Raju Balmik vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 6 July, 2026

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    Madhya Pradesh High Court

    Raju Balmik vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 6 July, 2026

    Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia

    Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia, Anuradha Shukla

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                               NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167
    
    
    
    
                                                                                      Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024
    
    
                                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                   AT GWALIOR
    
                                                                          BEFORE
    
                                            HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
                                                              &
                                           HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
                                                           ON THE 6th OF JULY, 2026
                                                    CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1871 of 2024
                                                           MUKESH BALMIK
                                                                Versus
                                                    THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
    
                               Appearance:
                                       Ms Nikita Jain - Advocate for appellant.
                                       Shri Rajesh Shukla - Additional Advocate General for the State.
                                       Shri Abhishek Tiwari - Advocate for complainant.
    
    
                                                                           WITH
                                                    CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2045 of 2024
                                                            RAJU BALMIK
                                                                Versus
                                                    THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
    
                               Appearance:
                                    Shri Sushant Tiwari - Advocate for appellant.
                                       Shri Rajesh Shukla - Additional Advocate General for the State.
                                       Shri Abhishek Tiwari - Advocate for complainant.
    
    
    
    
    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
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                               NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167
    
    
    
    
                                                                                              Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024
    
    
                                                                     JUDGMENT
    

    Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia

    1. These two Criminal Appeals under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. have
    been filed against the Judgment and Sentence dated 8-12-2023 passed by
    1st A.S.J., Datia in S.T. No. 55/2018 and 57/2019, by which the appellants
    have been convicted and sentenced as under :

    SPONSORED
                                        S.No.         Name of Conviction           Sentence           Fine
                                                      Appellant under
                                                                Section
                                        1.            Mukesh 148 of IPC            R.I. for six Rs.500/-
                                                      Balmik                       months       in default
                                                                                                to suffer
                                                                                                RI for 2
                                                                                                months
                                                                    302/149 of     Life         Rs.
                                                                    IPC      (in   Imprisonment 1,000/- in
                                                                    respect of                  default 1
                                                                    deceased                    year's
                                                                    Badal)                      R.I.
                                                                    302/149 of     Life         Rs.
                                                                    IPC      (in   Imprisonment 1,000/- in
                                                                    respect of                  default 1
                                                                    deceased                    year's
                                                                    Ajay)                       R.I.
                                                                    323/149 of     R.I. for 1 Rs.500/-
                                                                    IPC      (in   year         in default
                                                                    respect of                  3
                                                                    injured                     months'
                                                                    Vinod)                      RI.
                                                                    323/149 of     R.I. for 1 Rs.500/-
                                                                    IPC      (in   year         in default
                                                                    respect of                  3
                                                                    injured                     months'
                                                                    Shivkumar)                  RI.
                                                                    25(1B)(a)      R.I. for 1 Rs.1000/-
                                                                    of      the    year         in default
    
    
    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
                                                                            3
                               NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167
    
    
    
    
                                                                                                Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024
    
    
                                                                    Arms Act                            3
                                                                                                        months'
                                                                                                        RI.
                                                                    27 of Arms R.I. for            3    Rs.1000/-
                                                                    Act        years                    in default
                                                                                                        1 year's
                                                                                                        RI.
                                        2.            Raju          148 of IPC     R.I. for six         Rs.500/-
                                                      Balmik                       months               in default
                                                                                                        to suffer
                                                                                                        RI for 2
                                                                                                        months
                                                                    302/149 of     Life                 Rs.
                                                                    IPC      (in   Imprisonment         1,000/- in
                                                                    respect of                          default 1
                                                                    deceased                            year's
                                                                    Badal)                              R.I.
                                                                    302/149 of     Life                 Rs.
                                                                    IPC      (in   Imprisonment         1,000/- in
                                                                    respect of                          default 1
                                                                    deceased                            year's
                                                                    Ajay)                               R.I.
                                                                    323/149 of     R.I.   for      1    Rs.500/-
                                                                    IPC      (in   year                 in default
                                                                    respect of                          3
                                                                    injured                             months'
                                                                    Vinod)                              RI.
                                                                    323/149 of     R.I.   for      1    Rs.500/-
                                                                    IPC      (in   year                 in default
                                                                    respect of                          3
                                                                    injured                             months'
                                                                    Shivkumar)                          RI.
                                                                    27 of Arms     R.I. for        3    Rs.1000/-
                                                                    Act            years                in default
                                                                                                        1 year's
                                                                                                        RI.
    
    
    
    
    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
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                               NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167
    
    
    
    
                                                                                     Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024
    
    
    

    2. It is not out of place to mention here that Appellant Mukesh Balmik
    and Raju Balmik were absconding. Raju Balmik was arrested on 27-11-
    2017 and supplementary charge sheet was filed and accordingly trial in
    S.T. No. 55/2018 was initiated. Mukesh Balmik was arrested on 18-12-
    2018 and supplementary charge sheet was filed and accordingly, trial in
    S.T. No. 57/2018 was initiated. Both the Trials were clubbed together.

    3. Other co-accused persons, namely Rohit @ Golu, Aakash, Chappa
    @ Harkishan, Chhuttan, Sunny, Kadori @ Chunnilal were tried in S.T. No.
    131/2014 and by Judgment and Sentence dated 25-10-2017 passed by
    Additional Sessions Judge, Datia, co-accused Rohit @ Golu was acquitted
    and others were convicted for offence under Sections 148,302/149 (2
    counts) and 323/149 (2 counts). Criminal Appeal No. 5631/2017 filed by
    Aakash and Chappa @ Harkishan, Criminal Appeal No. 6250/17 filed by
    Chhuttan, Criminal Appeal No. 6251/17 filed by Kadori @ Chunnilal and
    Criminal Appeal No. 6252/17 filed by Sunny, were also listed for
    analogous hearing. In the light of judgment passed by Supreme Court in
    the case of A.T. Mydeen Vs. The Asstt. Commissioner, Customs
    Department
    , decided on 31/10/2021 in Cr.A. No. 1306 of 2021, the
    evidence led in the case of present appellants cannot be read for the
    accused persons who were tried separately, accordingly the appeals filed by
    Raju Balmik and Mukesh, are being decided separately by a separate
    judgment.

    4. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal in short are
    that the appellants and the complainant party were known to each other.
    According to the prosecution case, on 29.05.2014 at about 09:30 a.m.
    complainant Vinod Balmik lodged an FIR at Police Station Kotwali

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
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    Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024

    District Datia alleging that the accused party was on inimical term with the
    complainant party on account of one criminal case which is also pending in
    the Court. The said trial is at the stage of evidence. The appellant Raju
    Balmik and others were insisting that the complainant party should turn
    hostile. On this issue, on 29.05.2014 at about 09:00 a.m., the complainant
    Vinod (injured), Ajay (Deceased), Badal (Deceased), Shiv Kumar (injured)
    were returning back to their house. As soon as they reached near the house
    of Maithili, they were waylaid by Raju Balmik, Mukesh, Akash, Chappa @
    Harkishan, Chhuttan, Sunny and Chunnilal @ Kadori. The accused
    persons were armed with weapons. Raju, Chhuttan and Mukesh were
    having 0.315 bore Adhiya, whereas Akash, Chappa @ Harkishan were
    having 12 Bore gun, Sunny was having sword and Chunnilal was having
    lathi. By forming an unlawful assembly and in furtherance of common
    object, they started abusing the complainant party and insisted that the
    complainant party should compromise. Thereafter, Chunnilal @ Kadori
    Balmik assaulted Vinod by Lathi. As a result, the complainant Vinod
    sustained injury on the elbow of his left hand, knee of his left leg, as well
    as on his back. Raju Balmik fired a gunshot with an intention to kill Badal,
    which caused injury near the right eye of Badal. Mukesh fired a gunshot on
    Badal causing gunshot injury in his abdominal region. Chhuttan also fired
    a gun shot caused injury in the abdominal region of Badal. Badal fell down
    on the ground and expired. Sunny assaulted Ajay @ Ajju by means of a
    sword which landed on the back side of his head. Aakash and Chappa @
    Harkishan also fired gunshots from their respective guns. Ajay also fell
    down on the spot. Shiv Kumar, Aakash Balmik, his wife Anita and other
    persons who had also reached on the spot have also witnessed the incident.

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    6

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    Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024

    Shiv Kumar had also sustained injury in the incident. On the basis of the
    FIR, Crime No. 196/2014 was registered for offence under Section 147,
    148, 149, 302, 307, 323 and 294 of Indian Penal Code. The
    complainant/injured Vinod Balmik, (PW1), and Shiv Kumar (PW4) were
    sent for medical examination. The Investigating Officer prepared the spot
    map. A merg intimation under Section 174 of CrPC was also recorded on
    the spot in respect of death of Badal. The blood-stained earth, plain earth,
    fired empty cartridge of 0.315 bore were seized from the spot vide seizure
    memo (Ex.P/6C). The injured Ajay was referred to District Hospital, Datia.
    An information in that regard was also sent by Dr. Ujjania to the police. Dr.
    Ujjania had also conducted the MLC of Ajay @ Ajju. The MLC report of
    complainant Vinod and Shiv Kumar was also prepared by Dr. D. K.
    Ujjania. The Lash panchanama of the dead body of Badal was prepared.
    The post mortem of the dead body of Badal was got done. A plastic cap
    was also recovered by the autopsy surgeon during post mortem. The
    clothes, plastic cap in sealed cover were handed over by the autopsy
    surgeon to the police which were also seized. The dying declaration of the
    injured Ajay was recorded. The statement of Ajay under Section 161 of
    CrPC was also recorded by the police. However, on 08.06.2014, Ajay also
    died on account of injuries sustained by him. Accordingly, an information
    was also given. The Lash panchanama of the dead body of deceased Ajay
    Balmik was prepared. The post mortem of the dead body of Ajay Balmik
    was done.

    5. Initially, the appellant Raju Balmik was arrested, later on during the
    pendency of trial of Raju Balmik, appellant Mukesh was arrested. The
    police filed supplementary charge sheets against both the appellants for

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    7
    NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167

    Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024

    offence under Section 302, 307, 323, 294, 148 of IPC and under Section 25
    and 27 of Arms Act.

    6. The trial Court by order dated 5-7-2018 framed charges against
    appellant Raju Balmik under Section 148, 302 r/w Section 149 (2 counts),
    307, 323,294 of IPC. However by order dated 3-11-2023, charges were
    amended and charges under Section 147,148,302 r/w149 (2 counts),
    307/149 (4 counts), 323/149,294 of IPC and under Section 27 of Arms Act,
    were framed. Similarly, the Trial Court by order dated 3-9-2019, framed
    charges against appellant Mukesh for offence under Sections
    147,148,302/149 (2 counts), 307/149 (4 counts), 323/149 and 294 of IPC.
    The charges were amended by order dated 3-11-2023 and charges under
    Section 147,148,302/149 (2 counts), 307/149 (4 counts), 323/149, 294 of
    IPC under Section 25(1-b) and 27 of Arms against appellant Mukesh were
    framed.

    7. The appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded not guilty.

    8. The prosecution examined Vinod Balmik (P.W.1), Sunita @ Anita
    (P.W.2), Aakash Balmik (P.W.3), Shiv Kumar (P.W.4), Bhanvar Singh
    (P.W.5), Mohit Verma (P.W.6), Devendra Singh (P.W.7), Jagdish Prasad
    Sen (P.W.8), Ajay Koli (P.W.9), Ghanshyam Singh Tomar (P.W.10),
    Manoj Kumar Shrivastava (P.W.11), Ram Singh (P.W.12), Vinit Goyal
    (P.W.13), Dr. D.K. Ujjania (P.W.14), Rajpal Singh (P.W.15), Dilip Singh
    (P.W.16), Sobaran Singh Tomar (P.W.17), R.K. Singh (P.W.18), Khuman
    Singh (P.W.19), Sher Singh (P.W.20), and Dr. Dinesh Kumar (P.W.21).

    9. The Appellants examined Dr. Ravin Patel (D.W.1) in their defence.

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    8

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    10. The Trial Court after recording evidence and hearing both the
    parties, convicted and sentenced the appellants for the offences already
    mentioned above.

    11. As already pointed out, the Cr.A.s of other co-accused persons who
    were tried and convicted in separate trial were also listed for analogous
    hearing. In Criminal Appeal No. 2045/2024, this Court while refusing to
    grant bail to appellant Raju had directed the listing of this case for final
    hearing in the month of July 2026. Accordingly, the counsel for the
    appellants were directed to argue the matter finally. But the Counsel for the
    accused persons did not argue inspite of the fact that order dated 1-4-2026
    was passed in Cr.A. No. 2045/2024 (Appellant Raju Balmik). However, at
    the time of hearing of connected appeals, which were listed for hearing
    analogously and have been decided by separate judgment, Shri Sankalp
    Sharma and Shri B.K. Sharma, Counsels for Aakash, Chappa @ Harkishan
    and Kadori @ Chunnilal submitted that they would give their written
    submissions. Ms. Nikita Jain, Counsel for Chhuttan was also requested to
    file her written submissions. Shri Sankalp Sharma and Shri B.K. Sharma,
    Advocates, provided their written submissions, but no written submission
    was filed by Ms. Nikita Jain, Counsel for the appellant Chhuttan. On one
    hand, it is being projected in the society that it is the Court which has failed
    to dispose of the appeals in time, but on most of the occasions, it is only on
    account of non-cooperation by the counsel for the parties, the Courts are
    forced to adjourn the cases. Once this Court had already made it clear by
    order dated 1-4-2026 passed in Cr.A. No. 2054/2026 that in the month of
    July 2026, the matter shall be heard finally, then it was always expected
    from the counsel for the parties that they should have made preparation in

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    9
    NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167

    Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024

    order to put forward the case of the appellants. But the counsel for the
    parties deliberately did not prepare the case and deliberately did not utter
    even a single word in spite of repeated requests made by the Court. The
    Court also tried to convince or persuade the counsel for the parties by
    clarifying that the court is ready to read the entire record with them,
    therefore, they must put forward the case of their litigants, but
    unfortunately none of the counsel for the appellant rose to the occasion and
    did not utter a single word.

    12. Above all, the order for Final Hearing was passed in Cr.A. No.
    2045/2024 in the presence of Shri Sushant Tiwari, Counsel for
    appellant Raju Balmik, but inspite of repeated requests, he did not
    utter a single word and all the time was looking at the Court. Similarly,
    Ms. Nikita Jain, who was appearing for appellant Mukesh also did not utter
    a single word. Although this Court had also granted an opportunity to file
    written arguments but that was not done either by Shri Sushant Tiwari
    Advocate, nor by Ms. Nikita Jain/Ashok Jain, Advocates.

    13. The only question for consideration is that when the litigants are
    being represented by their counsel and in spite of the order passed by this
    Court that the appeal shall be heard finally, still the Counsel for the
    appellants are not co-operating, then whether this Court should adjourn the
    hearing merely on the ground that the counsel for the parties are not ready
    to argue the matter or not?

    14. In the considered opinion of this court, the timely disposal of appeal
    is the requirement of the hour. Once the appeal has been filed, then it has to
    be decided and the disposal of the appeal cannot be left to the mercy of the
    appellants. In order to meet such a hostile attitude, this Court can finally

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    10
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    decide the appeal after going through the record. The Supreme Court in the
    case of Surya Baksh Singh v. State of U.P., reported in (2014) 14 SCC
    222 has held as under :

    24. It seems to us that it is necessary for the appellate court which
    is confronted with the absence of the convict as well as his
    counsel, to immediately proceed against the persons who stood
    surety at the time when the convict was granted bail, as this may
    lead to his discovery and production in court. If even this exercise
    fails to locate and bring forth the convict, the appellate court is
    empowered to dismiss the appeal. We fully and respectfully
    concur with the recent elucidation of the law, profound yet
    perspicuous, in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka. After a
    comprehensive analysis of previous decisions our learned Brother
    had distilled the legal position into six propositions: (SCC p. 734,
    para 19)
    “19.1. that the High Court cannot dismiss an appeal for non-
    prosecution simpliciter without examining the merits;
    19.2. that the Court is not bound to adjourn the matter if both the
    appellant or his counsel/lawyer are absent;

    19.3. that the court may, as a matter of prudence or indulgence,
    adjourn the matter but it is not bound to do so;

    19.4. that it can dispose of the appeal after perusing the record and
    judgment of the trial court.

