No Motor Accident Compensation For Murder Inside Vehicle

1. Leave Granted.

2. One Anand, sat in the vehicle driven by his friend, the

appellant Dilip, on 29th November 2009 and three days later, on

03.12.2009 he was found dead near Binjkot village, PS

Chalradhar Nagar. Rajshri – Anand’s wife lodged FIR No.963 of

2009 at PS Kotwali, District Raigarh, thus setting in motion the

machinery in criminal law. The chargesheet alleged that a total of

three accused persons in furtherance of a conspiracy, kidnapped

Anand, killed him in a premeditated fashion and disposed of his

mortal remains. Somewhat parallelly, Rajshri and her three

children filed a claim petition vide claim Case No.37 of 2011

under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, before the Fourth

Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal1, Raigarh, seeking

compensation of approximately Rs. 26,00,000/-, alleging that

Anand, was killed inside Dilip’s vehicle and hence the vehicle

was used in the commission of the offence.

3. In the criminal case being Sessions Trial No. 38 of 2010,

vide judgment dated 30th November 2012, Dilip was convicted

under Sections 365, 302, 201 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code,

18602. His appeal to the High Court succeeded and in terms of

judgment dated 18th November 2015, he was acquitted of all

charges primarily on account of the fact that the last seen theory,

on which the case of the prosecution rested, could not be proved.

4. The Tribunal, while holding that rashness and negligence

could not be proved, held the death of Anand, to be covered under

Sections 165 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,3

observing that the dominant intention at play was not the murder

1 MACT

2 IPC

3 MVA

of Anand, but the injuries suffered by him were inflicted while

they were in the vehicle, eventually leading to his death. Another

reason for the Tribunal’s conclusion was that Dilip, failed to deny

the case of the claimants and as such accepted their version of

events. A total amount of Rs.5,64,000/- with 7% interest was

awarded. The High Court agreed with the findings of the

Tribunal and enhanced total compensation to Rs.8,60,832/- with

6% interest on the enhanced amount.

5. The short question before us is whether the death of Anand

‘arises out of’ the use of the motor vehicle thereby making Dilip

and/or his insurer liable to compensate the respondents?

6. In a recent decision, this Court in Bruhat Bangalore

Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar4, while considering

a case of a passenger in an autorickshaw that was parked on the

side of the road, being injured by a branch of a tree falling on top

of the said vehicle, referred to earlier precedents in connection

with ‘arising out of’. Relevant extract of the decision is as

follows:

“12. The question that arises is whether the falling of a tree

on an autorickshaw, would qualify as an accident for which

a claim can be filed. The phrase emphasised by us in the

Section above was, in its corresponding form in the

preceding legislation interpreted by this Court in Shivaji

Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More,:

4 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1111

“26. These decisions indicate that the

word “use”, in the context of motor

vehicles, has been construed in a wider

sense to include the period when the

vehicle is not moving and is stationary,

being either parked on the road and

when it is not in a position to move due

to some breakdown or mechanical

defect. … In our opinion, the word

“use” has a wider connotation to cover

the period when the vehicle is not

moving and is stationary and the use of

a vehicle does not cease on account of

the vehicle having been rendered

immobile on account of a breakdown or

mechanical defect or accident. In the

circumstances, it cannot be said that the

petrol tanker was not in the use at the

time when it was lying on its side after

the collision with the truck.

…

33. …The words “arising out of” were

not construed to mean “arising under”

as in Union of India v. E.B. Aaby’s

Rederi A/S [1975] A.C. 797 : [1974] 2

All ER 874] which decision was held

inapplicable to the construction of

Section 20(2)(1)(h) and it was observed

by Lord Brandon:

“With regard to the first point, I would

readily accept that in certain contexts

the expression ‘arising out of ’ may, on

the ordinary and natural meaning of the

words used, be the equivalent of the

expression ‘arising under’, and not that

of the wider expression ‘connected

with’. In my view, however, the

expression ‘arising out of ’ is, on the

ordinary and natural meaning of the

words used, capable, in other contexts,

of being the equivalent of the wider

expression ‘connected with’. Whether

the expression ‘arising out of ’ has the

narrower or the wider meaning in any

particular case must depend on the

context in which it is used.”

