Gujarat High Court
Rajulben Pareshbhai Shah vs The Patidar Ginning And Pressing … on 23 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
Reserved On : 13/07/2026
Pronounced On : 23/07/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 97 of 2026
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2026
In R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 97 of 2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
=============================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
✓
=============================================
RAJULBEN PARESHBHAI SHAH & ANR.
Versus
THE PATIDAR GINNING AND PRESSING COMPANY LTD. & ORS.
=============================================
Appearance:
MR. PERCY KAVINA, SENIOR COUNSEL WITH
MR JAMSHED KAVINA(11236) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2
MR SP MAJMUDAR(3456) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2
MR. RASHESH SANJANWALA, SENIOR COUNSEL WITH
MR. AADIT SANJANWALA, & MS SIMRAN PAHWA(12846) for the
Respondent(s) No. 12,13
=============================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
CAV JUDGMENT
1. The present Appeal from Order is filed under Order XLIII
Rule 1(r) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) by the
original plaintiffs against the order dated 27.01.2026 passed
by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief
Page 1 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
Judicial Magistrate, Bardoli at Surat below Exhibit-5 in
Special Civil Suit No.3 of 2024, whereby the Trial Court has
rejected the injunction application.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred
to hereinafter as per their original status in the suit. The
appellants are the original plaintiffs, whereas the respondent
Nos.12 & 13 (caveator) are original defendant Nos.12 and 13.
The rest of the respondents are original defendant Nos. 1 to
11.
FACTS OF THE CASE:-
3. The short facts of the case appear to be that Special
Civil Suit No. 3 of 2024 is filed by the plaintiffs against
defendant Nos.1 to 11 seeking specific performance of an oral
agreement to sell executed between the parties, whereby it
has been alleged by the plaintiffs that original defendant
Nos.1 to 11 agreed to sell the suit property situated at
Bardoli, District: Surat, T.P. Scheme No. 2, Sheet No.19
having Survey No.4613, admeasuring 1697 Sq. mtrs, and
Survey No.4588/A, admeasuring 4676.53 Sq. mtrs, out of
which admeasuring 1091 Sq. mtrs; in all 2788 Sq. mtrs (1697
+ 1091).
Page 2 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
3.1 The defendant Nos.1 to 11 appeared and contested the
suit by filing their respective written statements. Defendant
Nos.1, 3, 7, 8, 10, and 11 jointly filed their written statements
at Exhibit-16, whereas defendant Nos.4 and 5 have filed their
written statement at Exhibit-22 and defendant No.2 filed his
written statement at Exhibit-30.
3.2 Further, the defendant Nos.1 to 3 have executed a
registered sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.12 & 13, thus,
during the pendency of the suit whereby defendant Nos. 12 &
13 were joined as party defendants in the suit. Defendant
Nos.12 & 13 subsequently filed their written statement below
Exhibit-66. According to the contesting defendants, there was
neither any oral nor written agreement to sell executed with
the plaintiff. As per the say of the defendant Nos. 12 & 13 that
they are bonafide purchaser value without notice and after
purchase of one parcel of the suit land, they have developed it
and construction works almost reached the final phase.
3.3 After hearing the parties, the Trial Court, vide its
impugned order, has rejected the injunction application.
Hence, this Appeal from Order.
Page 3 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS (ORIGINAL
PLAINTIFFS):-
4. Mr. Percy Kavina, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Mr. Jamshed Kavina, learned advocate for the appellants-
plaintiffs, has made the following submissions: –
4.1 The Trial Court has committed a serious error by
applying wrong principles of law while adjudicating the
impugned injunction application, which ultimately resulted
into the rejection of the injunction application.
4.2 The Trial Court could not have applied the principle of
res ipsa loquitur while interpreting the terms of the
agreement. It is unknown in law that said principle can be
applied for interpretation of terms of document. Likewise, the
Trial Court had also wrongly applied the principle of
approbate and reprobate, which would apply only in the case
of pleadings of the parties.
