Garima Singh & Anr vs State Of H.P. & Anr on 20 July, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Garima Singh & Anr vs State Of H.P. & Anr on 20 July, 2026

Author: Sandeep Sharma

Bench: Sandeep Sharma

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

.

Cr.MMO No.376 of 2024

Date of Decision: 20.07.2026
_______________________________________________________
Garima Singh & Anr. …….Petitioners
Versus

State of H.P. & Anr. …..Respondents
_______________________________________________________
Coram:

of
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes.

For the petitioner:

rt Mr. Anshul Bansal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Anshul Attri, Mr. Piyush Dhanotia & Mr.
Ankit Chandel, Advocates.

For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar,
Additional Advocates General with Mr. Ravi
Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy

Advocates General, for respondent No.1-
State.

Mr. Kuldeep Singh Chandel, Advocate, for

respondent No.2.

_______________________________________________________

Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):

By way of the instant petition filed under Section 482 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of

the petitioners-accused (in short ‘accused’) for quashing and setting

aside the FIR No.37 of 2023 dated 02.03.2023, registered under

Sections 451, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station

Kangra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent

proceedings pending adjudication competent Court of law.

1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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2. Quint-essential facts, as emerge from the pleadings as

well as other material adduced from the record by respective parties

.

are that the FIR, sought to be quashed came to be instituted at the

behest of respondent No.2, Ms. Heena Sharma, (hereinafter referred

to as the “complainant”), who, at the relevant time, was a third-year

Postgraduate Junior Resident in the Department of Surgery at Dr.

of
RPGMC, Tanda. Complainant, named hereinabove, alleged that on

27.02.2023, she fell ill and as such, was admitted in the afore Hospital

in Private Ward No.209. She alleged that on 27.02.2023 at about
rt
12:30 p.m., accused No.1, Garima Singh, who was also pursuing the

MBBS course at Tanda College, along with her mother, Ms. Shobha

Singh Kanwar (accused No.2), unauthorizedly entered her room and

clicked her photographs on mobile phone. She also alleged that

above-named persons also pulled her hand. She alleged that accused

named in FIR uploaded her photograph as well as video on internet.

She alleged that since she had not suffered any injury, she did not

wish to undergo medical examination. However, on account of

unauthorized entry of the accused in the room of the complainant,

appropriate action in accordance with law be taken against them. In

the aforesaid background, FIR sought to be quashed came to be

instituted against the accused, who happen to be daughter and

mother.

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3. Though after completion of investigation, Police has

already presented challan in the competent Court of law, but before

.

same could be taken to its logical end, accused have approached this

Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR as well as

consequent proceedings pending in the competent Court of law on

the ground that no case much less under Sections 451, 506 and 34 of

of
the Indian Penal Code is made out against the accused.

4. Mr. Anshul Bansal, learned Senior Counsel, duly assisted

by Mr. Anshul Attri, learned counsel for the accused, vehemently
rt
argued that once accused, named in the FIR, after their having

allegedly entered the private room of the complainant, not committed

any illegal act, for which they could be imprisoned, there was no

occasion, if any, for investigation agency to proceed against accused

under Section 451 of IPC. Mr. Bansal further submitted that though

accused came to be charged under Section 506 of IPC, but bare

perusal of allegations contained in FIR nowhere suggest that threats,

if any, were extended by the accused named in the FIR, rather, they,

after having entered the private ward, allegedly clicked the

photographs of the complainant and thereafter uploaded the same on

Instagram. While referring to the reply filed by the respondent-State,

Mr. Bansal submitted that Investigating Officer, after having

conducted investigation, has categorically concluded that though

simple photographs of the complainant were clicked, but those were

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not uploaded on internet as is otherwise being alleged by the

accused. Mr. Bansal further submitted that since no offence can be

.

said to have been committed by the accused under Section 451 of

IPC, charge of the accused under Section 506 of IPC is not tenable at

all.

