Telangana High Court
Faiyaz Ahmed vs Smt. Dr. Priyanka Ala, Ias on 29 June, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR THE STATE OF
TELANGANA
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
CONTEMPT CASE No. 1792 OF 2025
29.06.2026
Between:
Faiyaz Ahmed
..... Petitioner
And
Dr. Priyanka Ala, IAS,
Secretary,
Telangana State Public Service Commission
..... Respondent
O R D E R:
The image of justice in the popular imagination is
that of a woman who is blind-folded with a weighing scale in her
hand. The blindfold represents the idea of impartiality i.e. the
belief that the judge has to be completely neutral and decide the
matter before her without being influenced by any consideration
other than the merits of the case.
By Saurabh Kirpal (Chapter 11 – The Telecom
Counter-Revolution from FIFTEEN JUDGMENTS CASES THAT
SHAPED INDIA’S FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE)
Respondent authorities appear to be on the
erroneous assumption that symbolism of the blindfold denotes
inability of the justice delivery system to perceive or take
cognizance of manifest illegality. The contemporary conception
2
of Justice, as reflected in the recently unveiled Nyay Devatha by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, depicts Lady Justice with open
eyes, signifying that the law is neither oblivious nor indifferent,
but remains vigilant and sees every citizen equally while
administering justice without fear or favour. Further significant
is the replacement of the traditional sword with the Constitution
of India, symbolizing that the constitutional values, the rule of
law, and the protection of fundamental rights constitute the
true foundation of the justice delivery system, and not the
punitive legacy of colonial jurisprudence.
*****
The present Contempt Case is filed aggrieved by the
action of Respondent in willfully and deliberately disobeying and
violating the directions contained in the final order dated
29.04.2025 in Writ Petition No. 28765 of 2019.
2. Petitioner appeared in the recruitment process
conducted by the Telangana State Public Service Commission
pursuant to Notification No. 54 of 2017 dated 21.10.2017 for
the post of Language Pandit Urdu in the Department of School
Education and is the next eligible meritorious candidate who
was denied appointment against a local vacancy in
Mahabubnagar District under the Open Competition General
category. He filed the present Writ Petition aggrieved by the
3
action of the Respondents in not selecting him against the L(G)
or UR(G) vacancies in Mahabubnagar District, though he is the
next eligible meritorious candidate, and by the publication of
the impugned provisional Selection Notification (Language
Pandit Urdu) dated 29.03.2019 of the provisionally selected
candidates for appointment to the post of Language Pandit Urdu
under the 1st Respondent, notified vide Notification No. 54 of
2017 dated 21.10.2017, thereby denying Petitioner his right to
be considered against the local vacancy as per his merit and
eligibility, which action was assailed as arbitrary, illegal,
without jurisdiction and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the
Constitution of India.
2.1. The Writ Petition was disposed of at an earlier stage
vide order dated 24.06.2021, directing Respondents to fill all the
unfilled vacancies strictly by following Rule 6-A of the Telangana
State Public Service Commission Rules. Thereafter,
Respondents preferred Writ Appeal No. 533 of 2021 and batch
and the Division Bench vide order dated 26.10.2021 set aside
the order of the learned Single Judge and remanded the matter
to deal with each and every individual writ petition. On remand,
this Court heard the matter at length and vide final order dated
29.04.2025, allowed the Writ Petition in terms of the order
passed in Writ Petition No. 19242 of 2019 dated 21.03.2025,
4
directing Telangana State Public Service Commission, to select
and appoint the Petitioner as per his merit against the unfilled
or unclaimed vacancies by removing the names of the
candidates who could have relinquished to the post of Language
Pandit (Urdu) under Notification No. 54 of 2017 dated
21.10.2017. The operative portion of the order dated
29.04.2025 reads as under:
” The 2nd respondent is directed to select and appoint
petitioners as per their merit against the unfilled/unclaimed vacancies
by removing the names of the candidates who could have relinquished
to the post of Language Pandit (Telugu) under Notification No. 54 of
2017, dated 21.10.2017. In terms of the order dated 21.03.2025 in W.P.
No. 19242 of 2019, and for the reasons alike, this Writ Petition is also
allowed. No Costs.”
The said order became final as no Writ Appeal was preferred by
Respondents against the said order, and the same acquired the
character of a final binding judicial order, mandating
compliance without any option or discretion being vested in the
Respondents. The order was duly communicated to the
Respondents, who were called upon to comply with the same
and to select and appoint the Petitioner against the unfilled or
unclaimed vacancies in Mahabubnagar District for the post of
Language Pandit Urdu under Notification No. 54 of 2017 dated
21.10.2017.