4.3 The Trial Court has also misdirected itself by observing
that since defendant Nos.4 and 5 are supporting defendants
to the plaintiffs, the principle of lis pendens, as provided
under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for
Page 4 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
short ‘the Act, 1882’) is not applied to the case at hand.
4.4 The Trial Court has also committed a serious error in
law by observing that defendant Nos.12 & 13 are bona fide
purchasers, value without notice. The burden to prove that
they were bona fide purchasers value without notice, is upon
defendant Nos.12 & 13. The Trial Court has completely lost
sight of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for
short ‘the Relief Act, 1963‘).
4.5 The findings recorded by the Trial Court in the
impugned order are not in consonance with the settled
principles of law and had it applied correct principles of law,
what would have been the view of the Trial Court is in realm
of conjectures and surmises.
4.6 The Trial Court has not properly appreciated the facts in
their correct perspective and ignoring the fact that there were
several exchanges offers between the parties, which
otherwise a matter of trial as to what was agreed between the
parties and upon wrong premise, based on conjuncture and
surmises, the Trial Court has in fact erroneously rejected the
impugned application.
Page 5 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
4.7 The Trial Court could not have discarded the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) executed by some of
the defendants, who happen to be the Directors of the
defendant No.1 – Company, in favour of the plaintiffs and
considering the Board Resolutions passed by defendant No.1,
coupled with the MoU executed by its Directors, a prima facie
case was made out by the plaintiffs to proceed for trial and to
avoid any multiplicity of proceedings, the Trial Court ought to
have granted an injunction in favour of the plaintiffs by
directing the defendants to maintain status quo, as defendant
Nos. 12 & 13, after they purchased the one of parcel of land,
are changing the nature of suit property-land, which would
seriously prejudice the interest of the plaintiffs who definitely
suffer irreparable injury.
4.8 To buttress his arguments, Mr. Kavina, learned Senior
Counsel would rely upon the following decisions: –
(i) Julien Educational Trust Vs. Sourendra Kumar
Roy reported in 2010 (1) SCC 379;
(ii) Maheshbhai Chaganbhai Patel Vs. Jarin Naushir
Dalal D/o Jalambahi Rustamji reported in 2011 (0)
AIJEL-HC 226232 (Appeal From Order No.335 of
2010 decided on 10.11.2011).
Page 6 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
4.9 Making the above submissions, Mr. Kavina, learned
Senior Counsel would request this Court to allow the present
Appeal.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS. 12 & 13 – ORIG.
DEFENDANT NOS. 12 AND 13:-
5. Mr. Rashesh Sanjanwala, learned Senior Counsel
assisted Mr. Aadit Sanjanwala, learned advocate & Ms.
Simran Pahwa, learned advocate for respondent Nos.12 & 13
– Orig. Defendant Nos.12 & 13 – Caveators, vehemently
opposed the present Appeal from Order by making the
following submissions:-
5.1 There is no error, much less any gross error of law,
committed by the Trial Court while rejecting the injunction
application filed by the plaintiffs and as such, no interference
is required of this Court who exercise its limited power while
adjudicating the Appeal filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of
the CPC.
5.2 The foundation of the case of plaintiffs that they had
entered into an oral agreement to sell itself is not established
on record, inasmuch as there is no offer made by defendant
No.1 – titleholder, in favour of the plaintiffs, to come forward
Page 7 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
for execution of any agreement to sell or sale deed for any
fixed amount; rather board resolution of defendant No.1, as
referred by the Trial Court in its impugned order, would
clearly show that subject to performing certain acts by the
plaintiffs, defendant No.1 agreed to enter into sale agreement
with plaintiffs.