Keeping in view the context in which the

expression was used in the statute it was

construed to have the wider meaning viz.

“connected with”.

34. In the context of motor accidents the expressions

“caused by” and “arising out of” are often used in

statutes. Although both these expressions imply a

causal relationship between the accident resulting in

injury and the use of the motor vehicle but they differ

in the degree of proximity of such relationship. This

distinction has been lucidly brought out in the

decision of the High Court of Australia

in Government Insurance Office of N.S.W. v. R.J.

Green case [(1965) 114 CLR 437], wherein Lord

Barwick, C.J. has stated : (CLR p. 433)

“Bearing in mind the general purpose of

the Act I think the expression ‘arising out

of ’ must be taken to require a less

proximate relationship of the injury to

the relevant use of the vehicle than is

required to satisfy the words ‘caused by’.

It may be that an association of the

injury with the use of the vehicle while it

cannot be said that that use was causally

related to the injury may yet be enough

to satisfy the expression ‘arise out of ’ as

used in the Act and in the policy.”

35. In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as

under : (CLR p. 447)

“The words ‘injury caused by or arising

out of the use of the vehicle’ postulate a

causal relationship between the use of

the vehicle and the injury. ‘Caused by’

connotes a ‘direct’ or ‘proximate’

relationship of cause and effect. ‘Arising

out of ’ extends this to a result that is less

immediate; but it still carries a sense of

consequence.”

7. The phrase ‘arising out of’ has to be understood in the

context of two other words, ‘accident’ and ‘motor vehicles’. The

three Judge Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd.

v. Swaran Singh5, discussed accidents in the following terms:

“31. The right of the victim of a road accident to

claim compensation is a statutory one. He is a victim

of an unforeseen situation. He would not ordinarily

have a hand in it. The negligence on the part of the

victim may, however, be contributory. He has

suffered owing to wrongdoing of others. An accident

may ruin an entire family. It may take away the only

earning member. An accident may result in the loss

of her only son to a mother. An accident may take

place for a variety of reasons. The driver of a vehicle

may not have a hand in it. He may not be found to be

negligent in a given case. Other factors such as

unforeseen situation, negligence of the victim, bad

road or the action or inaction of any other person

may lead to an accident.”

8. Accidents which may be of the above varieties must arise

out of use of motor vehicle. Liability under this Act cannot be

fastened only because of accident and motor vehicle. ‘Arising out

of’ is the causal link. Without this, liability falls.

9. What is to be understood in the facts of this case is the

causal relationship between the death of Anand and the motor

vehicle. The judgment in Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co.

Ltd.6, involved the primary objective of theft of the vehicle and

5 (2004) 3 SCC 297

6 (2000) 5 SCC 113

the murder of the driver thereof was in furtherance of the act of

theft. In other words, the primary felonious intention was theft

and, therefore, the death, which was a consequence of this, arose

in relation to the motor vehicle itself.

“10. The question, therefore is, can a murder be an accident in

any given case? There is no doubt that “murder”, as it is

understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where

death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act

normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But

there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a

given set of facts. The difference between a “murder” which is

not an accident and a “murder” which is an accident, depends

on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if

the dominant intention of the Act of felony is to kill any

particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder

but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act

of murder was originally not intended and the same was

caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such

murder is an accidental murder.”

10. We are, however, of the considered view that this

distinction between primary and secondary felonious act cannot

be made in the present case. What transpired was a perfectly

innocuous set of circumstances. Anand knew Dilip and as such

sat in his car and went away. Subsequently, he turned up dead

three days later. It is held that in the criminal case that the last

seen theory was not proved. It need not be buttressed by citations

that this is a weak piece of evidence.