5. To the contrary, Sh. Kuldeep Singh, learned counsel

of
representing the respondent, supported the impugned action of

lodging FIR against the accused. He submitted that bare perusal of

FIR clearly reveals that accused, firstly, unauthorizedly entered the
rt
private ward of the complainant, who at relevant time was taking rest

in room allotted in her favour and thereafter unauthorizedly also

clicked photographs of her and uploaded the same on internet. He

further argued that accused by pulling arm of the complainant, also

attempted to give injury, and as such, no illegality can be said to have

been committed by the investigation agency by lodging FIR under

Sections 451, 506 & 34 of IPC against the accused. He further

submitted that otherwise also, present petition is not maintainable

because allegations, which have been leveled in the FIR can only be

proved by the investigation agency by leading cogent and convincing

evidence and in case FIR sought to be quashed is quashed, it would

amount to preempting the trial court from conducting proceedings to

ascertain the correctness of allegations leveled in the FIR sought to

be quashed, which is otherwise not permissible.

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6. I have heard learned counsel of the parties and gone

through the record carefully.

.

7. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of

the submissions and counter-submissions having been made by the

learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant

petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate upon the

of
scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal

proceedings, while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC (now

528 of BNSS).

rt

8. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case

titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2)

SCC 699, held that High Court while exercising power under Section

482 Cr.PC is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the

conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an

abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require

that the proceeding ought to be quashed.

9. Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and

others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the

Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborately discussing the scope and

competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under

Section 482 Cr.PC laid down certain principles governing the

jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of

aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under

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Section 482 Cr.PC, again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of

.

SLP (CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of

U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High

Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed

to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not

of
be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or

persecution.

10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State
rt
(NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, relying upon its earlier judgment

titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC

330, reiterated that High Court has inherent powers under Section

482 Cr.PC., to quash the proceedings against an accused, at the

stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the

stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with

caution, care and circumspection. In the aforesaid judgment, the

Hon’ble Apex Court concluded that while exercising its inherent

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, Court exercising such

power must be fully satisfied that the material produced by the

accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their

defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the

material adduced on record itself overrule the veracity of the

allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the

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prosecution/complainant. Besides above, the Hon’ble Apex Court

further held that material relied upon by the accused should be such,

.

as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the

actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the

judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its

power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal

of
proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and

secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as

Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the
rt
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-

“22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal
proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by
this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor

wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330,
paras 29-30)

29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,

if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against
an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of
committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These
are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial.
The same parameters would naturally be available for later
stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to
hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences,
inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s
case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead

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evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with
caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court

.

has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the

accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that
his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and

indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule
out and displace the assertions contained in the charges
levelled against the accused; and the material produced is

of
such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the
allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out,
rt
reject and discard the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording

any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence
should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be
justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable

quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be
such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and
condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such

a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would

persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would

prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of
justice.

30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing
paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to
determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an
accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the
accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the
material is of sterling and impeccable quality?

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30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the
charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material
is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions
contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as

.

would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and

condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, has not been refuted by the

prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such,
that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?

of
30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would
result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not
serve the ends of justice?

30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative,
judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it
rt
to quash such criminal – proceedings, in exercise of
power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the
accused, would save precious court time, which would
otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as,
proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear
that the same would not conclude in the conviction of

the accused.”

11. It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of aforesaid

judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time that

where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to

spite him/her due to private and personal grudge, High Court while

exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC can proceed to quash the

proceedings.

12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case tilted Anand Kumar

Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)

Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210, has held that abuse

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of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the

form of a charge sheet after investigation and as such, the abuse of

.

law or miscarriage of justice can be rectified by the court while

exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC. The relevant paras of the

judgment are as under:

16. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision
invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482

of
Cr. P.C and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C reads as
follows:-

rt
“482. Saving of inherent power of the High Court.-

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect

the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order
under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

17. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts

the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of
process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of

the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High court can
exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C even when

the discharge application is pending with the trial court ( G.
Sagar Suri and Anr. V. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC

636 (para 7), Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 591 (para 20). Indeed, it would be a
travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can
be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced,
and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet. On
the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused
by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a
charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly
conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.”

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13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Pramod

Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9

.

