National Insurance Company Ltd vs Smt. Tikma Devi & Others on 21 July, 2026

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    Himachal Pradesh High Court

    National Insurance Company Ltd vs Smt. Tikma Devi & Others on 21 July, 2026

    Author: Virender Singh

    Bench: Virender Singh

                                   1                    2026:HHC:30105
    
    
    
    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
    
    
    
    
                                                             .
                                FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017 a/w
    
    
    
    
    
                         FAO (MV) Nos. 227, 228, 229 of 2017 &
                                     FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019
    
    
    
    
    
                                       Reserved on : 01.07.2026
                                        Decided on : 21.07.2026
                                       Uploaded on : 22.07.2026
    
    
    
    
                                       of
        FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017
                       rt
        National Insurance Company Ltd.                 ...Appellant
    
                             Versus
    
        Smt. Tikma Devi & Others                  ...Respondents
    
    
    
        FAO (MV) No. 227 of 2017
    
        National Insurance Company Ltd.                 ...Appellant
    
    
    
    
                             Versus
    
    
    
    
    
        Dole Ram & Others                         ...Respondents
    
    
    
    
    
        FAO (MV) No. 228 of 2017
    
        National Insurance Company Ltd.                  ...Appellant
    
                             Versus
    
        Smt. Gumti Devi & Others                     ...Respondents
    
    
    
    
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                                   2                        2026:HHC:30105
    
    
    
    
        FAO (MV) No. 229 of 2017
    
    
    
    
                                                                .
    
        National Insurance Company Ltd.                      ...Appellant
    
                               Versus
    
    
    
    
    
        Dhani Ram & Others                              ...Respondents
    
    
    
    
                                        of
        FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019
    
        National Insurance Company Ltd.                      ...Appellant
                        rt     Versus
    
        Hira Singh & Others                             ...Respondents
    
    
        Coram
    
    
        The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
        Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
    
    
    
    
        For the appellant:         Mr.   Ashwani  K.  Sharma,
                                   Senior Advocate, with Ms.
    
    
    
    
    
                                   Mamta, Advocate, in all the
                                   appeals.
    
    
    
    
    
        For the respondents:       Ms. Leena Guleria, Advocate,
                                   for respondents No. 1 to 4, in
                                   FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017.
    
                                   Mr. Sunil Kumar, Advocate,
                                   for respondent No. 1, in FAO
                                   (MV) Nos. 227, 228 & 229 of
                                   2017.
    
    
    
    
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                                      Respondent No. 1 ex­parte in
                                      FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019.
    
    
    
    
                                                                    .
    
                                      Mr. Lokesh Thakur, Advocate,
                                      vice Mr. G.R. Palsra, Advocate,
                                      for respondents No. 5 and 6 in
    
    
    
    
    
                                      FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017, for
                                      respondents No. 2 and 3 in
                                      FAO (MV) Nos. 227, 228, 229
    
    
    
    
                                              of
                                      of 2017 and 376 of 2019.
    
        Virender Singh, Judge
    

    rt
    The above titled appeals are being decided by a

    common judgment, as the appellant­National Insurance

    SPONSORED

    Company Ltd., has filed these appeals, under Section 173 of

    the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the M.V.

    Act‘), against the awards, which have been passed by the

    learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal­I, Mandi, District

    Mandi, H.P. and learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal­III,

    Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., respectively, (hereinafter

    referred to as ‘the MACT­I’ and ‘the MACT­III’), in the claim

    petitions, which have arisen out of the accident, which had

    taken place on 21.12.2013, at place Chaira­khad Nalla,

    involving Tata Sumo bearing No. HP01M­1688 (hereinafter

    referred to as ‘the offending vehicle’).

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    2. FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017, has been preferred by

    .

    the Insurance Company against the award dated

    02.01.2017, passed by the learned MACT­I, in Claim Petition

    No. 67/2014, titled as ‘Smt. Tikma Devi & Ors. Versus

    Neeraj Kumar & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 16,02,000/­,

    of
    along with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the

    date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole
    rt
    awarded amount, has been awarded by fastening the

    ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation upon

    the appellant­Insurance Company.

    3. FAO (MV) No. 227 of 2017, has been preferred by

    the Insurance Company against the award dated

    02.01.2017, passed by the Court of learned MACT­I, in

    Claim Petition No. 74/2014, titled as ‘Dole Ram Versus Roop

    Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 5,91,600/­, along with

    interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of

    filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded

    amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability

    to pay the amount of compensation upon the appellant­

    Insurance Company.

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    4. FAO (MV) No. 228 of 2017, has been preferred by

    .

    the Insurance Company against the award dated

    02.01.2017, passed by the Court of learned MACT­I, in

    Claim Petition No. 76/2014, titled as ‘Gumti Devi Devi

    Versus Roop Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 40,300/­,

    of
    along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the

    date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole
    rt
    awarded amount, has been awarded by fastening the

    ultimate liability to pay the compensation upon the

    appellant­Insurance Company.

    5. FAO (MV) No. 229 of 2017, has been preferred by

    the Insurance Company against the award dated

    02.01.2017, passed by the Court of learned MACT­I, in

    Claim Petition No. 90/2014, titled as ‘Dhani Ram Versus

    Roop Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 40,000/­, along with

    interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of

    filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded

    amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability

    to pay the compensation upon the appellant­Insurance

    Company.