    19.5. that if the accused is in jail and cannot, on his own, come to
    court, it would be advisable to adjourn the case and fix another
    date to facilitate the appearance of the appellant-accused if his
    lawyer is not present, and if the lawyer is absent and the court
    deems it appropriate to appoint a lawyer at the State expense to
    assist it, nothing in law would preclude the court from doing so;
    and
    19.6. that if the case is decided on merits in the absence of the
    appellant, the higher court can remedy the situation.”

    15. In view of the aforesaid judgment, this Court had also made it clear to
    the counsel for the appellants that in case if they do not co-operate with the
    Court, then this Court after going through the record will decide the appeal

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    11
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    Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024

    by itself. In spite of that information, the counsel for the appellant Raju and
    Mukesh neither uttered a single word nor filed written submission, and all
    the time they kept mum. If an Advocate has accepted the brief on behalf of
    the litigant, then it is always expected that he should be ready with the
    arguments. The Advocates are the Officers of the Court and therefore they
    must behave like an Officer of the court. It was not the case of any of the
    counsel that they were engaged by the litigants only for the purposes of
    filing bail applications. Once the appellant has engaged a counsel, then the
    said counsel has a duty towards the Court as well as towards his appellant.

    In the present case the counsel for the appellants namely Shri Sushant
    Tiwari (Counsel in Cr.A. No. 2045/2024) and Shri Ashok Jain/Ms. Nikita
    Jain (Cr.A. No. 1871/2024) ), have miserably failed in discharging their
    duties. Neither they argued the matter nor they agreed to file their written
    submissions. This Court cannot allow anybody to hijack the proceedings of
    the court. Once it was already made clear by the Court that this matter shall
    be heard finally in the month of July 2026 then in all fairness it was
    expected from the counsel for the appellants that either they should have
    made preparation by themselves or should have engaged any counsel if
    they were of the view that they are not competent enough to argue this
    case.

    16. Under these circumstances this Court is of considered opinion that as
    one of the accepted mode for disposal of the appeal is to go through the
    record by itself and decide the matter, therefore, looking to the conduct of
    the counsel for the parties, this Court has decided to exercise this option
    which is permissible in the light of Judgment passed by the Supreme Court
    in the case of Suryabaksh (Supra).

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    12

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    17. It is also not out of place to mention here that Shri Sankalp Sharma
    and Shri B.K. Sharma, Advocates who were appearing in connected
    Criminal Appeals had provided written submissions. Accordingly this
    Court has gone through the entire record of the Court below as well as the
    written submissions provided by Shri Sankalp Sharma, and Shri B.K.
    Sharma, Counsel for other co-accused persons.

    18. It is submitted by counsel for State that the prosecution has proved
    its case beyond a reasonable doubt and does not require any interference.
    The counsel for the State submitted that it is a case of double murder. The
    accused party as well as the complainant party were on inimical terms. The
    accused party was facing a trial in which the complainant party was the
    witness. The accused party was pressurizing the complainant party to enter
    into a compromise and when they refused to do so, then the accused party
    deliberately and intentionally attacked the complainant party even by using
    the firearms resulting in death of two persons and causing injury to two
    witnesses. Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) and Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) are the injured
    witnesses. Therefore their presence on the spot is un-doubtful. It is further
    submitted that the appellants could not demolish the evidence of the
    prosecution witnesses. The oral evidence is supported by the medical
    evidence and thus it is submitted that the trial court did not commit any
    mistake by convicting the appellants. However it is fairly conceded that the
    acquittal of Rohit @ Golu is not under challenge.

    19. Heard the learned counsel for the State and perused the record as
    well as the written submissions submitted by Shri B. K. Sharma, counsel
    for co-accused Aakash, Chappa @ Harkishan and filed by Shri Sankalp

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    13
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    Sharma, Counsel for co-accused Kadori in separately decided appeal for
    guidance purposes.

    20. At the cost of repetition, it is once again clarified that these two
    appeals are being decided on the basis of evidence led by the
    prosecution and the evidence led by prosecution in earlier Sessions
    Trial No. 131/2104 in respect of other co-accused persons has not been
    taken into consideration.

    21. The first question for consideration is as to whether the death of
    Badal and Ajay is homicidal in nature or not?

    22. Dr. D. K. Ujjania (P.W.14) had medically examined the injured Ajay
    @ Ajju on 29.05.2014. On medical examination, Dr. Ujjania found 4
    injuries (in fact 5 injuries) on the body of Ajay, which are as under :

    (i) Incised wound transversally mid parietal region size 5×1/2x
    bone deep over the skull. Bleeding present Left side;

    (ii). Incised wound size 6 x ½ x bone deep over the right parietal
    region of scalp, transversely obliquely bleeding present;

    (iii). Incised wound size 4×1/2×1/2 cm left side of parietal region.

    (iv). Pain and Tenderness on the left leg.

    (v) Contusion size 5 x 3 inch over the right forearm near forearm.

    23. The MLC report of Ajay @ Ajju is Ex. P/16. According to Dr.
    Ujjania (PW14), the injuries no. 1, 2 and 3 were caused by hard and sharp
    object, whereas injury no. 5 was caused by hard and blunt object. X-ray of
    skull, x-ray of right forearm, wrist and x-ray of left leg of thigh was
    advised and the injured was referred to Medical College. This witness was
    cross-examined.

    24. In cross examination, he admitted that he had not verified from Ajay
    about the incident. He had not found any fire arm injury to Ajay. He
    denied that he had prepared the MLC, Ex. P/16 without actually examining
    the injured Ajay. Injured Shiv Kumar had no external injury.

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    14

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    25. Later on, Ajay expired on 08.06.2014 and accordingly Dr. A. K.
    Ojha, who was examined as PW5 in the earlier trial, conducted post
    mortem of the dead body of the deceased. In the post mortem report Ex.
    P/27-C, the following injuries were found :

    1. Healed wound found at occipital region 5 x 4 cm in
    measuring, conical in shape (V shape).

    2. Healed wound found on fronto parietal region of skull
    towards left side admeasuring 3×1 cm.

    On dissection of wound No. 1 fracture was found
    admeasuring 5×4 cm at the base of occipital bone and mid of
    occipital region, both fracture met at left side of occipital
    region which is conical in shape. Another fracture found at
    top of ocipital region which is measuring 3×1 cm. After
    dissection of bone, subdural hematoma was found in
    fracture of skull in both fracture area and corresponding to
    fracture side. On dissection of another bone, no fracture was
    found. The cause of death was the injury on head and coma.
    It was also opined by Dr. A. K. Ojha (PW5) that the injuries
    might be 10 to 12 days old.

    (Although Dr. Dinesh Kumar (PW21), who on the relevant date was posted
    as Medical Officer with Dr. A.K.Ojha at District Hospital, Datia and owing
    to death of Dr. A.K.Ojha had entered the witness box in his place has
    proved the post mortem report of Ajay (Ex.P/27C), but it appears that the
    entire post mortem report has not been placed by the concerning clerk in
    the record of exhibited documents and only last page of the report is placed
    at page No.72, while the remaining pages are placed in the file captioned
    “Committal Part” at Page No.40)

    26. Since, Dr. A.K. Ojha was no more, therefore, the Post mortem report
    was proved by Dr. Dinesh Kumar (P.W.21) who also identified the
    signatures of Dr. A.K. Ojha. In cross examination, Dr. Dinesh Kumar
    (P.W.21) admitted that Post mortem report was not prepared in his
    presence.

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
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    27. The next question for consideration is that whether the deceased
    Ajay @ Ajju died because of injuries sustained by him or not?

    28. In order to do complete justice, this Court would like to consider the
    arguments advanced by Shri Sankalp Sharma, Advocate in connected
    Cr.A.s, which were decided by passing separate Judgment.

    29. It was argued by Shri Sankalp Sharma, Advocate, in separately
    decide appeal that since, Ajay @ Ajju had died on account of
    complications, therefore, it cannot be said that Ajay @ Ajju died on
    account of injuries caused to him.

    30. Since, the complications were developed on account of injuries caused
    to him, therefore, it can be safely said that the appellants are liable for
    committing murder of Ajay @ Ajju. A Division Bench of this Court in the
    case of Bablu @ Virendra Kumar Vs. State of M.P. decided on 21-12-
    2017 in Cr.A. No. 427 of 2009 has held as under :

    21. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the death of
    Prembai was homicidal in nature and the cause of death was
    septicemia due to infection and gangrene of peritoneum, omentum
    and intestine coil. There is nothing on record to suggest that the
    septicemia had developed due to post operational complications.

    Thus, the septicemia had developed due to infection and gangrene
    because of injuries caused by the appellant. Thus, the cause of
    homicidal death is directly relatable to the injuries caused by the
    appellant.

    31. Thus, where the complications had developed on account on injuries
    caused to the deceased, then it cannot be said that the accused would not be
    guilty of committing murder of the deceased. In the present case, repeated
    sword blows were given on the head of deceased Ajay @ Ajju which is
    vital part of the body therefore, it is clear that assault was made with a clear

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    intention and knowledge to cause murder and the injuries were sufficient in
    the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Accordingly, it is held that the
    death of Ajay @ Ajju was homicidal in nature.

    32. So far as the death of Badal is concerned, according to the
    prosecution case, Badal had died on the spot. The post mortem of Badal
    was done by Dr. D. K. Ujjania (PW.14). Dr. D. K. Ujjania found the
    following injuries on the body of the deceased Badal:

    (i) Entrance wound size 2.5 x 2 cm situated over abdomen in
    umbilicus region in the left side .3 cm away from umbilicus,
    inferio lateral from umbilicus. Margins of the wound was inverted,
    lacerated blackening of the margin was present around the wound.

    Wound track deep directed upward and laterally connecting exit
    wound No. 1. Clotted blood was present inside the track of wound.

    (ii) The second entrance wound situated in the left pelvic area of
    abdomen 8 cm away from the umbilicus Inferio lateral situated 3
    cm in size, circular in shape margin inverted blackening was seen.
    Track direction upward and medially continued exit wound no.2.
    Clotted blood was present inside the track.

    (iii) Entrance wound situated on right side of scalp temporal
    region size 5 cm away from the right eye margin of wound is
    lacerated, inverted, blackening seen around the wound. Track deep
    direction upward and medially contained with the exit wound no.3

    (iv) First exit wound was of 4 x 4 cm situated over left side back
    of the chest at the level of 10th intercostal space. 5 cm away from
    the midline margin, everted, lacerated track deep continued with
    the entrance wound no. 1.

    (v) Second Exit wound situated over right side of back in
    lumbar region L3,L4 level just lateral to the mid line margin of
    wound everted. Lacerated size 3 into 3.5 cm continued with track
    no. 2.

    (vi) Third exit wound situated over right side of eye orbit 5 x 5 cm
    margin of the wound lacerated, everted track deep continue to the
    entrance wound no. 3. Structure like eye wall was absent.

    Signature Not Verified
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    SHRIVASTAVA
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    On internal examination plastic cap was found on wound number 1 of Exit
    Wound 2.5 cm long diameter 2 cm which was sealed and handed over to
    the police constable. According to Dr. D. K. Ujjania (P.W.14), the cause of
    death was syncope on account of firearm injury in the vital organs and the
    death of the deceased Badal was homicidal in nature. The post mortem
    report is Ex.P/17. This witness was cross examined and in cross
    examination this witness has stated that copy of FIR was not sent. The Fire
    arms were also not shown to him at the time of Post mortem. The track of
    entrance wound was from downwards to upward. The person who had
    caused injury No.3 must be on the right side of the deceased. The cloths
    were sealed by him but did not mention as to whether any gun shot holes
    were there or not.

    33. It is not out of place mention here that no accused was arrested and
    no fire arm was seized prior to post mortem of the deceased Badal. Thus,
    this Court has failed to understand the logic behind the question that fire
    arms were not shown to this witness prior or at the time of post mortem.
    Thus it is clear that this witness was not effectively cross examined with
    regard to the injuries found on the body of the deceased as well as the
    nature of death. Under these circumstances it is clear that even Badal had
    died a homicidal death.

    Whether Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) and Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) had
    sustained injuries?

    34. Dr. D.K. Ujjania (P.W.14) had medically examined Shiv Kumar
    (P.W.4) and found following injuries on his body :

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    (i) Pain @ Tenderness of the back. No swelling and redness
    seen;

    (ii) Pain @ Tenderness on right side of chest but no swelling
    and redness seen.

    All the injuries simple in nature, caused by hard @ blunt. Duration
    within 12 hours. The MLC report is Ex. P/14.

    35. Dr. D.K. Ujjania (P.W.14) had examined Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) and
    found following injuries on his body:

    (i) Contusion 4×4 cm on the left elbow joint

    (ii) Pain & Tenderness of left knee joint, but not swelling and
    redness seen;

    (i) Abrasion middle finger 2×1/4×1/4 cm with redness.

    Injuries 2 and 3 simple in nature caused by hard & blunt object.
    Duration within 12 hours. X-ray of left elbow joint was advised.
    The MLC report of Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) is Ex. P/15.

    36. Thus, it is clear that Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) and Shiv Kumar (P.W.4)
    had also sustained injuries.

    Who are the author of death of Badal and Ajay and causing injuries to
    Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) and Shiv Kumar (P.W.4)

    37. It is not out of place to mention here that initially appellant
    Raju Balmik was arrested and accordingly, his trial had begun,
    whereas the appellant Mukesh was arrested during the pendency
    of trial against Raju Balmik.

    38. Vinod Balmik (PW1), has stated that Raju who is present in the
    Court, is known to him. He has also stated that the deceased Badal,

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    and Ajay are his nephews. He further stated that on 29.05.2014 at
    about 09:00 a.m., he was returning back to his house from the market.
    He was accompanied by deceased Ajay, Badal, Pappu @ Akash and
    Anita. As soon as they reached in front of the house of Maithili, they
    found that accused Raju, Mukesh, and Chhuttan were carrying 0.315
    bore Adhiya each. Akash, Chappa @ Harkishan and Rohit @ Golu
    were carrying 12 bore gun. Sunny was carrying sword and Chunnilal
    was having lathi. The accused persons surrounded them and started
    threatening as to whether they would enter into compromise or not?
    When he refused then Chunnilal started assaulting this witness by
    means of a lathi. Raju fired a gunshot from his 0.315 Bore Adhiya
    causing injury near the eye of deceased Badal. The second gunshot
    was fired by Mukesh from his 0.315 Bore Adhiya causing gunshot
    injury in the abdominal region of Badal. Chhuttan also fired a gunshot
    from his 0.315 Bore Adhiya causing another injury in the abdominal
    region of Badal. Sunny gave 3 to 4 sword blows to Ajay which landed
    on his head. Ajay fell down on the ground. Akash, Chappa @
    Harkishan, Rohit @ Golu fired indiscriminately. Badal had died on
    the spot. This witness and Shiv Kumar somehow managed to rush to
    police station. The FIR was lodged by this witness. The FIR is Ex.
    P/1C. The spot map is Ex. P/2C. The merg intimation is Ex. P/3C.
    This witness was sent for medical examination. His statement under
    Section 164 of CrPC was recorded which is Ex. P/4C. He was also
    sent for medical examination and x-ray was also done. The cross-
    examination of this witness was deferred at the request of the Counsel
    for the appellants. This witness was cross examined on 24-1-2019.