SCC 608, has elaborated the scope of exercise of power under

Section 482 Cr.PC, the relevant para whereof reads as under:-

“7. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent

powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under
Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be

of
exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the CrPC; (ii) to
prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court
rt
under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a
significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to

exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its
extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding
as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case

through investigation and evidence. These principles have been
consistently followed and re-iterated by this Court. In Inder
Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal, this Court observed.

“23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope

and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every
High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do

real and substantial justice, for the administration of which
alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

24. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C though wide
have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution
and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the
advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to

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injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court
would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent
powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.”

.

8. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High
Courts, any strict test as to when the court’s extraordinary
powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court’s hands in the

face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v Bhajan
Lal conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court

of
may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of
illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is
not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear
relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted
rt
that quashing may be appropriate where, (2007) 12 SCC 1 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335

“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police

officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).
……….

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.”

In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section
482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the

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facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing
evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the
face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence.

.

As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v State of

Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine SC3100 (“Dhruvaram
Sonar”):

“13. It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous
analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by
the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence
is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If

of
the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute
the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is
open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of
its inherent powers.”

14.
rt
Aforesaid law, clearly stipulates that court can exercise

power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash

criminal proceedings, in cases, where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the accused.

15. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid

down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor

to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-

vis factual matrix of the case.

16. To ascertain the correctness of rival submissions made

by learned counsel for the parties, it would be apt to take note of

Sections 451, 503 and 506:-

“451. House-trespass in order to commit offence
punishable with imprisonment.–

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Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the
committing of any offence punishable with
imprisonment, shall be punished with imprisonment of

.

either description for a term which may extend to two

years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if the offence
intended to be committed is theft, the term of the

imprisonment may be extended to seven years.

503. Criminal intimidation.–

of
Whoever threatens another with any injury to his
person, reputation or property, or to the person or
reputation of any one in whom that person is interested,
with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause
rt
that person to do any act which he is not legally bound

to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is
legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.–

Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation
shall be punished with imprison-ment of either

description for a term which may extend to two years,

or with fine, or with both;If threat be to cause death or
grievous hurt, etc.– And if the threat be to cause death

or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any
property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with
death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute,
unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

17. Careful perusal of Section 451 of IPC reveals that

whoever commits house-trespass in order to commit any offence

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punishable with imprisonment shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall

.

also be liable to fine. The expression “house-trespass” has been

defined under Section 442 of IPC to mean criminal trespass by

entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a

human dwelling, or any building used as a place of worship or as a

of
place for the custody of property. Thus, Section 451 of IPC provides

the punishment for a person, who commits house-trespass with the

intent to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment.

rt

18. Though Mr. Kuldeep Singh, learned counsel for the

complainant and Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate General for

respondent-State, attempted to argue that act of the accused

inasmuch as they unauthorizedly entered the private ward, wherein

complainant was admitted, can be termed as house-trespass, but

having perused material adduced on record, this Court is not

persuaded to agree with aforesaid contention of learned counsel

representing respondents. It is admitted case of parties that

complainant at relevant time was teaching accused No.1. Since

accused No.1 was unable to answer the query raised by the

complainant during the medical examination of some admitted patient,

allegedly complainant humiliated and harassed accused No.1,

whereafter matter reached up to the level of Head of the Department.

Head of the Department constituted an inquiry, wherein it transpired

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that no act of humiliating and insulting accused No. 1 was committed

by the complainant. However, in police inquiry, it transpired that

.

accused No. 1 was insulted and humiliated by the complainant during

the course of routine ward rounds in the hospital. It also emerges from

the material adduced on record by the respective parties that on

account of aforesaid dispute inter se accused No. 1 and the

of
complainant, accused No. 1 was asked to bring her parents. Mr.

Anshul Bansal, learned Senior Counsel for accused No. 1,

vehemently argued that accused No.1, along with her mother i.e.
rt
accused No.2, after having reached Tanda and approached the Head

of the Department, who directed them to meet the complainant, who

at the relevant time was stated to be admitted in a private ward.