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    6. FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019, has been preferred by

    .

    the Insurance Company against the award dated 22.10.2018

    passed by the Court of learned MACT­III, in Claim Petition

    No. 44/2015, 32/2017/2015, titled as ‘Hira Singh Versus

    Roop Lal & Ors.’, wherein a sum of Rs. 21,173/­, along with

    of
    interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of

    filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole awarded
    rt
    amount, has been awarded by fastening the ultimate liability

    to pay the compensation upon the appellant­Insurance

    Company.

    7. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the

    present lis, are, hereinafter referred to, in the same manner,

    as were, referred to, by the learned MACT.

    STAND OF THE PETITIONERS BEFORE LEARNED MACT:

    8. Necessary facts, for adjudication of the above

    titled appeals are being borrowed from Claim Petition No. 67

    of 2014, titled as “Smt. Tikma Devi & Ors. Versus Neeraj

    Kumar & Ors.”, by treating the said case as the lead case,

    9. The petitioners, in Claim Petition No. 67 of 2014,

    have filed the claim petition, seeking compensation on

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    account of death of their predecessor­in­interest Sh.

    .

    Chhabinder, whereas in Claim Petition Nos. 74/2014,

    76/2014, 90/2014 and 44/2015 (32/2017/2015), the

    petitioners have sought compensation, on account of the

    injuries sustained/suffered in Claim Petition No.67 of 2014

    of
    (lead case), by them, in the aforesaid accident.

    10. The petitioners, in Claim Petition No.67 of 2014
    rt
    (lead case) being widow, minor sons and mother of deceased

    Chhabinder, have filed the claim petition under Section 166

    of M.V. Act, seeking compensation on account of death of

    Sh. Chhabinder, in a motor vehicle accident involving the

    offending vehicle, against the respondents being driver,

    owner and insurer of the offending vehicle.

    10.1 According to the petitioners, on 21.12.2013, Sh.

    Chhabinder, along with his nephew Jhabe Ram, son of Sh.

    Ganga Ram, was coming from Kullu to their native place and

    when, they reached at place Kandha, they hired the

    offending vehicle. Apart from them, other persons also

    boarded the offending vehicle. When the offending vehicle

    reached at Chaira­Khad Nala, the same fell down from the

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    road, due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1,

    .

    due to which, Sh. Chhabinder sustained fatal injuries and

    died. His dead body was taken to PHC Thunag for

    postmortem examination, where, the postmortem

    examination was conducted on 22.12.2013. The

    of
    information, regarding the accident, was given to police of

    Police Station Gohar, where, FIR No. 140 dated 22.12.2014
    rt
    under Sections 279, 337, 304­A of IPC was registered.

    10.2 The age of Sh. Chhabinder, at the time of his

    death, was pleaded as 27 years. He was earning Rs.

    12,000/­ per month, from all sources. Elaborating the

    stand, it has been pleaded by the petitioners that apart from

    working as mason, Sh. Chhabinder was also following the

    agricultural pursuits.

    10.3 Since, the accident in question has solely been

    attributed to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1,

    as such, petitioners have sought the compensation of Rs.

    30,00,000/­, from the respondents.

    STAND OF THE RESPONDENTS BEFORE LEARNED

    MACT:

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    11. When put to notice, respondents have contested

    .

    the claim petition, by filing their replies.

    11.1 Respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed their joint

    reply, in which, they have pleaded that respondent No. 1 was

    not driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent

    of
    manner. According to them, respondent No. 1 was having a

    valid driving license. Other contents of the claim petition
    rt
    have been denied by pleading that at the site of accident, it

    was a hilly track and there was a blind curve also. When,

    the offending vehicle reached at the spot, a stray cow

    suddenly appeared in front of the offending vehicle, from the

    adjoining hill, and in order to save the said cow, vehicle

    rolled down from the road.

    12. Insurance company of the offending vehicle has

    filed the separate reply by taking preliminary objections that

    the vehicle in question was being permitted to ply in

    violation of the terms and conditions of insurance policy and

    the driver was not holding valid and effective driving license

    at the time of accident.

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    12.1 On merits, contents of the claim petition have

    .

    been denied mainly for want of knowledge.

    13. Thus, a prayer has been made by the

    respondents to dismiss the claim petition.

    PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LEARNED MACT:

    of

    14. From the pleadings of the parties, the following

    issues were framed by the learned MACT on 27.03.2015:­
    rt

    1. Whether the deceased Chhabinder had died in Motor
    Vehicle Accident on account of rash and negligent

    driving of respondent No. 1? OPP

    2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount
    the petitioners are entitled for compensation? OPP

    3. Whether the respondent No. 3 Insurance Company can

    be held liable to indemnify the award amount? OPR­
    1&2

    4. Whether the vehicle was driven by the respondent No.
    2 in violation of the terms and conditions of the

    Insurance Policy? OPR­3

    5. Whether the respondent No. 2 was not having valid

    and effective driving license to drive the vehicle at the
    time of the accident? OPR­3

    6. Relief.

    15. Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to

    adduce evidence.

    16. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for

    the parties, the learned MACT have allowed the petitions, as

    referred to above, by fastening the liability upon the

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    insurance company to pay the compensation, as referred

    .

    above.

    STAND OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY BEFORE THIS
    COURT:

    17. Feeling aggrieved from the awards, the Insurance

    of
    Company of the offending vehicle has preferred the present

    appeals, before this Court, assailing the awards, mainly on
    rt
    the ground that the evidence has not been properly

    considered by the learned MACT.

