Abstract
The power of imposing President’s Rule in any State due to the failure of its constitutional government under Article 356 of the Constitution of India is vested in the President of India. Though intended to be an exceptional measure to maintain constitutional government, Article 356 has been one of the most controversial aspects of the federal structure of India because of its abuse in politics. This article highlights the constitutional provisions and development of Article 356 from an extraordinary emergency measure to one used often for political ends. The paper focuses on the significant judgement in S.R. Bommai v Union of India and judicial precedents which have brought about judicial review of the Presidential proclamations under Article 356. Although judicial scrutiny has made substantial contributions to the strengthening of federalism and democracy, it is argued that problems continue with the procedural misuse of the provision by means of governor’s discretionary powers.
Keywords
Article 356; President’s Rule; Federalism; S.R.Bommai; Governor;
Introduction
While trying to strike a fine balance between a powerful Union and autonomous State governments, the Indian Constitution has a unique provision under Article 356 which allows the President to issue his rule in a State in case there is failure of constitutional machinery.[1] The provision though intended to be used only in an emergency to ensure constitutional governance in extraordinary cases, its implementation impacts the federal division of powers by suspending the duly elected government in a State.[2] Hence, Article 356 has always been the subject matter of constitutional debates because of the inherent conflict between the requirements of administration and maintaining the federal character of the country.[3]
Though the framers of the Constitution meant to keep this provision in reserve to use it in extreme cases only where all other constitutional options fail, the history of the Constitution since the emergence of independent India suggests that the article has often been applied to suit some political exigencies raising suspicion about the use of Article 356 for partisan gains.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in S.R. Bommai v Union of India has changed the constitutional interpretation of Article 356 by making it open to judicial review and reinforcing the role of the federation, the problem of controversy associated with its misuse still remains relevant today.[4] The modern nature of the problem can be explained by the fact that the nature of the controversy has shifted from straightforward political criticism of State governments to issues of procedure and process including issues of gubernatorial discretion and delayed floor test.[5]
Having taken this into consideration, this paper seeks to investigate the constitutional basis and purpose of Article 356, to study the history of its misuse, to analyze the transformation that occurred as a result of the Supreme Court’s judgment in S.R. Bommai v Union of India, and to find out whether the current constitutional democracy.
Constitutional Provisions of Article 356
Article 356 of the Constitution allows the President to proclaim President’s Rule in the case where the President is satisfied that the government of the State is unable to operate in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.[6] The President’s satisfaction can either be based on the report filed by the Governor or “otherwise,” and thus gives the Union Government the right to exercise its powers even without an official recommendation from the Governor. In the event of a proclamation, the President may exercise the functions of the State Government, provide that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercised by or under the authority of Parliament, and make such other provisions as are necessary.
There is no doubt that Article 356 is not an autonomous provision. Article 355 serves as the basis of Article 356 in terms of constitutionality. This is because Article 355 stipulates the need for the Union to defend the States from any form of external threat or internal disturbance and to ensure that the Government of each State is running in accordance with the Constitution. This means that Article 355 creates the constitutional responsibility of the Union while Article 356 gives it a means to discharge such responsibility in extreme cases. Once the President’s Rule has been put in place, Article 357 enables the Parliament to delegate legislative powers to the President or anyone else for administration of the State.[7]
The genesis of Article 356 lies in Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which gave power to Provincial Governors to take over the control in some cases.[8] In the Constituent Assembly deliberations, it was feared that such a provision could jeopardize the independence of the States if used unilaterally.[9] In order to address these fears, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar justified the necessity for having the provision saying that it was meant purely as an emergency measure. He is well-known for his remark that the provision should be a “dead letter” that would come into play only if all other constitutional options failed.
Procedural provisions have been set out in the Constitution to ensure that President’s Rule does not go on indefinitely.[10] Any proclamation made under Article 356 shall be ratified by both Houses of Parliament within two months or else lose its validity. The ratified proclamation shall be valid for a period of six months and can be extended for an additional six-month period from time to time. Yet since the adoption of the Forty-fourth Constitutional Amendment, President’s Rule shall generally not be extended beyond one year unless there is a National Emergency in force and a certificate of the Election Commission is to the effect that holding elections to the State Legislative Assembly is not possible. Under any circumstance, President’s Rule cannot be continued for more than three years. These provisions of the Constitution clearly demonstrate the intent behind Article 356 being a temporary and exceptional provision.
