Bombay High Court
Tecpro Systems Limited vs Reliance Infrastructure Ltd on 22 July, 2026
CNR No : HCBM020009272024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.245 OF 2026
Tecpro Systems Limited (In Liquidation) .. Applicant
Vs
Reliance Infrastructure Limited .. Respondent
Mr. Akash Loya a/w Mr. Vishal N. Nevshe, Mr. Abhishek Bhaduri, for
Applicant
Mr. Tushad Kakalia a/w Mr. Kartik Hede i/by Mr. Shivshankar Prajapati for
Respondent.
CORAM : ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.
DATE : 22nd July 2026.
JUDGMENT :
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. The present application has been filed under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”), seeking the
appointment of an Arbitrator in terms of the Purchase Order (the
“Agreement”) dated 17th January 2018 executed between the parties. The
Agreement contains an arbitration clause providing for reference of disputes
to arbitration arising out of or in connection with the supply of goods under
the agreement.
1/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
3. The relevant Clause 17 of the Purchase Order dated 17 th January 2018
(Arbitration Agreement) is reproduced below for ease of reference:
“17.0 Settlements of Disputes and Arbitration
Any dispute or difference arising out of this Supply Contract
shall be discussed between the Purchaser and Contractor.
Both shall endeavor to reach an amicable settlement within a
period of fifteen (15) days. If an agreement could not be
reached within this period then the dispute shall be referred to
arbitration under the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, as may be amended from time to time. The venue of
arbitration shall be Mumbai.
The award shall be a reasoned award and shall be final and
binding on both the parties and shall not be subjected to
appeal. Subject arbitration, the Courts at Mumbai shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters arising under this
Purchase Order. During pendency of arbitration, the parties
shall continue to perform respective obligation under this
Supply Contract.”
4. It is stated that the Applicant Company is under liquidation and the
Liquidator of the Applicant-Company issued a notice dated 10 th March 2022
to the Respondent invoking arbitration clause under Section 21 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
5. The invocation notice dated 10th March 2022 was not replied to by the
Respondent. In these circumstances, the present application is filed under
Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the
appointment of an Arbitrator.
2/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
6. The Respondent opposes the arbitration application and submits that,
the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), New Delhi, passed
an order dtd. 16th January 2020 directing liquidation of the Applicant and
appointed a Liquidator to administer the liquidation proceedings.
7. On 10th March 2022, the Applicant, through the Liquidator, issued a
notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
invoking arbitration against the Respondent. Thereafter, on 23rd December
2022, the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) granted post
facto approval under Section 33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 (“IBC”) for the initiation of arbitration proceedings against the
Respondent. Subsequently, the present application under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed on 10th January 2024.
8. Learned Counsel, Mr. Tushad Kakalia, appearing for the Respondent
submits that, upon the passing of a liquidation order, no legal proceedings
can be instituted by or on behalf of the Corporate Debtor in liquidation
except by the Liquidator with the prior approval of the National Company
Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), as mandated by the proviso to Section 33(5) of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”). It is contended that the
requirement of obtaining prior approval is mandatory and not merely
directory.
3/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
9. It is further submitted that arbitral proceedings commence upon the
issuance of a notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”). In the present case, the Liquidator
issued the notice invoking arbitration on 10th March 2022, whereas the
approval of the NCLT was obtained only on 23 rd December 2022.
Consequently, the notice invoking arbitration was issued without the
requisite prior approval and was therefore incompetent and void ab initio.
As a result, no valid arbitral proceedings ever came into existence.
Accordingly, the mandatory precondition for maintaining an application
under Section 11 of the A&C Act has not been satisfied, and the present
application is liable to be rejected.
10. It is respectfully submitted that the Liquidator failed to obtain the
prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority, as mandated under Section
33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, before issuing the notice
under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, the initiation of
arbitral proceedings by the Liquidator, without such prior approval, is
unauthorized, incompetent, and contrary to the statutory mandate. Any
approval obtained subsequently cannot cure this fundamental defect or be
construed as compliance with Section 33(5). Accordingly, the proceedings
4/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
initiated pursuant to such notice are without jurisdiction and are liable to be
declared void.
11 It is submitted that where a statute expressly mandates prior approval
for the performance of a particular act, such a requirement cannot be
validated by obtaining post facto approval. In support of this proposition,
reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bajaj
Hindustan Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors 1. and Union of India v.
Vinod Kumar2. It is, therefore, contended by the learned counsel that, in the
absence of a valid notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, the present application under Section 11 of the said
Act is not maintainable. Accordingly, the learned counsel prays for dismissal
of the application.