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    SHRIVASTAVA
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    39. In cross-examination he stated that he was working in fisheries
    department and his timings of duty was 10:30 to 5:30 P.M. The spot
    map was prepared on his instructions. Certain questions were put
    regarding location of Harijan Colony and this witness specifically
    stated that Harijan Colony is situated where the incident took place.
    He further admitted that the houses of Maharaj Singh Adivasi,
    Maithili, Prakash, Babu Khan are situated near the place of occurrence
    in which they are residing along with their family. Police had shifted
    Ajay to hospital in front of him. He admitted that while recording
    merg intimation, Ex. P/3C regarding death of Badal, he did not lodge
    the merg intimation regarding death of Ajay (It is not out of place to
    mention that Ajay died on 8-6-2014, there was no question of lodging
    merg intimation regarding death of Ajay at that time). He further
    stated that he had informed the police that he was accompanied by his
    wife Anita and Aakash Balmik but could not explain as to why it was
    not mentioned in his police statement, Ex. D/2 and F.I.R. Ex. P/1 (It is
    not out of place to mention here that presence of Anita and Aakash
    Balmik is mentioned in the FIR and police statement of this witness).
    He was further confronted with omission in his police statement, FIR
    and statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. that before threatening to
    enter into compromise, Raju had also abused him in the name of his
    mother, but he could not explain as to why this fact is not mentioned
    in above mentioned statements. They reached the police station at
    about 9:20 A.M. He denied that lot of persons had gathered on the
    spot even prior to arrival of police but on his own stated that 2-4
    persons had come. He admitted that he was on inimical terms with

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    appellant Raju. He admitted that his brother Chandraprakash was
    killed in the year 2004. In that case he had made allegations against
    Raju, Pramod, Mukesh. However, he denied that the police had not
    filed charge sheet against aforesaid persons. Raju Balmik had fired
    from a distance of 2-4 fts. He stated that since, they were surrounded
    by the accused persons, therefore, neither he nor his family members
    could inform the police while the firing was going on. He denied that
    appellant Raju Balmik was not present on the spot. He also denied
    that Raju Balmik had not committed the incident. He denied that Raju
    Balmik was on his duty till 8:40 A.M. behind the P.W.D. office. He
    denied for want of knowledge that CMO had given a certificate to the
    effect that Raju Balmik was on duty.

    40. After Mukesh was arrested, the examination in chief of this
    witness was once again recorded and in the examination in chief, he
    re-iterated the same allegations. He was cross-examined and in cross-
    examination, nearly similar questions were put to this witness, which
    were already asked to this witness in cross examination by co-accused
    Raju Balmik and by other co-accused persons. It was denied that
    Mukesh was getting treatment at the time of incident and was not
    involved.

    41. Anita (PW2) is the another eyewitness. She was examined on
    22-4-2019 in respect of appellant Raju. She had identified Raju in
    Court. It was also stated by her that deceased Badal, Ajay and injured
    Shiv Kumar are also known to her. She had stated that there was an
    old enmity between them and accused. However, she was not aware of
    the fact as to whether any criminal case is pending or not. She further

    Signature Not Verified
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    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
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    stated that on 29.05.2014 at about 09:00 a.m., she was returning back
    from market along with her husband Vinod, Badal, Akash Balmik,
    Shiv Kumar, Ajju @, Ajay. She was behind her husband. As soon as
    they reached in front of the house of Maithili, they were waylaid by
    the accused persons. Raju, Chhuttan and Mukesh were having small
    guns in their hands whereas Akash and Chappa @ Harkishan were
    having longer guns. Sunny was having sword whereas Chunnilal was
    having lathi. Raju challenged her husband and insisted that in case if
    they do not enter into a compromise then they will be killed.
    Thereafter Kadori started assaulting her husband Vinod by lathi. As a
    result he sustained injury on the elbow of her left hand and knee of her
    left leg. Thereafter Raju fired a gunshot causing injury near the eye of
    Badal. Mukesh fired a gunshot causing injury on the abdominal region
    of Badal. Chhuttan also fired a gunshot causing gunshot injury in the
    abdominal region of Badal. Thereafter Sunny assaulted Ajay by sword
    causing injury on his head. Akash and Chappa @ Harkishan also fired
    towards these witnesses, Ajay had fallen down on the ground. The
    accused persons had also fired at witnesses, however, they succeeded
    in running away by saving their lives. Her husband Vinod and Shiv
    Kumar went to lodge FIR. The incident was witnessed by her
    husband Vinod, Shiv Kumar, Aakash Balmik, Badal and Ajju. Her
    statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. was recorded which is Ex. P/5.
    The police had also recorded her statement.

    42. She was cross-examined by the counsel for the appellant Raju.
    She stated that her original name is Anita whereas her nickname is
    Sunita. She admitted that she had disclosed her name to the police as

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    Sunita. The police had neither recorded her statement on the date of
    incident nor had interrogated her. She did not go to the police station
    to inform the police that she had witnessed the incident. Her
    statements were recorded after 24-25 days of the incident. She had
    disclosed to the police that she was following her husband with Vinod,
    Aakash Balmik, Shivkumar, and Ajju, but could not explain as to why
    this fact is not mentioned in her police statement (Ex.D/1). She further
    stated that Ajay is the son of her Jeth. Earlier, a fight had taken place
    between Raju Balmik, Mukesh, and the deceased Ajay alias Ajju.
    Appellant Raju Balmik was of the view that it is Vinod Balmik (PW1)
    who is not allowing the compromise to take place.

    43. On 22/10/2019, the examination-in-chief of this witness was
    once again recorded in respect of another appellant Mukesh Balmik.
    This witness had identified Mukesh Balmik as well as Raju Balmik.
    She again narrated the entire incident in her examination-in-chief for
    Mukesh Balmik. She was further cross-examined. She admitted that
    she is working as a Safai Karamchari in Municipal Council, Datia.
    She further stated that on the date of the incident, she had gone to
    vegetable market to purchase vegetables. She further stated that she
    had left her house at about 8:00-8:30 a.m. for purchasing vegetables.
    Her husband had already left the house prior to her leaving to
    purchase vegetables. She expressed her ignorance as to whether Ajay,
    Badal, and Shivkumar were on duty or not. She claimed that she met
    with the witnesses and the deceased near Bhainro Mandir at about
    8:45-9:00 a.m. All four persons were coming from the side of the
    market. The house of Shiv kumar is at a distance of 150 to 200 meters

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    SHRIVASTAVA
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    away from the house of this witness. Badal, Shiv kumar, and Ajay
    were 2-3 steps ahead of her. She further stated that her husband Vinod
    was also along with the deceased Ajay. When she noticed that the
    accused persons were standing behind the house of Maharaj Singh, at
    that time she had not noticed Maithili, Prakash, and Brindavan. The
    gunshot fired at Badal was shot from a distance of 2-4 steps. She
    further stated that the appellants had surrounded them. When Badal
    suffered a gunshot injury, then he fell behind the house of Maharaj
    Singh, whereas Ajay had fallen down in front of the house of Prakash.
    Out of fear, she had rushed towards her house. Ajay had not suffered
    any gunshot injury. Ajay was earlier treated in Gwalior; however, she
    was not in a position to disclose the name of the hospital. She
    admitted that appellant Raju was working as a Safai Daroga in the
    Municipal Council. She denied that at the time of the incident, Raju
    was busy in performing his duties. She was not in a position to
    disclose the distance of the vegetable market from her house;
    however, she claimed that it takes about 5-7 minutes to reach there.
    She had purchased only one or two vegetables from the market. When
    she started coming back from the market, she was not aware of the
    location of her husband and her nephew. Chunghar Phatak, where she
    met with her husband and nephew, is about 20-30 steps away from her
    house. She further stated that a lot of houses and shops are situated on
    the way. In between Chunghar Phatak and the place of occurrence, no
    incident had taken place. When she turned towards her house, people
    were walking on the street. She admitted that her relationships with
    the neighbors are good and they visit the houses of each other on

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    SHRIVASTAVA
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    every occasion of sorrow and happiness. She further stated that people
    are residing in the houses situated by the side of the place of
    occurrence. After the first gunshot was fired, she did not run away as
    she could not get any opportunity. She has further stated about the
    place from where Mukesh had fired the gunshot. She further stated
    that about two years back, appellant Mukesh etc. had beaten Ajay, and
    in respect of that, a criminal case was going on. She further stated that
    the wife and children of appellant Mukesh are also employees of the
    Municipal Council. She denied that she was not present on the spot at
    the time of the incident.

    44. Thus, it is clear that the appellants have failed to point out any
    circumstance which may falsify or make the evidence of Anita alias
    Sunita (PW2) doubtful.

    45. Akash Balmik (PW3) was examined and cross-examined after
    both the appellants i.e. Raju and Mukesh, were arrested. Accordingly,
    his evidence was recorded in respect of both the accused persons. This
    witness has identified Raju and Mukesh Balmik in the Court. He
    further has stated that the deceased Ajay and Badal were his brothers.
    It was stated that on 29/05/2014 at about 9:00 a.m., he was returning
    from Thandi Sadak towards his house after purchasing pulses from a
    shop. In front of the house of Maharaj Singh, the accused persons
    were standing and met with the complainant party. Raju, Mukesh, and
    Chuttan were having .315 bore Adhias, Sunny was having sword,
    Chunnilal alias Kadori was having sword, Akash and Harkishan were
    having 12 bore guns. At that time, the accused persons started abusing
    his uncle Vinod Balmik (PW-1). The accused persons scolded Vinod

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    Balmik (PW-1) whether he would enter into a compromise or not.
    Then Chunnilal alias Kadori started assaulting his uncle Vinod by
    Lathi. Raju fired a gunshot from his .315 bore Adhiya, causing an
    injury near the right eye of Badal. Mukesh fired a gunshot from his
    .315 bore Adhiya, causing an injury in the abdominal region of Badal.
    Chuttan also fired one gunshot from his .315 bore adhiya, causing an
    injury in the abdominal region of the deceased Badal. Sunny gave
    multiple sword blows on the head of the deceased Ajay. Furthermore,
    Akash Balmik assaulted Shiv kumar by the handle of the gun, as a
    result of which he sustained multiple injuries. Harkishan alias Chappa
    fired gunshots. Therefore, the witnesses ran away. The incident was
    witnessed by Vinod, Shiv kumar, and Anita as well. The blood-stained
    earth, plain earth, and one fired .315 empty cartridge were seized from
    the spot vide seizure memo (Ex.P/6C). This witness had also given a
    Safi, to police, which was tied around the wounds on the head of Ajay.
    The said Safi was seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/7C). This witness
    was cross-examined. He stated that he has been working in the
    Municipal Council for the last eight to nine years. Deceased Badal had
    worked in the Municipal Council for 13 to 14 years. He further stated
    that his father was in the service of the Municipal Council but he has
    expired. He stated that Badal had not gone to his duty on the date of
    the incident. His statement was recorded by the Police after 24-25
    days, and prior thereto, he had not disclosed the incident to anybody.
    He also stated that he had informed the police that he was returning
    from a shop situated on Thandi Sadak towards his house. He could not
    explain why this fact was not mentioned in his police statement

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    (Ex.D/5C). He further stated that for the last about 3 to 3.5 years, his
    duty has been in the Rajghat colony. On the date of the occurrence, he
    had gone to the colony, and he was all alone. He had gone to Rajghat
    colony on his Motorcycle. He was not in a position to disclose the
    name of the shop from where he had purchased pulses. He further
    stated that earlier he went to his house, and thereafter he went to the
    shop by walking. Certain omissions and contradictions in his police
    statement and statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. were pointed out.
    Vinod (PW-1) is his real uncle. He denied that Vinod is also working
    in the Municipal Council. He on his own stated that he is working in
    the Fisheries Department and he has now taken voluntary retirement.
    He further admitted that about 100 to 200 houses are situated in the
    colony. He denied that while going from Thandi Sadak towards his
    house Bhainroji temple would not fall on the way. However, he
    admitted that if he goes from Thandi Sadak to his house via Idgah
    Mohalla, then Bhainroji Mandir would not fall on the way. He further
    stated that lot of grocery shops are situated near Idgah Mohalla. He
    further admitted that pulses can be purchased from any grocery shop.
    He denied that he had not returned to his house from Thandi Sadak.
    He further stated that there is a lot of traffic on the road. He further
    admitted that he had not made any arrangement for providing
    immediate treatment to Ajay. He further stated that when the first
    gunshot was fired, he did not make any effort to save him and kept
    standing. He further admitted that during the trial of the other co-
    accused persons, his evidence was recorded, and in his evidence, he
    had stated that he ran towards the market after the first gunshot was

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    fired. However, he stated that, in fact, he had run away after the
    second and third gunshots were fired. He further stated that he had not
    taken any objection during the recording of his evidence in the trial of
    the other co-accused persons. He further stated that the fact that the
    accused persons had started abusing his uncle Vinod (PW1) was
    disclosed by him to the police, but he could not explain why that fact
    is not mentioned in his police statement (Ex.D/5C) and statement
    recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C (Ex.D/6C). He further stated
    that he had disclosed to the Police that the accused persons had
    challenged his uncle Vinod to compromise, but could not explain as
    why the said fact is not mentioned in his police statement (Ex.P/5C).
    He also could not explain why that fact is also not mentioned in his
    statement under Section 164 of the CrPC (Ex.D/6C). He denied that
    none of the accused had challenged Vinod to enter into compromise.
    (It is not out of place to mention here that in his police statement
    (Ex.D/5C), this witness had stated that his uncle Vinod was
    challenged by all the accused persons and since in his Court statement
    recorded under section 164 of Cr.P.C. (Ex.D/6C) he had stated that
    appellant Raju had challenged his uncle Vinod, therefore, the
    omission was pointed out). Gunshots were fired on Badal from the
    side of the house of Maharaj Singh, and the firing continued for two to
    three minutes. He could not disclose as to whether the persons
    residing at nearby place had witnessed the incident or not. He did not
    try to call anybody to save his brother because he could not get any
    opportunity. He further stated that since he had run away from the
    spot, therefore, he did not make any effort to take the injured person to

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    the hospital. He further stated that at the time of the occurrence, he
    was not having any mobile. (Certain omissions and contradictions in
    respect of the other two co-accused persons who were tried on an
    earlier occasion were pointed out to this witness, which are not
    relevant for the disposal of this appeal). He further stated that the
    incident in respect of which the accused party was insisting for a
    compromise had taken place in the year 2012, and Akash, Mukesh,
    and Sevak were the accused persons. The gunshots were fired from a
    distance of one and a half feet. He could not recollect that by what
    time the police had reached the spot. He returned to the place of
    occurrence after the police had already reached to the place of
    occurrence, and in the intervening period, he was hiding himself in the
    Santoshi Mata temple. He further stated that he had not disclosed to
    any bypasser that his brother has been shot. He further stated that
    since his father was having 12 bore gun, therefore, he has knowledge
    about the types of cartridges. The fired cartridge which was seized by
    the police was lying between the houses of Maithili and Maharaj
    Singh. The blood of Badal and Ajay was lying at different places. The
    blood of Ajay was lying in front of the house of Prakash, whereas the
    blood of Badal was lying between the houses of Maithili and Maharaj
    Singh. The Safi was handed over by this witness to the police after six
    to seven days after the occurrence, and during this period, the Safi was
    in his custody. He denied that Raju and Mukesh had not committed
    any offence. He further stated that he has no personal enmity with
    Raju. He further admitted that Raju had no personal enmity with the
    deceased Badal. He further stated that on the date of occurrence, eight

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    to ten persons of the members of his family, were residing in his
    house. His house is approximately at a distance of 100 to 150 steps
    from the place of occurrence. He denied that at the time of occurrence,
    the appellant Raju was deploying Safai Karamchari s to different
    places.