5
2.2. It is stated, shockingly and in total disregard of the
authority of this Court, Respondents, instead of complying with
the directions issued, proceeded to issue a rejection order vide
Memo No. 707/TRT/Rectt-1/4/2017 dated 23.05.2025, by
which they have categorically stated that they will not select the
Petitioner, thereby willfully disobeying and defying the order of
this Court. This Court had given a clear and positive direction to
Respondents to select and issue appointment orders in favour of
Petitioner. In that event, no discretion whatsoever was vested in
Respondents to issue a rejection order, and the issuance of
such a rejection order is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
order dated 29.04.2025 as well as contrary to the law laid down
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Telangana State Level Police
Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi 1, which has already
been considered and answered by this Court in the order passed
in Writ Petition No. 19242 of 2019 dated 21.03.2025.
2.3. It is further stated, petitioner had obtained
information through the Right to Information Act, 2005 from the
concerned educational department regarding the vacancies, and
the information so obtained revealed that there are several
unfilled and non-joining vacancies. The reasoning given by the
Respondent in rejecting the candidature of Petitioner vide
1
(2017) 14 SCC 797
6
rejection order dated 23.05.2025 is in respect of DSC-2024, that
all the backlog and non-joining vacancies of TRT-2017 were
notified in DSC-2024 and the same were filled by eligible
candidates. This reasoning is unsustainable and contrary to the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Telangana State
Level Police Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi, which
has already been considered and answered by this Court.
2.4. According to petitioner, Respondent had committed
serious and grave contempt by deliberately and wilfully
disobeying and violating the orders of this Court and thereby
undermining the authority of this Court. Respondents are
accordingly liable to be punished under Sections 10 to 12 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for their willful disobedience of
the directions of this Court contained in the order dated
29.04.2025. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Baranagore Jute Factory PLC Mazdoor
Sangh (BMS) v. Baranagore Jute Factory PLC 2, wherein at
Para No. 23, the Court observed that as held in DDA v. Skipper
Construction Co. (P) Ltd., the Court has a duty to issue
appropriate directions for remedying or rectifying the things
done in violation of the orders, and in that regard the Court may
even take restitutive measures at any stage of the proceedings.
2
(2017) 5 SCC 506
7
3. Respondent filed a counter contending as follows:
The subject matter of the present contempt case
relates to the recruitment to the post of Language Pandit Urdu
Medium in the Department of School Education, as issued by
the Telangana Public Service Commission vide Notification No.
54/2017 dated 21.10.2017. Telangana State Public Service
Commission had notified 26 posts of Language Pandit Urdu vide
Notification No. 54/2017 dated 21.10.2017 in six districts of
erstwhile Telangana, namely Adilabad, Karimnagar, Nizamabad,
Mahabubnagar, Medak and Ranga Reddy. The post of Language
Pandit Urdu is a district cadre post, and candidates are selected
and allotted to the Service or Department as per their rank in
the merit list and as per District Preference for allotment of
candidates against the vacancies available.
3.1. It is stated, candidates were provisionally selected
for appointment to the post of Language Pandit Urdu, duly after
obtaining relinquishment from the candidates who were selected
to the post of School Assistant Urdu. It is pertinent to mention
that when the Commission sought relinquishment from the
selected candidates of SA Urdu, no candidate had opted for
relinquishment to the post of Language Pandit Urdu. That out of
the total 26 vacancies notified, only 09 candidates were selected
and 17 vacancies were left unfilled due to non-availability of
8eligible candidates in the respective communities, namely
02-BC-A, 01-BC-B, 01-BC-C, 01-BC-D, 06-SC, 04-ST and 02-
PH.
3.2. Petitioner bearing Hall Ticket No. 1754300211
belongs to BC-E community in Mahabubnagar District and
secured 56.263 marks and did not come within the Zone of
Selection in the BC-E category or in the OC category, due to his
low merit. All the OC and BC-E vacancies are already filled. The
Petitioner as such does not fall in the category of vacancies that
remained unfilled. Regarding the unfilled vacancies, as per the
reservation rules, the roster points specifically meant for
reserved communities cannot be filled by candidates from other
communities. In the event of non-availability of a suitable
person at the roster point, the existing rules mandate carrying
forward that point to the succeeding recruitment year. TGPSC
strictly follows the rules of reservation laid down under Rule 22
of the Telangana State and Subordinate Service Rules.
Therefore, Petitioner cannot be considered for selection in the
unfilled vacancies in accordance with the extant Rules and
Government Orders which are in force as on the date of the
Notification. TGPSC is a recruiting body and is not authorised to
relax the rules at its own discretion.