Pursuant to afore direction, accused No. 1 along with her mother went

to see the complainant in a private ward, where she was admitted, but

while doing so, they allegedly clicked her photographs, which were

allegedly subsequently uploaded on the internet. Though question,

which needs to be determined in the case at hand, is that “Whether

act of the accused inasmuch as visiting the private ward, wherein the

complainant was admitted can be said to be house trespass in terms

of provision contained under Section 451 or not?”

19. Bare perusal of aforesaid provision of law reveals that

though definition of “house-trespass” under Section 442 of IPC

contemplates that whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into

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or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling,

or any building used as a place of worship or for the custody of

.

property, is said to commit “house-trespass”, but to attract the

provisions of Section 451 of IPC, it is not sufficient merely to establish

the commission of house-trespass. The prosecution must further

demonstrate that such house-trespass was committed with the intent

of
to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment. Section 451 of

IPC specifically provides that whoever commits house-trespass in

order to commit any offence punishable with imprisonment shall be
rt
liable to punishment with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.

Admittedly, in the case hand, accused, after having entered private

ward of the hospital, where the complainant was admitted, but there is

nothing to suggest that after they entered, they caused or attempted

to cause any harm to the complainant. Precise allegation, as came to

be leveled against the accused, is that they unauthorizedly clicked the

photographs of the complainant and thereafter, uploaded the same on

internet. However, such allegation was not found to be correct by the

investigating agency, who, in its inquiry, found that though simple

photographs were clicked but same were not uploaded on internet,

rather subsequent to filing of FIR, such photographs were also

deleted.

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20. Though at this stage, Mr. Kuldeep Singh, learned counsel

representing the complainant, attempted to argue the act of pulling

.

arm or throwing arm to other side can be said to be act of causing

bodily injury to the complainant, which if found to be true, can invite

action against the culprit under relevant provisions of law. However,

this court, having taken note of fact that accused, after having entered

of
the private ward, wherein the complainant was admitted, did not

create any kind of ruckus, rather simply clicked the photographs of the

complainant, is of the view that such an act cannot be said to
rt
constitute the offence of house-trespass punishable under Section

451 IPC. Similarly, this Court, having carefully perused material

adduced on record as well as record made available to this court,

nowhere finds that specific allegation, if any, with regard to extension

of threats ever came to be leveled against the accused, rather they

allegedly after having clicked simple photographs of the complainant,

left the room and thereafter photographs were also not uploaded on

the internet as has been concluded by the Police.

21. Section 506 of Indian Penal Code provides for

punishment for alleged act of “criminal intimidation”, which otherwise

defined in Section 503 of IPC. Bare reading of definition of “criminal

intimidation” reveals that there must be an act of threatening another

person with injury to his person, reputation, or property, or to the

person, reputation, or property of anyone in whom the threatened

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person is interested. Most importantly, the threat must be made with

intent to cause alarm for the person threatened, or it must be to do

.

any act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act,

which he is legally entitled to do. At this stage, it would be apt to take

note of judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Naresh

Aneja Alias Naresh Kumar Aneja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and

of
another, (2025) 2 Supreme Court Cases 604. Relevant paras of the

afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:-

“25. Let us now examine the next charge for which the
rt
appellant stands accused. For an offence u/s 503 to be

established, it must be shown that:-

(1) Threatening a person with any injury;

(i) to his person, reputation or property; or

(ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in

whom that person is interested.

(2) Such threat must be intentional;

(i) to cause alarm to that person; or

(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he

is not legally bound to do as the means of
avoiding the execution of such threat; or

(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do as the
means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

Punishment for this offence is prescribed u/s
506 IPC, which is two years or with a fine or
both, as applicable to this case.

26. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423:

(2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132, as affirmed by a bench of three
judges in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2020) 8 SCC

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20

811: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 914, records the principle of
application of Section 506, IPC in the following terms: – (Manik
Taneja case, SCC p.428, paras 11-12

.

“11….A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation”

would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to
another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation,

or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom
the threatened person is interested and the threat must be
with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it

of
must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or
omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

rt

12. …It is the intention of the accused that has to be
considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated

comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat
must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to
cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere

expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm
would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this
section. But material has to be placed on record to show that

the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant….”

