Patna High Court – Orders
Mithila Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh … vs The State Of Bihar on 16 July, 2026
Author: A. Abhishek Reddy
Bench: A. Abhishek Reddy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.10686 of 2013
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Mithila Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. Industrial Area, P.O.-Harpur
Alowth, District- Samastipur through its' Managing Director
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Of Bihar.
2. The Secretary, Department Of Labour, Employment Nd Training, Govt. Of
Bihar, Patna
3. Abul Hayat Son Of Late Shekh Bihari Hassan Resident Of Village -
Muradpur Bangra, P.O. Kubauli Ram, District - Samastipur
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Rajesh Prasad Choudhary, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. S.Raza Ahmad
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. ABHISHEK REDDY
ORAL ORDER
66 16-07-2026
Heard the learned counsel for both the parties
The present writ petition has been filed for the
following relief(s):-
“That, this is an application for
issuance of an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders,
direction / directions for setting aside the order
awarddated18/10/2012 passed in Reference Case
No.1 of 1998 by Sri Rajesh Kumar III the Presiding
Officer, Labour Court, Begusarai, whereby and
where under the petitioner/management has been
directed to reinstate the respondent no.3 with 25%
of the consequential monetary benefits. The
petitioner further prays for any other relief/reliefs
for which the petitioner management may be found
entitled too.”
3. The factual matrix of the instant case reveal that
Respondent No. 3 has commenced work as a daily wage typist
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on 12.11.1987. The learned counsel for petitioner-management
contends that the respondent No. 3 was an employee of the Baso
Kubauli Mahila Dugdh Utpadak Sahyog Samiti Limited, from
where he was sent on deputation to the Samastipur Dairy
pursuant to are solution dated 10.06.1988. In order to regularize
the services of 18 such deputed secretaries, the management
constituted an expert team comprising of Managing Director
V.K. Srivastava and NDDB Member Dr. G.P. Vijay and
scheduled the interviews for 11.04.1990. That out of the 18
candidates, only three candidates appeared that the Respondent
No. 3, representing an unorganized union, boycotted the
interview process and, assaulted the management and the
interview board members. That the respondent No. 3 forcibly
extorted signatures on an agreement demanding automatic
regularization, prompting the registration of an FIR (Tajpur P.S.
Case No. 74 of 1990, later proceeding as G.R. Case No.
475/90). That the respondent No. 3 was subsequently acquitted
in the said criminal case by giving benefit of doubt. In the wake
of the violent events, that took place on the date of interview,
the Board of Directors convened an emergent meeting and
resolved to cancel the extorted agreement. The deputation of the
respondent No. 3 were terminated on 12.04.1990 via Letter No.
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50D/55/907, repatriating respondent No. 3 to his parent society.
That the responent No. 3 had approached the Labour Court
earlier and a “No Dispute” award was passed by the Labour
Court, Muzaffarpur (Ref. Case No. 16/1989) and the Industrial
Tribunal, Patna (Ref. Case No. 3/1991). Thereafter, the State
Government referred the present dispute on 27.03.1998. The
Labour Court, Begusarai, vide the impugned Award dated
18.10.2012, concluded that the termination was illegal solely on
the ground of non-compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court came to the said
conclusion citing a lack of evidentiary proof regarding the
payment of one month’s advance salary in lieu of notice.
4. Assailing the impugned Award, the learned counsel
for the petitioner- management strenuously urged that
Respondent No. 3 was never directly employed by the petitioner
but was a daily wager engaged by a distinct Mahila Samiti,
making the direction for reinstatement inherently flawed. It is
contended that the termination of deputation was a direct
consequence of the gross indiscipline and physical violence
exhibited on 11.04.1990. That the Labour Court’s finding
regarding the violation of Section 25F of the ID Act is factually
incorrect, as the ledger extracts and Cheque No. 2399 dated
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29.05.1990 unequivocally demonstrate that one month’s advance
salary and deputation allowance were indeed paid in compliance
of 25F of the ID Act. That there was no employer/ employee
between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3. That the
respondent No. 3 had earlier approached the Labour Court
which had passed a no dispute award, therefore, the second
reference is impermissible under law.