    18. The awards have also been assailed, on the

    ground, that driving license Ext. RW1/A, has been proved to

    be fake and learned MACT has wrongly held that respondent

    No. 1 was having valid and effective driving license, to drive

    the offending vehicle, at the time of accident.

    19. It is further case of the Insurance Company that

    the driver, Neeraj Kumar, has placed on record his driving

    license No. 157636/BPR (Ext. RW1/C). He has also

    produced on record copy of the No Objection Certificate (Ext.

    RW1/D) allegedly issued by DTO, Bishnupur (Manipur).

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    20. According to the appellant, a commission was

    .

    appointed by the learned MACT, to record the statement of

    District Transport Officer, Bishnupur (Manipur).

    Accordingly, statement of Simen Keishing, the then D.T.O.

    Bishnupur was recorded by the Commissioner as RW­2, in

    of
    which, he has deposed that the driving license No.

    157636/BPR was issued from his office in the name of
    rt
    Takhellambam Nanoacha Singh, resident of Ithai Wakokpi,

    P.O. and P.S. Kumbi, District Bishnupur (Manipur) on

    22.01.2013 for MLV and lateron, the said person was

    authorized to drive Heavy Motor Vehicle on 06.01.2014.

    According to the appellant, RW­2 has categorically stated

    that the driving license was not issued in the name of Neeraj

    Kumar son of Roop Lal, resident of Village Kondhi, however,

    in the cross­examination, he has admitted that document

    Ext. RW1/C bears his signatures.

    21. All these facts have been highlighted by the

    Insurance Company, in the present appeals, to establish

    that the company has successfully proved that the driving

    license Ext. RW1/C, was not issued by DTO Bishnupur

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    (Manipur), in the name of respondent No. 1. As such, the

    .

    findings have been assailed on the ground that the learned

    MACT has wrongly concluded that the Insurance Company

    could not prove the violation of the terms and conditions of

    the Insurance Policy.

    of

    22. The findings of the learned MACT have further

    been assailed on the ground that the monthly income of Sh.

    rt
    Chhabinder has wrongly been taken as Rs. 6,000/­ per

    month and thereafter increase at the rate of 50% has been

    given on account of future prospects, which according to the

    learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant­

    Insurance Company, is not sustainable in the eyes of law, in

    view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in

    “National Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Pranay Sethi &

    Others, (2017) 16 Supreme Court Cases 680”.

    23. On the basis of above facts, Sh. Ashwani K.

    Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Mamta, Advocate,

    has prayed that the appeals may kindly be allowed by setting

    aside the awards and Insurance Company may kindly be

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    exonerated from the liability to pay the amount of

    .

    compensation to the petitioners.

    STAND OF THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THIS COURT:

    24. Per contra, Ms. Leena Guleria, learned counsel

    appearing for respondents No. 1 to 4, in FAO (MV) No. 226 of

    of
    2017, has supported the award passed by learned MACT

    and prayed that the awarded amount may kindly be
    rt
    enhanced, so that the same could fall within the definition of

    ‘just compensation’.

    25. In order to buttress her contentions, Ms. Leena

    Guleria, learned counsel has drawn the attention of this

    Court towards the fact that all the petitioners are entitled for

    compensation, under the heads ‘loss of estate’; and ‘loss of

    consortium’, along with 10% increase, as mandated by the

    Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay

    Sethi’s case (supra).

    STAND OF THE OWNER & DRIVER BEFORE THIS
    COURT:

    26. Sh. Lokesh Thakur, Advocate vice Mr. G.R.

    Palsra, Advocate, appearing for respondents No. 5 and 6,

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    have supported the award passed by the learned MACT and

    .

    prayed that the appeal sans merits and the same may kindly

    be dismissed.

    DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS:

    27. This Court has to decide the contention, as

    of
    raised by the Insurance Company, in the present appeals,

    qua violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance
    rt
    Policy. From the evidence, so adduced on the file, it has

    been argued that respondent No. 1 was not having a valid

    and effective driving license, as such, the insurance

    company is not liable to pay the amount of compensation.

    28. In this regard, evidence of RW­2 Simen Keishing,

    has been highlighted to prove that he has categorically

    stated that driving license No. 157636/BPR dated

    28.01.2013, has never been issued by DTO Bishnupur

    (Manipur), in favour of respondent No. 1. As such, efforts

    have been made by the Insurance Company to get rid of

    their liability of indemnifying the owner of offending vehicle.

    29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision

    in case “Hind Samachar Ltd. Versus National Insurance

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    Company Ltd. & Ors., (2026) 2 Supreme Court Cases

    .

    773″, has held that it is incumbent upon the Insurance

    Company to plead and prove that the owner was knowing

    the fact that his driver was having a fake driving license, in

    case the Insurance Company wants to get the exoneration

    of
    from the liability to indemnify the owner. Relevant

    paragraphs 8 to 17 of the judgment, are reproduced, as
    rt
    under:­

    “8. In Swaran Singh (supra), a three Judge Bench of this
    Court, considered the purported conflict in Kamla (supra)
    and Lehru and Ors. (supra) to hold as under: ­

    “99. So far as the purported conflict in the judgments
    of Kamla (2001) 4 SCC 342 and Lehru (2003) 3 SCC
    338 is concerned, we may wish to point out that the
    defence to the effect that the licence held by the

    person driving the vehicle was a fake one, would be
    available to the insurance companies, but whether
    despite the same, the plea of default on the part of

    the owner has been established or not would be a
    question which will have to be determined in each
    case.”