9
3.3. Regarding the unclaimed or non-joining vacancies,
after sending the Unit List to the appointing authorities, if any
vacancy is left from the Unit List for any reason, G.O. Ms. No.
81 will come into force and those vacancies will be treated as
non-joining vacancies and will be filled up in the subsequent
recruitment as per G.O. Ms. No. 81, G.A. (Ser-A) Dept., dated
22.02.1997 and G.O. Ms. No. 544, G.A. (Ser-A) Dept., dated
04.12.1998. The selected candidates, who are not inclined to be
appointed are required to submit their relinquishment to the
Commission, but not to the Unit Officer after sending the Unit
List to the appointing authorities. This Court in order dated
21.03.2025 in W.P. No. 16580 of 2024 has upheld the same.
3.4. Regarding the removal of names of candidates who
could have relinquished to the post of Language Pandit Urdu, it
is submitted that the relinquishment option is relevant only at a
particular point of time when the selections are being finalised.
After conclusion of selections to a post, it is not feasible to
remove the names of candidates who could have relinquished to
the post of Language Pandit Urdu. As per the Rules, the selected
candidates who are not inclined to be appointed have to submit
their relinquishment to the Commission and not to the Unit
Officer after sending the Unit List to the appointing authorities.
10
3.5. In compliance of the order dated 29.04.2025, a
letter bearing No. 708/TRT/Rectt.1/4/2017 dated 06.05.2025
was addressed to the Director of School Education Department
as per the common orders of this Court in Writ Petition No.
9626 of 2019 and batch, regarding the availability of non-
joining vacancies. In response, letter dated 19.05.2025 was
received from the Director of School Education, informing that
there were 03 vacancies (i.e. 01 vacancy in Local Body Plain and
02 vacancies in Government Plain) in which candidates had not
joined in Mahabubnagar District for the post of Language Pandit
Urdu, and that these vacancies were already notified in the
subsequent recruitment of DSC-2024.
3.6. In view of the aforesaid facts, there are no unfilled
or non-joining vacancies available for the post of Language
Pandit Urdu Medium under Notification No. 54/2017 dated
21.10.2017. The Petitioner was accordingly informed of the said
facts vide Memo No. 707/TRT/Rectt-1/4/2017 dated
23.05.2025. The Department of School Education issued a
Notification for filling up vacant teacher posts in Government
Schools as well as in Zilla Parishad or Mandal Parishad Schools.
Teachers Recruitment Test (DSC-2024) was held from
18.07.2024 to 05.08.2024 and results were released on
30.09.2024. After the declaration of results in DSC-2024, merit
11
lists were generated and certificate verification at the ratio of 1:3
was held from 01.10.2024 to 05.10.2024. Appointment orders
were issued to the candidates on 09.10.2024 as per merit and
as per rank obtained by the candidates. All the vacancies in
DSC-2024 were filled up on 09.10.2024 and the orders of this
Court were issued on 21.03.2025, which was much later, after
the vacancies in DSC-2024 had already been filled.
3.7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in A.V. Bhogeswarudu v.
APPSC 3 held that the only point which requires consideration is
as to whether, out of the names recommended for appointment,
some candidates do not join, whether the vacancies remaining
unfilled should or should not be filled up from out of the
remaining successful candidates. The Court saw no justification
in the stand of the State Public Service Commission that instead
of filling up the vacancies by recommending the candidates next
in order of merit out of the present list, a fresh selection should
be made. The Court accordingly, directed that the number of
vacancies remaining to be filled up on account of non-joining of
select candidates, for whatever reason, shall be from out of the
present list.
4. Petitioner filed a reply contending that
Respondents have committed serious and grave contempt by
3
JT 1989(4) SC 130
12
deliberately and willfully disobeying and violating the orders of
this Court and the so-called compliance attempted by them is
nothing but a sham, mechanical and a paper exercise entirely
lacking in good faith. The rejection order vide Memo No.
707/TRT/Rectt-1/4/2017 dated 23.05.2025 was issued by
Respondents in purported compliance of the order of this Court
dated 21.03.2025, but in reality it was issued mechanically,
without any application of mind, totally ignoring the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the subject issue, and it
rejected the Petitioner’s request as well as failed to comply with
the positive direction given by this Hon’ble Court.
4.1. It is stated, the reasoning given by the Respondents
in their rejection order dated 23.05.2025, that the vacancies in
TRT-2017 were notified in DSC-2024 and filled by eligible
candidates, is unsustainable and directly contrary to the law
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Telangana State Level
Police Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi 4, which was
already considered and answered by this Hon’ble Court in the
order in Writ Petition No. 19242 of 2019 dated 21.03.2025.