5.3 The Trial Court correctly observed that the MoU dated
14.11.2022 (Mark 3/4), upon which heavy reliance placed, is
not beyond doubt as the plaintiffs never whispered about said
MoU when issued legal notices dated 17.01.2023 &
10.05.2023, expressed their concern about backing out from
the commitment to execute sale deed and thereby, called
upon the defendants to execute the sale deed. The reference
of MoU came for the first time in the suit. The execution of
MoU by some of the Directors (defendant Nos.4 to 6) who
were never authorized to execute the MoU which was in fact
undated. The stamp paper was purchased in the name of
advocate at Ahmedabad, its alleged execution was at Bardoli
and notarized it at Surat. All these acts would prima facie
prove that said MoU is nothing but a got-up document.
5.4 There is no purchase money fixed between the parties
Page 8 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
and the Trial Court has correctly observed that the plaintiffs
have failed to prove that they have performed their part of the
contract, as the plaintiffs were unable to show that they got a
title-clearance of suit land at their expense and / or they
shifted the family members of the peon staying at suit land by
offering them an alternative place. The plaintiffs though
referred in their aforesaid notice about guarantee agreement
executed by defendant Nos.1 & 2 in their favour, but no such
guarantee agreement is produced on record, even not
produced a notice dated 02.01.2024, whereby they issued a
notice to advocate of defendants in connection with public
notice.
5.5 There is neither any perversity nor any gross error
committed by the Trial Court while disbelieving the case of
the plaintiffs and as such, ultimate conclusion drawn by the
Trial Court against the plaintiffs is upon appreciation of
documentary evidence made available on record. Therefore,
this Court should not interfere with the well-reasoned order
passed by the Trial Court.
5.6 There is a substantial delay in filing the suit, inasmuch
as first notice was issued by the plaintiffs on 17.01.2023,
Page 9 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
followed by another on 10.05.2023 and the suit in question
filed on 04.07.2024, in such circumstances, the plaintiffs are
not entitled to receive any interim injunction in their favour,
as sought for.
5.7 Defendant Nos.12 & 13, after purchasing the one of the
suit lands, have developed the suit land substantially and the
construction carried out by them reached in the final phase,
then this Court may not disturb such development at the
instance of the plaintiffs who failed to even show any prima
facie case in their favour.
5.8 To buttress his arguments, Mr. Sanjanwala, learned
Senior Counsel would rely upon the following decisions:-
(i) Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Limited Vs. KS
Infraspace LLP Limited & Anr. reported in
(2020) 5 SCC 410;
(ii) Veetrag Holding Co Ltd Vs. Gujarat State
Textile Corporation Ltd. reported in 1996 (3)
GLR 1996; and
(iii) Brij Mohan & Ors. v. Sugra Begum & Ors,
reported in (1990) 4 SCC 147.
5.9 Making the above submissions, Mr. Sanjanwala, learned
Senior Counsel would request this Court to dismiss the
present appeal.
Page 10 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
6. No other and further submissions are being made by the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respective parties.
7. Heard Mr. Percy Kavina, learned Senior Counsel with
Mr. Jamshed Kavina, learned advocate for the appellants-
plaintiffs as also Mr. Rashesh Sanjanwala, learned Senior
Counsel with Mr. Aadit Sanjanwala, learned advocate & Ms.
Simran Pahwa, learned advocate for respondents – Orig.
Defendant Nos.12 & 13 – Caveators, at length.
ANALYSIS AND REASONS:-
8. I have minutely gone through the impugned order /
judgment passed by the Trial Court as well as documents
submitted before the Trial Court which are placed before this
Court in the form of paper-book.
9. Having gone through the impugned judgment and
documents on record, following would emerge: –
9.1 Defendant No.1 is a Company registered under the
Companies Act, which appears to have passed Resolution
Nos.3 and 4 on 07.05.2022, whereby resolved that to do
certain acts in relation to the company’s property and to offer
Page 11 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
an alternate accommodation to the family of its peon namely
Mohan, the plaintiff No.2 was assigned the work. It was also
agreed that once plaintiff No.2 obtained clear title to the land,
he should be called in board meeting for negotiating the price
of the land and the entire amount shall be received through
cheque and fulfilling such condition, the company’s land can
be sold. It is also mentioned that the fees of plaintiff No.2 to
carry out the aforesaid act, shall be adjusted against the sale
consideration.