    46. Shiv Kumar (PW4) is the injured witness who stated that the
    appellants Raju and Mukesh are known to him. The complainant
    Vinod Balmik as well as the deceased Badal Balmik and Ajay Balmik
    are also known to him. The incident took place at about 9:00 a.m. on
    29/05/2014. At that time, he was returning to his house after
    completing his work. As soon as he reached in front of the house of
    Maithili, he met with Ajay, Badal, and Vinod. Immediately thereafter,
    the accused persons, namely appellant Raju, appellant Mukesh, co-
    accused Chuttan, Sunny, Kadori, Akash, and Chappe, arrived on the
    spot. Raju, Mukesh, and Chuttan were having Adhias, Sunny was
    having a sword, Kadori was having a Lathi, Akash and Chappe were
    having 12 bore guns and challenged Vinod as to whether they would
    enter into a compromise or not. Immediately thereafter, Kadori started
    assaulting Vinod by lathi. Raju fired a gunshot from his Adhiya,
    causing an injury near the eye of Badal. Mukesh fired a gunshot from
    his Adhiya, causing an injury in the abdominal region of Badal.
    Chuttan also fired a gunshot, causing a gunshot injury in the
    abdominal region of Badal. Sunny gave sword blow on the head of
    Ajay. Akash and Chappe fired from their 12 bore guns. He was
    assaulted by Akash by the handle of the gun. Akash and Anita had
    also reached the spot. Thereafter, he ran away in order to save his life.

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    Safina form (Ex.P/7), was prepared, which contains his signatures.
    Lash Panchnama, (Ex.P/8), was also prepared. He had identified the
    dead body of Badal in the identification memo is Ex.P/6. He was
    medically examined, and his statements were recorded by the police.

    47. This witness was also cross-examined. This Court has gone
    through the cross-examination of this witness and could not find any
    important circumstances which may demolish or make the evidence of
    Shiv Kumar (PW-4) vulnerable or doubtful. Thus, it is clear that the
    prosecution story is supported by Vinod Balmik (PW-1), who is also
    the complainant and an injured witness, Anita (PW-2), Akash (PW-3),
    and Shiv Kumar (PW-4), who is also one of the injured persons.

    48. Now, the only question for consideration is whether these
    witnesses are reliable or not?

    49. As already pointed out, this appeal was not argued by the counsel for
    the appellant in spite of repeated requests made by the Court, specifically
    when this Court in the criminal appeal of Raju had specifically pointed out
    that this matter shall be heard finally. Under these circumstances, the
    reliability and credibility of these witnesses shall be considered by this
    Court in the light of the arguments advanced by Shri Shankar Sharma and
    Shri B.K. Sharma, who had argued the connected appeal (which has been
    decided on the basis of evidence led in that case), as well as by applying
    our own mind.

    Related witnesses

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    50. Before considering the defence that all the four eye witnesses are
    related witnesses, this Court would like to consider the law governing the
    field.

    51. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahavir Singh v. State of M.P.,
    reported in (2016) 10 SCC 220 has held as under :

    18. The High Court has attached a lot of weight to the evidence
    of the said Madho Singh (PW 9) as he is an independent witness.

    On perusal of the record, it appears that the said person already
    had deposed for the victim family on a number of previous
    occasions, that too against the same accused. This being the fact,
    it is important to analyse the jurisprudence on interested witness.
    It is a settled principle that the evidence of interested witness
    needs to be scrutinised with utmost care. It can only be relied
    upon if the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible
    and trustworthy. Here we may refer to chance witness also. It is
    to be seen that although the evidence of a chance witness is
    acceptable in India, yet the chance witness has to reasonably
    explain the presence at that particular point more so when his
    deposition is being assailed as being tainted.

    19. A contradicted testimony of an interested witness cannot be
    usually treated as conclusive…….

    52. The Supreme Court in the case of Raju v. State of T.N., reported in
    (2012) 12 SCC 701 has held as under :

    21. What is the difference between a related witness and an
    interested witness? This has been brought out in State of
    Rajasthan v. Kalki
    . It was held that: (SCC p. 754, para 7)
    “7. … True, it is, she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot
    be called an ‘interested’ witness. She is related to the deceased.

    ‘Related’ is not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness may be
    called ‘interested’ only when he or she derives some benefit from
    the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing
    an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and
    is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case
    cannot be said to be ‘interested’.”

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    15. In light of the Constitution Bench decision in State of Bihar v.
    Basawan Singh
    , the view that a “natural witness” or “the only
    possible eyewitness” cannot be an interested witness may not be,
    with respect, correct. In Basawan Singh, a trap witness (who would
    be a natural eyewitness) was considered an interested witness since
    he was “concerned in the success of the trap”. The Constitution
    Bench held: (AIR p. 506, para 15)
    “15. … The correct rule is this: if any of the witnesses are
    accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual
    crime charged, their evidence must be treated as the evidence of
    accomplices is treated; if they are not accomplices but are
    partisan or interested witnesses, who are concerned in the success
    of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as other
    interested evidence is tested by the application of diverse
    considerations which must vary from case to case, and in a
    proper case, the court may even look for independent
    corroboration before convicting the accused person.”

    23. The wife of a deceased (as in Kalki), undoubtedly related to
    the victim, would be interested in seeing the accused person
    punished–in fact, she would be the most interested in seeing the
    accused person punished. It can hardly be said that she is not an
    interested witness. The view expressed in Kalki is too narrow and
    generalised and needs a rethink.

    24. For the time being, we are concerned with four categories of
    witnesses–a third party disinterested and unrelated witness
    (such as a bystander or passer-by); a third party interested
    witness (such as a trap witness); a related and therefore an
    interested witness (such as the wife of the victim) having an
    interest in seeing that the accused is punished; a related and
    therefore an interested witness (such as the wife or brother of the
    victim) having an interest in seeing the accused punished and
    also having some enmity with the accused. But, more than the
    categorisation of a witness, the issue really is one of appreciation
    of the evidence of a witness. A court should examine the
    evidence of a related and interested witness having an interest in
    seeing the accused punished and also having some enmity with
    the accused with greater care and caution than the evidence of a
    third party disinterested and unrelated witness. This is all that is
    expected and required.

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    25. In the present case, PW 5 Srinivasan is not only a related and
    interested witness, but also someone who has an enmity with the
    appellants. His evidence, therefore, needs to be scrutinised with
    great care and caution.

    26. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab this Court observed,
    without any generalisation, that a related witness would
    ordinarily speak the truth, but in the case of an enmity there may
    be a tendency to drag in an innocent person as an accused–each
    case has to be considered on its own facts. This is what this Court
    had to say: (AIR p. 366, para 26)
    “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless
    he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and
    that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity
    against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily,
    a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and
    falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run
    high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a
    tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness
    has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid
    for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from
    being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However,
    we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case
    must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made
    to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a
    general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case
    must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.”

    27. How the evidence of such a witness should be looked at was
    again considered in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab. This Court
    was of the opinion that a related or interested witness may not be
    hostile to the assailant, but if he is, then his evidence must be
    examined very carefully and all the infirmities taken into
    account. It was observed that where the witness shares the
    hostility of the victim against the assailant, it would be unlikely
    that he would not name the real assailant but would substitute the
    real assailant with the “enemy” of the victim. This is what this
    Court said: (AIR p. 331, para 6)
    “6. There can be no doubt that in a murder case when evidence is
    given by near relatives of the victim and the murder is alleged to
    have been committed by the enemy of the family, criminal courts

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    must examine the evidence of the interested witnesses, like the
    relatives of the victim, very carefully. But a person may be
    interested in the victim, being his relation or otherwise, and may
    not necessarily be hostile to the accused. In that case, the fact that
    the witness was related to the victim or was his friend, may not
    necessarily introduce any infirmity in his evidence. But where the
    witness is a close relation of the victim and is shown to share the
    victim’s hostility to his assailant, that naturally makes it
    necessary for the criminal courts to examine the evidence given
    by such witness very carefully and scrutinise all the infirmities in
    that evidence before deciding to act upon it. … [I]t may be
    relevant to remember that though the witness is hostile to the
    assailant, it is not likely that he would deliberately omit to name
    the real assailant and substitute in his place the name of the
    enemy of the family out of malice. The desire to punish the
    victim would be so powerful in his mind that he would
    unhesitatingly name the real assailant and would not think of
    substituting in his place the enemy of the family though he was
    not concerned with the assault. It is not improbable that in giving
    evidence, such a witness may name the real assailant and may
    add other persons out of malice and enmity and that is a factor
    which has to be borne in mind in appreciating the evidence of
    interested witnesses. On principle, however, it is difficult to
    accept the plea that if a witness is shown to be a relative of the
    deceased and it is also shown that he shared the hostility of the
    victim towards the assailant, his evidence can never be accepted
    unless it is corroborated on material particulars.”

    28. More recently, in Waman v. State of Maharashtra this Court
    dealt with the case of a related witness (though not a witness
    inimical to the assailant) and while referring to and relying upon
    Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, Balraje v. State of
    Maharashtra
    , Prahalad Patel v. State of M.P., Israr v. State of
    U.P.
    , S. Sudershan Reddy v. State of A.P., State of U.P. v.
    Naresh
    , Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab and Vishnu v. State of
    Rajasthan
    it was held: (Waman case, SCC p. 302, para 20)
    “20. It is clear that merely because the witnesses are related to
    the complainant or the deceased, their evidence cannot be thrown
    out. If their evidence is found to be consistent and true, the fact
    of being a relative cannot by itself discredit their evidence. In

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    other words, the relationship is not a factor to affect the
    credibility of a witness and the courts have to scrutinise their
    evidence meticulously with a little care.”

    16. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or
    interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined.
    In a case where the related and interested witness may have some
    enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised and the
    evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a
    standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of
    prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh and pithily
    reiterated in Sarwan Singh in the following words: (Sarwan Singh
    case, SCC p. 376, para 10)
    “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer
    from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of
    prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses
    should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is
    made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested
    witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon
    even without corroboration.”

    53. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Kishanpal,
    reported in (2008) 16 SCC 73 has held as under :

    17. The plea of “interested witness”, “related witness” have been
    succinctly explained by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki.
    The following conclusion in para 7 is relevant: (SCC p. 754)
    “7. As mentioned above the High Court has declined to rely on
    the evidence of PW 1 on two grounds: (1) she was a ‘highly
    interested’ witness because she ‘is the wife of the deceased’, and
    (2) there were discrepancies in her evidence. With respect, in our
    opinion, both the grounds are invalid. For, in the circumstances of
    the case, she was the only and most natural witness; she was the
    only person present in the hut with the deceased at the time of the
    occurrence, and the only person who saw the occurrence. True, it
    is, she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot be called an
    ‘interested’ witness. She is related to the deceased. ‘Related’ is
    not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness may be called
    ‘interested’ only when he or she derives some benefit from the
    result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an

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    accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is
    the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case
    cannot be said to be ‘interested’.”

    From the above it is clear that “related” is not equivalent to
    “interested”. The witness may be called “interested” only when
    he or she has derived some benefit from the result of a litigation,
    in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person
    punished. A witness, who is a natural one and is the only possible
    eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be
    “interested”.

    18. The plea of defence that it would not be safe to accept the
    evidence of the eyewitnesses who are the close relatives of the
    deceased, has not been accepted by this Court. There is no such
    universal rule as to warrant rejection of the evidence of a witness
    merely because he/she was related to or interested in the parties to
    either side. In such cases, if the presence of such a witness at the
    time of occurrence is proved or considered to be natural and the
    evidence tendered by such witness is found in the light of the
    surrounding circumstances and probabilities of the case to be
    true, it can provide a good and sound basis for conviction of the
    accused. Where it is shown that there is enmity and the witnesses
    are near relatives too, the court has a duty to scrutinise their
    evidence with great care, caution and circumspection and be very
    careful too in weighing such evidence. The testimony of related
    witnesses, if after deep scrutiny, found to be credible cannot be
    discarded.

    19. It is now well settled that the evidence of witness cannot be
    discarded merely on the ground that he is a related witness, if
    otherwise the same is found credible. The witness could be a
    relative but that does not mean his statement should be rejected.
    In such a case, it is the duty of the court to be more careful in the
    matter of scrutiny of evidence of the interested witness, and if, on
    such scrutiny it is found that the evidence on record of such
    interested witness is worth credence, the same would not be
    discarded merely on the ground that the witness is an interested
    witness. Caution is to be applied by the court while scrutinising
    the evidence of the interested witness.

    20. It is well settled that it is the quality of the evidence and not
    the quantity of the evidence which is required to be judged by the

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    court to place credence on the statement. The ground that the
    witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan
    witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. Relationship
    is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often
    than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make
    allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid
    if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to
    adopt a careful approach and analyse the evidence to find out
    whether it is cogent and credible. (Vide State of A.P. v. Veddula
    Veera Reddy
    , Ram Anup Singh v. State of Bihar, Harijana
    Narayana v. State of A.P.
    , Anil Sharma v. State of Jharkhand,
    Seeman v. State, Salim Sahab v. State of M.P., Kapildeo Mandal
    v. State of Bihar
    and D. Sailu v. State of A.P.)

    21. In Kulesh Mondal v. State of W.B. this Court considered the
    reliability of interested/related witnesses and has reiterated the
    earlier rulings and it is worthwhile to refer the same which reads
    as under: (SCC pp. 580-81, para 11)
    “11. ’10. We may also observe that the ground that the [witnesses
    being close relatives and consequently being partisan witnesses,]
    should not be relied upon, has no substance.
    This theory was
    repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh v. State of
    Punjab
    in which surprise was expressed over the impression
    which prevailed in the minds of the members of the Bar that
    relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through
    Vivian Bose, J. it was observed: (AIR p. 366, para 25)
    “25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High
    Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires
    corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based
    on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven
    men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is
    grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the
    deceased we are unable to concur.
    This is a fallacy common to
    many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court
    endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan (AIR
    at p. 59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if
    not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of
    counsel.”

    11. Again in Masalti v. State of U.P. this Court observed: (AIR
    pp. 209-10, para 14)

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    “14. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that
    evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the
    ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. …
    The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground
    that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No
    hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence
    should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in
    dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence
    should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as
    correct.”

    12. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir
    Singh
    , Lehna v. State of Haryana …. As observed by this Court
    in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki normal discrepancies in evidence
    are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal
    errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition
    such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are
    always there however honest and truthful a witness may be.
    Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not
    expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to
    which a discrepancy may be categorised.
    While normal
    discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party’s case,
    material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted
    recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar.’* “

    54. The Supreme Court in the case of Sudhakar v. State, reported in
    (2018) 5 SCC 435 has held as under :

    17. It would be appropriate to have a look at the legal position with
    regard to the evidence of related and interested witnesses. In
    Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, SCC para 10, this Court observed
    thus: (SCC p. 376, para 10)
    “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer
    from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of
    prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses
    should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is
    made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested
    witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon
    even without corroboration.”

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    It is settled law that there cannot be any hard-and-fast rule that
    the evidence of interested witnesses cannot be taken into
    consideration and they cannot be termed as witnesses. But, the
    only burden that would be cast upon the courts in those cases is
    that the courts have to be cautious while evaluating the evidence
    to exclude the possibility of false implication. Relationship can
    never be a factor to affect the credibility of the witness as it is
    always not possible to get an independent witness.

    17. Then, next comes the question “what is the difference
    between a related witness and an interested witness?”. The plea of
    “interested witness”, “related witness” has been succinctly
    explained by this Court that “related” is not equivalent to
    “interested”. The witness may be called “interested” only when
    he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation in the
    decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. In
    this case at hand PWs 1 and 5 were not only related witnesses,
    but also “interested witnesses” as they had pecuniary interest in
    getting the accused petitioner punished. [refer State of U.P. v.
    Kishanpal
    ]. As the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of
    interested witnesses, it would be prudent in the facts and
    circumstances of this case to be cautious while analysing such
    evidence. It may be noted that other than these witnesses, there
    are no independent witnesses available to support the case of the
    prosecution.

