Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Sohrab (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs Tek Chand And Ors on 16 July, 2026
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 217/2011
SOHRAB (DEAD) THR. LRS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
TEK CHAND AND ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
ORDER
1. The Legal representatives of the deceased
Defendant in Civil Suit No.93 of 2003, before the
Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ferozepur,
Jhirka, are the Appellant(s). The Respondent No.1
is the Plaintiff in the said Suit.
2. The Respondent No.1 filed C.S. No. 93 of
2003, for the specific performance of an agreement
to sell dated 22.03.2000, said or alleged to have
been executed by the deceased Appellant. The case
of the Respondent(s) is that the parties to the
agreement to sell finalised the transaction to sell
and purchase the agricultural land, measuring 46
kanals 15 marlas, to the extent of half share,
situated within the revenue estate of Village
Raniyala, Ferozepur, for a total consideration of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Rs.2,70,000/-(Rupees two lakhs seventy thousand
Date: 2026.07.24
19:24:26 IST
Reason:
only). As on the date of the alleged execution of
the suit agreement, the deceased Appellant had
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entered into a deed of mortgage dated 11.03.1998
with ‘Raj Kumar’, the brother of the Respondent(s),
in the Civil Appeal. The suit agreement refers to
the mortgage on the property and also to the
receipt of a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh
twenty thousand only) as an advance. It has been
agreed, as per the tenure of the suit agreement,
between the parties that the balance sale
consideration of Rs.70,000/-(Rupees seventy
thousand only) will be paid by the Respondent(s) to
the Appellant(s), and a regular sale deed is
obtained from the Appellant(s).
3. The default conditions are stipulated in the
agreement. For our purpose, we may note that in the
event of Appellant(s) failing to execute the
registered sale deed on a proper demand by the
Respondent(s), the Respondent(s) are entitled to
get a regular sale deed registered through the
process of law. The reciprocal condition is that,
in the event Appellant(s) are ready and willing to
perform their part under the agreement, and the
Respondent(s) do not cooperate, the Appellant(s)
are entitled to forfeit the advance amount received
under the suit agreement dated 22.03.2000. The
Plaint further avers that despite the demand, the
Appellant(s) have not come forward to execute a
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regular registered sale deed. Hence, the suit is
for specific performance of the agreement to sell
dated 22.03.2000 and also for recovery of
possession from the Appellant(s).
4. Before we refer to the case of the
Appellant(s) in the written statement, we notice
that the suit agreement does not deal with the
possession of the property. The Written Statement
avers that the prayer for specific performance is
unavailable as the agreement is a document as
‘security’ for the amount lent by the Respondent(s)
to the Appellant(s). The land is very valuable, and
consideration doesn’t reflect the then existing
market value. Other observations for the view we
are proposing to take are not adverted to.
5. We have heard learned counsel Mr. R. K.
Kapoor, for the Appellant(s) and learned senior
counsel, Mr. Gagan Gupta, for the Respondent No.1.
6. The Appellant(s) contend that the suit
agreement is not, in fact, an agreement to sell,
between the parties and the transaction between the
Appellant(s) and the Respondent(s) is one of Debtor
and Creditor, and the suit agreement has been
brought into existence as a security for the money,
now lent to the Appellant(s), and there is no
consensus ad idem for bringing into existence the
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suit agreement dated 22.03.2000. The Appellant(s)
further contend that the Respondent(s) are the
money lenders and are in the practice of securing
the amount lent by them to needy persons through
one form or another, including obtaining agreements
in their favour.
7. The Trial Court has taken note of the oral
and documentary evidence and dismissed the Suit.
Resulting in the filing of Civil Appeal No. 178 of
2008 by the Respondent(s).
7.1 On 11.05.2009, the First Appellate Court
allowed the Appeal and decreed C.S. No. 93 of 2003,
filed for specific performance of the agreement to
sell dated 22.03.2000. The findings of the First
Appellate Court are that:
A. The Appellant (defendant/vendor) duly executed
the agreement to sell (Ex. P1) on 22.03.2000 for a
total sale consideration of Rs. 2,70,000/- in
favour of Respondent(s). The execution was
conclusively proved by the testimonies of the
scribe (PW1), the attesting witnesses (PW3 and
PW4), and the plaintiff (PW5). The receipt of Rs.
1,20,000/- as earnest money in cash was also
established. The Respondent(s) successfully proved
that he was always ready and willing to perform his
part of the contract.
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B. The Appellant(s) claimed that the agreement to
sell was procured fraudulently while he was signing
documents to cancel a mortgage for a Rs. 80,000/-
loan. This was found factually illogical because
the mortgage deed was executed in favour of Raj
Kumar, but not the Respondent(s).
C. The First Appellate Court reversed the finding
of the Trial Court that the plaintiff concealed
material facts by failing to disclose similar
agreements he had with other third parties. It was
held that concealment of material facts must relate
specifically to the agreement in dispute. Since the
other agreements were with different persons and
were not in dispute between the present parties,
they were irrelevant to the case, and their non-
disclosure could not legally constitute
concealment.
7.2 The Appellant(s) before us carried the matter
in RSA No. 3357 of 2009 before the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Through the
impugned judgment, the High Court has confirmed the
view taken by the first Appellate Court and thus,
the Appellant(s) challenge the same in the Civil
Appeal before us. The summary of the impugned
judgment is noted as follows:
A. Plaintiff has proved the execution of the
6agreement by himself entering into the witness box
and examining the deed writer and both the
attesting witnesses. The defendant’s plea is that
he repaid the mortgage amount, and accordingly, the
plaintiff had to execute a receipt and deed for
cancellation of mortgage. If this is correct, then
the agreement had to be executed by the plaintiff.