    9. In PEPSU RTC (supra) it was held so on the facts arising
    in the said case, as under: ­

    “11. On facts, in the instant case, the appellant
    employer had employed the third respondent Nirmal
    Singh as driver in 1994. In the process of
    employment, he had been put to a driving test and
    he had been imparted training also. The accident
    took place only after six years of his service in PRTC
    as driver. In such circumstances, it cannot be said
    that the insured is at fault in having employed a
    person whose licence has been proved to be fake by

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    the Insurance Company before the Tribunal. As we
    have already noted above, on scanning the evidence

    .

    of the licensing authority before the Tribunal, it

    cannot also be absolutely held that the licence to the
    driver had not been issued by the said authority and
    that the licence was fake. Though the appellant had
    also taken a contention that the compensation is on

    the higher side, no serious attempt has been made
    and according to us justifiably, to canvas that
    position.”

    of

    10. In Geeta Devi (supra) this Court deprecated the practice
    of the insurance companies blithely claiming that the
    deceased vehicle owner did not conduct due diligence while
    employing a driver; which is not a condition prescribed
    rt
    either in the statute or in the insurance policy, despite the
    wealth of precedents. It was held so in paragraph 18, as
    under: ­

    “18. Applying the afore­stated edicts to the case on
    hand, it may be noted that the petitioner­insurance
    company did not even raise the plea that the owner
    of the vehicle allowed Ujay Pal to drive the vehicle

    knowing that his licence was fake. Its stand was
    that the accident had occurred due to the negligence
    of the victim himself. Further, the insurance policy
    did not require the vehicle owner to undertake

    verification of the driving licence of the driver of the
    vehicle by getting the same confirmed with the RTO.

    Therefore, the claim of the petitioner­ insurance
    company that it has the right to recover the
    compensation from the owners of the vehicle, owing
    to a willful breach of the condition of the insurance

    policy, viz., to ensure that the vehicle was driven by
    a licenced driver, is without pleading and proof.”

    11. Now, coming to the facts of this case, A2 was produced
    by R3W1, a Clerk of the record room in Tis Hazari Court as
    was pointed out by the appellant. While referring to his
    deposition, the Tribunal had in paragraph 179 specifically
    stated that neither the Clerk nor the Court could have
    seized the driving licence at the time of accident. It is also
    stated in paragraph 184 that: ‘Interestingly, the police had
    seized the driving licence A2 from the driver of the Tempo
    issued from Alwar, renewed on 18.04.1990 till

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    17.04.1993′. We would, for the moment, assume that it is a
    typographical error and the statement is that A2 was

    .

    seized from the driver of the truck itself. Even then, there is

    no evidence to substantiate the seizure having been made,
    nor even the seizure mahazar produced, which the police
    would have recorded if such seizure had been made at the
    accident spot or from the driver, later on.

    12. We do not find any substance in the argument of the
    respondent­insurer that a collusion can be validly inferred
    since the driving licence was produced by the owner. In

    of
    fact, the owner of the truck is not an individual and is a
    company, as we see from the cause title. Undisputedly,
    even if the tort­ feasor is the driver, the liability for any
    negligence of the driver rests on the owner of the vehicle,
    rt
    vicariously. There can be no suspicion raised merely
    because the owner had produced the driving licence before
    Court. It only indicates that the owner had been diligent

    enough to procure the driving licence from the driver and
    produce it before the Tribunal, so as to validly raise a case
    for indemnification by the insurer.

    13. The office of the DTO, Gurdaspur had also issued a

    certificate indicating that the driving licence No.5288 issued
    in the name of the first respondent was so issued on
    05.04.1991 valid from 05.04.1991 to 04.04.1994 and,
    thereafter renewed from 11.08.1994 to 10.08.1997 vide

    entry No.2903 dated 11.08.1994, produced along with the
    additional documents by the appellant and marked before

    the Tribunal as R­1.

    14. The driving licence issued from the office of DTO
    Gurdaspur was produced as R1W1/1 and R3W3 was a

    Clerk from the office of DTO Gurdaspur who claimed that
    Exhibit R1W1/1 was not issued from their office and no
    amount was deposited in the name of R1 towards driving
    licence fees in their office on 21.08.1990. Immediately, we
    have to notice that the date 21.08.1990 has no nexus with
    the date of issuance of R1W1/1, which was first issued on
    05.04.1991 and the renewal effected on 11.08.1994.

    15. Further, it is to be noticed that the DL register produced
    from the office of DTO Gurdaspur was full of interpolations.
    A colour photograph of 1st respondent was found in the
    register but the name shown was different. In cross

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    examination, it has come out that there were interpolations
    and deletions made as against other entries too. Also on the

    .

    ground of there being no possibility of a colour photograph

    in the year 1990, the High Court found collusion between
    the owner and the driver. The collusion at best can be only
    alleged for the production of the licence and not with
    respect to the entrustment of the vehicle.