9.2 Defendant No.1, vide its letter dated 15.10.2022,
informed the plaintiffs about its Resolution No.7 passed on
02.09.2022, whereby defendant No.1 resolved that to execute
the agreement to sell with plaintiffs qua the suit land,
plaintiffs should be called. There is a footnote in the aforesaid
letter that as per earlier arrangement, plaintiff No.2 is
required to ensure that that the room possessed by the family
of Company’s peon is vacated and offer them an alternate
place of residence. The said act was to be done by the Plaintiff
No.2. There is nothing on record to show that it was done by
him. Rather, the plaintiffs appear to have relied upon MoU,
allegedly executed on 14.11.2022, which was signed by
Page 12 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
defendant Nos. 4 to 6, who happen to be Directors of
defendant No.1. However, a bare perusal of said MoU shows
that the it is not only undated but its stamp was purchased in
the name of one advocate Zahurkhan Latifkhan Pathan and
appears to have been purchased from Ahmedabad, it was
executed at Bardoli and notarized at Surat. Even, as per the
terms of the MoU also, there is no agreed amount fixed
between the parties. Neither plaintiffs nor defendant Nos.4 to
6 who are supporting defendants, would bring on record any
board resolution or any authority, whereby defendant Nos.4 to
6 could have executed the said MoU in favour of the plaintiffs.
Though, as per the case of the plaintiffs, there is MoU dated
14.11.2022 executed by defendant Nos.4 to 6 (Directors of
defendant No.1) in their favour, but surprisingly, while issuing
legal notice to defendant No.1 on 17.01.2023 and 10.05.2023,
called upon them to execute sale deed, there is no whisper
about the said MoU. In view of said facts, prima facie, the
Trial Court has correctly observed that there is a serious
doubt about execution of said MoU on behalf of the defendant
No.1-company-title holder.
9.3 Furthermore, defendant No.1 appears to have issued a
Page 13 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
public notice in the month of December, 2023 against which
the plaintiffs sent their reply on 02.01.2024 but same was
neither disclosed in the plaint nor submitted with plaint;
rather, contesting defendants along with their written
statements, have submitted said reply to public notice sent by
the plaintiffs. As observed by the Trial Court’s in para 15 of
impugned order that despite calling upon the plaintiffs to
supply necessary documents referred in the reply, it was
neither supplied nor submitted on record.
9.4 Apart from aforesaid, the plaintiffs sought specific
performance of an oral agreement to sell qua two parcels of
land – suit lands, i.e., Survey No. 4613 and a part of Survey
No. 4588/A, but while sending the aforesaid notices dated
17.01.2023 and 10.05.2023, referred the agreement qua one
of the suit lands, i.e., Survey No.4613. This parcel of land
appears to have been purchased by the defendant No.12 & 13
by registered sale deed on 20.02.2025.
9.5 The plaintiffs have also not produced on record any
material to show that how they have spent Rs.1,50,00,000/-,
as mentioned in the aforesaid MoU; rather in their aforesaid
notices, they have stated that they have spent around
Page 14 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
Rs.39,66,500/-. The suit in question was filed on 04.07.2024,
and lis pendens was already registered on 02.12.2024,
whereas the sale deed qua suit land situated at survey
No.4613 was executed by defendant No.1 – Company in
favour of defendant Nos.12 & 13 on 20.02.2025.
9.6 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and
also taking note of the documents exchanged between the
parties, the Trial Court, vide its impugned order, has not
believed the case of the plaintiffs and accordingly, refused to
grant the injunction in favour of the plaintiffs.