12. In response to the objection raised by the learned counsel appearing
for the Respondent, the learned counsel, Mr. Akash Loya, appearing for the
Applicant submits that a proper construction of Section 33(5) would indicate
that a notice issued under Section 21 would be deemed to remain ineffective
until the requisite approval is granted. It is further submitted that the
proceedings would be deemed to have been instituted only on the date on
which such approval is granted.
1 (2016) 12 SCC 613
2 (1996) 10 SCC 78
5/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
13. It is submitted that the proceedings initiated without obtaining the
prior approval of the Hon’ble NCLT are merely ineffective and do not attain
legal efficacy. Such proceedings shall become effective and shall be deemed
to have been instituted only from the date on which the requisite
leave/approval is granted by the Hon’ble Tribunal. The aforesaid distinction
is further fortified by the provisions of Section 28 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, wherein any action undertaken by the Resolution
Professional without the prior approval of the Committee of Creditors, as
mandated under the said provision, is rendered null and void under Section
28(4).
14. The learned counsel places reliance upon the following judgments in
support of the aforesaid submissions:
2. Slimline Realty Pvt,. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Jigar Bhatt4.
15 Learned Counsel for the Applicant submits that approval under
Section 33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was granted by
the Hon’ble NCLT on 23rd December 2022. Accordingly, the notice issued
under Section 21 ought to be deemed to have been issued on the date of
grant of such approval, i.e., on 23rd December 2022. Consequently, the
3 (2013) 15 SCC 655
4 (2024) SCC OnLine NCLAT 6895 (Co. Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.690 of 2024
6/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
application under Section 11 would be maintainable. It is further submitted
that the interpretation and construction of Section 33(5) of the IBC must be
aligned with the underlying object and purpose of the liquidation process,
namely, the maximisation of the liquidation value of the corporate debtor.
Such maximisation can be achieved only by enabling the liquidator to pursue
and realise recoveries arising out of the claims and receivables of the
company under liquidation.
16. Having considered the rival submissions, the issues that arise for
consideration are : (i) Whether proviso to Section 33(5) of the IBC is
mandatory i.e. prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority is mandatory to
institute any legal proceedings on behalf of the corporate debtor? (ii) If prior
approval is mandatory, what is the effect of post facto approval by the
Adjudicating Authority on proceedings already instituted without approval
of the Authority?
17. The relevant Sections of the I.B. Code and the Arbitration Act are
noted below.
“28. Approval of committee of creditors for certain actions.
–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force, the resolution professional,
during the corporate insolvency resolution process, shall not
take any of the following actions without the prior approval
of the committee of creditors namely:–
7/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
(a) raise any interim finance in excess of the amount as may
be decided by the committee of creditors in their meeting;
(b) create any security interest over the assets of the
corporate debtor;
(c) change the capital structure of the corporate debtor,
including by way of issuance of additional securities,
creating a new class of securities or buying back or
redemption of issued securities in case the corporate debtor
is a company;
(d) record any change in the ownership interest of the
corporate debtor;
(e) give instructions to financial institutions maintaining
accounts of the corporate debtor for a debit transaction from
any such accounts in excess of the amount as may be decided
by the committee of creditors in their meeting;
(f) undertake any related party transaction
(g) amend any constitutional documents of the corporate
debtor;
(h) delegate its authority to any other person;
(i) dispose of or permit the disposal of shares of any
shareholder of the corporate debtor or their nominees to third
parties;
(j) make any change in the management of the corporate
debtor or its subsidiary;
(k) transfer rights or financial debts or operational debts
under material contracts otherwise than in the ordinary
course of business;
(l) make changes in the appointment or terms of contract of
such personnel as specified by the committee of creditors; or
(m) make changes in the appointment or terms of contract of
statutory auditors or internal auditors of the corporate debtor.
8/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
(2) The resolution professional shall convene a meeting of
the committee of creditors and seek the vote of the creditors
prior to taking any of the actions under sub-section (1).
(3) No action under sub-section (1) shall be approved by the
committee of creditors unless approved by a vote of 1[sixty-
six] per cent. of the voting shares.
(4) Where any action under sub-section (1) is taken by the
resolution professional without seeking the approval of the
committee of creditors in the manner as required in this
section, such action shall be void.
(5) The committee of creditors may report the actions of the
resolution professional under sub-section (4) to the Board for
taking necessary actions against him under this Code..