    16. As has been noticed in Geeta Devi (supra) there is no
    pleading or substantiation of due diligence having not been
    employed at the time of entrustment. R1W1 was the

    of
    Advertising In­charge of the appellant who produced the
    licence before the Court as Exhibit R1W1/1. The certificate
    issued by the RTO Gurdaspur was also marked as R1
    which we referred to from the additional documents. In
    rt
    cross­examination, there was only a bland suggestion
    made to the witness that the Directors of R2 knew that R1
    possessed only a fake driving licence. There were no

    questions put to the witness, who was examined on behalf
    of the owner, as to the actual entrustment of the vehicle or
    whether R1 was employed regularly or temporarily and
    when such employment commenced, which are crucial
    insofar as proving or disproving due diligence by the owner

    at the time of engagement of the driver and the entrustment
    of the vehicle. As has been rightly held by the precedents
    above noticed, the owner of a vehicle employing a driver
    can only look at the licence produced by the person seeking

    employment and is not expected to verify from the licence
    issuing authority whether the licence is fake or not.

    17. The insurance company from the totality of the
    circumstances has to bring out the absence of due diligence
    in the employment of the driver or the entrustment of the

    vehicle, to prove breach by the insured, which is totally
    absent in the present case. The High Court had erred in
    finding that there was collusion between the employer and
    the employee merely for reason of the driving licence having
    been produced by the employer and the driver having not
    contested the claim. The driver, as has been noticed in a
    number of decisions of this Court, would have kept himself
    away from the box, for fear of incriminating himself; since a
    prosecution was pending against him. In any event, the
    vicarious liability to satisfy the damages caused by the
    negligence of the employee is on the employer, the later of
    whom has to contest the matter. Not only was the driving

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    licence, as issued to the driver produced, but, a certificate
    showing its further renewal was also produced. In fact, we

    .

    specifically notice that the renewal made is not an

    automatic renewal which has to be carried out within 30
    days of the expiry of a driving licence, as per the Motor
    Vehicles Act
    and the Rules made thereunder. Herein the
    validity period of the licence, originally issued expired on

    04.04.1994 and the renewal was on 11.08.1994.”

    (Self emphasis supplied)

    30. Being guided by the above decision, now, this

    of
    Court would proceed further to determine the fact, whether

    the Insurance Company has proved/probablized the fact
    rt
    that respondent No. 2, owner of the offending vehicle (father

    of respondent No. 1), had the knowledge that the license Ext.

    RW1/C was not valid.

    31. In order to determine the said fact, relevant

    evidence, so adduced by the parties, before the learned

    MACT, is required to be discussed. Onus to prove the willful

    violation was on respondent No. 3­Insurance Company.

    32. Respondents No. 1 and 2­driver & owner, filed

    the joint reply, in which, specific stand has been taken that

    respondent No. 1 was having valid driving license.

    33. Respondent No. 2 appeared in the witness box as

    RW­1 and filed his duly sworn­in affidavit Ext. RW1/A in

    evidence, in which, he has asserted the factual position qua

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    the fact that he is owner of the offending vehicle and he has

    .

    deployed his son Neeraj Kumar, as driver of his vehicle, who

    has good experience of driving for the last about ten years in

    the State of H.P. and other States of India, including

    Manipur, where he used to work as driver, upto January,

    of
    2013. According to him, he had verified his driving license

    and his driving was perfect with no antecedents of accident.

    34.
    rt
    In the cross­examination by the learned counsel

    for the Insurance Company, this witness has deposed that

    he had verified the driving license from Manipur and

    obtained the copy of verification letter Ext. RW1/E. Rest, he

    has denied all the suggestions, including the suggestion, qua

    production of documentary proof to prove that his son was

    working at Manipur.

    35. The verification letter has not been tendered by

    RW­1, in his examination­in­chief, rather, on asking of

    learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, he

    has deposed about the material fact that he got verified the

    license of his son by obtaining the verification report Ext.

    RW1/E.

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    22 2026:HHC:30105

    36. Respondent No. 1 has not appeared in the

    .

    witness box, nor he has been examined by the Insurance

    Company, as their witness, to probablize their defence that

    the driving license, copy of which is Ext. RW1/C, was not

    obtained by him from the office of DTO Bishnupur

    of
    (Manipur).

    37. In this case, evidence of DTO Bishnupur
    rt
    (Manipur) has been recorded by the Local Commissioner as

    RW­2. RW­2, in his examination­in­chief has deposed that

    the driving license No. 157636/BPR, as per record, was

    issued in the name of Takhellambam Nanoacha Singh on

    22.01.2013, which was issued for Light Motor Vehicle,

    lateron, he was authorized to drive Heavy Motor Vehicle on

    06.01.2014. In this regard, he has issued the report Ext.

    RW2/A, mentioning therein that no license was issued in the

    name of Neeraj Kumar son of Roop Lal, resident of Village

    Kandhi, P.O. Saroa, Tehsil Chachiot, District Mandi, H.P.

    38. Interestingly, in the cross­examination by learned

    counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2, this witness has

    admitted that the document Ext. RW1/C, bears his

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    signature. Ext. RW1/C is the copy of verification report of

    .

    driving license issued in the name of respondent No. 1. The

    evidence of RW­2 was recorded on 25.02.2016 and

    statement of RW­1 was recorded on 20.11.2015, prior to the

    recording of statement of RW­2. On the day, when the

    of
    statement of RW­2 was recorded i.e. on 25.02.2016,

    document Ext. RW1/E was already on record, as the same
    rt
    had been produced by respondent No. 2 (RW­1) on

    20.11.2015, in the cross­examination conducted by the

    learned counsel for the Insurance Company.

    39. Interestingly, this document i.e. No Objection

    Certificate has been issued under the seal and signature of

    Simon Keishing, District Transport Officer Bishnupur

    District, Manipur (RW­2) as admitted by him, in his cross­

    examination. In the absence of any evidence contrary to the

    authenticity of Ext. RW1/E, this document is sufficient to

    hold that the owner has taken requisite precautions before

    handing over the offending vehicle to a person, who was

    having a driving license purported to have been issued by

    DTO Bishnupur, Manipur.