Historical Abuse of Article 356: Pre-Bommai Period
While the intention behind Article 356 was that of a special protection mechanism for the constitution, it has unfortunately been abused in the period post-enactment of the constitution. Prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v Union of India in 1994, there have been more than one hundred cases of the imposition of President’s rule, many of which were widely criticized as political in nature and not related to the constitutional breakdown at all.[11] Far from being a remedy of last resort, Article 356 was often used to pressure or even change state governments run by rival political parties.[12]
Among the early cases was the dismissal of the elected Communist government of Kerala in 1959 due to political agitation without any evidence of collapse of the constitutional machinery. Later, Article 356 was widely employed in 1977, when the newly elected Janata Party Government dismissed several state governments of Congress run states because of the Emergency, claiming that they had lost the people’s mandate. Just three years later, in 1980, the Congress Government took the same steps against the state governments of non-Congress party states.
The repeated use of Governor’s reports added to this problem, since these reports were usually seen as supporting the views of the Union government, without any proper constitutional basis. Judicial review was also minimal during this period. In State of Rajasthan v Union of India, the Supreme Court used a cautious stance and held that “the satisfaction of the President” under Article 356 is largely non-justiciable, barring a few cases where there may be a suspicion of malafides. The lack of judicial control over the Executive actions thus made people feel that the Article 356 was being misused for political gains.
The Turning Point: S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994)
However, the interpretation of the constitutional provisions of Article 356 was dramatically altered by the judgment of the S.R. Bommai v Union of India case, which has come to be regarded as a landmark in this regard.[13] The origin of the case dates back to the dismissal of the government in Karnataka led by the Chief Minister, S.R. Bommai, in 1989, following reports of the loss of majority of the council of ministers by the Governor.[14] Despite the fact that Bommai alleged that he continued to have the backing of the legislature and was looking for the chance to demonstrate his majority in the legislature, President’s Rule was imposed without asking for any floor test. Other constitutional cases involving the proclamations made in Meghalaya, Nagaland, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh were heard along with this case.[15]
It was a major shift in the decision pronounced by a Bench comprising of nine judges, wherein the Court negated the presumption that the President’s satisfaction under Article 356 was beyond the pale of judicial review. Although the President does enjoy constitutional discretion, the satisfaction must be made in light of material relevant to it and is open to judicial review. Thus, a Proclamation could be rendered invalid if it was based upon mala fide consideration, irrelevant material or if it was arbitrary/unconstitutional. This represented a complete change in the stance of the Supreme Court which was taken earlier in the case of State of Rajasthan v Union of India.[16]
Furthermore, it has been established that the proper place where it would be decided whether the Government has the confidence of the Legislative Assembly lies within the House itself and governors cannot form an opinion of their own to make it or not.
Further, the decision also reinforced the view that both federalism and secularism were essential elements of the basic structure of the Constitution. It was noted that where the State government was acting in a way that was totally against the constitutional doctrine of secularism, resort could be made to Article 356. However, what was stressed in the judgment was that no ideological or political difference between the Union government and the State government alone could be considered to be a failure of constitutional machinery.
Moreover, an important procedural safeguard has also been provided by the Court through its ruling that the State Legislative Assembly should not usually be dissolved until Parliament gives its sanction to the proclamation made under Article 356. Where such a proclamation is later found to be unconstitutional, the Court had the power to reinstate the government which was sacked and also reassemble the State Legislative Assembly which was dissolved.
In other words, the Bommai decision converted Article 356, which was originally open to abuse, into a clause that is now controlled by the limits of constitutionality, judicial review, and the doctrines of federalism, democracy, and responsible government. Even after thirty years since then, it remains the primary protection against the arbitrary removal of elected State governments.
Post-Bommai Developments: Judicial Clarification of Constitutional Provisions
Though the case of S.R. Bommai v Union of India effectively limited the arbitrary exercise of Article 356, the decision certainly did not resolve all the constitutional issues between the Center and State. On the contrary, the later judicial pronouncements have developed further the principles enunciated in Bommai, especially in terms of increasing judicial oversight of executive actions and the constitutional position of the Governors. This clearly shows that while political abuse of Article 356 has been minimized, constitutional questions have been raised in terms of process.[17]
An illustration of this situation would be Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v Union of India, where the issue related to the dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly before it had even met.[18] Following the recommendation by the Governor, the Union Government made a decision to dissolve the Assembly due to fears that there could be manipulation in order to gain legislative approval by improper methods. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that the proclamation was a colorable use of constitutional power since the decision was made on the basis of assumptions, rather than facts showing any constitutional crisis. Even though the Court refused to revive the assembly as elections had already been held, it clearly stated that the dissolution of the Assembly was unconstitutional.[19]
The Court expanded upon these principles further still in the matter of Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker. This case pertained to the issue of political turmoil in Arunachal Pradesh. While the matter at hand did not pertain to Article 356 of the Constitution, it dealt with the extent of discretion available to the Governor under the Constitution. The Governor had brought forward the session of the legislature while modifying its business agenda without any assistance or advice from the Council of Ministers. The Supreme Court ruled that the Governor is not a politically independent entity and normally acts on ministerial advice except when he has discretion under the Constitution.