5. Furthermore, during the pendency of this writ,
statutory wages under Section 17-B of the ID Act were dutifully
paid until August 2022, at which point the respondent attained
the age of superannuation (Date of Birth: 15.08.1962), thereby
extinguishing any continuing liability. To bolster these
submissions, heavy reliance was placed on the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State
Agriculture Marketing Board & Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 327 and
U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. v. Uday Narayan
Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479, asserting that industrial courts must
not mechanically apply the cold letter of the statute. That even if
Section 25F was violated, automatic reinstatement with back
wages for a daily wager is not the rule; rather, adequate
monetary compensation is the sole appropriate relief. Learned
counsel has therefore, prayed this Hon’ble Court for allowing
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the present CWJC and for setting aside the award of the Labour
Court dated 18.10.2012.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel representing
Respondent No. 3 has vehemently defended the Labour Court’s
Award. Learned counsel has stated that the respondent No. 3
was directly appointed against a permanent vacancy by the
Manager of the Milk Union and had rendered continuous
service of more than 240 days, a fact substantiated by the
testimony of AW-2 (Tej Narayan Choudhary) confirming that
the aforementioned Mahila Samiti only employs females. In
support of his case, reliance is placed on Director, Fisheries
Terminal Department v. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda,
(2010) 1 SCC 47, to assert that once the workman deposed he
had worked for 240 days continuously, the burden of proof
shifted entirely to the management, which failed to adduce any
evidence or produced the muster rolls to disprove his continuous
service. It is argued that the termination of the respondent No. 3
was a vindictive measure designed to break the employees’
union of which the respondent was an executive member. That
the management’s abrupt dismissal of the respondent No. 3 on
allegations of gross misconduct without ever conducting a
mandatory domestic departmental enquiry stands in stark
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violation of the principles of natural justice. The respondent
points out that the management’s allegations of assault falls flat
given the fact that the respondent No. 3 was honourably
acquitted in the criminal case (G.R. Case No. 475/90). That the
management has utterly failed to adduce any evidentiary proof
before the Labour Court that the mandatory Section25F
payment was actually tendered. Relying on the Constitution
Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob
v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, the learned counsel
for respondent submitted that a writ of certiorari is purely
supervisory and the Hon’ble High Court cannot act as an
appellate court to re-appreciate findings of fact recorded by the
Labour Court.
7. Further reliance is placed on Hindustan Tin Works
Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works, (1979) 2
SCC 80 to assert that once an unfair labour practice is
established and termination is held to be illegal, reinstatement
with full back wages remains the normal and inevitable rule.
8. During the pendency of this writ, this Court
directed the payment of Section 17-B wages vide an order
dated24.08.2015, which the management paid until August
2022.
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9. This Court after giving a thoughtful consideration
to the rival submissions made by the counsels is of the opinion
that the judicial system, as a cohesive framework, is designed to
deliver justice grounded in the sound application of legal
principles. The fulcrum of the Labour Court’s decision rests on
the premise that Section 25F of the ID Act was violated due to
the non-payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice.
However, this conclusion of the Labour Court is erroneous and
contrary to the record, a bare perusal of the supplementary
affidavit and the annexed wage ledgers leaves no modicum of
doubt that the petitioner- management had explicitly disbursed
the said one month delay vide Cheque No. 2399 dated
29.05.1990 in compliance of the Section 25F.
10. Though, the respondent No. 3, has heavily relied
on Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477,
contending that a writ court exercising certiorari jurisdiction
cannot re appreciate evidence or disturb the findings of fact, the
same is misplaced in the present context. It is a settled canon of
law, as elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in General
Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa v.
Giridhari Sahu, (2019) 10 SCC 695, that if a tribunal arrives at
a finding of fact by ignoring vital, incontrovertible documentary
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evidence that goes to the very root of statutory compliance, it
commits an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Such
a glaring omission by the Labour Court renders the finding
patently perverse and fully amenable to correction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the restrictive
principles of Syed Yakoob do not afford an absolute shield to
the respondent in the face of demonstrable factual perversity.
11. Furthermore, the reliance placed by the
Respondent No. 3 on Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v.
Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works, (1979) 2SCC 80, for
demanding automatic reinstatement is entirely distinguishable.