4.2. This Court had given a clear and positive direction
to Respondents to select and issue appointment orders. No
discretion whatsoever was vested in the Respondents to issue a
4
(2017) 14 SCC 797
13
rejection order, and the issuance of such rejection orders is
contrary to the order of this Court as well as to the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is stated, there were several
unfilled and non-joining vacancies as disclosed by the RTI
information obtained from the concerned educational
department, and Respondents cannot be permitted to take
shelter behind the alleged subsequent recruitment of DSC-2024
so as to frustrate a final order of this Court that had already
directed them to appoint the Petitioner against such vacancies.
The present Contempt Case is filed to show volumes as to how
Respondents treat the orders of this Court and what respect
they have for the authority of this Court. Respondents have
clearly and contumaciously undermined the authority of this
Court by wilfully disobeying its final and binding order
5. Heard Sri Allika Suresh, learned counsel for
petitioner as well as Sri P.S. Rajasekhar, learned Standing
Counsel for TGSPC on behalf of respondent.
6. The genesis of the present contempt lies in the
proceedings arising from Notification No. 54/2017 dated
21.10.2017, issued by the Telangana State Public Service
Commission for the recruitment to 26 posts of Language Pandit
Urdu in six districts of erstwhile Telangana, pursuant to which
Petitioner appeared as a candidate. Having been denied
14
appointment despite being the next eligible meritorious
candidate against the local vacancy under OC (G) in
Mahabubnagar District, the Petitioner approached this Court by
way of this Writ Petition.
7. The matter travelled through considerable
procedural history. An earlier order dated 24.06.2021 directing
compliance with Rule 6-A of the Telangana State Public Service
Commission Rules was set aside by the Division Bench vide
order dated 26.10.2021 in W.A. No. 533 of 2021 and batch, and
the matter was remanded to be heard on individual facts. On
remand, this Court after examining the facts of Writ Petition No.
19242 of 2019 rendered a detailed reasoned order on
21.03.2025 therein, and on the very same basis extended the
identical relief to the Petitioner herein vide order under
contempt. The operative direction issued by this Court reads as
follows:
” The 2nd Respondent is directed to select and appoint the
Petitioner as per his merit against the unfilled or unclaimed vacancies
by removing the names of the candidates who could have relinquished
to the post of Language Pandit (Urdu) under Notification No. 54 of 2017
dated 21.10.2017. The said order became final, as no Writ Appeal was
preferred against it”.
8. Before examining whether Respondents have
complied with the said order, it is necessary to understand the
15
true character of the direction issued. The order is not a
direction to consider the candidature of Petitioner or to examine
the matter afresh at the discretion of the Respondent. It is a
positive, mandatory and unambiguous direction to select and
appoint Petitioner against the unfilled or unclaimed vacancies.
The use of the phrase “directed to select and appoint” leaves no
room for any other interpretation. It is well settled that when a
court issues a positive direction to a public authority to perform
a specific act, the authority has no residual discretion to refuse
compliance or to substitute its own judgment for that of the
court.
9. The order was not passed in isolation. The
reasoning of this Court in Writ Petition No. 19242 of 2019 dated
21.03.2025, which directly informs the order in Writ Petition No.
28765 of 2019, rested squarely on the law declared by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Telangana State Level Police
Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi, wherein it was held
that if a candidate has not gone through the process of
recruitment and has not done what was required to be done by
him, the vacancy cannot be construed as one that has to be
carried forward to the next recruitment process. An
interpretation that leaves a large number of vacancies unfilled
would go against the very ethos of providing public employment
16
to eligible and meritorious candidates. The Court in Writ
Petition No. 19242 of 2019 had specifically noted that TGPSC’s
stand was unsustainable and contrary to the law so laid down.
Respondents were present in those proceedings and never
challenged the said order. In that context, the binding force of
the direction in Writ Petition No. 28765 of 2019 dated
29.04.2025 admits of no dilution.
10. Respondents’ case is that they have complied with
the order of this Court. Their purported compliance consists of
two steps: first, they wrote a letter bearing No.
708/TRT/Rectt.1/4/2017 dated 06.05.2025 to the Director of
School Education seeking information regarding unfilled or non-
joining vacancies under Notification No. 54 of 2017 in the
Petitioner’s category and district; second, upon receiving a reply
dated 19.05.2025 from the Director of School Education
informing that there were 03 non-joining vacancies in
Mahabubnagar District for the post of Language Pandit Urdu,
being 01 in Local Body Plain and 02 in Government Plain, and
that these vacancies had already been notified in DSC-2024, the
Respondents proceeded to issue a rejection order to the
Petitioner vide Memo No. 707/TRT/Rectt-1/4/2017 dated
23.05.2025.