33. Initiation of liquidation.–(1) Where the Adjudicating
Authority,–
(a) before the expiry of the insolvency resolution process
period or the maximum period permitted for completion of
the corporate insolvency resolution process under section 12
or the fast track corporate insolvency resolution process
under section 56, as the case may be, does not receive a
resolution plan under sub-section (6) of section 30; or
(b) rejects the resolution plan under section 31 for the non-
compliance of the requirements specified therein, it shall–
(i) pass an order requiring the corporate debtor to be
liquidated in the manner as laid down in this
Chapter;
(ii) issue a public announcement stating that the corporate
debtor is in liquidation; and (iii) require such order to be sent
to the authority with which the corporate debtor is registered.
(5) Subject to section 52, when a liquidation order has
been passed, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be
9/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
instituted by or against the corporate debtor:
Provided that a suit or other legal proceeding may be
instituted by the liquidator, on behalf of the corporate debtor,
with the prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority..”
“21. Commencement of arbitral proceedings.–Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in
respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on
which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is
received by the respondent.”
18. A perusal of the proviso to Section 33(5) indicates that the provision
employs the expression “prior approval.” Admittedly, in the present case, no
prior approval was obtained before issuance of the notice. Therefore, the
issue that arises for consideration is whether the notice issued without
obtaining prior approval is rendered void ab initio, or ineffective and, what
would be the legal consequence of the grant of post facto approval under
Section 33(5) of the I.B. Act for initiation of the legal proceedings.
19. In the case of Erach Boman Vs. Tukaram Bhat (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court while considering the expression “leave of the Court” in
paragraph nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22 has observed as follows :
“19. Reflecting on the said provision, this Court in Central
Bank of India v. Elmot Engg. Co.11 has ruled that it aims at
safeguarding the assets of a company in winding up against
wasteful or expensive litigation as far as matters which
could be expeditiously and cheaply decided by the Company
Court are concerned. In granting leave under the said
provision, the court always takes into consideration whether
the company is likely to be exposed to unnecessary litigation
10/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
and cost.
20. In Ammonia Supplies Corpn. (P) Ltd. V. Containers
(P) Ltd. 12, while dealing with power under Section 446(1)
of the 1956 Act, it has been observed that in the said sub-
section the words used would indicate that the discretion to
exercise such power is with the Company Court.
21. In State of J&K v. UCO Bank, while interpreting
Section 446(1) of the 1956 Act, the Court opined that a suit
cannot be instituted once a winding-up order is passed
except by leave of the court. The two- Judge Bench referred
to the earlier decision rendered in Bansidhar Shankarlal v.
Mohd. Ibrahim14, wherein the leave had been obtained at
the time of filing of the suit and the question was whether
fresh leave ought to be obtained before proceeding under
Section 446(1) of the 1956 Act before institution of
execution proceedings. The Court considered the contrary
views expressed by different High Courts on the effect and
purport of Section 446(1) of the 1956 Act and came to the
conclusion that the view that failure to obtain leave prior to
institution of suit would not debar the court from granting
such leave subsequently and that the only consequence of
the same would be that the proceedings would be regarded
as having been instituted on the date on which the leave was
obtained from the High Court.
22. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions solely for
two purposes. First, grant of leave of the court is not a
condition precedent for initiation of a civil action or the
legal proceedings. It is because the section does not
expressly provide for annulment of a proceeding that is
undertaken without the leave of the court. There can be no
shadow of doubt that leave of the winding-up court can be
obtained even after initiation of the proceeding. Second, the
seminal object behind engrafting of the said provision is to
see that the interest of the company is safeguarded so that it
does not face deprivation of its right and claims are
adjudicated without the knowledge of the Company Court
and further the court has a discretion to see whether leave
11/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
should be granted and, if so, with what conditions or no
condition. That apart, the court may grant leave if it felt that
the company should not enter into unnecessary litigation and
incur avoidable expenditure.”
20. From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it is apparent
that, although prior leave of the Court is not obtained, the Court has held that
such leave is not a condition precedent for initiating civil proceedings. The
leave of the Court may, therefore, be obtained subsequently, even after the
institution of the suit proceedings.