    55. The Supreme Court in the case of Sarwan Singh v. State of
    Punjab
    , reported in (2003) 1 SCC 240 has held as under :

    14. The test of creditworthiness and acceptability in our view,
    ought to be the guiding factors and if so the requirements as
    above, stand answered in the affirmative, question of raising an
    eyebrow on reliability of witness would be futile. The test is the
    credibility and acceptability of the witnesses available — if they
    are so, the prosecution should be able to prove the case with their
    assistance.

    15. Coming to the contextual facts once again, while it is true that
    there is no independent witness, but the evidence available on
    record does inspire confidence and the appellant has not been

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    able to shake the credibility of the eyewitnesses: there is not even
    any material contradiction in the case of the prosecution.

    56. Thus, it is clear that there is a distinction between “Related witness”

    and “interested witness”. However, Court should examine the evidence of
    a related and interested witness having an interest in seeing the accused
    punished and also having some enmity with the accused with greater care
    and caution. Their evidence cannot be rejected merely on the ground that
    either they are related witnesses or interested witnesses.

    57. Furthermore, it is also true that now a days, the independent
    witnesses donot come forward for multiple reasons. The Supreme Court in
    the case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., reported in (2016) 4 SCC
    357 has held as under :

    58. 29. As far as the non-examination of any other
    independent witness is concerned, there is no doubt that the
    prosecution has not been able to produce any independent
    witness. But, the prosecution case cannot be doubted on this
    ground alone. In these days, civilised people are generally
    insensitive to come forward to give any statement in respect of
    any criminal offence. Unless it is inevitable, people normally
    keep away from the court as they find it distressing and stressful.

    Though this kind of human behaviour is indeed unfortunate, but it
    is a normal phenomena. We cannot ignore this handicap of the
    investigating agency in discharging their duty. We cannot derail
    the entire case on the mere ground of absence of independent
    witness as long as the evidence of the eyewitness, though
    interested, is trustworthy.

    58. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh v. State of
    Maharashtra
    , reported in (2008) 13 SCC 271 has held as under :

    55. As regards non-examination of the independent witnesses
    who probably witnessed the occurrence on the roadside, suffice it
    to say that testimony of PW Sanjay, an eyewitness, who received

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    injuries in the occurrence, if found to be trustworthy of belief,
    cannot be discarded merely for non-examination of the
    independent witnesses. The High Court has held in its judgment
    and, in our view, rightly that the reasons given by the learned trial
    Judge for discarding and disbelieving the testimony of PWs 4, 5,
    6 and 8 were wholly unreasonable, untenable and perverse. The
    occurrence of the incident, as noticed earlier, is not in serious
    dispute. PW Prakash Deshkar has also admitted that he had
    lodged complaint to the police about the incident on the basis of
    which FIR came to be registered and this witness has supported in
    his deposition the contents of the complaint to some extent. It is
    well settled that in such cases many a times, independent
    witnesses do not come forward to depose in favour of the
    prosecution. There are many reasons that persons sometimes are
    not inclined to become witnesses in the case for a variety of
    reasons. It is well settled that merely because the witnesses
    examined by the prosecution are relatives of the victim, that fact
    by itself will not be sufficient to discard and discredit the
    evidence of the relative witnesses, if otherwise they are found to
    be truthful witnesses and rule of caution is that the evidence of
    the relative witnesses has to be reliable evidence which has to be
    accepted after deep and thorough scrutiny.

    59. Furthermore, if the eye witness is also an injured one, then his
    presence on the spot becomes un-doubtful. The Supreme Court in the case
    of Majju v. State of M.P., reported in (2001) 9 SCC 449 has held as under

    :

    5. The counsel for the appellants contended that the evidence
    adduced by the prosecution was interested and therefore, it cannot
    be relied upon. It is important to note that the witnesses examined
    on the side of the prosecution were all injured in the incident. PW
    6 Ramchandra sustained a grievous injury, in the sense that he
    lost one of his teeth. The other witnesses also sustained injuries.

    That is proved by the various medical certificates issued by the
    doctor who examined them. Therefore, the presence of these
    witnesses at the place of occurrence cannot be suspected. All
    these witnesses gave evidence to the effect that when they along

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    with deceased Bihari Lal were coming from the temple after
    performing some ceremony, the accused surrounded and attacked
    them. We do not find any infirmity in the evidence of these
    witnesses.

    60. If the evidence of Vinod Balmik (P.W.1), Anita (P.W.2), Akash
    Balmik (P.W.3) and Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) and are considered in the light of
    law laid down by Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion
    that all of them are reliable witnesses. From plain reading of the entire
    evidence, it is clear that Vinod Balmik (PW1) is an injured eye witness and
    his presence on the spot is natural because the incident took place near to
    the house of this witness. The deceased persons as well as the another
    injured Shiv Kumar (P.W.3) are related to this witness. Since this witness
    had also suffered injuries, therefore, his presence on the spot is un-
    doubtful. Furthermore, the incident took place on 29.05.2014 at about
    09:00 a.m. whereas the FIR was lodged within half an hour i.e., at 09:30
    a.m. (Ex P/1C). The incident narrated in the FIR was similar to the incident
    which was stated by this witness in the court. There is no material omission
    or improvement in the FIR and the statement of this witness recorded under
    Section 161 of CrPC. The allegations made by this witness against the
    accused persons are duly corroborated by the medical evidence because 3
    gunshot entry wounds were found on the dead body of the deceased Badal
    and similarly incised wounds were found on the head of the
    injured/deceased Ajay. Thus this Court is of considered opinion that Vinod
    Balmik (PW1) is a reliable witness. Similarly, the evidence of Anita
    (P.W.2), injured witness Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) and Akash Balmik (P.W.3)
    is reliable.

    Discrepancies in the evidence of eye witnesses

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    61. Shri Sankalp Sharma, Advocate in appeals of co-accused
    persons had tried to highlight certain contradictions/ discrepancies in the
    evidence of four eye witnesses. It is the argument of the counsel for Kadori
    that the Vinod Balmik (PW1) had stated that as soon as they reached in
    front of the house of Maithili, they were way laid and they were threatened
    to enter into a compromise otherwise they will be killed. By referring to
    the statement of Deceased Ajay @ Ajju recorded under Section 161 of
    CrPC, Ex. D/7 ( in appeals of co-accused persons), it was submitted that
    Ajay @ Ajju had stated that the incident took place near the house of
    Prakash. Thus the witnesses have miserably failed to prove the place of
    occurrence beyond reasonable doubt.

    62. Considered the aforesaid submission.

    63. The spot map is Ex. P/12C. From the spot map it is clear that the
    house of Maithili and the house of Prakash Balmik are adjoining to each
    other. The spot map was prepared by Patwari Manoj Kumar (P.W.11).
    From the spot map, it is clear that the house of Prakash Balmik is adjoining
    to the place of occurrence. No cross-examination was done with regard to
    the distance of the house of Prakash Balmik from the place of occurrence.
    Thus it is clear that the house of Maithili and House of Prakash Balmik are
    adjoining to each other. Thus even if it is presumed that there is a slight
    discrepancy in the evidence of the witnesses with regard to the place of
    occurrence, it is held that unless and until the said discrepancy is shown to
    be material going to the root of the case, the minor discrepancies cannot be
    given undue importance. Ajay @ Ajju was in an injured condition and he
    had disclosed that the incident has taken place near the house of Prakash
    According to witnesses, the blood of Ajay was lying in front of the house

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    of Prakash, whereas the blood of Badal was lying in front of house of
    Maharaj Singh. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any discrepancy in
    the evidence of witnesses with regard to place of occurrence.

    64. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Naresh, reported
    in (2011) 4 SCC 324 has held as under :

    27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due
    weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be
    doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable
    and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to
    falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured
    witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained
    injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support
    to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus,
    the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in
    law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant
    go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the
    commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured
    witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the
    rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and
    discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab,
    Balraje v. State of Maharashtra and Abdul Sayeed v. State of
    M.P
    .)

    28. The High Court disbelieved both the witnesses, Subedar (PW

    1) and Balak Ram (PW 5) as being closely related to the deceased
    and for not examining any independent witnesses. In a case like
    this, it may be difficult for the prosecution to procure an
    independent witness, wherein the accused had killed one person
    at the spot and seriously injured the other. The independent
    witness may not muster the courage to come forward and depose
    against such accused.

    29. A mere relationship cannot be a factor to affect credibility of
    a witness. The evidence of a witness cannot be discarded solely
    on the ground of his relationship with the victim of the offence.

    The plea relating to relatives’ evidence remains without any
    substance in case the evidence has credence and it can be relied
    upon. In such a case the defence has to lay foundation if plea of

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    false implication is made and the court has to analyse the
    evidence of related witnesses carefully to find out whether it is
    cogent and credible. (Vide Jarnail Singh, Vishnu v. State of
    Rajasthan and Balraje.)

    30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur
    in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of
    observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or
    due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of
    occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction,
    creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and
    other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing
    in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However,
    minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or
    improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of
    the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the
    evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its
    opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding
    as to whether his deposition inspires confidence.

    “9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it
    can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution
    version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being
    tested on the touchstone of credibility.”*
    Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness
    cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be
    elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The
    omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars
    i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of
    the prosecution’s case, render the testimony of the witness liable
    to be discredited. [Vide State v. Saravanan, Arumugam v. State,
    Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and Sunil Kumar
    Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra
    .]

    65. The Supreme Court in the case of Parbata v. State of Rajasthan,
    reported in (2005) 13 SCC 398 has held as under :

    9. The trial court has really not recorded any convincing reason
    for not accepting the testimony of PW 2 and PW 8. We have
    carefully perused their evidence. Their evidence appears to be

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    natural having a ring of truth. Much was sought to be made of
    minor discrepancies in the evidence of the two eyewitnesses,
    which have been described as glaring contradictions. Some
    variation in matters of detail is but natural, and much depends
    on the capacity of a witness to observe and remember events,
    particularly in matters of minor details. Moreover, the two
    witnesses came from two different directions, and they may
    have observed the incident at different stages, though in quick
    succession. However, such minor discrepancies do not warrant
    rejection of their evidence. Their deposition is natural and
    consistent with the case of the prosecution and we find no
    reason why they should be disbelieved.

    66. Thus this Court is of considered opinion that in fact there are no
    material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of witnesses. The
    witnesses are rustic villagers and minor contradictions are bound to take
    place.

    Whether incident took place all of a sudden

    67. As already pointed out, Mukesh, Raju Balmik and Chhuttan were
    armed with .315 bore Adhiya, whereas Kadori @ Chunnilal was armed
    with Lathi, Sunny was armed with Sword and Aakash and Chappa @
    Harkishan were armed with 12 bore guns. Admittedly there was an old
    enmity and the accused party was pressurizing the complainant party to
    enter into a compromise in a criminal case which was registered on the
    allegation of assaulting deceased Ajay. It is not the case of the appellants
    that the complainant party was the aggressor. In fact, neither any of the
    deceased i.e., Badal and Ajay were armed, nor any witness was armed with
    any weapon. No injuries were sustained by any of the accused/appellant.
    Thus, it is clear that the incident did not take place all of a sudden but it
    was pre-mediated and planned

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    Delayed recording of police statements

    68. Although the police statement of Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) was
    recorded immediately, but the police statements of Anita (P.W.2), Akash
    Balmik (P.W.3) and Shivkumar (P.W.4) were recorded belatedly, therefore,
    the question is that whether their evidence is not reliable or not?

    69. The Police Statement of Anita (P.W.2) was recorded on 23-6- 2014,
    Police Statement of Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) was recorded on 29-5-2014, the
    Police Statement of Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) was recorded on 23-6-2014 and
    Police Statement of Akash Balmik (P.W.3) was recorded on 23-6-2014.
    The incident took place on 29-5-2014. Thus, it is clear that the Police
    Statement of Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) was recorded on the date of
    occurrence, whereas the Police Statement of Anita (P.W.2), Shiv Kumar
    (P.W.4) and Akash Balmik (P.W.3) were recorded after 25 days.

    70. It is not out of place to mention here that the names of Anita
    (P.W.2), Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) and Akash Balmik (P.W.3) are mentioned as
    eye-witnesses in the FIR (Ex. P/1C). Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) was also an
    injured witness who was medically examined by Dr. D.K. Ujjania (P.W.14)
    on 29-5-2014 itself on the requisition sent by police Ex. P/14. Thus, it is
    clear that Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) was available with the police, but the
    investigating officer, did not record his Police Statement.

    71. The Supreme Court in the case of V.K. Mishra v. State of
    Uttarakhand
    , reported in (2015) 9 SCC 588 has held as under :

    25……It is pertinent to point out that on the delayed examination
    of PW 2, no question was put to the investigating officer (PW 14)
    by the defence. Had such question been put to PW 14, he would
    have certainly explained the reason for not examining PW 2 from
    15-8-1997 to 17-8-1997. Having not done so, the appellants are

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    not right in contending that there was delay in recording the
    statement of PW 2.

    26. It cannot be held as a rule of universal application that the
    testimony of a witness becomes unreliable merely because there
    is delay in examination of a particular witness. In Sunil Kumar v.

    State of Rajasthan, it was held that the question of delay in
    examining a witness during investigation is material only if it is
    indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice by the
    investigating agency for the purpose of introducing a core of
    witness to falsely support the prosecution case. As such there was
    no delay in recording the statement of PW 2 and even assuming
    that there was delay in questioning PW 2, that by itself cannot
    amount to any infirmity in the prosecution case.

    72. The Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar v. State of
    Rajasthan
    , reported in (2005) 9 SCC 283 has held as under :

    14. So far as the delayed recording of statement of the witnesses
    is concerned, here again no question was put to the investigating
    officer specifically as to why there was delay in recording the
    statement. On the contrary, the witnesses themselves have
    indicated as to why there was delay. The plea of the appellants in
    this regard, therefore, has no substance.

    73. Thus, it is clear that mere delay in recording of Police Statement will
    not make the evidence of such witness doubtful. Furthermore, as already
    point, not only the names of Anita (P.W.2), Akash Balmik (P.W.3) and
    Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) were mentioned in FIR (Ex. P/1C) as eye witnesses,
    but Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) was also medically examined on the date of
    occurrence. The Police Statement of another injured eye witness who was
    also the complainant, namely Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) was already recorded
    on 29-5-2014 i.e., the date of occurrence. Therefore, under these
    circumstances, it is held that in view of un-doubtful presence of eye
    witnesses on the spot, the delayed recording of Police Statements of Anita

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    (P.W.2), Akash Balmik (PW3) and Shiv Kumar (PW4) and will not make
    their evidence unreliable.

    Enmity

    74. It is the case of the prosecution itself, that the accused party was
    pressurizing the complainant party to enter into a compromise in a criminal
    case which was pending on the allegations of assaulting Ajay. Enmity is a
    double edged weapon. If on one hand it provides a motive for falsely
    implicating the accused, then on the other hand, it forms the basis for
    commission of offence. In the present case, the allegations are that
    Mukesh, Raju Balmik and Chhuttan fired three guns shots causing three
    gun shot injuries on the face and abdominal region of deceased Badal. The
    ocular evidence is fully corroborated by Medical Evidence. Similarly, the
    allegations are that Sunny assaulted Ajay on his head repeatedly by sword.
    The said allegation was also fully corroborated by the Medical Evidence.
    Similarly, Kadori @ Chunnilal assaulted Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) and this
    allegation is also supported by medical evidence. Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) was
    assaulted by the handles of gun by Aakash. The said allegation is also
    corroborated by the medical evidence. Furthermore, this Court has already
    found that Vinod Balmik (P.W.1), Anita (P.W.2), Akash Balmik (PW3)
    and Shiv Kumar (P.W.4) are reliable witnesses. Thus, in the present case,
    it is held that the incident was caused by the appellants only because of
    enmity between the parties.