27. A recent judgment of this court, Sharif Ahmed v. State of

U.P15 held as under: –

“48. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the
accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does
not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention
of the accused to cause alarm must be established by bringing
evidence on record. The word ‘intimidate’ means to make timid
or fearful, especially : to compel or deter by or as if by threats.
The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in
the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and
communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the
purpose of influencing her mind. The word ‘threat’ refers to the

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21

intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Injury
involves doing an illegal act.”

This judgment also, with reference to Manik Taneja (supra),

.

underscored the importance of material and evidence being

placed on record to demonstrate intention. A mere statement
without intention would not attract the offence.

28. What flows from the judgments referred is that for an
offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established,
the intention should be 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726 clearly

of
visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on
record. Granted that at this stage, evidence on record is not
the standard to be applied since the trial is underway, but at
rt
least the results of the investigation and the material gathered
thereunder, which is on record, should disclose somewhat of

an offence. The FIR, interim investigation report and the
chargesheet, reproduced above, do not disclose any offence
having been committed by the appellant herein.

22. As per aforesaid exposition of law, to invoke Section 503

of IPC, prosecution is under a legal obligation to prove that the

accused threatened a person with injury to his person, reputation, or

property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom such

person is interested, and such threat was made with the intention of

causing alarm to that person or of inducing him to do any act which he

is not legally bound to do, as a means of avoiding the execution of

such threat. It is the intention of the accused that has to be

considered while determining whether the words uttered by him

amount to criminal intimidation. This necessarily implies that there

must be an act of threatening another person with injury to his person,

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22

reputation, or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in

whom such person is interested. Further, such threat must have been

.

made with the intention of causing alarm to the person threatened, or

of inducing him to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to

omit doing any act which he is legally entitled to do. For an offence of

criminal intimidation to be established prima facie, intention should be

of
clearly discernible from the material on record and the same is to be

established by the evidence available on record.

23. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by
rt
Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhushree Datta vs. State of Karnataka

and Another, along with Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs. State of

Karnataka and Another, 2025 (3) Supreme Court Cases 612,

decided on 24.01.2025, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that

mere act of insulting someone does not fulfill its requirement of

Section 504 IPC, rather insult must be of such nature as to provoke

the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal

conduct. In afore judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court had an occasion to

deal with the applicability of Sections 504, 506 and 507 of IPC.

Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:-

“22. The next question for determination is, whether the mere
assertion of “filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in
scolding the complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of
offences under Sections 504 and 509IPC.

23. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions
contained in Section 504IPC.

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23

24. A perusal of Section 504 IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting
someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such
a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public

.

peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the
ingredients of Section 504 IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on
the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent

or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of
the public peace or the commission of any other offence.

of

26. In the instant case, the charge-sheet states that the appellants
used “filthy language” while scolding the complainant; however, no
such allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint.

rt
Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy
language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has

provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to
commit any other offence. Therefore, from the materials on record,
the ingredients of the offence under Section 504IPC, as explained in
the abovesaid decision, are not satisfied.

27. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section

509IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning
of the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has been

insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in IPC, this Court
has addressed the essence of a woman’s modesty in the decision
in Ramkripal v. State of M.P. [Ramkripal v. State of M.P., (2007) 11

SCC 265 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 674] Excerpts from the decision read
as under : (SCC pp. 266-67, para 7)

“7. … ’12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is
nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman’s modesty
is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux
of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant,
but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this
Section is an attribute associated with female human beings
as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to
her sex.’ “

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(emphasis supplied)

28. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the
modesty of a woman under Section 509IPC in Rupan Deol

.

Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal
Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , observed as
under : (SCC p. 206, para 15)

“15. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh [State of
Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967

of
SC 63] a question arose whether a female child of seven-
and-a-half months could be said to be possessed of
“modesty” which could be outraged. In answering the above
question Mudholkar, J., who along with Bachawat, J. spoke
rt
for the majority, held that when any act done to or in the
presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according

to the common notions of mankind that must fall within the
mischief of Section 354IPC. Needless to say, the “common
notions of mankind” referred to by the learned Judge have to

be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other
learned Judge (Bachawat, J.) observed that the essence of
a woman’s modesty is her sex and from her very birth she

possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex.