10. Even after appreciating the assiduous arguments
advanced by Mr. Kavina, learned senior counsel, I am not able
to agree with him that impugned order is so grossly
erroneous, perverse and passed in contravention of settled
principles of law, whereby interference of this Court in its
limited jurisdiction under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC is
required. Rather, I am in complete agreement with ultimate
conclusion of the Trial Court, whereby it has refused to grant
injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. My reasons for saying so
as follows:
Page 15 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
10.1 Apart from the oral agreement to sale as alleged by the
plaintiffs, the foundational fact upon which the suit has been
instituted by the plaintiffs is MoU dated 14.11.2022 produced
at Mark 3/4. As referred hereinabove, there is no reference of
said MoU made in the previous notices issued by the plaintiffs
prior to filing of the suit, though such notices were
undisputedly issued subsequent to the alleged MoU. The
reasons assigned by the Trial Court in regards to genuineness
of MoU cannot be said to be either perverse or grossly
erroneous, inasmuch as such MoU was neither signed by
authorized person of defendant No.1 – Company. The
defendant Nos.4 to 6 happen to be Directors of defendant
No.1 in absence of holding any authority (at least not made
available on record of the suit) to execute such MOU for and
on behalf of defendant No.1-Company, the circumstances
under which such MoU was executed having no dates, seal of
defendant No.1 – Company and its stamp purchased by the
lawyer etc., at this stage, create reasonable doubt in the mind
of the prudent to accept the MoU.
10.2 The suit is filed seeking specific performance of an oral
agreement coupled with MOU. Prima facie, the plaintiffs have
Page 16 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
failed to show that they have already performed their part of
the contract, then sought for the performance of the
defendants. The Trial Court has correctly observed that the
plaintiffs have failed to show that they have performed their
part of the contract, whereby cleared the title of the suit land
and gave an alternate accommodation to company’s peon by
vacating their possession from the suit land, then naturally
cannot allow to seek performance of the defendants.
10.3 The plaintiffs have also failed to show the expenses
incurred by them, i.e., Rs. 1,50,00,000/, as claimed in said
MoU, which is otherwise contrary to their own notices
wherein they claimed that they have incurred expenses of
Rs.39,66,500/-.
10.4 Moreover, in the aforesaid notices, the plaintiffs
referred about guarantee agreement executed by defendant
No.1 in their favour, but no such guarantee agreement is
produced on record.
10.5 It is worth to note that in their aforesaid notices, the
plaintiffs referred having an agreement to purchase only
about one land situated at Survey No.4613, admeasuring 1697
Page 17 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
Sq.mtrs, which is purchased by defendant Nos.12 & 13, but in
the suit, they also referred that defendant Nos.1 to 10 have
agreed to sell a land situated at survey No.4588/A,
admeasuring 1091 Sq. mtrs, out of 4676.52 Sq.mtrs. Even the
description of the said property, which is additionally made
part of the suit, is also not properly defined as to which side of
the land they have agreed to purchase.
10.6 It is true that while adjudicating the injunction
application, the Trial Court has referred to certain principles,
more particularly, res ipsa loquitur, while judging the
genuineness of the MoU. The mere reference to the aforesaid
principles would not, by itself, render the impugned order
perverse, inasmuch as the Trial Court has given its reason
that how the aforesaid MoU cannot be believed and why it is
not appeared genuine. Likewise, the principle of approbate
and reprobate might not have been correctly applied so far as
acts of plaintiffs are concerned, but the fact remains that the
plaintiffs have not acted as per the above referred board
resolution passed by defendant No.1, whereby they have
neither cleared the title to the suit land nor removed the
family of the defendant No.1 company’s peon. Thus, in the
Page 18 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
above referred context, the Trial Court has referred those
principles. According to me, after perusing the impugned
order in entirety, there is no reason for this Court to either
interfere or to disturb the impugned order by sending the
matter back to the Trial Court for its fresh look.