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    24 2026:HHC:30105

    40. The Insurance Company has miserably failed to

    .

    prove that the owner has knowingly allowed the breach of

    terms and conditions of the Insurance Company, by handing

    over the offending vehicle to a person, who was not having a

    valid and effective driving license.

    of

    41. At the cost of repetition, RW­2 has admitted that

    the driving license, copy of which is Ext. RW1/C, bears his
    rt
    signatures and the verification report has also been tendered

    in evidence by respondent No. 2 (owner of the offending

    vehicle). Thus, the learned MACT has considered the

    evidence in the right perspective and rightly concluded that

    the Insurance Company has miserably failed to prove the

    willful violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance

    Policy.

    42. The Insurance Company could not prove any

    fault on the part of the owner of the offending vehicle. As

    such, it can be said that the Insurance Company has failed

    to prove that respondent No. 2 (owner of the offending

    vehicle) had handed over the offending vehicle to respondent

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    No. 1 (driver) to drive the same, despite knowing the fact that

    .

    he was not having a valid and effective driving license.

    43. Now, the next question is whether the amount of

    compensation awarded to the petitioners falls within the

    definition of ‘just compensation’, as the endavour of the

    of
    Court/Tribunal is to grant ‘just compensation’.

    44. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Oriental Insurance
    rt
    Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and another, (2009) 2

    SCC (Cri.) 987 has held that the provisions of M.V. Act are

    beneficial piece of legislation and the endeavour of the

    Court/Tribunal should be to provide “just compensation”.

    The relevant paras 23 and 24 of the judgment are

    reproduced as under:­

    “23. Both, the 1923 Act and 1988 Act are beneficent
    legislation insofar as they provide for payment of

    compensation to the workmen employed by the
    employers and/or by use of motor vehicle by the
    owner thereof and/or the insurer to the petitioners
    suffering permanent disability. The amount of
    compensation is to be determined in terms of the
    provisions of the
    respective Acts. Whereas in terms of the 1923 Act, the
    Commissioner who is a quasi judicial authority, is
    bound to apply the principles and the factors laid
    down in
    the Act for the purpose of determining the
    compensation, Section 168 of the 1988 Act enjoins the
    Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of
    compensation which appears to be just.

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    26 2026:HHC:30105

    24. Both the Acts aim at providing for expeditious relief
    to the victims of accident. In these cases, the accidents

    .

    took place by reason of use of motor vehicles. Both the

    statutes are beneficial ones for the workmen as also
    the third parties. The benefits thereof are available
    only to the persons specified under the Act besides
    under the Contract of Insurance. The statutes,

    therefore, deserve liberal construction. The legislative
    intent contained therein is required to be interpreted
    with a view to give effect thereto.”

    of
    (self emphasis supplied)

    45. This view has again been reiterated by Hon’ble
    rt
    Apex Court in Govind Yadav versus The New India

    Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2012 ACJ 28 (SC).

    Relevant paragraphs 12 & 13 of the judgment are

    reproduced as under:

    12. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2009) 13 SCC
    422, this Court reiterated that the compensation awarded

    under the Act should be just and also identified the factors
    which should be kept in mind while determining the

    amount of compensation. The relevant portions of the
    judgment are extracted below:

    “The compensation which is required to be determined
    must be just. While the petitioners are required to be

    compensated for the loss of their dependency, the same
    should not be considered to be a windfall. Unjust
    enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot
    also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for
    example death of the only son to a mother, she can
    never be compensated in monetary terms. The question
    as to the methodology required to be applied for
    determination of compensation as regards prospective
    loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible
    should be based on certain principles. A person may
    have a bright future prospect; he might have become
    eligible to promotion immediately; there might have

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    been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in
    another (sic situation) the nature of employment was

    .

    such that he might not have continued in service; his

    chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of
    employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore,
    difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which
    should be applied in all situations. There are divergent

    views. In some cases it has been suggested that some
    sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable.
    That may be so.

    of
    In the Indian context several other factors should be
    taken into consideration including education of the
    dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of
    changed societal conditions and global scenario, future
    rt
    prospects may have to be taken into consideration not
    only having regard to the status of the employee, his
    educational qualification; his past performance but also

    other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and
    perks which are being offered by the private companies
    these days. In fact while determining the m ultiplicand
    this Court in O riental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jas huben
    held that even dearness allowance and perks with

    regard thereto from which the family would have
    derived monthly benefit, must be taken into
    consideration.

    One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken
    into consideration is inflation. Is the practice of taking

    inflation into consideration wholly incorrect?
    Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries in India
    there has been no scientific study. It is expected that

    with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up.
    In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a
    relevant factor which may be taken into consideration
    for determining the actual ground reality. No hard­and­
    fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    13. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance
    Company Limited
    (2010) 10 SCC 254, the Court considered
    the plea for enhancement of compensation made by the
    appellant, who was a student of final year of engineering

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    and had suffered 70% disablement in a motor accident.
    After noticing factual matrix of the case, the Court observed:

    .