17
11. This Court is unable to accept that the aforesaid
chain of events constitutes compliance with the order dated
29.04.2025 in any meaningful sense. The court’s direction was
a positive and mandatory one. Respondents were not directed to
make an enquiry and reject Petitioner’s claim if no vacancy was
found to exist. The direction was to select and appoint the
Petitioner against the unfilled or unclaimed vacancies, by
removing the names of candidates who could have relinquished.
The manner in which Respondents have approached the matter,
as though they were doing Petitioner a favour by enquiring and
then promptly rejecting him, is precisely the kind of mechanical
and bad faith compliance that cannot be countenanced. A
court’s order is not a license to investigate and refuse. It is a
command to act.
12. The plea that non-joining vacancies of TRT-2017
were notified and filled in DSC-2024 deserves close
examination. The Director of School Education informed the
TGPSC vide letter dated 19.05.2025 that there were 03 non-
joining vacancies in Mahabubnagar District for Language Pandit
Urdu under Notification No. 54/2017, and that these had been
included in the subsequent notification and notified in DSC-
2024. However, the critical fact to be noted is that all the
vacancies in DSC-2024 were filled up on 09.10.2024, and the
18
orders of this Hon’ble Court were issued on 21.03.2025 in W.P.
No. 19242 of 2019 and on 29.04.2025 in W.P. No. 28765 of
2019, both of which came into existence long after the DSC-
2024 vacancies were filled. The Respondents are therefore
seeking to use the filling of DSC-2024 vacancies, an event that
preceded the court’s order, as a ground to defeat the very order
that was intended to remedy the wrong done to Petitioner.
13. The conduct of the Respondents in including the
TRT-2017 non-joining vacancies in DSC-2024 without awaiting
the outcome of Writ Petition No. 28765 of 2019 and the
connected batch, which were pending before this Court, cannot
be used to defeat the final direction of this Court. To permit
such reasoning to prevail would be to allow a litigant to benefit
from acts done in the teeth of pending litigation and to render
the court’s final order a dead letter. That is not a course this
Court can accept.
14. Respondents also rely upon the fact that the
Petitioner secured 56.263 marks, belongs to BC-E category, and
was not within the zone of consideration for OC or BC-E
vacancies. However, this argument had already been raised
before this Court in Writ Petition No. 28765 of 2019 at the
hearing stage, and this Court, after considering the said
contention, allowed the Writ Petition by the order dated
19
29.04.2025. The Respondents are bound by that finding. It is
not open to a contemnor to re-agitate in contempt proceedings
the very defences that were considered and rejected by this
Court in the original proceedings. To do so would be to allow an
oblique review of the original order under the guise of resisting
contempt.
15. The further submission of the Respondents that the
relinquishment option is relevant only at a particular point of
time when selections are being finalized, and that it is not
feasible to remove the names of candidates who could have
relinquished after the conclusion of selections, is again a
contention that goes to the merits of the original order and
cannot be entertained in contempt proceedings. This Court had
specifically directed the removal of names of candidates who
could have relinquished and the selection of the Petitioner in
their place. That direction was passed after hearing all parties
and considering all relevant submissions. It is binding and must
be obeyed.
16. Respondents have contended in the Counter
Affidavit that the Respondent tenders an unconditional apology
if this Court feels that the orders dated 29.04.2025 have been
disobeyed. The filing of an unconditional apology does not by
itself absolve a contemnor. An apology, to be meaningful, must
20
be accompanied by actual compliance. Where a litigant merely
offers a verbal apology without undoing the disobedience or
committing to immediate compliance, the apology cannot be
treated as a sufficient response to a finding of willful contempt.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has consistently held that the court
must be satisfied not only with the expression of remorse but
also with the contemnor’s genuine intention and ability to
comply with the order in question.
17. On a holistic consideration of the facts and
circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the Respondents
have willfully and deliberately disobeyed the order dated
29.04.2025 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 28765 of
2019. The issuance of the rejection order vide Memo No.
707/TRT/Rectt-1/4/2017 dated 23.05.2025, barely a month
after the final order of this Court, with categorical statements
that the Petitioner will not be selected, constitutes a clear,
defiant and contumacious act of disobedience. The order of this
Court had given a clear positive direction, and the Respondents
had no option but to comply with it. No discretion was vested in
the Respondents to issue a rejection order, and the doing so is a
direct violation of the order of this Court and of the authority of
this institution.
21
18. Respondents have attempted to dress up their non-
compliance as a reasoned exercise of applying the court’s
direction to the facts, and then rejecting the Petitioner on the
ground that no vacancies are available. This Court has
examined that exercise and found it to be hollow and not in
good faith. The court’s direction was not to enquire and reject. It
was to select and appoint. The attempt to convert a mandatory
positive direction into a permission to refuse is itself an act of
contempt.