11. Granted the standard of proof in a criminal case is higher,

either beyond reasonable doubt or ruling out of any other

possibility and the chain of circumstances being so complete to

point the guilt only to the accused and no one else; whereas in a

civil case preponderance of probability is the standard and so the

evidence has to be looked at differently. This principle has been

stated aptly in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

Rajani Sahoo7 reiterating Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi8,

“12. In this context, we could refer to the judgments of

this Court in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai

Ammal [N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal,

(1980) 3 SCC 457 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 774] , wherein the

plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and

that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was

rejected. It was observed that culpable rashness under

Section 304-AIPC is more drastic than negligence under

the law of torts to create liability. Similarly, in Bimla

Devi v. Himachal RTC [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC,

(2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1

SCC (Cri) 1101] (“Bimla Devi”), it was observed that

in a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal has to determine the

amount of fair compensation to be granted in the event

an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of a

driver of a motor vehicle. A holistic view of the evidence

has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and

strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle

in a particular manner need not be established by the

claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on

the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The

standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be

applied while considering the petition seeking

compensation on account of death or injury in a road

7 (2025) 2 SCC 599

8 (2023) 13 SCC 510

traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation

made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim

Xavier Cruz [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier

Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 :

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] which has referred to the

aforesaid judgment in Bimla Devi [Bimla

Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5

SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] .”

12. What exactly is preponderance of probabilities was stated

in N.G. Dastane (Dr) v. S. Dastane9, as follows:

“24. The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is

that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by

a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason

that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to

be proved when the court either believes it to exist or

considers its existence so probable that a prudent man

ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to

act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief

regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on

a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with

conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will

act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing

the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance

is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a

prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding

whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first

step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second

to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle.

The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the

improbable at the second. Within the wide range of

probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to

make but it is this choice which ultimately determines

where the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important

issues like those which affect the status of parties

demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a

9 (1975) 2 SCC 326

promissory note: “the nature and gravity of an issue

necessarily determines the manner of attaining

reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue [ Per

Dixon, J. in Wright v. Wright, (1948) 77 CLR 191, 210]

”; or as said by Lord Denning, “the degree of

probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion

as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear

[Blyth v. Blyth, (1966) 1 AER 524, 536] ”. But whether

the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the

test to apply is whether on a preponderance of

probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases

this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for

finding whether the burden of proof is discharged.

25. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher

standard which generally governs criminal trials or

trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal

nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject

which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance

of probabilities. If the probabilities are so nicely

balanced that a reasonable, not a vascillating, mind

cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises

regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the

benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It

is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a

purely civil nature.

13. We are of the view that even on this lighter standard, there

is no causal link that has been established. A perusal of the

judgments of the Courts below in a sense assume that the injuries

suffered by the deceased took place while Dilip and Anand were

in the car. How such a conclusion came about, is best known to

them. The evidence-on-record does not point to any forensic

proof having been recovered from the car for example – blood,

skin cells, hair etc. Neither it is anybody’s case that Dilip’s car is

involved in any collision. All that has been said is that the injuries sustained by Anand were by hard and blunt objects. Now true it is that the claimants need not establish the particular manner in which injuries have been sustained by the injured or the deceased but that does not mean that simply because there was a car somehow involved in a chain of circumstances that led to his death, the provisions of MVA would apply. Some link whatsoever between the car, and the death has to be established.

14. Pursuant to the aforesaid discussion, there is an alleged

accidental murder and there is a motor vehicle, but the

relationship between the two specifically involving a motor

vehicle has not been established. There cannot be, consequently,

any liability under the MVA. Judgments of the Courts below are

set aside. The appeals are allowed. In the peculiar facts, we direct

that the amount of compensation, if already paid to the

respondents, shall not be subjected to any recovery.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

……………………………………………J.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

New Delhi;

July 22, 2026