10.7 The plaintiffs have also failed to prove on record that
they were and are ready and willing to perform their part of
contract and in absence of any such case made out, plaintiffs
failed to prove their prima facie case. Over and above, the
plaintiffs are unable to prima facie prove that there was any
oral agreement to sell executed by defendant No.1 – Company
– (Titleholder), in their favour.
10.8 So far as aspect of lis pendens is concerned, the
plaintiffs have already registered such lis pendens.
Nonetheless, the Trial Court has arrived at a conclusion that
in view of the fact that the defendant Nos.4 to 6, some of the
Directors of defendant No.1, executed alleged MoU in favour
of the plaintiffs, and when there is a collusion between
plaintiffs and some of the defendants, benefit of lis pendens
cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiffs. According to my
view, when the plaintiffs have failed to show prima facie case,
Page 19 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
balance of convenience and irreparable loss in their favour, it
pales into insignificance that any benefit of lis pendens can be
granted in favour of the plaintiffs at this stage. Yet, it can be
observed that any one consciously entered into an agreement
with the defendants, are not in a position to say that they are
not aware about the pending litigation qua suit lands.
10.9 Likewise, whether defendant Nos.12 & 13 are bona-fide
purchasers, value without notice or not, is requires to be
decided by the Trial Court as per the evidence forthcoming on
record of the suit. The Trial Court at end of para 15 of its
impugned order itself clarified this position. Thus, I would not
like to add anything more on this point.
11. So far as decisions cited by Mr. Kavina, learned Senior
Counsel, in support of his submissions are concerned,
according to this Court, none would be applicable to the case
at hand.
11.1 In the case of Julien Educational Trust (supra), the
Hon’ble Apex Court has prima facie believed that there was
an agreement to sell in favour of the appellant – Trust, which
had to go to trial and in such factual scenario, the order of
status quo granted in favour of the appellant – Trust, which is
Page 20 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
not the case here. In the case at hand, the plaintiffs are
unable to prima facie prove that there was any agreement to
sell by defendant No.1 in their favour, i.e., oral or written.
Rather, it is evident from the resolutions passed by the
defendant No.1-company, its subsequent communication
letter dated 15.10.2022 etc., that there was as such no oral
agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant No.1/its
authorized person to sale the suit lands. No purchase priced
even fixed when those resolutions and letter issued.
11.2 In the case of Maheshbhai Chaganbhai Patel
(supra), again the coordinate Bench of this Court has
accepted that there is an agreement to sell between the
parties and the plaintiffs have performed their part of contract
and subsequently, sale deed executed is of much lower price
than what was agreed for agreement to sell. In such factual
scenario, order of status quo was granted to avoid further
multiplicity of proceedings. Again, in absence of existence of
any agreement to sell, prima facie proved on record by the
plaintiffs, they cannot seek any relief of injunction much less
an order of status quo. Moreover, the plaintiffs have failed to
prove their part of the contract as per the said resolutions &
Page 21 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
letter, at this stage, it can be gainsaid that plaintiffs have not
performed their part of the contract.
12. At this juncture, it would be apt to observe that the
plaintiffs first issued a legal notice dated 17.01.2023
expressing concern about cancelling the agreement of sale by
the defendant No.1, it appears to have been responded by the
company through its lawyer on 29.04.2023, then again
another legal notice dated 10.05.2023 issued by the plaintiffs,
whereby called upon the defendants to execute sale deed,
whereas, through public notice issued in month of December,
2023, defendant No.1 declared its intention to sale the suit
land, yet, the suit was filed on 04.07.2024. The documents on
record of the suit suggests that the suit land purchased by the
defendant No. 12 & 13 is substantially developed by now and
there are no good reasons, for this Court to stop the
development work at this stage, especially when the plaintiffs
unable to show their prima facie case. Thus, considering the
series of events as recorded above and nature of dispute,
though the suit filed within limitation but there is a
considerable delay on the part of the plaintiffs to file suit.