That judgment primarily dealt with the retrenchment of regular,
permanent employees. In the instant case, the respondent was
admittedly a daily wager who had worked for a brief period of
less than three years before his termination in 1990. The law in
this regard has significantly evolved. As cogently laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BSNL v. Bhurumal, (2014) 7
SCC 177, the mechanical application of reinstatement with back
wages for daily wagers whose termination is found to be in
violation of Section 25F is wholly unjustified; the proper relief
is an award of lump-sum compensation. This view was firmly
reiterated in Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development
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Corporation v. Gitam Singh, (2013) 5 SCC 136, establishing
that the relief of reinstatement for a daily wager after a hiatus
spanning several decades is legally unsustainable. The Labour
Court, thus, erred in adopting an inflexible approach by ordering
reinstatement 22 years after the cessation of a brief, daily-wage
engagement.
12. Insofar as the respondent’s reliance on Dena Bank
v. Ghanshyam, (2001) 5 SCC 169 and Dilip Mani Dubey v.
SIEL Limited, (2019) 4 SCC 534, is concerned, the said
judgment explicitly clarifies that while wages paid under
Section 17-B of the ID Act are in the nature of a non-refundable
subsistence allowance, the payment of such interim relief does
not preclude the Hon’ble High Court from adjudicating the
legality of the underlying Award. The disbursement of 17-B
wages during the pendency of the writ petition does not cure the
inherent perversity of the Labour Court’s Award, nor does it
grant an indefeasible right to physical reinstatement. This court
is in respectful agreement with the principles of Dena Bank
(supra) only to the extent that the wages already disbursed tot he
respondent up to his superannuation in August 2022 shall not be
recovered.
13. Finally, this court must advert to the payment of
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wages under Section17-B of the ID Act. The record indicates
that the petitioner-management complied with this Court’s
interim orders and disbursed the statutory maintenance
allowance up to August 2022. As Respondent No. 3reached his
age of superannuation (60 years) in August 2022, the
management was well within its statutory rights to cease further
payments. As observed in K.V. Anil Mithra v. Sree
Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, (2022) 17 SCC 505,
statutory benefits or claims tied to an active service lifespan
cannot be extended beyond the date of superannuation. The
passage of time and the attainment of superannuation render the
relief of physical reinstatement both a legal and practical
impossibility.
14. The reliance on Director, Fisheries Terminal
Department v. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda, (2010) 1 SCC
47, regarding the burden of proof for establishing 240 days of
continuous service, is well-taken as a general proposition of law
but provides no succor to the respondent in the present factual
matrix. The petitioner-management’s primary defense was not
merely a denial of the 240 days of service, but rather that the
mandatory pre-conditions of retrenchment under Section
25Fwere, in fact, affirmatively complied with through the
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payment of advance salary via Cheque No. 2399. When
incontrovertible documentary evidence proves compliance with
Section 25F, the shifting of the evidentiary burden regarding the
completion of 240 days becomes a moot academic point
15. However, addressing the management’s potential
claim for recovery of these paid wages, we find merit in the
respondent’s reliance on DenaBank v. Ghanshyam, (2001) 5
SCC 169 and Dilip Mani Dubey v. SIEL Limited, (2019) 4
SCC 534. The law is no longer res integrathat proceedings under
Section 17-B are independent in nature. As held in Dilip Mani
Dubey, even if the Hon’ble High Court eventually upholds the
termination order and quashes the Labour Court’s award, the
employer has no right to recover the amount already paid under
Section17-B, as it is in the nature of a non-refundable
subsistence allowance. Thus, while the relief of physical
reinstatement is a legal and practical impossibility, the wages
disbursed to the respondent as interim relief remain legally non-
recoverable.
16. In light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court find
that the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court suffers
from patent illegality and jurisdictional overreach. The Labour
Court not only failed to appreciate the factual matrix regarding
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the compliance of Section 25F of the ID Act but also erred in
law by ordering the reinstatement of a daily wage employee
after an inordinate delay, contrary to the settled jurisprudence of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Consequently, the writ petition is
allowed. The impugned Award dated 18.10.2012 passed by the
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Begusarai, in Reference Case
No. 1 of 1998, is hereby quashed and set aside.
17. This court further clarify that the wages already
paid to Respondent No. 3 under Section 17-B of the ID Act
during the pendency of this litigation cannot be recovered by the
petitioner-management, and the claims of the respondent-
workman stand finally extinguished.
18. Registry is directed to return the Lower Court
Record of Reference Case No. 01 of 1998 from the Presiding
Officer, Labour Court, Begusarai.
19. The present CWJC stands allowed to the extent
indicated.
20. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
(A. Abhishek Reddy, J)
Ayush/-
U