    75. The Supreme Court in the case of Anil Rai v. State of Bihar,
    reported in (2001) 7 SCC 318 has held as under :

    18. There is no doubt that PWs 1, 2, 5 and 6 relied upon and
    believed by the trial as well as the High Court are not friendly to
    the accused persons on account of previous existing enmity

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    between them. The admitted position of law is that enmity is a
    double-edged weapon which can be a motive for the crime as also
    the ground for false implication of the accused persons. In case of
    inimical witnesses, the courts are required to scrutinise their
    testimony with anxious care to find out whether their testimony
    inspires confidence to be acceptable notwithstanding the
    existence of enmity. Where enmity is proved to be the motive for
    the commission of the crime, the accused cannot urge that despite
    proof of the motive of the crime, the witnesses proved to be
    inimical should not be relied upon. Bitter animosity, held to be a
    double-edged weapon, may be instrumental for false involvement
    or for the witnesses inferring and strongly believing that the
    crime must have been committed by the accused. Such possibility
    has to be kept in mind while evaluating the prosecution witnesses
    regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of
    the crime. Testimony of eyewitnesses, which is otherwise
    convincing and consistent, cannot be discarded simply on the
    ground that the deceased were related to the eyewitnesses or
    previously there were some disputes between the accused and the
    deceased or the witnesses. The existence of animosity between
    the accused and the witnesses may, in some cases, give rise to the
    possibility of the witnesses exaggerating the role of some of the
    accused or trying to rope in more persons as accused persons for
    the commission of the crime. Such a possibility is required to be
    ascertained on the facts of each case. However, the mere
    existence of enmity in this case, particularly when it is alleged as
    a motive for the commission of the crime, cannot be made a basis
    to discard or reject the testimony of the eyewitnesses, the
    deposition of whom is otherwise consistent and convincing.

    76. The Supreme Court in the case of Matibar Singh v. State of U.P.,
    reported in (2015) 16 SCC 168 has held as under :

    14. That brings us to the question whether there is any room for
    our interference with the conviction of Matibar Singh, appellant,
    as recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment1. We
    must, at the outset, say that the High Court’s judgment, which has
    been read out at length before us, has dealt with the evidence
    adduced at the trial as also the submissions made by the learned

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    counsel for the parties with commendable clarity. We have,
    therefore, no hesitation in affirming the reasoning and the
    conclusions arrived at by the High Court. The fact that there was
    previous enmity between the complainant’s party and the rival
    group of which the accused happen to be members or
    sympathisers is a factor that need to be taken as adverse to the
    prosecution. Enmity is a double-edged weapon. It was because of
    the said enmity that the victim was assaulted while he was on his
    way to attend the function. The existence of such enmity lends
    support to the prosecution case rather than demolish the same.

    The trial court was obviously in error in taking a contrary view
    which the High Court has rightly corrected by the impugned
    judgment. So also, the High Court was, in our opinion, perfectly
    justified in holding that the deposition of the victim and the
    eyewitnesses examined at the trial had not been shaken in cross-
    examinations to render it unsafe for the Court to rest an order of
    conviction against the accused persons.

    77. Thus, it is held that the incident was caused by appellants, only on
    account of enmity and they were not falsely implicated.

    Whether appellants were members of Unlawful Assembly and have
    committed the offence in furtherance of Common Object

    78. It is the case of the prosecution that on account of old enmity, the
    appellants with deadly weapons like firearm, sword and lathi were waiting
    for the complainant party and three appellants namely, Mukesh, Raju and
    Chhuttan caused three gun shot injuries to Badal whereas Sunny assaulted
    repeatedly Ajay on his head. Kadori @ Chunnilal assaulted Vinod Balmik
    (P.W.1) and Aakash assaulted Shiv Kumar by handle of guns. Thus, not
    only all the accused persons were present on the spot but they also actively
    participated in the incident by causing injuries to the deceased Badal and

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    Ajay but to injured witnesses Vinod Balmik (P.W.1) and Shiv Kumar
    (P.W.3).

    79. The Supreme Court in the case of Lalji v. State of U.P., reported in
    (1989) 1 SCC 437 has held as under :

    7. The precise question to be decided in this appeal, therefore, is
    whether in view of death caused to Girdhari and Siddhu by the
    unlawful assembly which is punishable under Section 302 with
    the aid of Section 149 IPC the corroboration as to participation of
    each individual member of the assembly would be necessary, and
    if so, whether in the instant case there is such corroboration.

    8. Section 149 IPC provides that if an offence is committed by
    any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the
    common object of that assembly, or such as the members of the
    assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
    object, every person, who at the time of committing of that
    offence is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that
    offence. As has been defined in Section 141 IPC, an assembly of
    five or more persons is designated an “Unlawful Assembly”, if
    the common object of the persons composing that assembly is to
    do any act or acts stated in clauses “First”, “Second”, “Third”,
    “Fourth”, and “Fifth” of that section. An assembly, as the
    Explanation to the section says, which was not unlawful when it
    assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.

    Whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an
    unlawful assembly intentionally joins that assembly, or continues
    in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly. Thus,
    whenever so many as five or more persons meet together to
    support each other, even against opposition, in carrying out the
    common object which is likely to involve violence or to produce
    in the minds of rational and firm men any reasonable
    apprehension of violence, then even though they ultimately depart
    without doing anything whatever towards carrying out their
    common object, the mere fact of their having thus met will
    constitute an offence. Of course, the alarm must not be merely
    such as would frighten any foolish or timid person, but must be
    such as would alarm persons of reasonable firmness and courage.

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    The two essentials of the section are the commission of an
    offence by any member of an unlawful assembly and that such
    offence must have been committed in prosecution of the common
    object of that assembly or must be such as the members of that
    assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Not every person is
    necessarily guilty but only those who share in the common object.
    The common object of the assembly must be one of the five
    objects mentioned in Section 141 IPC. Common object of the
    unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the
    assembly, arms used by them and the behaviour of the assembly
    at or before scene of occurrence. It is an inference to be deduced
    from the facts and circumstances of each case.

    9. Section 149 makes every member of an unlawful assembly at
    the time of committing of the offence guilty of that offence. Thus
    this section created a specific and distinct offence. In other words,
    it created a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of
    the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant
    to the common object by any other member of that assembly.
    However, the vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful
    assembly extends only to the acts done in pursuance of the
    common objects of the unlawful assembly, or to such offences as
    the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be
    committed in prosecution of that object. Once the case of a
    person falls within the ingredients of the section the question that
    he did nothing with his own hands would be immaterial. He
    cannot put forward the defence that he did not with his own hand
    commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common
    object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of the
    assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
    object. Everyone must be taken to have intended the probable and
    natural results of the combination of the acts in which he joined.
    It is not necessary that all the persons forming an unlawful
    assembly must do some overt act. When the accused persons
    assembled together, armed with lathis, and were parties to the
    assault on the complainant party, the prosecution is not obliged to
    prove which specific overt act was done by which of the accused.
    This section makes a member of the unlawful assembly
    responsible as a principal for the acts of each, and all, merely
    because he is a member of an unlawful assembly. While overt act

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    and active participation may indicate common intention of the
    person perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful
    assembly may fasten vicariously criminal liability under Section

    149. It must be noted that the basis of the constructive guilt under
    Section 149 is mere membership of the unlawful assembly, with
    the requisite common object or knowledge.

    10. Thus, once the court holds that certain accused persons
    formed an unlawful assembly and an offence is committed by any
    member of that assembly in prosecution of the common object of
    that assembly, or such as the members of the assembly knew to
    be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every
    person who at the time of committing of that offence was a
    member of the same assembly is to be held guilty of that offence.
    After such a finding it would not be open to the court to see as to
    who actually did the offensive act or require the prosecution to
    prove which of the members did which of the offensive acts. The
    prosecution would have no obligation to prove it.

    80. The Supreme Court in the case of Manjit Singh v. State of
    Punjab
    , reported in (2019) 8 SCC 529 has held as under :

    14.3. We may also take note of the principles enunciated and
    explained by this Court as regards the ingredients of an unlawful
    assembly and the vicarious/constructive liability of every member
    of such an assembly. In Sikandar Singh, this Court observed as
    under : (SCC pp. 483-85, paras 15 & 17-18)
    “15. The provision has essentially two ingredients viz. (i) the
    commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful
    assembly, and (ii) such offence must be committed in prosecution
    of the common object of the assembly or must be such as the
    members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
    prosecution of the common object. Once it is established that the
    unlawful assembly had common object, it is not necessary that all
    persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have
    committed some overt act. For the purpose of incurring the
    vicarious liability for the offence committed by a member of such
    unlawful assembly under the provision, the liability of other
    members of the unlawful assembly for the offence committed
    during the continuance of the occurrence, rests upon the fact

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    whether the other members knew beforehand that the offence
    actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of
    the common object.

    17. A “common object” does not require a prior concert and a
    common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each
    member of the unlawful assembly has the same object in view
    and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly
    to achieve that object. The “common object” of an assembly is to
    be ascertained from the acts and language of the members
    composing it, and from a consideration of all the surrounding
    circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct
    adopted by the members of the assembly. For determination of
    the common object of the unlawful assembly, the conduct of each
    of the members of the unlawful assembly, before and at the time
    of attack and thereafter, the motive for the crime, are some of the
    relevant considerations. What the common object of the unlawful
    assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a
    question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of
    the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour
    of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not
    necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with
    an unlawful common object, the same must be translated into
    action or be successful.

    18. In Masalti v. State of U.P. a Constitution Bench of this Court
    had observed that : (AIR p. 211, para 17)
    ’17. … Section 149 makes it clear that if an offence is committed
    by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the
    common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that
    assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
    object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that
    offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that
    offence; and that emphatically brings out the principle that the
    punishment prescribed by Section 149 is in a sense vicarious and
    does not always proceed on the basis that the offence has been
    actually committed by every member of the unlawful assembly.'”

    14.4. In Subal Ghorai, this Court, after a survey of leading cases,
    summed up the principles as follows : (SCC pp. 632-33, paras 52-

    53)

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    “52. The above judgments outline the scope of Section 149 IPC.

    We need to sum up the principles so as to examine the present
    case in their light. Section 141 IPC defines “unlawful assembly”

    to be an assembly of five or more persons. They must have
    common object to commit an offence. Section 142 IPC postulates
    that whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an
    unlawful one intentionally joins the same would be a member
    thereof. Section 143 IPC provides for punishment for being a
    member of unlawful assembly. Section 149 IPC provides for
    constructive liability of every person of an unlawful assembly if
    an offence is committed by any member thereof in prosecution of
    the common object of that assembly or such of the members of
    that assembly who knew to be likely to be committed in
    prosecution of that object. The most important ingredient of
    unlawful assembly is common object. Common object of the
    persons composing that assembly is to do any act or acts stated in
    clauses “First”, “Second”, “Third”, “Fourth” and “Fifth” of that
    section. Common object can be formed on the spur of the
    moment. Course of conduct adopted by the members of common
    assembly is a relevant factor. At what point of time common
    object of unlawful assembly was formed would depend upon the
    facts and circumstances of each case. Once the case of the person
    falls within the ingredients of Section 149 IPC, the question that
    he did nothing with his own hands would be immaterial. If an
    offence is committed by a member of the unlawful assembly in
    prosecution of the common object, any member of the unlawful
    assembly who was present at the time of commission of offence
    and who shared the common object of that assembly would be
    liable for the commission of that offence even if no overt act was
    committed by him. If a large crowd of persons armed with
    weapons assaults intended victims, all may not take part in the
    actual assault. If weapons carried by some members were not
    used, that would not absolve them of liability for the offence with
    the aid of Section 149 IPC if they shared common object of the
    unlawful assembly.

    53. But this concept of constructive liability must not be so
    stretched as to lead to false implication of innocent bystanders.
    Quite often, people gather at the scene of offence out of curiosity.
    They do not share common object of the unlawful assembly. If a

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    general allegation is made against large number of people, the
    court has to be cautious. It must guard against the possibility of
    convicting mere passive onlookers who did not share the common
    object of the unlawful assembly. Unless reasonable direct or
    indirect circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution case that
    they shared common object of the unlawful assembly, they
    cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC. It must be
    proved in each case that the person concerned was not only a
    member of the unlawful assembly at some stage, but at all the
    crucial stages and shared the common object of the assembly at
    all stages. The court must have before it some materials to form
    an opinion that the accused shared common object. What the
    common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage
    has to be determined keeping in view the course of conduct of the
    members of the unlawful assembly before and at the time of
    attack, their behaviour at or near the scene of offence, the motive
    for the crime, the arms carried by them and such other relevant
    considerations. The criminal court has to conduct this difficult
    and meticulous exercise of assessing evidence to avoid roping
    innocent people in the crime. These principles laid down by this
    Court do not dilute the concept of constructive liability. They
    embody a rule of caution.”

    14.5. We need not expand on the other cited decisions because
    the basic principles remain that the important ingredients of an
    unlawful assembly are the number of persons forming it i.e. five;
    and their common object. Common object of the persons
    composing that assembly could be formed on the spur of the
    moment and does not require prior deliberations. The course of
    conduct adopted by the members of such assembly; their
    behaviour before, during, and after the incident; and the arms
    carried by them are a few basic and relevant factors to determine
    the common object.

    81. Thus, it is held that the appellants were the member of Unlawful
    Assembly and they were sharing common object.

    Promptness in lodging of FIR

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    82. The Supreme Court in the case of Krishnan v. State, reported in
    (2003) 7 SCC 56 has held as under :

    17. The fact that the first information report was given almost
    immediately, rules out any possibility of deliberation to falsely
    implicate any person. All the material particulars implicating the
    four appellants were given.

    83. The Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh v. State of
    Haryana
    , reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 91 has held as under :

    10. Apart from that if the evidence adduced on behalf of the
    prosecution is accepted then whether there was immediate motive
    for committing the offence loses all significance. The present
    case has many special features which weigh heavily against the
    accused persons and it is not easy on their part to dislodge them.
    The occurrence took place before noon. The FIR was lodged at
    12.30 p.m. within an hour. A copy of the FIR was received by the
    concerned Magistrate by 2.15 p.m., the same day. The
    Investigating Officer reached the place of occurrence before 4
    p.m. Even the post-mortem examinations of the two victims were
    held by two doctors mentioned above by 5.30 p.m. the same day.

    In cases relating to murder the time taken in lodging the FIR
    assumes special significance. The FIR being the first version of
    the occurrence disclosed to the police acts as check on the part of
    the prosecution. The fact that Surjit Kaur (PW 4) lodged the FIR
    within an hour of the occurrence, giving the details of the manner
    of occurrence lends corroboration to her testimony in court
    regarding the participation of the accused persons in the present
    occurrence. The manner of occurrence disclosed by Surjit Kaur
    (PW 4) in the FIR was fully corroborated by the post-mortem
    examination reports. She stated in the FIR at 12.30 p.m. that
    accused persons after having assaulted the two victims with
    gandasa and lathis, crushed them with the wheel of the truck. The
    two doctors during post-mortem examinations found that injury
    No. 7 on the chest of Gurbux Singh and injury No. 11 on Wasava
    Singh could have been caused by the wheel of the truck passing
    over the chest of Gurbux Singh and any blunt part of the truck
    striking against the body of Wasava Singh. This not only

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    corroborates the version disclosed by Surjit Kaur (PW 4) in the
    FIR but goes a long way to establish the correctness thereof. If
    Surjit Kaur (PW 4) had not witnessed the occurrence as suggested
    by accused persons then how could she have mentioned in the
    FIR that after assaulting the two victims the accused persons
    entered into the truck and crushed the victims with the wheel of
    the truck, which is supported by the post-mortem examination.