    “We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities

    in relation to assessment of all damages for personal
    injury. Suffice it to say that the basis of assessment of
    all damages for personal injury is compensation. The

    whole idea is to put the petitioner in the same position
    as he was insofar as money can. Perfect compensation
    is hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that the
    victim has done no wrong; he has suffered at the hands

    of
    of the wrongdoer and the court must take care to give
    him full and fair compensation for that he had
    suffered.”

    rt (emphasis supplied)

    46. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant

    paragraphs 29 to 34 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court in the case titled as, Sidram versus

    Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company

    Limited & anr., reported in (2023) 3 Supreme Court Cases

    439, as under:

    29. The process of determining the compensation by the
    court is essentially a very difficult task and can never be an

    exact science. Perfect compensation is hardly possible, more
    so in claims of injury and disability. As rightly pointed out in
    H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958­65 ACJ 504 (HL,
    England):

    “…money cannot renew a physical frame that has been
    battered.”

    30. The principle consistently followed by this court in
    assessing motor vehicle compensation claims, is to place the
    victim in as near a position as she or he was in before the
    accident, with other compensatory directions for loss of
    amenities and other payments. These general principles

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    have been stated and reiterated in several decisions.
    [Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10

    .

    SCC 683.]

    31. It is now a well settled position of law that even in cases
    of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor­
    accident, the petitioner can seek, apart from compensation

    for future loss of income, amounts for future prospects as
    well. We have come across many orders of different
    tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different High
    Courts, taking the view that the petitioner is not entitled to

    of
    compensation for future prospects in accident cases
    involving serious injuries resulting in permanent
    disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is
    no justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for
    future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries
    rt
    resulting in permanent disablement. Such a narrow reading
    is illogical because it denies altogether the possibility of the
    living victim progressing further in life in accident cases –

    and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case of
    the victim’s death.

    (Self emphasis supplied)

    32. This Court has emphasised time and again that “just
    compensation” should include all elements that would go to
    place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in,
    before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of

    money or other material compensation can erase the
    trauma, pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a
    serious accident, (or replace the loss of a loved one),

    monetary compensation is the manner known to law,
    whereby society assures some measure of restitution to
    those who survive, and the victims who have to face their

    lives.

    33. In Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited
    and Others
    , (2012) 6 SCC 421, this Court held that:

    “14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any
    rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24 of
    the judgment in Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC,
    (2009) 6 SCC 121] that where the deceased was self­
    employed or was on a fixed salary without provision
    for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take
    only the actual income at the time of death and a
    departure from this rule should be made only in rare
    and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.

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    In our view, it will be nave to say that the wages or
    total emoluments/income of a person who is self­

    .

    employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without

    provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the
    same throughout his life.

    15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across

    the board. It does not make any distinction between
    rich and poor.

    of
    As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which
    directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich
    and maximum on those who are self­employed or who
    get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst
    affected people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to
    rt
    generate additional income necessary for sustaining
    their families.

    16. The salaries of those employed under the Central
    and State Governments and their agencies/
    instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to
    provide a cushion against the rising prices and
    provisions have been made for providing security to the

    families of the deceased employees. The salaries of
    those employed in private sectors have also increased
    manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could
    have imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the

    Government would be in five figures and total
    emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will

    cross the figure of rupees one lakh.

    17. Although the wages/income of those employed in
    unorganised sectors has not registered a corresponding

    increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the
    salaries of the government employees and those
    employed in private sectors, but it cannot be denied
    that there has been incremental enhancement in the
    income of those who are self­ employed and even those
    engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even
    seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact
    that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high
    cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category
    periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this
    context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor
    who earns his livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost
    of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it

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    is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour.
    So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled

    .

    labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc.

    18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the
    observations in the last three lines of para 24 of Sarla
    Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121]

    judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an
    absolute rule that there will be no addition in the
    income of a person who is self­employed or who is paid
    fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that

    of
    a person who is self­employed or is engaged on fixed
    wages will also get 30% increase in his total income
    over a period of time and if he/she becomes the victim
    of an accident then the same formula deserves to be
    applied for calculating the amount of compensation.”
    rt

    34. In Jagdish v. Mohan and Others, (2018) 4 SCC 571,
    the victim, a carpenter, suffered permanent

    disablement, and his claim for compensation including
    for loss of future prospects was considered by a three­
    Judge Bench which included, incidentally, the judges
    who had decided National Insurance Company (supra).
    This Court held that:

    “13. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench
    in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay
    Sethi
    , (2017) 16 SCC 680], this Court has held that the

    benefit of future prospects should not be confined only
    to those who have a permanent job and would extend
    to self­employed individuals. In the case of a self­

    employed person, an addition of 40% of the established
    income should be made where the age of the victim at
    the time of the accident was below 40 years. Hence, in

    the present case, the appellant would be entitled to an
    enhancement of Rs. 2400 towards loss of future
    prospects.

    14. In making the computation in the present case, the
    court must be mindful of the fact that the appellant has
    suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a
    loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged
    in manual activities, it requires no stretch of
    imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a
    complete deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing –at
    least in the facts of this case–can restore lost hands.
    But the measure of compensation must reflect a

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    genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the
    being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so

    .

    abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law

    values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide
    a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the
    trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not
    law’s doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute

    entitlements under law. Our conversations about law
    must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the
    individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as
    intrinsic to human dignity.

    of

    15. The Tribunal has noted that the appellant is unable
    to even eat or to attend to a visit to the toilet without
    the assistance of an attendant. In this background, it
    rt
    would be a denial of justice to compute the disability at
    90%. The disability is indeed total.