From the above dictionary meaning of “modesty” and the
interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh
case [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC

51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] it appears to us that the ultimate test
for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged, is the
action of the offender such as could be perceived as one
which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a
woman.”

29. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it
will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence
presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material
to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the
appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it

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25

pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency
of the complainant being a woman.

30. The term “filthy language”, when examined in isolation, and

.

without any contextual framework or accompanying words,
indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall
within the purview of Section 509IPC. Had there been references to

specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures–whether
preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words–that could
demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might

of
have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the
appellants.

rt

31. In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the
overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the

appellants’ actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or
knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their
conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to
constitute an insult to a woman’s modesty.

32. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be

assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not
only of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the

alleged incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the
appellants were positioned as an employee and senior officials,
respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented by both

parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the
employment in question.

33. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate
that the appellants used language towards the complainant that
would warrant an offence under Section 509IPC. However, the
charge-sheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant
using “filthy language”. Notably, this allegation is also absent in the
FIR.

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26

34. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the
appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them
relating to the employment; the absence of any references to
specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying

.

gestures–whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words–the
failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint;
and the fact that this allegation is only found in the charge-sheet :

there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty
of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials
available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients

of
of an offence under Section 509IPC have not been disclosed.

35. This brings us to the offence under Section 506IPC, which the
rt
High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the
appellants. Section 506IPC prescribes the punishment for the

offence of criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the
offence of criminal intimidation.

36. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of

Sections 503 and 506IPC in Manik Taneja v. State of
Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 :

(2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132] , wherein it was observed as follows : (SCC
p. 428, para 11)

“11. … A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation”

would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to
another person, of causing an injury to the person,

reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the
person in whom the threatened person is interested and the
threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person
threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled
to do.”

37. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute
any threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore,
ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie, are not made out
against him. The argument that the first accused acted at the behest

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27

of the second accused is untenable, as Section 34IPC, which
imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been applied
in this case.

.

38. However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she
was threatened by the first accused, as detailed below:

“Then on 25-10-2013 at about 2.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m. one

Madhushiree Dutta (HR) asked me to forcefully resign or
otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she abruptly
asked me not to come for my work henceforth.”

of

39. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against
the first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to
rt
cause alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat
reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination,

which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. It
is also the appellants’ case, which has not been disputed by the
complainant, that the complainant has filed a reference before the
Labour Court challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement

along with back wages. Given these circumstances and the
materials on record, the ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie,

are not disclosed against the first accused too.

24. In afore case, Hon’ble Apex Court, while relying upon its

earlier judgments, reiterated that before offence of criminal

intimidation is made out against the perpetrator, it must be

established that she/he intentionally caused alarm to the complainant.

25. In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that there

was intentional insult at the behest of the complainant with intent or

knowledge to provoke disturbance of public peace or commission of

any other offence. Similarly, the complaint, on the basis of which the

FIR came to be registered, nowhere suggests that the accused

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28

intended to cause alarm to the complainant. In the absence of such

intention, the essential ingredients of the offence of criminal

.

intimidation are not made out.

26. Having scanned the entire material adduced on record,

vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court is persuaded to

agree with learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that this Court,

of
while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., may proceed to

quash the FIR/challan submitted against the accused, because

continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law, since,
rt
for the reasons stated herein above, case of prosecution is bound to

fail against the accused in all probabilities. Otherwise also, in case

prayer made on behalf of the accused is not accepted, they would be

subjected to unnecessary ordeal of facing protracted trial, which

otherwise is bound to fail.

27. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein

above and law taken into consideration, present petition is allowed.

FIR No. 37 of 2023 dated 02.03.2023, registered under Sections 451,

506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Kangra, District

Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent proceedings, are

quashed and set aside qua the petitioner. The petitioner is discharged

henceforth. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
July 20, 2026
(sunil)

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