    84. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Harban Sahai,
    reported in (1998) 6 SCC 50 has held as under :

    13…….In such a situation the prompt and early reporting of the
    occurrence by PW 1 to the police with all its vivid details gives us
    an assurance regarding truth of his version.

    85. Since, the FIR was lodged within 30 minutes, therefore, the
    promptness in lodging of FIR also lends credibility to the prosecution case.
    Dying Declaration of Ajay

    86. Vinit Goyal (PW13) is the Naib Tahsildar who had recorded the
    dying declaration of Ajay @Ajju. He has stated that on 29.05.2014 he was
    posted on the post of Naib Tahsildar. Before recording the dying
    declaration he had taken the certificate of fitness of the patient. Then this
    witness has reiterated the contents of the dying declaration. The dying
    declaration is Ex. P/13C. In cross-examination, this witness has stated that
    the identity of Ajay was disclosed by Doctor. In the dying declaration, it is
    specifically narrated by Ajay @ Ajju that Sunny had caused injuries by
    sword. The Trial Court has rightly held that the Dying declaration is
    reliable and minor contradictions are not material.

    87. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh v. State of Haryana,
    reported in (2017) 1 SCC 529 has held as under :

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    31. Law on the admissibility of the dying declarations is well
    settled. In Jai Karan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court explained
    that a dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle
    of necessity and can form the basis of conviction if it is found to
    be reliable. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole
    basis for conviction without the need for independent
    corroboration it must be shown that the person making it had the
    opportunity of identifying the person implicated and is
    thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and
    circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the
    statement was in a fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the
    statement on the basis of personal knowledge without being
    influenced by others and the court on strict scrutiny finds it to be
    reliable, there is no rule of law or even of prudence that such a
    reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon unless it is
    corroborated. A dying declaration is an independent piece of
    evidence like any other piece of evidence, neither extra strong or
    weak, and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found
    to be otherwise true and reliable. There is no hard-and-fast rule of
    universal application as to whether percentage of burns suffered
    is determinative factor to affect credibility of dying declaration
    and improbability of its recording. Much depends upon the nature
    of the burn, part of the body affected by the burn, impact of the
    burn on the faculties to think and convey the idea or facts coming
    to mind and other relevant factors. Percentage of burns alone
    would not determine the probability or otherwise of making dying
    declaration.
    Physical state or injuries on the declarant do not by
    themselves become determinative of mental fitness of the
    declarant to make the statement (see Rambai v. State of
    Chhattisgarh
    ).

    32. It is immaterial to whom the declaration is made. The
    declaration may be made to a Magistrate, to a police officer, a
    public servant or a private person. It may be made before the
    doctor; indeed, he would be the best person to opine about the
    fitness of the dying man to make the statement, and to record the
    statement, where he found that life was fast ebbing out of the
    dying man and there was no time to call the police or the
    Magistrate. In such a situation the doctor would be justified,
    rather duty-bound, to record the dying declaration of the dying

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    man. At the same time, it also needs to be emphasised that in the
    instant case, dying declaration is recorded by a competent
    Magistrate who was having no animus with the accused persons.

    As held in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, this kind of dying
    declaration would stand on a much higher footing.
    After all, a
    competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person
    named in the dying declaration of the victim and in the absence of
    circumstances showing anything to the contrary, he should not be
    disbelieved by the court (see Vikas v. State of Maharashtra).

    Absconsion

    88. The incident took place on 29/05/2014. The appellants Raju and
    Mukesh were employees, however, they absconded after the incident. The
    appellant Raju Balmik was arrested on 27/11/2017 and Mukesh was
    arrested on 18/12/2018 vide arrest memos Ex.P/18 and Ex.P/20
    respectively. Thus, it is clear that immediately after the incident, both the
    accused persons had absconded and could only be arrested after more than
    three years and four years respectively.

    89. The next question for consideration is as to whether the absconsion
    of the accused after the incident is indicative of their guilty mind or not ?

    90. Section 8 of the Evidence reads as under:-

    Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct.
    Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or
    preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.
    The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit
    or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in
    reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the
    conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of
    any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is
    influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it
    was previous or subsequent thereto.

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    Explanation 1. – The word “conduct” in this section does not
    include statements, unless those statements accompany and
    explain acts other than statements, but this explanation is not to
    affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this
    Act.

    Explanation 2. – When the conduct of any person is relevant, any
    statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which
    affects such conduct, is relevant.”

    91. Therefore, the post-incident conduct of the accused is a relevant
    factor. However, mere absconsion by itself is not indicative of a guilty
    mind. Sometimes, under an apprehension of false implication, a person
    may abscond. However, in the present case, the names of the appellants
    were specifically mentioned in the FIR along with the roles played by
    them. The deceased Badal had suffered three gunshot injuries with three
    different exit wounds. The first gunshot was fired by Raju
    Balmik/Appellant, causing an injury near the right eye of deceased Badal.
    The said allegation is supported by medical evidence. Similarly,
    Mukesh/Appellant had fired a gunshot causing an injury on the abdominal
    region of the deceased Badal, which is also supported by medical evidence.
    The FIR was lodged within half an hour, and as already pointed out by this
    Court, the promptness of the FIR rules out the possibility of over-
    implication. The incident started at about 9:00 a.m. and continued for three
    to four minutes. Thereafter, the complainant, who himself was assaulted
    and was a witness to the brutal murder of Badal and the brutal assault on
    the head of Ajay, would have taken a few minutes to settle himself down
    and rush to the Police Station, Kotwali. From the FIR, it is clear that the
    police station is situated at a distance of 1 kilometer. The complainant
    Vinod Balmik (PW-1) and Shiv Kumar (PW-4) went to the police station

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    by running. Therefore, if they took about 10 to 15 minutes to reach the
    police station, it cannot be said that while running they were thinking to
    over-implicate innocent persons. The FIR was recorded at 9:30 a.m. Under
    these circumstances, it is clear that the complainant had no time at all to
    rethink about the incident and make a plan to falsely implicate any other
    person. Under these circumstances, the absconsion of the appellant Raju
    Balmik for more than three years and Mukesh Balmik for more than four
    years is also an additional circumstance against them, which has not been
    explained by the appellant Raju and Mukesh.

    Recoveries

    92. Mohit Verma (PW-6) stated that on 31/01/2018, the memorandum of
    Raju Balmik was recorded as Ex.P/8.

    93. Devendra Singh (PW7) has stated that Raju Balmik was arrested on
    27/11/2017 vide arrest memo (Ex.P/9), and one country-made pistol and
    two live cartridges were seized from his possession vide seizure memo
    (Ex.P/10).

    94. Jagdish Prasad Sen (PW8) has stated that on 31/01/2018, the
    memorandum of Raju Balmik was recorded, who had voluntarily stated
    that he had already handed over the country-made pistol to the police on
    27/11/2017. The memorandum is Ex.P/8. From the arrest memo of Raju
    Balmik (Ex.P/9), it is clear that he was arrested on 27/11/2017 at 10:50
    a.m. From the seizure memo (Ex.P/10), it is clear that one .315 bore
    country-made Katta with two live cartridges was seized from his
    possession on 27/11/2017 at 10:30 a.m., which is just 20 minutes prior to
    his formal arrest. It is clear that at the time of arrest, one .315 bore Katta
    and two live cartridges were seized from the possession of the appellant

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    Raju Balmik. Therefore, merely because the memorandum (Ex.P/8) was
    recorded on 31/01/2018, in which appellant Raju Balmik had stated that the
    weapon has already been seized by the police on 27/11/2017, merely shows
    that no other weapon was seized on a disclosure made by the appellant
    Raju but, the .315 bore katta and two live cartridges were seized from the
    physical possession of the appellant himself at the time of his arrest. Thus,
    it is clear that one .315 bore Katta and two live cartridges were seized from
    the possession of the appellant on 27/11/2017 at the time of his arrest.

    95. Ram Singh (PW12) is also a witness to the memorandum of Raju
    Balmik (Ex.P/8).

    96. Rajpal Singh (PW15), who was the independent witness of arrest of
    Raju Balmik (Ex.P/18) and the seizure (Ex.P/19), turned hostile but
    admitted that both documents contain his signatures.

    97. Dilip Singh (PW-16) is a witness of arrest of Mukesh Balmik. He
    turned hostile, but in his examination-in-chief, he admitted his signatures
    on the arrest memo of Mukesh Balmik (Ex.P/20). He also turned hostile in
    respect of the memorandum and the seizure from Mukesh Balmik.

    98. Sher Singh (PW-20) is the Investigating Officer who had arrested
    Mukesh Balmik vide arrest memo (Ex.P/20). The memorandum of Mukesh
    Balmik is Ex.P/21, and on the disclosure made by Mukesh Balmik, one
    .315 bore Adhiya and one live cartridge of .315 bore were seized from the
    house of Mukesh Balmik vide seizure memo Ex.P/22. The .315 bore
    Adhiya seized from the possession of Mukesh Balmik was identified by
    this witness as Article A1, and the cartridge as Article A3, while the chit
    affixed on the sealed packet containing both articles is Article A2. This

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    witness also stated that he has taken permission from the District
    Magistrate for prosecution of the appellant.

    99. Thus, it is clear that one .315 bore Aadhiya/country-made pistol with
    two live cartridges were seized from the possession of appellant Raju on
    27/11/2017 i.e. while he was taken in custody by the police, whereas one
    .315 bore Adhiya and one cartridge were seized on a disclosure made by
    appellant Mukesh. It is true that the independent witness to the
    memorandum and seizure of the weapon and cartridge from Mukesh has
    turned hostile, but it is a well-established principle of law that the seizure
    can be proved by official police witnesses. Merely because a witness is a
    police personnel cannot be a good ground to discard his evidence.

    100. The Supreme Court in the case of State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v.
    Sunil
    , reported in (2001) 1 SCC 652 has held as under :

    20. Hence it is a fallacious impression that when recovery is
    effected pursuant to any statement made by the accused the
    document prepared by the investigating officer contemporaneous
    with such recovery must necessarily be attested by the
    independent witnesses. Of course, if any such statement leads to
    recovery of any article it is open to the investigating officer to take
    the signature of any person present at that time, on the document
    prepared for such recovery. But if no witness was present or if no
    person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is
    difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so
    prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the
    recovery evidence unreliable. The court has to consider the
    evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of
    recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its
    own worth.

    21. We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police
    officer should be approached with initial distrust. We are aware
    that such a notion was lavishly entertained during the British
    period and policemen also knew about it. Its hangover persisted
    during post-independent years but it is time now to start placing at

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    least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the
    police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that
    the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law the
    presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of
    the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of
    presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a
    police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article was
    recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the
    accused it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if
    it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused,
    through cross-examination of witnesses or through any other
    materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either
    unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If
    the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such
    records of the police the court could certainly take into account the
    fact that no other independent person was present at the time of
    recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume
    the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such
    action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures
    of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous
    with such actions.

    101. The Supreme Court in the case of Praveen Kumar Vs. State of
    Karnataka
    reported in (2003) 12 SCC 199 has held as under :

    21. Section 27 does not lay down that the statement made to
    a police officer should always be in the presence of independent
    witnesses. Normally, in cases where the evidence led by the
    prosecution as to a fact depends solely on the police witnesses,
    the courts seek corroboration as a matter of caution and not as a
    matter of rule. Thus, it is only a rule of prudence which makes
    the court to seek corroboration from an independent source, in
    such cases while assessing the evidence of the police. But in
    cases where the court is satisfied that the evidence of the police
    can be independently relied upon then in such cases there is no
    prohibition in law that the same cannot be accepted without
    independent corroboration

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    102. The Supreme Court in the case of Yakub Abdul RazakMemon v.
    State of Maharashtra
    , reported in (2013) 13 SCC 1 has held as under :

    1737. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
    the appellant has submitted that two panch witnesses were there,
    whereas one has been examined i.e. Suresh Satam (PW 37). His
    evidence cannot be relied upon for the reason that he was the
    brother of a Police Constable and thus, cannot be termed as an
    independent witness. Factually, it is true that the panch witness
    Suresh Satam (PW 37) himself has admitted that his brother was
    an employee of the Police Department of Maharashtra. Further,
    merely having such a relationship does not make him disqualified
    to be a panch witness, nor his evidence required to be ignored. In
    Kalpnath Rai, this Court has held that the evidence of police
    officials can be held to be worthy of acceptance even if no
    independent witness has been examined. In such a fact situation, a
    duty is cast on the court to adopt greater care while scrutinising the
    evidence of the police official. If the evidence of the police official
    is found acceptable it would be an erroneous proposition that the
    court must reject the prosecution version solely on the ground that
    no independent witness was examined. (See also Paras Ram v.
    State of Haryana
    , Pradeep Narayan Madgaonkar v. State of
    Maharashtra
    , Sama Alana Abdulla v. State of Gujarat, Anil v.
    State of Maharashtra
    , Tahir v. State (Delhi), and Balbir Singh v.
    State
    .)

    103. Thus, it is held that the prosecution has successfully proved that one
    .315 bore Adhiya and two live cartridges were seized from the possession
    of appellant Raju, and one .315 bore Adhiya and one cartridge were seized
    from the possession of appellant Mukesh.

    104. Khuman Singh (PW-19) is the Armorer who examined the weapon
    which was seized from the possession of appellant Mukesh. He stated that
    one sealed packet was received by him containing the seal of the SHO,
    Police Station Kotwali. On opening the packet, he found one .315 bore
    Adhiya and one cartridge of .315 bore. The Adhiya was in firing condition,

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    which could have been used for causing injury. The .315 bore cartridge was
    a live cartridge. The ballistic report is Ex.P/26. The Adhiya and cartridge
    were resealed and handed over to Constable No. 126 Mohit Verma along
    with the report.

    105. Since the Adhiya was seized after more than four years of the
    incident, therefore it cannot be said that the weapon which was seized from
    the possession of appellant Mukesh as well as appellant Raju Balmik were
    the same weapons which were used for committing the offence.
    Now, the question for consideration is that if the prosecution has failed to
    prove the recovery of the weapon of offence, then whether it would be fatal
    to the prosecution case or not?

    106. This case is based on eyewitness account of four persons, out of
    whom two are injured witnesses. The appellants Raju Balmik and Mukesh
    absconded immediately after the incident, and the weapons were seized
    after more than three and four years respectively. Even otherwise, if the
    prosecution has failed to prove the recovery of weapon of offence, it would
    not be fatal to the prosecution case, specifically when it is supported by
    eyewitness accounts. The Supreme Court in the case of Gulab v. State of
    U.P.
    , reported in (2022) 12 SCC 677 has held as under:-

    20. The deceased had sustained a gunshot injury with a point of
    entry and exit. The non-recovery of the weapon of offences would
    therefore not discredit the case of the prosecution which has relied
    on the eyewitness accounts of PWs 1, 2 and 3. In Sukhwant Singh
    v. State of Punjab [Sukhwant Singh
    v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3
    SCC 367 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 524] , Dr A.S. Anand, J. (as the learned
    Chief Justice then was) speaking for a two-Judge Bench held :

    (SCC p. 377, para 21)
    “21. There is yet another infirmity in this case. We find that
    whereas an empty [sic] had been recovered by PW 6, ASI
    Raghubir Singh from the spot and a pistol along with some

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    cartridges were seized from the possession of the appellant at the
    time of his arrest, yet the prosecution, for reasons best known to it,
    did not send the recovered empty [sic] and the seized pistol to the
    ballistic expert for examination and expert opinion. Comparison
    could have provided link evidence between the crime and the
    accused. This again is an omission on the part of the prosecution
    for which no explanation has been furnished either in the trial
    court or before us. It hardly needs to be emphasised that in cases
    where injuries are caused by firearms, the opinion of the ballistic
    expert is of a considerable importance where both the firearm and
    the crime cartridge are recovered during the investigation to
    connect an accused with the crime. Failure to produce the expert
    opinion before the trial court in such cases affects the
    creditworthiness of the prosecution case to a great extent.”