19. This Court also notes that this is not a case of
inadvertent or bona fide difficulty in complying with an
ambiguous order. The order was clear and was passed after a
fully contested hearing. The Respondents chose to remain silent
in appeal and then proceeded to reject the Petitioner’s claim in a
calculated manner. The conduct of the Respondents shows
volumes about the respect they have for the authority of this
Court.
20. This Court is also placing reliance upon the law
laid down in Celir LLP v. Mr. Sumathi Prasad Bafna 5,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that once a court passes
an order, the said order is required to be complied with in letter
and spirit, and that a party cannot be permitted to sit in
5
2024 INSC 978
22
judgment over the order of the court and decide for itself
whether to comply with it or not. The Hon’ble Apex Court
further held that when a court passes a clear and unequivocal
direction, the authority or party bound by such direction is
under an absolute obligation to comply with the same, and that
any attempt to wriggle out of the said obligation by raising
technical pleas or by advancing justifications that were either
already considered or ought to have been raised before the court
that passed the order, would amount to willful disobedience
constituting contempt. The Hon’ble Apex Court also made it
clear that where a party has chosen not to challenge the order
by preferring an appeal and has allowed the same to attain
finality, such a party cannot be heard to raise objections to
compliance at the stage of contempt proceedings, as the
correctness of the order is no longer open for examination at
that stage. The operative portion of the judgment is extracted
hereunder:
” 182.In order to decide whether the appellants are guilty of
civil contempt, it would be apposite to refer to Section 2(b) of the Act,
1971, which reads as under:
“2. Definitions.-
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
xxx xxx xxx
(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach
of an undertaking given to a court;”
23
183. The Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, at page 1599,
defines “willful” as hereunder: –
“Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary; knowingly;
deliberate. Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional;
purposeful; not accidental or involuntary. Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or
with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural consequences; unlawful;
without legal justification. An act or omission is “willfully” done, if done voluntarily and
intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific
intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose
either to disobey or to disregard the law. It is a word of many meanings, with its
construction often influenced by its context. In civil actions, the word (willfully) often denotes
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But
when used in a criminal context it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without
justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.”
184. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and
Ors. reported in (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression ‘wilful disobedience’ in
the context of Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 was read to mean an act or
omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do
something, which the law forbids or with the specific intention to fail to
do something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness signifies
deliberate action done with evil intent and bad motive and purpose. It
should not be an act, which requires and is dependent upon, either
wholly or partly, any act or omission by a third party for compliance.
185. Hence, the expression or word “wilful” means act or
omission which is done voluntarily or intentionally and with the specific
intent to do something which the law forbids or with the specific intent
to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say with
bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a
deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose.
186. Article 129 of the Constitution declares this Court as a “a
court of record” and states that it shall have all the powers of such a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The
provisions of the Act, 1971 and the Rules framed thereunder form a part
of a special statutory jurisdiction that is vested in courts to punish an
offending party for its contemptuous conduct. It needs no emphasis that
the power of contempt ought to be exercised sparingly with great care
and caution. The contemptuous act complained of must be such that
would result in obstruction of justice, adversely affect the majesty of law
and impact the dignity of the courts of law.
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187. It must also be understood that contempt proceedings are
sui generis inasmuch as the Law of Evidence and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 are not to be strictly applied. At the same time, the
procedure adopted during the contempt proceedings must be fair and
just that is to say the principles governing the Rule of law must be
extended to the party against whom contempt proceedings have been
initiated. The party must have every opportunity to place its position
before the Court. Such a party must not be left unheard under any
circumstances.
188. In Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj & Ors. reported in (2014)
16 SCC 204 it was held that the contempt jurisdiction conferred on to
the law courts power to punish an offender not only for his wilful
disobedience but also for contumacious conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law. It further observed that such power has been conferred
for the simple reason that the respect and authority commanded by the
courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his
rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society
will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. The
relevant observations read as under: –
“11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts power to punish
an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty
of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the
greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the entire
democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is
undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of
the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus,
otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the
law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all
reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
189. In Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr. reported in
(2000) 2 SCC 367 this Court held that the purpose of contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law
since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
led to be distorted, as any indulgence which can even remotely be
termed to affect the majesty of law would result in the society losing its
confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts forfeiting the
25
trust and confidence of the people in general. The relevant observations
read as under: –
“9 […] The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity
of the courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by courts of law are the greatest
guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble
down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged
by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which can even
remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and
faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the
people in general.”