There was no occasion for the defendant to execute
any document or affix his signature or thumb
impressions on any document/impugned agreement.
B. Defendant has not pleaded in his written
statement that the plaintiff has obtained similar
agreements from different persons by playing fraud.
The agreements do not show that they have been
obtained by fraud.
C. Hence, it is apparent that the mortgage amount
had been advanced not by the plaintiff but by his
brother to the defendant. The last date for
execution of the sale deed, as stipulated in the
agreement, was 15.02.2001. The plaintiff served a
notice after 20 months, i.e. on 04.10.2002.
However, relief cannot be denied on this ground
because the plaintiff attended the office of the
Sub-Registrar on 15.02.2001 to get the sale deed
executed, but the defendant himself did not turn
up.
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8. The learned counsel appearing for the
Appellant(s) argues that the scope and jurisdiction
of Regular Second Appeal in the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana, having regard to Section 41 of
the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, is not confined to the
consideration to a substantial question of law, as
may be required in a case exclusively covered by
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Expanding the argument, he contends that the High
Court has not adverted to the non-consideration of
evidence, pointed out by the Appellant(s), and
misreading of evidence, which has not only lead to
confirmation of a finding, which is not available
at the hands of the first Appellate Court, but
finally granted a relief to which a party is not
entitled to, in a suit for specific performance. To
wit, it is argued that there is an inconsistency
between the oral and the documentary evidence of
the improvements to prove the alleged execution of
an agreement to sell. The oral evidence ought not
to have been read in pieces, but a combined reading
of the very oral evidence, on which so much
emphasis is laid by the Plaintiff for specific
performance, belied the case of the existence of an
agreement to sell dated 22.03.2000.
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9. The learned counsel commended to us the
categorical statements, which, according to him,
would show that what has been brought into
existence is not an agreement to sell but a form of
security for the amount borrowed by the
Appellant(s) from the Respondent(s). He invited our
attention to a few of the findings in the impugned
judgment and, as the first and foremost argument,
contends that either this Court may, to meet the
ends of justice, undertake the exercise of re-
appreciating the evidence and record a finding
available in the facts, as established by evidence.
He has referred to a few other arguments on the
merits of the matter, which we would have liked to
examine if we were not in agreement with the
learned counsel for the Appellant(s) on the first
argument.
10. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No. 1, argues that the impugned judgment
in the Civil Appeal merely confirms the view taken
by the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 178 of
2008. He relies on this Court’s view in
Girijanandini Devi and Others v. Bijendra Narain
Choudhary,1 where it was held that when the
appellate court agrees with the trial court’s view
1 1966 SCC OnLine SC 236 (Para 13).
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on the evidence, it is not its duty to restate the
effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons
given by the trial court. An expression of general
agreement with the reasons given in the decision
under appeal would ordinarily suffice. According to
him, this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
examines the confirmation of the finding of fact by
the High Court through the prism of the view taken
by the Appellate Court. In the facts and
circumstances of this case, re-appreciation of
evidence by this Court is not needed.
Alternatively, it is argued that the re-
appreciation of evidence is undertaken by the High
Court, keeping in perspective the jurisdiction of a
Regular Second Appeal applicable to the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana.
11. We have perused the impugned judgment and,
for the limited purpose of appreciating whether the
impugned judgment, though not as elaborate as now
expected by the Appellant(s), still satisfies the
requirement of complete adjudication of the
dispute.
12. In the circumstances of this case, we are of
the view that it may not be correct to say that the
impugned judgment suffers from brevity, but what we
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notice after going through the impugned judgment is
that, while confirming the view of the Appellate
Court, the needed independent consideration is
lacking in the impugned judgment. The High Court
was testing the legality and correctness of the
judgment which reverses the view taken by the Trial
Court. The reliability of evidence, which was a
factor before the Trial Court, is not taken note of
by the First Appellate Court. Appreciating oral
evidence in the backdrop of documentary evidence
would have conformed to the requirement. We would
have appreciated the evidence and tested whether
there is non-consideration of oral evidence or
conclusions unavailable have been drawn by the
Appellate Court. Therefore, to give a proper and
complete hearing before the High Court and while
disagreeing with the argument of learned senior
counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 1, we are
of the view that the judgment in RSA No. 3357 of
2009 warrants interference, is set aside, the
matter is remitted to the High Court for
consideration afresh uninfluenced by any of the
observations made by us for the limited purpose of
remitting the matter to the High Court.
13. The Civil Appeal stands allowed in the above
terms, and it is needless to observe that pending
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the final decision of RSA No. 3357 of 2009, the
interim order dated 11.03.2011, passed in this
Civil Appeal, shall remain in operation.
14. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
……………………………………………………J.
[S.V.N. BHATTI]
……………………………………………………J.
[N.V. ANJARIA]
NEW DELHI;
JULY 16, 2026.
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ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.16 SECTION IV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No. 217/2011
SOHRAB (DEAD) THR. LRS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
TEK CHAND AND ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 16-07-2026 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.V.N. BHATTI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIAFor Appellant(s) Mr. R K Kapoor, Adv.
Ms. Shweta Kapoor, Adv.
Mr. Rajat Kapoor, Adv.
Ms. Kriti, Adv.
Ms. Aakriti Kapila, Adv.
Ms. Najreena Sheikh, Adv.
Ms. Kheyali Singh, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Gagan Gupta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Ananta Prasad Mishra, AOR
Mr. Saurabh Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Jasbir Singh, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The civil appeal stands allowed in terms of
the signed order which is placed on the file.
2. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
(SNEHA DAS) (NIDHI MATHUR) COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
