had to be given effect to even though no objection

of
regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to
in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon

rtthe court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond
limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The
exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24

(inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only
with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers
the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after

the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant
gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within
the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are

conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal
even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the

proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’
for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the

delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of
time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other
factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due
diligence etc.

13. It is very elementary and well understood that
courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in
dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay
in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to
advance substantial justice.

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14 to 20 xx xx xx xx

.

21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra

Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite
unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had

allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this
Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its
discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High

of
Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic
and an informed manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be
rt
allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court
observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’,

‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’
cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.

22. xx xx xx

23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer 8, this Court held that the discretion to

condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The

expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if

negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was
also observed that even though limitation may harshly
affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all
its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts
have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they
have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.

24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the
aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner
in which equilibrium has to be maintained between

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adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute
as it stands, Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation

.

may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be

applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation

on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress

of
resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but

rtthe court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means
“the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in

such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.”

15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant

that, being an instrumentality of the State, a liberal approach should be

adopted while condoning the delay in filing the application under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act. She submits that since the file went

through different channels and because it is an agency of the State,

the Court should adopt a liberal approach while considering the said

application

16. To the said submission of learned counsel for the

applicant, Mr. Varun Rana, learned counsel for the respondents, has

placed on record the copy of the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble

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Apex Court in Shivamma (dead) by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing

Board & others, Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025, decided on 12th

.

September, 2025, whereby Hon’ble Apex Court has held that

irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private

person, the provisions of law applicable are the same, and as such

same consideration that is shown by the courts to a private party, when

of
claiming the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, should also

be adopted towards the State. The expression “sufficient cause”

rt
cannot be construed too liberally merely because the party is the

Government, the courts are bound to accept readily whatever has been

stated on behalf of the state.

17. The Hon’ble Apex Court has deprecated the

condonation of delay in filing the appeal therein that was occasioned

not by any unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer inefficiency and

ineptitude of the Government pleaders concerned, merely because the

party seeking condonation happened to be the State. in doing so, the

Hon’ble Apex Court had observed that the concepts such as liberal

approach, justice-oriented approach, substantial justice cannot be

employed to thwart the substantial law of limitation, particularly in

cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the

delay. The distinction between the State or any instrumentality, vis-a-

vis the private individual for the purpose of Section 5 of The Limitation

Act should be understood in its proper context and true spirit.

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18. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the State

or any of its instrumentality cannot be put on the same footing as a

.

private party for the purpose of condonation of delay under Section 5 of

the Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court while passing the judgment

has given a clear message to the State and all its instrumentalities that

a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot continue for all times to

of
come. The State and all public authorities to constitute legal cells to

examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved in the
rt
decisions by the courts. If not, then endeavour should be made

towards arriving at a settlement, instead rather than re-agitating the

related causes before the courts. Differential treatment cannot continue

for all times to come.

19. The Hon’ble Apex Court after setting aside the judgment

passed by the High Court, whereby the delay was condoned,

dismissed the application for condonation of delay by imposing cost of

Rs.25,000/- on the respondent in the said case. It has been held by the

Hon’ble Apex Court that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a

sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the

importance of the judicial time, what worries is the plight of the litigant

with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and

its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations

deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold because, say if a party

litigating against the State for whatever reason is unable to contest the

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condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the

lis for another round of litigation and leaves such litigant listless.

.

20. The said exposition of law has been reiterated in various

judgments by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

21. In the present case, the applicant-NHAI has filed the

application to make out a case for the condonation of delay. The entire

of
burden has been shifted on M/s Mittal & Mittal, Advocates, and it has

been averred that on account of their negligence, the present appeal
rt
could not be filed. Interestingly, the applicant has failed to establish or

demonstrate from the record what steps were taken by the applicant

from the date the impugned judgment was passed by the learned

District Judge, Mandi. Not even a single communication has been

placed on record to show that any correspondence was made by the

applicant to the said legal firm prior to 23.09.2022. Even thereafter, for

three years, no steps were taken by the present applicant to inquire

about the pendency or status of the case. From 23.09.2022 till

23.07.2025, no explanation has come forward on behalf of the

applicant to show and establish that the applicant was prompt in

dealing with the present case and that there was no negligence on the

part of the applicant in filing the present appeal.

22. Though, in substance, it has been contended by the

learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant was not aware of

the filing of the appeal, if any, by M/s Mittal & Mittal, Advocates, and

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that they were under the impression that the appeals stood filed by the

said law firm, there is no explanation on behalf of the applicant as to

.

what steps were taken by them except for the letter (Annexure A-2) to

inquire about the pendency/status of the cases.