(Emphasis supplied)
190. In Pushpaben & Anr. v. Narandas Badiani & Anr.
reported in (1979) 2 SCC 394, it was held that contempt of court is a
special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever
an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends to
impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial
institutions. It further held that this jurisdiction is to be exercised not
for the protection of the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the
administration of justice from being maligned and ensure that the
authority of the courts is neither imperilled nor is the administration of
justice by it interfered with in any manner. The relevant observations
read as under: –
” 42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly
and with caution whenever an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which
tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions.
This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely affects the
majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the
majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining “the
jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any
claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an
individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the
general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be
imperilled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It
is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is
exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law
and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to
shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice.
(Emphasis supplied)
191. In Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian
Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (1988) 4
26
SCC 592 it was observed that the process of due course of
administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and
the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or
circumvented. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 35. The question of contempt must be judged in a particular situation. The
process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and the effect of the
judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by public agitation or
publications. It has to be remembered that even at turbulent times through which the
developing countries are passing, contempt of court means interference with the due
administration of justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
192. In Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora reported in
(1996) 6 SCC 14, it was observed that even if parties have not filed an
undertaking before the court but if the court was induced to sanction a
particular course of action or inaction on the representation made by a
party and the court ultimately finds that the party never intended to act
on the said representation or such representation was false, the party
would be guilty of committing contempt. The relevant observations read
as under: –
” 12. Law is well settled that if any party gives an undertaking to the court to
vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted under the orders of the court and
there is a clear and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt but since, in the
present case, the respondent did not file any undertaking as envisaged in the order of this
Court the question of his being punished for breach thereof does not arise. However, in our
considered view even in a case where no such undertaking is given, a party to a litigation
may be held liable for such contempt if the court is induced to sanction a particular course of
action or inaction on the basis of the representation of such a party and the court ultimately
finds that the party never intended to act on such representation or such representation was
false. In other words, if on the representation of the respondent herein the Court was
persuaded to pass the order dated 5-10-1995 extending the time for vacation of the suit
premises, he may be held guilty of contempt of court, notwithstanding non-furnishing of the
undertaking, if it is found that the representation was false and the respondent never
intended to act upon it. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
193. The Borrower and the Subsequent Transferee / the alleged
contemnors herein placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Patel
Rajnikant (supra) have contended that in the absence of any
disobedience or wilful breach of a prohibitory order no contempt could
27
be said to have been committed. It has been further canvased that this
Court in the Main Appeals never issued any specific direction either to
the Borrower or the Subsequent Transferee, & therefore no contempt
could be said to have been committed.
194. In Patel Rajnikant (supra), this Court upon examining
Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 held that to hold a person guilty of having
committed contempt, there must be a judgment, order, direction etc. by
a court, there must be disobedience of such judgment, order, direction
etc and that such disobedience must be willful.
” 58. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 have also
been invoked. Section 2 of the Act is a definition clause. Clause (a) enacts that contempt of
court means “civil contempt or criminal contempt”. Clause (b) defines “civil contempt”
thus:
” 2. (b) ‘civil contempt’ means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to
a court;”
Reading of the above clause makes it clear that the following conditions
must be satisfied before a person can be held to have committed a civil contempt:
(i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court (or an undertaking given to a court);
(ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a court (or breach of undertaking given to a court); and
(iii) such disobedience of judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court (or breach of undertaking) must be wilful.”
195. However, the subsequent observations made by this Court
in Patel Rajnikant (supra) are significant. It observed that the court
should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt, it is for
the proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with
the orders passed by it in order to uphold and maintain the dignity of
courts and majesty of law. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 70. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a person for contempt
of court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same
time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the court to uphold and maintain the
dignity of courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper
administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a court, it
is required to take strict view under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent
weapon of contempt.
(Emphasis supplied)
196. What can be discerned from the above exposition of law is
that any act of disobedience, defiance, or any attempt to malign the
authority of the court would amount to contempt because they
28
undermine the respect and trust that the public reposes in judicial
institutions. The judicial process relies on the confidence of society, and
any act that disrupts or disrespects this process threatens to erode the
foundation of justice and order.
197. Contempt jurisdiction exists to preserve the majesty and
sanctity of the law. Courts are the guardians of justice, and their
decisions must command respect and compliance to ensure the proper
functioning of society. When individuals or entities challenge the
authority of courts through wilful disobedience or obstructive behaviour,
they undermine the rule of law and create the risk of anarchy. Contempt
serves as a mechanism to protect the integrity of the courts, ensuring
that they remain a symbol of fairness, impartiality, and accountability.
