Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Maniya vs State Of Rajasthan on 22 July, 2026
Author: Kuldeep Mathur
Bench: Kuldeep Mathur
[2026:RJ-JP:34871]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal (Sb) No. 536/2026
CNR: RJHC010100862026 | URN: CRLAS / 1151U / 2026
Maniya S/o Dhuliya, Aged About 25 Years, Village Rujadi, P.s.
Pipal Khunt, Dist.- Pratapgarh. (Presently In Judicial Custody At
Central Jail, Jodhpur)
----Appellant
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor Jodhpur
2. Jaya Alias Jiwa D/o Rakma, Aged About 16 Years,
Through Her Father Rakma S/o Masru Age 43 Years,
Village Chib Kher Dabara, P.s. Bhungada, Dist - Banswada
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Siddharth Karwasra
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Narendra Singh Chundawat, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP MATHUR
ORDER
22/07/2026
Today, the matter was listed for consideration of application
for suspension of sentences of the petitioner. However, at the
request of both the parties, the appeal itself has been finally heard
and is being decided today itself.
1. The present appeal under Section 415 BNSS has been
preferred by the appellant against the judgment dated 30.09.2019
passed by the learned Special Court, Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act 2012 and Children’s Court under The
Commission for Protection of Child Right Act 2005, Banswara in
Special Case No.57/2018 whereby the learned trial court has
convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant as under:
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[2026:RJ-JP:34871] (2 of 9) [CRLAS-536/2026]Offence under Sentence Fine In default
Section
344 of IPC R.I. for 03 years Rs.3,000/- S.I. for 2 months
363 of IPC R.I. for 04 years Rs.4,000/- S.I. for 3 months
366 of IPC R.I. for 05 years Rs.5,000/- S.I. for 4 months
376 of IPC R.I. for 13 years Rs.13,000/- S.I. for 6 months
3/4(2) of R.I. for 13 years Rs.13,000/- S.I. for 6 months
POCSO Act
All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 22.04.2017,
the father of the prosecutrix submitted a written report at Police
Station Bhungada alleging inter alia that his daughter, aged about
15 years and 6 months, had gone to a nearby village to participate
in a Dandiya programme on 24.03.2017 and did not return home
thereafter. It was also alleged that the appellant had enticed and
taken away the minor prosecutrix and had committed sexual
intercourse with her during the period she remained in his
company. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, FIR
No.54/2017 came to be registered and investigation was
commenced.
3. During investigation, the prosecutrix as well as the appellant
were recovered. The Investigating Officer had got the medical
examination of the prosecutrix and the accused conducted,
recorded the statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C.,
obtained the school record and other documentary evidence
relating to the age of the prosecutrix and, after completion of
investigation, filed charge-sheet against the appellant for offences
punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC and Section 3/4
of the POCSO Act.
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4. Thereafter, the learned trial Court framed charges against
the appellant, who denied the allegations and claimed trial. The
prosecution examined twenty-three witnesses and exhibited
documentary evidence. The appellant, in his statement under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied all the allegations levelled against him
and pleaded false implication. After appreciating the oral as well
as documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial
Court convicted and sentenced the appellant by the impugned
judgment.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that
the learned trial Court has committed grave error in recording the
conviction without properly appreciating the evidence available on
record. It was further contended that the prosecution has failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below
eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. To
substantiate these contentions, learned counsel submitted that the
medical evidence regarding age of the prosecutrix indicates that
she was above eighteen years at the relevant time, whereas the
learned trial Court has placed implicit reliance upon the school
record without satisfying itself about the authenticity and
admissibility thereof.
6. It was further submitted that neither the admission form nor
the person who had supplied the date of birth at the time of
admission was produced before the Court and, therefore, the
school record could not have been treated as conclusive proof of
age. Learned counsel also submitted that the learned trial Court
has failed to properly appreciate the principles governing
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determination of age laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
its judgments.
7. Learned counsel further submitted that the evidence on
record unambiguously demonstrates that the prosecutrix and the
appellant were acquainted with each other, developed a love affair
and had voluntarily left their respective homes with the intention
of solemnizing marriage. The prosecutrix herself admitted in her
testimony that she accompanied the appellant out of her own free
will, travelled with him, remained with him for a considerable
period and even accompanied him to the Court for the purpose of
marriage.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there are
material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the
prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses, rendering the
prosecution version unreliable. Drawing attention of the Court
towards the medical and FSL evidence, learned counsel submitted
that the same does not corroborate with the prosecution’s case. It
was, therefore, submitted that the prosecution has failed to
establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the impugned
judgment of conviction deserves to be quashed and set aside.
9. Alternatively, learned counsel submitted that the incident is
of the year 2017; the appellant has already undergone a
substantial period of incarceration and has faced the agony of
criminal proceedings for several years. It was, therefore, prayed
that without making any interference on merits/conviction, the
sentences so awarded to the appellant may be substituted with
the period of sentences already undergone by him.
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10. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor supported the
impugned judgment and submitted that the learned trial Court has
meticulously appreciated the entire evidence available on record.