23. The learned counsel for the respondents filed reply in

connected case bearing OMP(M) No.250 of 2026, titled as NHAI vs.

of
Sunder and has adopted the same in the present case being similar in

nature, whereby it has been stated that the averments and contents of
rt
the application are false, incorrect, and mischievous. When the non-

applicants filed the execution petition, the counsel for the present

applicant put in an appearance before the learned executing court and

also deposited the entire awarded amount, based upon which the

execution petition was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The said

fact has been stated by the non-applicants, which also falsifies the

case of the present applicant. Once the learned counsel for the

applicant/JD put in an appearance in the execution proceedings and

subsequently accepted the same by depositing the awarded amount,

the allegations and averments made in the application do not hold

good and are found to be false and incorrect.

24. The stand as has been adopted by the learned counsel

for the applicant that on account of the fault of the legal firm, the delay

of 4 years 119 days has occurred in filing the present appeal, the

Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash,

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SLP(Civil) Nos.935-936 of 2021, has held that as noticed over a

period of time that a tendency on the part of litigants to blame their

.

lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings

before the court is coming forward. It has been observed that even if, it

is assumed that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this

by itself cannot be a ground to condone the long and inordinate delay,

of
as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is

expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending
rt
in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not

be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the Advocate

and thereby disowns him at any time and seek relief.

25. It is well settled that Advocate is the agent of the party.

His acts and statements, made within the limits of the authority given to

him, are the acts and statements of the principal, i.e. the party who

engages him. It is true that in certain situations the court may, in the

interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree

notwithstanding the negligence or misdemeanour of the Advocate

where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant, but there is no

such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and

seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an

absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment has held as follows:

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“10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the
head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in
the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency

.

on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence

and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court.
Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was

careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to
condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to
be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally

of
vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court
initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be
permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate
rt
and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021

11.In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this
Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd.
reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as

under:-

“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are

the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who
engage him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in

the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte
decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of

the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent
litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown
its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute
immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make
the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations
made in Rafiq [AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as
an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove,
this was an ongoing suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of
seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by
a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located.

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The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private
limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and
managed by educated businessmen who know where their

.

interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not

deposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt
piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was

part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be
not. But one thing is clear they chose to noncooperate with the
court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the

of
defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire
blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021 were totally unaware of
rt
the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which
cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.”

(Emphasis supplied)

12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision
of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The

Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860,
wherein this Court held as under:-

“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure

that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to
assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral

to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him;
secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a

person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing
them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without
asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the
basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non
dermientibus, jura sub- veniunt (the laws give help to those who
are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object
of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise
his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage
and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.” (Emphasis
supplied)”

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26. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex

.

Court in Sanjay Singh and another vs. Central Himalayan Land

Development Company Ltd., (2019) 12 SCC, 218, wherein the

parameters for condonation of delay have been laid down in the

following manner.

of
“15. But, what is more striking is that the delay to the tune
of 721 days was condoned by the High Court when there

rt was no satisfactory explanation. In CIVIL APPEAL NO.
1928 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C) No.24690 OF 2018) SANJAY
SINGH AND ANR. VS. CENTRAL HIMALAYAN LAND

DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. our view, there was gross
negligence on part of the respondent and the explanation
offered in support of the prayer for condonation does not

appear to be correct. This is evident from the fact that no
effective steps were taken to pursue the complaint which
was lodged against the then advocate. In the petition for

special leave, it was asserted that the complaint against

the Advocate was not being proceeded with and the
respondent had remained absent on the relevant date.
Said assertion was not answered satisfactorily in the

affidavit in reply filed in this Court. Taking totality of the
circumstances, in our view the delay ought not to have
been condoned by the High Court. We, therefore, accept
the submission of the appellants and set aside the order
condoning delay. Consequently, the First Appeal also
stands dismissed.”

27. This court is of the considered view that poor villagers,

whose land was utilized for the construction of the road, have been

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deprived of their properties, are running from pillar to post for the last

13 years. In case the present application is allowed, the respondents

.

will be thrown into another round of litigation for years to come. As

rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that

since the delay is inordinate and unexplained and is more than 4 years

119 days, it cannot be condoned in any eventuality. The applicant has

of
failed to make out a case for the condonation of delay as no sufficient

reasons have been assigned in the application.

28.
rt
Consequently, in view of the observations made

hereinabove, the present application, being devoid of any merit,

deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.

29. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed

of.

( Romesh Verma )
Judge
23rd July, 2026

(vt)

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