12.1 At this stage, it would be apt to refer the ratio laid down
Page 22 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ambalal Sarabhai
Enterprise Limited (supra), wherein it has been held that
conduct of the party seeking equitable relief of injunction is
also essential to be considered and in a case of delay or
otherwise, it will be inequitable to grant discretionary relief.
The relevant observations made in aforesaid decision read
thus:
“19. In a matter concerning grant of injunction, apart from the
existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience,
irreparable injury, the conduct of the party seeking the equitable
relief of injunction is also very essential to be considered as
observed in Motilal Jain [Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi, (2000) 6
SCC 420] holding as follows : (SCC p. 424, para 6)“6. The first ground which the High Court [Ramdasi
Devi v. Motilal Jain, 1990 SCC OnLine Gau 120 :
(1991) 2 Gau LR 195] took note of is the delay in filing
the suit. It may be apt to bear in mind the following
aspects of delay which are relevant in a case of specific
performance of contract for sale of immovable property:
(i) delay running beyond the period prescribed under the
Limitation Act;
(ii) delay in cases where though the suit is within the
period of limitation, yet:
(a) due to delay the third parties have acquired rights in
the subject-matter of the suit;
(b) in the facts and circumstances of the case, delay may
give rise to plea of waiver or otherwise it will be
inequitable to grant a discretionary relief.”
22. In M.P. Mathur v. DTC [M.P. Mathur v. DTC, (2006) 13 SCC
Page 23 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
706] , this Court observed : (SCC p. 716, para 14)
“14. The present suit is based on equity. … In the
present case, the plaintiffs have sought a remedy which
is discretionary. They have instituted the suit under
Section 34 of the 1963 Act. The discretion which the
court has to exercise is a judicial discretion. That
discretion has to be exercised on well-settled principles.
Therefore, the court has to consider–the nature of
obligation in respect of which performance is sought,
circumstances under which the decision came to be
made, the conduct of the parties and the effect of the
court granting the decree. In such cases, the court has to
look at the contract. The court has to ascertain whether
there exists an element of mutuality in the contract. If
there is absence of mutuality the court will not exercise
discretion in favour of the plaintiffs. Even if, want of
mutuality is regarded as discretionary and not as an
absolute bar to specific performance, the court has to
consider the entire conduct of the parties in relation to
the subject-matter and in case of any disqualifying
circumstances the court will not grant the relief prayed
for (Snell’s Equity, 31st Edn., p. 366).”
(Emphasis supplied)
12.2 A similar ratio was laid down by a Coordinate Bench of
this Court in the case of Veetrag Holding Co Ltd (supra),
wherein considering the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the case of Dalpat Kumar And Anr. vs Prahlad Singh And
Ors reported in AIR 1993 SC 276, held that once the
contract was terminated, it was expected from plaintiffs to
move for specific performance at the earliest if they were
serious about the same. Though, they may not be non-suited
Page 24 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
on the ground of limitation, inasmuch as their suit is within
time, however, when it comes to grant of equitable relief that
the suit is filed after lapse of time, it cannot be said that the
remedy of interim injunction was a necessary remedy and
there was no other remedy available to the parties concerned
in this behalf. The relevant observations made by a
Coordinate Bench in the case of Veetrag Holding Co Ltd
(supra), read as under:-
“8. Even so, in any case, inasmuch as this contract was terminated
on 6th December 1993, it was expected of the appellant to move for
specific performance at the earliest, if they were serious about the
same. The appellants certainly cannot be non-suited on the ground
of limitation inasmuch as their suit is within time. However, when it
comes to grant of equitable relief when the suit is filed after such a
lapse of time, it cannot be said that the remedy of interim injunction
was the necessary remedy and there was no other remedy available
to the party concerned in this behalf. Shri Gupta relied upon the
Apex Court judgment rendered in Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v.