The judgment in the S.R. Chaudhuri v State of Punjab case is yet another example of the Court’s efforts to maintain the constitutional morality of the parliamentarism.[20] In particular, the Court ruled that an individual who is not a member of the legislature cannot be repeatedly appointed as a minister without being elected within the constitutionally specified period. While this case was not related to Article 356 directly, it is quite clear that this kind of decision underlines the necessity for interpreting the constitutional powers in accordance with the democratic nature of these powers.
In summary, all the above-discussed judgments clearly illustrate the efforts of the Court to further develop the constitutional safeguards set in the Bommai decision. Instead of concentrating only on the provisions of Article 356, the Supreme Court has started to concentrate more on preventing the abuses of the constitutional procedures. This means that the focus has been transferred from correction of the unconstitutional proclamations to prevention of the very procedures which may later result in unconstitutional proclamations.
Critical Analysis: Has the Abuse of Article 356 Ceased?
The constitutional protections incorporated within the case of S.R. Bommai have certainly affected the functioning of Article 356 by making presidential orders open to constitutional challenges.[21] As compared to before the S.R. Bommai decision, the number of instances where President’s Rule is imposed on the basis of political considerations has certainly come down. With a floor test, judicial review, and the prospect of reinstatement of an unjustly dismissed government in place, the constitutional costs involved in arbitrary executive decisions have gone up significantly.[22]
However, it would not be right to assume that there is no chance for any misuse at all anymore. The constitutional problems have ceased to occur in the form of regular pronouncements under Article 356 and have become part of the pre-proceedings in politics instead. The selection and behavior of the governors, delays in conducting the floor tests, selective invitations to political parties for forming the government, as well as the timing of the governor’s report, lead to claims about their partisan behavior. In most cases, the problems that finally end up in the Supreme Court relate to gubernatorial discretion and not to the proclamation of President’s Rule per se.
Another area of constant worry is the ambiguous wording of the phrase “failure of constitutional machinery,” which appears in Article 356. The Constitution intentionally does not give any precise meaning to this phrase to leave room for dealing with extraordinary situations. However, the room left open here opens up possibilities for arbitrary interpretations from the executive side. While judicial review works as a check on executive power, the courts usually step in only after the executive has already acted.
Similarly, the success of the Bommai doctrine also hinges on the impartial and restrained functioning of the constitutional institutions. Although precedents may provide standards, they cannot replace constitutional norms or political morality. “Federalism” is more than an institution; it is a constitutional value that demands co-operation between the Union and the States. When constitutional morality is overridden by political considerations, even the best judicial protection may be inadequate to avoid institutional conflict.
Hence, even though the misapplication of Article 356 has been curtailed considerably post-Bommai, it has not been totally eliminated. The task ahead is no longer an issue of openly ignoring State governments, but ensuring that the exercise of constitutional powers is done in a clear, objective, and democratic manner. The development of judicial doctrine reveals that the protection of federalism not only entails constitutional restrictions of Article 356, but also its ongoing review within the wider process of the Constitution itself.
Conclusion
While Article 356 is enshrined in the Constitution as an emergency instrument for upholding the constitutionality of the polity, it was never intended as an instrument of political coercion over the States. While the use of the provision as a political instrument prior to the Bommai period has been a significant threat to India’s federal arrangement, judicial interpretation has radically altered the manner in which the provision operates within the framework of the Constitution. In cases such as S.R. Bommai, Rameshwar Prasad, and Nabam Rebia, the Supreme Court has upheld judicial review, curbed the discretionary powers of governors and strengthened democracy. However, procedural challenges continue to reveal weaknesses in the functioning of constitutional power. It is important that transparency in the Governors’ report, a mandatory and timely floor test, and strict observance of constitutional conventions be undertaken to safeguard the cooperative nature of federalism.
References
[1] Constitution of India, art 356.
[2] Constitution of India, arts 355-356.
[3] MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2023) 930-932.
[4] SR Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1.
[5] Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (2016) 8 SCC 1.
[6] Constitution of India, art 356(1).
[7] Constitution of India, art 357.
[8] Government of India Act 1935, s 93.
[9] Constituent Assembly Debates, vol IX, 4 August 1949.
[10] Constitution of India, art 356(3).
[11] M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2023) 930-935.
[12] Sarkaria Commission, Report of Commission on Centre-State Relations (Government of India 1988) ch VI.
[13] S R Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1.
[14] Ibid.
[15] S R Bommai (n 27).
[16] State of Rajasthan v Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 592; S R Bommai (n 27).
[17] S R Bommai (n 37).
[18] Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1.
[19] Rameshwar Prasad (VI) (n 39).
[20] S R Chaudhuri v State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 126.
[21] S R Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1.
[22] S R Bommai (n 46).