198. When judicial orders are openly flouted or court proceedings
are disrespected, it sends a signal that the rule of law is ineffective,
leading to a loss of trust in the system. Judicial decisions must remain
unimpaired, free from external pressures, manipulation, or
circumvention. Acts that attempt to mislead the court, obstruct its
functioning or frustrate its decisions distort the process of justice and
would amount to contempt.
199. The contempt jurisdiction of this court cannot be construed
by any formulaic or rigid approach. Merely because there is no
prohibitory order or no specific direction issued the same would not
mean that the parties cannot be held guilty of contempt. The Contempt
jurisdiction of the court extends beyond the mere direct disobedience of
explicit orders or prohibitory directions issued by the court. Even in the
absence of such specific mandates, the deliberate conduct of parties
aimed at frustrating court proceedings or circumventing its eventual
decision may amount to contempt. This is because such actions strike
at the heart of the judicial process, undermining its authority and
obstructing its ability to deliver justice effectively. The authority of
courts must be respected not only in the letter of their orders but also in
the broader spirit of the proceedings before them.
200. Any contumacious conduct of the parties to bypass or
nullify the decision of the court or render it ineffective, or to frustrate
the proceedings of the court, or to ensure any undue advantage
therefrom would amount to contempt. Attempts to sidestep the court’s
29
jurisdiction or manipulate the course of litigation through dishonest or
obstructive conduct or malign or distort the decision of the courts would
inevitably tantamount to contempt sans any prohibitory order or
direction to such effect.
201. Thus, the mere conduct of parties aimed at frustrating the
court proceedings or circumventing its decisions, even without an
explicit prohibitory order, constitutes contempt. Such actions interfere
with the administration of justice, undermine the respect and authority
of the judiciary, and threaten the rule of law.
202. However, at the same time, the power of contempt ought to
be exercised sparingly and with caution and care. It operates with a
string of caution and unless otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would
neither be fair nor reasonable for the courts to resort to such powers.
The standard of proof required before a person is held guilty of
committing contempt of court must be beyond all reasonable doubt.
203. The courts while exercising its contempt jurisdiction must
remain circumspect, more particularly, where there exists a possibility
of the order being amenable to more than one interpretation. In
Jhareshwar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly reported in (2002) 5
SCC 352 it was held that if an order does not contain any specific
direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions
issued therein then it would be appropriate to direct the parties to
approach the court which disposed of the matter for necessary
clarification of the order instead of the court exercising its contempt
jurisdiction thereby taking upon itself the power to decide the original
proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the
judgment or order. The relevant observations read as under:
“The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been
any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is
alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided
in the judgment or order… The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or
order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party,
which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding
a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to
direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the
30order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to
decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment
or order.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
21. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court,
mentioned supra in Celir LLP is squarely applicable to the
present case. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that
Respondent has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed and violated
the order dated 29.04.2025 in Writ Petition No. 28765 of 2019,
thereby committing civil contempt of this Court within the
meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
and is liable to be proceeded against under Sections 10 to 12
thereof.
22. Interestingly, an argument was sought to be put
forth contending that the direction in the Writ Petition was to
the TGPSC, therefore, there cannot be any contempt against the
State. In this connection, it is to be noted that Writ Petition was
filed against the State of Telangana (represented through
Principal Secretary, Roads & Buildings Department), and
Telangana State Public Service Commission, which is the
agency of the State. TGPSC being a recruiting agency of the
State Public Services, and acting for and on behalf of the State;
its role is to scrupulously follow the guidelines applicable for
conducting examinations, selection of candidates and
forwarding the select list to the State Government for issuance
31of necessary appointment orders. Therefore, a direction to
TGPSC is invariably a direction to the State. Merely because the
direction specified the TGPSC, that does not absolve the State of
its responsibility to act and implement the order. Therefore,
both the TGPSC as well as the State are duty-bound to take
action to implement the order under contempt.
23. Therefore, the grounds sought to be urged by
TGPSC that State has filled up / appointed the candidates
subsequently and that there are no vacancies, or the grounds
sought to be urged by the State that the direction is for TGPSC
are apparently a blame-game.
24. In that view of the matter, the Contempt Case is
allowed. The State of Telangana and TGPSC (respondents in the
Writ Petition) are directed to forthwith comply with the direction
issued in the order dated 21.03.2025 in Writ Petition No. 28765
of 2019, if necessary by creating supernumerary post, within
eight weeks from today.
24.1. Respondent shall also be liable for punishment
under Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
the quantum of which shall be determined upon Respondent’s
compliance or non-compliance with this direction being brought
to the notice of this Court.
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25. Consequently, miscellaneous applications, if any,
shall stand closed.
——– —————————–
NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
29th June 2026
ksld
33