21. In the case of Bajaj Hindustan Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
(supra), the Supreme Court at paragraph nos. 6 and 7 has held as under :
“6. From the aforesaid facts, what emerges is that there is
no evasion of any tax. The claim of the appellant that it had
paid the tax at the time of removal of the bags from the
godown is not disputed by the assessing authority. In fact,
as mentioned above, while granting ex post facto approval,
the assessing authority had satisfied itself about the due
payment of the entire tax at the time of removal of the bags
and that there was no evasion of tax. In these
circumstances, we have to consider as to whether ex post
facto approval amount to sufficient compliance with the
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3-A of the Act. The
issue is no more res integra and has been authoritatively
determined by a series of judgments of this Court. It would
be sufficient to refer to the judgment in Ashok Kumar Das
v. University of Burdwan². The discussion contained in
paras 10 to 12 and 15 of the said judgment squarely applies
to the present case and therefore, we reproduce the same:
(SCC pp. 619-20)
“10. The learned counsel for Respondents 1 to 3,
on the other hand, submitted that Section 21(xiii)
12/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
used the expression “approval of the State
Government” and not “prior approval of the State
Government” and it has been held by this Court in
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop.
Housing Society Ltd.3 and High Court of
Judicature of Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh that when an
approval is required, an action holds good and
only if it is disapproved it loses its force. He
further submitted that promotions made on the
basis of Resolution of the Executive Council of
the University adopted on 26-6-1995, therefore,
hold good and now that the State Government has
approved the Resolution of the Executive Council
of the University adopted on 26-6-1995 by Order
dated 10-10-2002, the promotions made on the
basis of the Resolution dated 26-6-1995 of the
Executive Council of the University hold good
and cannot be set aside by this Court.
11. In Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word
“approval” has been explained thus:
‘Approval. The act of confirming, ratifying,
assenting, sanctioning, or consenting to some act
or thing done by another.
Hence, approval to an act or decision can also be
subsequent to the act or decision.
12. In U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad³, this Court
made the distinction between permission, prior
approval and approval. Para 6 of the judgment is
quoted hereinbelow: (SCC pp. 458-59)
‘6. This Court in LIC v. Escorts Ltd.5, considering
the distinction between “special permission” and
“general permission”, “previous approval” or
“prior approval” in para 63 held that: (SCC p.
313).
13/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
“63. we are conscious that the word “prior” or
“previous” may be implied if the contextual
situation or the object and design of the legislation
demands it, we find no such compelling
circumstances justifying reading any such
implication into Section 29(1) [of the Act]”.
Ordinarily, the difference between approval and permission
is that in the first case the action holds good until it is
disapproved, while in the other case it does not become
effective until permission is obtained. But permission
subsequently granted may validate the previous Act. As to
the word “approval” in Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna Textile Mills v.
Workmen, that the Management need not obtain the
previous consent before taking any action. The requirement
that the Management must obtain approval was
distinguished from the requirement that it must obtain
permission, of which mention is made in Section 33(1).
15. The words used in Section 21(xiii) are not “with the
permission of the State Government” nor “with the prior
approval of the State Government”, but “with the approval
of the State Government”. If the words used were “with the
permission of the State Government”, then without the
permission of the State Government the Executive Council
of the University could not determine the terms and
conditions of service of the non-teaching staff. Similarly, if
the words used were “with the prior approval of the State
Government”, the Executive Council of the University
could not determine the terms and conditions of service of
the non-teaching b staff without first obtaining the approval
of the State Government. But since the words used are
“with the approval of the State Government”, the Executive
Council of the University could determine the terms and
conditions of service of the non-teaching staff and obtain
the approval of the State Government subsequently and in
case the State Government did not grant approval
subsequently, any action taken on the basis of the decision
of the Executive Council of the University would be invalid
14/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
and not otherwise.”
7. As is clear from the above, the dictionary meaning of
the word “approval” includes ratifying of the action,
ratification obviously can be given ex post facto approval.
Another aspect which is highlighted is a difference between
approval and permission by the assessing authority that in
the case of approval, the action holds until it is disapproved
while in other case until permission is obtained. In the
instant case, the action was approved by the assessing
authority. The Court also pointed out that if in those cases
where prior approval is required, expression “prior” has to
be in the particular provision. In the proviso to sub-section
(1) of Section 3-A word “prior” is conspicuous. For all
these reasons, it was not a case for levying any penalty
upon the appellant. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set
aside the impugned judgment¹ of the High Court as well as
the penalty. No order as to costs. Civil Appeal No. 1468 of
2006.”.
22. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Erach
Boman and Bajaj Hindustan (supra), it is apparent that where the word
“prior” is used in the statutory provision, the approval contemplated therein
must be obtained before the proposed action is undertaken. Consequently,
where the statute requires prior approval for initiating legal proceedings on
behalf of the corporate debtor, such approval must necessarily precede the
institution of those proceedings.