Prahlad Singh and Ors. thereof the Courts are cautioned and
required to exercise sound judicial discretion. They are required to
find out that no other remedy is available to the party concerned
and then as stated by the Honourable Supreme Court (and again
relied upon by Shri Gupta) in para 20 of the judgment of the Apex
Court rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar ; for
approaching a Court of equity, the blameworthy conduct of a
person approaching a Court of equity, for obtaining discretionary
relief disentitles him for grant of such relief. Para 20 of the above
judgment reads as under:
Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct
of a person in approaching a Court of equity inPage 25 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
England for obtaining discretionary relief which
disentitled him for grant of such relief was
explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long
ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, thus:
Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy,
either because the party has, by his conduct, done
that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that
remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in
which it would not be reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, is
founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so
far as it relates to the remedy.
9. Shri Naik submitted that the appellant was all throughout
ready and willing to perform its part of the contract. But as
provided in the agreement itself, the payments were to be
made on certain specified dates starting from 28th September
1992 until 28th November 1993. Apart from paying the initial
earnest money, the appellant has not paid any amount
thereafter and certainly not after raising the dispute about the
part of the land not being available to it. Shri Gupta
submitted that this was so inspite of Clause 2 of the agreementPage 26 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATIONC/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
which clearly provided as follows:
The area of the property is approximately
2,41,875 sq. mtrs. according to the vendor’s
records and the same shall be taken as correct
and accepted by the purchaser. The price of the
said property has been agreed to between the
parties on a lumpsum basis without any reference
to the said area and if the said area is ultimately
found to be more or less the same shall not be a
ground for any increase or decrease of price or
for rescinding this agreement.
As stated above the respondent-Corporation is in
financial difficulties and is in dire need of money.
The respondent-Corporation had entered into
long correspondence with the appellant from time
to time and there was no positive response from
the appellant in that behalf. In those
circumstances, the respondent-Corporation had
no option but to terminate the contract. The
appellant has not moved immediately thereafter
and was silent for nearly two years after
termination of the contract. These facts are gross
enough to disentitle the appellant to the remedy of
injunction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12.3 Thus, in light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
the impugned injunction application was correctly rejected by
the Trial Court. The submissions made by Mr. Sanjanwala,
learned senior counsel is accepted that the plaintiffs is not
entitled to any reliefs as prayed in the impugned injunction
application filed below Exhibit 5.
Page 27 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
13. It is well settled position of law that the present Appeal
from Order is appeal on principle unlike regular First Appeal
wherein the Appellate Court has power to re-appreciate the
evidence. This Court, while exercising its powers under Order
XLIII, Rule 1(r) of CPC, has a limited jurisdiction to interfere
with the discretionary order passed by the Trial Court. Unless
and until it has been shown to this Court that the impugned
order passed by the Trial Court while exercising its discretion
in a manner which is not akin to law and / or any perversity on
the face of the order, merely because another view is possible
in the matter, this Court should not substitute its view over
the view taken by the Trial Court (See:- Ramakant Ambalal
Choksi vs Harish Ambalal Choksi reported in (2024) 11
SCC 351).
14. Before parting with, it is made clear that any of the
observations so made either by this Court herein above or by
the Trial Court’s in its impugned order passed by below
Exhibit 5 would not come in the way of the parties. The Trial
Court is required to decide lis between the parties as per the
evidence forthcoming on the record of the suit without being
influenced by this order or the impugned order in this appeal.
Page 28 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/97/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
undefined
15. In view of the foregoing observations, discussions, and
reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Accordingly,
the present Appeal from Order is dismissed in limine. As a
sequel, the connected Civil Application is also disposed of. No
order as to costs.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
Lalji Desai
Page 29 of 29
Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Thu Jul 23 2026 Downloaded on : Thu Jul 23 23:04:18 IST 2026