It was contended that the age of the prosecutrix stood duly
proved from reliable documentary evidence and, once the
prosecutrix was found to be a minor, her alleged consent lost all
legal significance. It was further submitted that the testimony of
the prosecutrix inspires confidence and finds due corroboration
from the surrounding circumstances as well as the evidence
collected during investigation. Learned Public Prosecutor,
therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
11. Heard learned counsel for the appellant-applicant and the
learned Public Prosecutor at Bar. Perused the material available on
record.
12. At the outset, this Court finds that the learned trial Court has
undertaken a detailed appreciation of the entire evidence adduced
by the prosecution. The prosecutrix has consistently supported the
prosecution case in her statement before the Court and has
specifically stated regarding her kidnapping by the appellant and
commission of sexual intercourse with her during the period she
remained in his company. The statements of the prosecutrix finds
material corroboration from the medical evidence as well as other
prosecution witnesses. It is a settled proposition of law that the
testimony of the prosecutrix, if found reliable and trustworthy, is
by itself sufficient to sustain conviction and does not require
independent corroboration as a matter of rule.
13. So far as the contention regarding the age of the prosecutrix
is concerned, the learned trial Court has dealt with the said issue
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in considerable detail. Though learned counsel for the appellant
has sought to rely upon the opinion of the Medical Board
suggesting that the prosecutrix could be above eighteen years of
age, the documentary evidence relating to her date of birth, duly
proved during trial, has rightly been preferred by the learned trial
Court. It is well settled that where reliable documentary evidence
regarding age is available, the same ordinarily prevails over
medical opinion, which is only an approximate assessment. This
Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in the conclusion recorded by
the learned trial Court that the prosecutrix was a minor on the
date of occurrence.
14. Equally devoid of merit is the submission that the prosecutrix
had voluntarily accompanied the appellant. Even assuming that
the prosecutrix had accompanied the appellant out of her own
volition or that the parties were having a romantic relationship,
such circumstance would not exonerate the appellant from
criminal liability once the prosecutrix is found to be below eighteen
years of age. Under the provisions of the POCSO Act as well as the
relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, consent of a minor is
legally inconsequential.
15. This Court also finds that the discrepancies in statements of
prosecution witnesses and FSL report as pointed out by learned
counsel for the appellant are only minor inconsistencies, natural to
occur after lapse of time, and do not go to the root of the
prosecution case. The learned trial Court has appreciated the
evidence in its correct perspective and no perversity or illegality
warranting interference with the finding of conviction is made out.
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16. Consequently, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has
succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. The findings of conviction recorded by the learned court
below are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not
suffer from any legal or factual infirmity warranting interference in
appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant
for the offences under Sections 344, 363, 366 and 376 IPC as well
as Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012 deserves to be affirmed.
17. However, the question regarding the quantum of sentence
stands on a different footing and is required to be considered
independently. Sentencing is not a mechanical exercise to be
undertaken solely with reference to the statutory maximum or
minimum punishment prescribed for an offence. The Court is
required to balance the gravity of the crime with the
circumstances attending its commission, the antecedents of the
offender, the period already undergone, the passage of time and
the overall ends of justice.
18. In Alister Anthony Pareira vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2012) 2 SCC 648, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the
principles governing sentencing as under:
“70. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime. One
of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of
appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence
commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the
manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket
formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts
have evolved certain principles: twin objective of the sentencing
policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet
the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the(Uploaded on 27/07/2026 at 06:26:35 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:34871] (8 of 9) [CRLAS-536/2026]crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other
attendant circumstances.”
19. The aforesaid principle has consistently guided the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction while considering whether the sentence
imposed requires modification.
20. In the present case, the incident occurred in the year 2017.
The appellant has already undergone substantial incarceration
pursuant to the impugned judgment. It has also been brought to
the notice of this Court that after his release on bail during
pendency of the trial, the appellant has not misused the liberty
granted to him and has not involved in any criminal activity.
21. Having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances, the
nature of evidence available on record, the period already
undergone by the appellant, the long lapse of time since the
occurrence, the age of the appellant at the relevant time and
keeping in view the principles governing sentencing laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Alister Anthony Pareira (supra),
this Court is of the considered opinion that while the conviction
recorded by the learned trial Court deserves to be maintained in
toto, the ends of justice would be adequately served by reducing
the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant to the period
already undergone by him. The sentence of fine imposed by the
learned trial Court, together with the default stipulations, deserves
to remain unaltered.
22. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part. The conviction of
the appellant under Sections 344, 363, 366 and 376 IPC and
Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 is maintained. However, the substantive sentence of
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imprisonment awarded by the learned trial Court is modified and
reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant. The
sentence of fine and the default sentences shall remain intact. The
appellant is in prison and shall be released forthwith, if not wanted
in any other case, provided he deposits the amount of fine, if not
already deposited.
23. However, keeping in view the provisions of Section 481
BNSS, the accused appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond
in the sum of Rs.15,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount
before the learned trial court, which shall be effective for a period
of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of a Special
Leave Petition against the present judgment on receipt of notice
thereof, the appellant shall appear before the Supreme Court.
24. All pending applicaiton(s), if any, stand disposed of
accordingly.
(KULDEEP MATHUR),J
1/Divya Raj Jasmatiya
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