23. It is evident from the proviso to Section 33(5) that prior permission of
the N.C.L.T. is mandatory before the Liquidator initiates any legal
proceedings on behalf of the corporate debtor. The word ‘prior’ shows that
15/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
the approval has to be prior in point of time before initiating the
proceedings. A notice issued for invocation of arbitration under Section 21
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 constitutes the commencement
of arbitral proceedings. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the
notice under Section 21 was issued without obtaining prior permission from
the N.C.L.T. The record further indicates that such permission was
subsequently granted before the filing of the application under Section 11 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
24. The next issue that arises for consideration is the consequence on the
legal proceedings instituted without obtaining prior permission of the
Adjudicating Authority.
25. The question is whether the proceedings should be entirely set aside,
thereby relegating the parties to initiate the process afresh, or whether the
invocation should be treated as ineffective until the requisite permission is
obtained.
26. Sections 28 of the IBC provides that where the Resolution
Professional takes any action during the corporate insolvency resolution
process without the prior approval of the Committee of Creditors, whenever
such approval is required, the actions undertaken without such approval
would be void under Section 28(4) of the IBC. However, Section 33 does not
16/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
expressly provide for any such consequence in respect of legal proceedings
initiated by the Liquidator without the prior permission of the Adjudicating
Authority.
27. This Court is, therefore, of the view that while prior permission under
Section 33(5) is mandatory, the absence of such prior permission before the
initiation of the legal proceedings, does not render the proceedings void ab
initio. Instead, the commencement of such proceedings remains ineffective
until the date on which the required permission is granted by the
Adjudicating Authority.
28. Accordingly, in the present case, the notice issued for invocation of
arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act would
become effective only from the date on which permission under Section
33(5) is obtained. Any further steps in the proceedings can be taken only
thereafter. Relegating the parties to issue a fresh notice would not serve the
purpose of the proviso to Section 33(5), as it may also create issues relating
to limitation on account of the time lost during the intervening period. A
purposive interpretation of Section 33(5) requires that proceedings initiated
without prior permission remain ineffective for all purposes until such
permission is obtained, and that the proceedings shall be treated as having
commenced from the date of grant of permission.
17/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
29. Therefore, if any further steps have already been taken pursuant to the
notice under Section 21, those steps would also have to be undertaken
afresh. The effective date of the Section 21 notice shall be the date on which
the requisite permission is granted, and all subsequent procedural
requirements shall follow from that date. This interpretation neither causes
violence to the statutory provision nor amounts to rewriting the legislation. It
merely postpones the effective date of invocation until the mandatory
permission under Section 33(5) is obtained. In the present case, the notice
issued under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would
be deemed effective from 23rd December 2022. The present application has
been filed on 10th January 2024. Accordingly, there is no legal impediment
in allowing the present application.
30. Accordingly, this Court process to appoint an Arbitrator and pass
following Order :
ORDER
(A) Mr. Nitin Jamdar, Former Chief Justice of Kerala High Court, is
appointed as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes and
differences between the parties arising out of and in connection with the
Agreement referred to above. The contact details of the Arbitrator are as
18/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
under :-
Mobile No. : 9819829319
Email ID : [email protected]
(B) A copy of this order be communicated to the learned sole Arbitrator by
the Advocates for the Applicant within a period of 1 week from the date of
uploading of this order. The Applicant shall provide the contact and
communication particulars of the parties to the Arbitral Tribunal along with a
copy of this order.
(C) Seat and venue of the arbitration would be governed by the provisions
of the agreement executed between the parties.
(D) Learned sole Arbitrator is requested to forward the statutory Statement
of Disclosure under Section 11(8) read with Section 12(1) of the Act to the
Advocates for the Applicant so as to enable them to file the same in the
Registry of this Court. The Registry of this Court shall retain the said
Statement on the file of this Application and a copy of the same shall be
furnished by the Advocates for the Applicant to the Respondent.
(E) The parties shall appear before the learned sole Arbitrator on such date
and at such place as indicated by him, to obtain appropriate direction with
regard to conduct of the arbitration including fixing a schedule for pleadings,
examination of witnesses, if any, schedule of hearings etc. At such meeting,
the parties shall provide a valid and functional email address along with
19/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
mobile and landline numbers, if any, of the respective Advocates of the
parties to the Arbitral Tribunal. Communications to such email addresses
shall constitute valid service of correspondence in connection with the
arbitration.
(F) All arbitral costs and fees of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be borne by
the parties equally in the first instance and shall be subject to any final
Award that may be passed by the Tribunal in relation to costs.
31. All contentions of the parties are expressly kept open to be raised
before the Arbitrator.
32. With the above directions, Arbitration Application stands disposed of
accordingly.
(ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.)
20/20
2 CARAP 245.2026.doc Dusane
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