    (emphasis supplied)
    The above extract which has been relied upon by the learned
    counsel for the appellant emphasises that in a case where injury
    has been caused by a firearm, the opinion of the ballistic expert is
    of considerable importance where both the firearm and the crime
    cartridge had been recovered during the investigation. Failure to
    produce the expert opinion in such a case affects the
    creditworthiness of the prosecution case.

    21. However, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gurucharan
    Singh v. State of Punjab [Gurucharan Singh
    v. State of Punjab,
    (1963) 3 SCR 585 : AIR 1963 SC 340] , has analysed the
    precedents of this Court and held that examination of a ballistic
    expert is not an inflexible rule in every case involving use of a
    lethal weapon. Speaking through P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. (as the
    learned Chief Justice then was), this Court held : (AIR pp. 346-47,
    para 19)
    “19.
    It has, however, been argued that in every case where an
    accused person is charged with having committed the offence of
    murder by a lethal weapon, it is the duty of the prosecution to
    prove by expert evidence that it was likely or at least possible for
    the injuries to have been caused with the weapon with which, and
    in the manner in which, they have been alleged to have been
    caused; and in support of this proposition, reliance has been placed
    on the decision of this Court in Mohinder Singh v. State
    [Mohinder Singh
    v. State, 1950 SCC 673] . In that case, this Court

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    has held that where the prosecution case was that the accused shot
    the deceased with a gun, but it appeared likely that the injuries on
    the deceased were inflicted by a rifle and there was no evidence of
    a duly qualified expert to prove that the injuries were caused by a
    gun, and the nature of the injuries was also such that the shots
    must have been fired by more than one person and not by one
    person only, and there was no evidence to show that another
    person also shot, and the oral evidence was such which was not
    disinterested, the failure to examine an expert would be a serious
    infirmity in the prosecution case. It would be noticed that these
    observations were made in a case where the prosecution evidence
    suffered from serious infirmities and in determining the effect of
    these observations, it would not be fair or reasonable to forget the
    facts in respect of which they came to be made. These
    observations do not purport to lay down an inflexible rule that in
    every case where an accused person is charged with murder
    caused by a lethal weapon, the prosecution case can succeed in
    proving the charge only if an expert is examined. It is possible to
    imagine cases where the direct evidence is of such an
    unimpeachable character and the nature of the injuries disclosed
    by post-mortem notes is so clearly consistent with the direct
    evidence that the examination of a ballistic expert may not be
    regarded as essential. Where the direct evidence is not satisfactory
    or disinterested or where the injuries are alleged to have been
    caused with a gun and they prima facie appear to have been
    inflicted by a rifle, undoubtedly the apparent inconsistency can be
    cured or the oral evidence can be corroborated by leading the
    evidence of a ballistic expert. In what cases the examination of a
    ballistic expert is essential for the proof of the prosecution case,
    must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case.
    Therefore, we do not think that Mr Purushottam is right in
    contending as a general proposition that in every case where a
    firearm is alleged to have been used by an accused person, in
    addition to the direct evidence, prosecution must lead the evidence
    of a ballistic expert, however good the direct evidence may be and
    though on the record there may be no reason to doubt the said
    direct evidence.”

    (emphasis supplied)

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    22. Similarly, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab
    v. Jugraj Singh [State of Punjab
    v. Jugraj Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 234
    : 2002 SCC (Cri) 630] had noticed that surrounding circumstances
    in the prosecution case are sufficient to prove a death caused by a
    lethal weapon, without a ballistic examination of the recovered
    weapon. The Court, speaking through R.P. Sethi, J., had noted :

    (SCC pp. 243-44, para 18)
    “18. In the instant case the investigating officer has categorically
    stated that guns seized were not in a working condition and he, in
    his discretion, found that no purpose would be served by sending
    the same to the ballistic expert for his opinion. No further question
    was put to the investigating officer in cross-examination to find
    out whether despite the guns being defective the fire pin was in
    order or not. In the presence of convincing evidence of two
    eyewitnesses and other attending circumstances we do not find
    that the non-examination of the expert in this case has, in any way,
    affected the creditworthiness of the version put forth by the
    eyewitnesses.”

    23. The present case is not one where despite the recovery of a
    firearm, or of the cartridge, the prosecution had failed to produce a
    report of the ballistic expert. Therefore, the failure to produce a
    report by a ballistic expert who can testify to the fatal injuries
    being caused by a particular weapon is not sufficient to impeach
    the credible evidence of the direct eyewitnesses.

    107. The Supreme Court in the case of Amit v. State of U.P. reported in
    (2012) 4 SCC 107, has held as under:-.

    “17. The report of the forensic science laboratory (Ext. A-23)
    confirms human blood and human sperm on the underwear of
    Monika. Thus, even if the object with which Monika was hit has
    not been identified and recovered, the evidence of PW 3, the
    recovery of various articles made pursuant to the confession of
    the appellant, the evidence of PW 5 and the report of the forensic
    science laboratory, Ext. A-23 prove beyond all reasonable doubt
    that it is the appellant alone who after having kidnapped Monika
    committed unnatural offence as well as rape on her and killed her
    and thereafter caused disappearance of the evidence of the
    offences. The High Court has, therefore, rightly confirmed the

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    conviction of the appellant under Sections 364, 376, 377, 302 and
    201 IPC.”

    108. Under these circumstances, even if this Court holds that the
    prosecution has failed to prove the recovery of weapons of offence, still it
    will not have any adverse effect on the prosecution case, specifically when
    the accused persons were absconding and were arrested after more than 3
    years and 4 years of the date of the offence.

    109. Ajay Koli (PW-9) is the Arms clerk posted in the office of the
    District Magistrate, Datia. He has proved the sanction for prosecution,
    (Ex.P/11).

    110. Ghanshyam Singh Tomar (PW-10) is the scribe of the FIR, who has
    recorded the FIR on the information given by Vinod Balmik in Crime No.
    196 of 2014 for offences under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, 149, 294, and
    323 of the IPC (Ex.P/1C).

    111. Manoj Kumar Shrivastava (PW-11) is the Patwari, who prepared the
    spot map on 24/08/2014 (Ex.P/12C).

    112. Ram Singh (PW-12) is the witness who had arrested the appellant
    Raju Balmik vide arrest memo (Ex.P/7) and had recorded the memorandum
    (Ex.P/8).

    Defence of the Appellant Mukesh Balmik

    113. The appellant Mukesh Balmik had examined Dr. Ravindra Patel
    (DW-1), who stated that he is currently posted as a Medical Officer in the
    Community Health Center, Naugaon. Earlier, Dr. K.K. Ravi was posted in
    the Rogi Kalyan Samiti, and since he has expired, therefore, this witness
    appeared. He further stated that he was directed by the court to produce the
    original record of receipt number 2303, OD number 2191 of Rogi Kalyan

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    Samiti, PHC Maharajpur, the discharge ticket dated 30/05/2014 issued by
    the Rogi Kalyan Samiti, as well as the document dated 01/06/2014 issued
    by Dr. K.K. Ravi. He has stated that he had tried to search for the original
    record of the documents relied upon by the accused, but he could not find
    any register for the year 2014 pertaining to hospitalization. The receipts at
    the relevant time were issued by Lakhanlal Soni, who has also expired. He
    further stated that although the accused has produced Ex.D/7 (receipt),
    Ex.D/8 (registration dated 27/05/2014 of Rogi Kalyan Samiti), Ex.D/9
    (discharge ticket), and Ex.D/10 (fitness certificate), but in the absence of
    the original documents, he cannot verify or authenticate the documents.
    However, he admitted that the documents, Ex.D/7 to Ex.D/10, contain the
    signatures of Dr. K.K. Ravi. According to Ex.D/7 to Ex.D/10, Mukesh had
    remained hospitalized in CHC Naugaon from 27/05/2014 to 30/05/2014.
    He admitted that the letter pad (Ex.D/10) is not the letter pad of the
    Government hospital, but it is the private letter pad of Dr. K.K. Ravi. He
    denied that a doctor posted in CHC cannot issue a certificate on his private
    letter pad. He further admitted that on the fitness certificate (Ex.D/10), at
    one place the date is mentioned as 30/05/2014, whereas at the bottom, the
    date is mentioned as 01/06/2014. He also admitted that there is an
    overwriting on the digit ‘0’ of the date 30/05/2014. He further admitted that
    in Ex.D/8, the indoor number is not mentioned, but he claimed that the
    registration number is mentioned. He admitted that an indoor number is
    given to persons who are hospitalized. He further admitted that on Ex.D/9,
    the registration and indoor numbers are not mentioned. He further admitted
    that receipts like Ex.D/7 are not issued by the doctor, but claimed that such
    receipts are issued by the ward in-charge; however, he admitted that Ex.D/7

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    appears to contain the signature of Dr. K.K. Ravi. He further stated that he
    cannot say whether Dr. Ravi prepared the documents Ex.D/7 to Ex.D/10 at
    a later stage at the behest of the appellant Mukesh or not, but he admitted
    that he could not retrieve the original documents from the hospital. Thus, it
    is clear that the original records of the documents which were relied upon
    by the appellant Mukesh were not found in the hospital. Furthermore, it
    was admitted by Dr. Ravindra Patel that receipts are issued by the ward in-
    charge and not by doctors, but admitted that receipt (Ex.D/7) contains the
    signature of Dr. K.K. Ravi. Therefore, it is clear that Dr. K.K. Ravi must
    have prepared false documents at the behest of Mukesh. Furthermore, if
    Mukesh was admitted in CHC Naugaon, then there was no occasion for Dr.
    K.K. Ravi to issue a fitness certificate on his private letterhead. He should
    have issued on his official letterhead with dispatch number. As the original
    records of the documents relied upon by the appellant Mukesh (Ex.D/7,
    Ex.D/8, Ex.D/9, and Ex.D/10) could not be authenticated by Dr. Ravindra
    Patel in absence of the original documents, which could not be recovered in
    spite of extensive search in the hospital, this Court is of considered opinion
    that the plea of alibi taken by the appellant Mukesh is unreliable.
    Furthermore, it is well-established principle of law that burden lies heavily
    on the accused who takes a plea of alibi.

    114. Plea of alibi is a highly disputed question of fact which has to
    be proved by accused by leading cogent evidence. The Supreme Court in
    the case of Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in
    (2015) 4 SCC 749 has held as under :

    25. At this juncture, we think it apt to deal with the plea of alibi
    that has been put forth by the appellant. As is demonstrable, the
    trial court has discarded the plea of alibi. When a plea of alibi is

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    taken by an accused, burden is upon him to establish the same by
    positive evidence after onus as regards presence on the spot is
    established by the prosecution. In this context, we may profitably
    reproduce a few paragraphs from Binay Kumar Singh v. State of
    Bihar
    : (SCC p. 293, paras 22-23)
    “22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception
    (special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 or any
    other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11
    of the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact
    in issue are relevant. Illustration (a) given under the provision is
    worth reproducing in this context:

    ‘(a) The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on
    a certain day. The fact that, on that date, A was at Lahore is
    relevant.’

    23. The Latin word alibi means ‘elsewhere’ and that word is used
    for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line
    that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the
    place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would
    have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal
    case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical
    injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to
    prove that the accused was present at the scene and has
    participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by
    the mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi.

    The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only
    when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution
    satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging
    the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of
    alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the
    possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the
    presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been
    established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable
    evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any
    counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the
    occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused
    is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may
    entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the
    scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no
    doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that

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    purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down that, in
    such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It
    follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the
    plea of alibi.”

    (emphasis supplied)
    The said principle has been reiterated in Gurpreet Singh v.
    State of Haryana
    , Sk. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra and
    Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana.

    115. The Supreme Court in the case of S.K.Sattar v. State of
    Maharashtra
    , reported in (2010) 8 SCC 430 has held as under :

    35. Undoubtedly, the burden of establishing the plea of alibi lay
    upon the appellant. The appellant herein has miserably failed to
    bring on record any facts or circumstances which would make the
    plea of his absence even probable, let alone, being proved beyond
    reasonable doubt. The plea of alibi had to be proved with
    absolute certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility of
    the presence of the appellant in the rented premises at the
    relevant time. When a plea of alibi is raised by an accused it is
    for the accused to establish the said plea by positive evidence
    which has not been led in the present case. We may also notice
    here at this stage the proposition of law laid down in Gurpreet
    Singh v. State of Haryana
    as follows: (SCC p. 27, para 20)
    “20. … This plea of alibi stands disbelieved by both the courts
    and since the plea of alibi is a question of fact and since both the
    courts concurrently found that fact against the appellant, the
    accused, this Court in our view, cannot on an appeal by special
    leave go behind the abovenoted concurrent finding of fact.”

    But it is also correct that, even though the plea of alibi of the
    appellant is not established, it was for the prosecution to prove
    the case against the appellant. To this extent, the submission of
    the learned counsel for the appellant was correct. The failure of
    the plea of alibi would not necessarily lead to the success of the
    prosecution case which has to be independently proved by the
    prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Being aware of the
    aforesaid principle of law, the trial court as also the High Court
    examined the circumstantial evidence to exclude the possibility
    of the innocence of the appellant.

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    78

    NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167

    Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024

    116. The Supreme Court in the case of Binay Kumar Singh v. State of
    Bihar
    , reported in (1997) 1 SCC 283 has held as under:

    22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception (special
    or general) envisaged in the Indian Penal Code or any other law. It
    is only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of the Evidence
    Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are
    relevant. Illustration (a) given under the provision is worth
    reproducing in this context:

    “The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a
    certain date; the fact that on that date, A was at Lahore is
    relevant.”

    23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere” and that word is
    used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence
    line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from
    the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he
    would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a
    criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted
    physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution
    to prove that the accused was present at the scene and has
    participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the
    mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The
    plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only when
    the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily.
    But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is
    incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it
    with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his
    presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the
    accused at the scene of occurrence has been established
    satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence,
    normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence
    to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened.
    But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and
    of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable
    doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence
    took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit
    of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound
    proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden

    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    79
    NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21167

    Cr.A. Nos. 1871/2024, 2045/2024

    on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict
    proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. This Court has
    observed so on earlier occasions (vide Dudh Nath Pandey v. State
    of U.P.
    ; State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple.”

    117. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case,
    this Court is of the considered opinion, that the prosecution has
    successfully established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable
    doubt. Therefore, their conviction under Section 148, 302 read with
    Section 149 (2 Counts) and 323 read with Section 149 of IPC (2 Counts) is
    hereby upheld. Conviction of appellant Raju under section 27 of the Arms
    Act and that of Mukesh under sections 25(1B)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act
    are also upheld.

    118. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, the minimum
    sentence for offence under Section 302 of IPC is Life Imprisonment.
    Hence, no interference is required in the sentence awarded by the Trial
    Court, accordingly it is also upheld. The sentences awarded by the trial
    Court under sections 148, 323 read with 149 (2 counts) of the IPC,
    25(1B)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act are also affirmed.

    119. The appellants Raju Balmik and Mukesh are in jail. They shall
    undergo the remaining jail sentence.

    120. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the Trial Court for necessary
    information and compliance.

    121. The Cr.A. No. 1871/2024 filed by Mukesh and Cr.A. No. 2045 of
    2024 filed by Raju Bamik fail and are hereby Dismissed.

                                        (G.S.Ahluwalia)                         (Anuradha Shukla)
                                            Judge                                    Judge
    
    
    
    Signature Not Verified
    Signed by: ANAND
    SHRIVASTAVA
    Signing time: 22-07-2026
    19:31:21
    



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