    Having regard to the age of the appellant, the Tribunal
    applied a multiplier of 18. In the circumstances, the
    compensation payable to the appellant on account of
    the loss of income, including future prospects, would be
    Rs 18,14,400. In addition to this amount, the appellant

    should be granted an amount of Rs 2 lakhs on account
    of pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The amount
    awarded by the Tribunal towards medical expenses
    (Rs 98,908); for extra nourishment (Rs 25,000) and for

    attendant’s expenses (Rs 1 lakh) is maintained. The
    Tribunal has declined to award any amount towards

    future treatment. The appellant should be allowed an
    amount of Rs 3 lakhs towards future medical
    expenses. The appellant is thus awarded a total sum of

    Rs 25,38,308 by way of compensation. The appellant
    would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on
    the compensation from the date of the filing of the claim
    petition. The liability to pay compensation has been
    fastened by the Tribunal and by the High Court on the
    insurer, owner and driver jointly and severally which is
    affirmed. The amount shall be deposited before the
    Tribunal within a period of 6 weeks from today and
    shall be paid over to the appellant upon proper
    identification.”

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    47. Being guided by the above decisions of Hon’ble

    .

    Supreme Court, now this Court would proceed further to

    determine the fact whether the learned MACT has rightly

    assessed the amount of compensation or not.

    FAO (MV) No. 226 of 2017 arising out of Claim Petition

    of
    No. 67 of 2014

    48. As per the stand taken by the petitioners, Sh.

    rt
    Chhabinder, at the time of accident was 27 years of age and

    earning Rs. 12,000/­ per month, by working as mason and

    also pursuing agricultural pursuits. By examining PW­3

    Jhabe Ram, who is nephew of Sh. Chhabinder, an attempt

    has been made by the petitioners to prove that Sh.

    Chhabinder was earning Rs. 12,000/­ per month, during his

    lifetime.

    49. Petitioner No. 1 Tikma Devi, while appearing in

    the witness box as PW­4, has deposed almost on the same

    lines. In the cross­examination, she has admitted that her

    husband was not getting regular employment and he used to

    get work occasionally. He was earning Rs. 400/­ ­ Rs. 500/­

    per day. Learned MACT has taken the income of Sh.

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    34 2026:HHC:30105

    Chhabinder, during his life time as Rs. 6,000/­ per month.

    .

    The accident in question had taken place in the year 2013.

    Even in that year, the minimum wages of a skilled worker

    were Rs. 122/­ per day, or to say Rs. 3660/­ per month.

    However, the principle of minimum wages is to be applied,

    of
    where there is no evidence, whereas, in the present case, the

    wife of Sh. Chhabinder categorically deposed about the
    rt
    income of her husband, in her statement, on oath. In such

    situation, this Court is of the view that the learned MACT

    has rightly taken the monthly earning of Sh. Chhabinder as

    Rs. 6,000/­ per month.

    50. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court in “Sarla Verma Vs Delhi Transport

    Corportation, 2009 (6) SCC 121″, and as approved in

    Pranay Sethi‘s case (supra), keeping in view the age of Sh.

    Chhabinder, at the time of his death, increase has rightly

    been given by the learned MACT, but the said increase

    should be 40%, not 50% as awarded by the learned MACT,

    as Sh. Chhabinder was working in unorganized sector.

    Thus, his contribution towards his family comes to Rs.

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    35 2026:HHC:30105

    6,000/­ + 40% of Rs. 6,000/­ = Rs. 6,000/­ + Rs. 2,400/­ =

    .

    Rs. 8,400/­ per month.

    51. Keeping in view the number of dependents, 1/4th

    amount, out of the total contribution of Sh. Chhabinder is

    liable to be deducted, on account of personal expenses, had

    of
    he been alive, which comes to Rs. 6,300/­ per month (Rs.

    8,400/­ minus Rs. 2,100/­). His monthly contribution, thus
    rt
    comes to Rs. 6,300/­ per month.

    52. The learned MACT has applied the multiplier of

    17, which according to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme

    Court in Sarla Verma’s case (supra), is the appropriate

    multiplier, to be applied in the present case. Thus, the loss

    of contribution comes to Rs. 6,300/­ x 12 x 17 = Rs.

    12,85,200/­.

    53. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court

    in Magma General Insurance Company Limited versus

    Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, reported in

    (2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130, all the petitioners are

    held entitled for the amount of loss of consortium. The

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    relevant paras 21 to 24 of the judgment are reproduced, as

    .

    under:­

    “21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
    Pranay Sethi dealt with the various heads

    under which compensation is to be awarded in
    a death case. One of these heads is loss of
    consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a
    compendious term which encompasses

    of
    `spousal consortium’, `parental consortium’,
    and `filial consortium’. The right to consortium
    would include the company, care, help, comfort,
    guidance, solace and affection of the deceased,
    rt
    which is a loss to his family. With respect to a
    spouse, it would include sexual relations with
    the deceased spouse:

    21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined
    as rights pertaining to the relationship of a
    husband­wife which allows compensation to
    the surviving spouse for loss of “company,

    society, co­operation, affection, and aid of the
    other in every conjugal relation”.

    21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the
    child upon the premature death of a parent, for
    loss of “parental aid, protection, affection,

    society, discipline, guidance and training.”

    21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the

    parents to compensation in the case of an
    accidental death of a child. An accident leading
    to the death of a child causes great shock and
    agony to the parents and family of the
    deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to
    lose their child during their lifetime. Children
    are valued for their love, affection,
    companionship and their role in the family unit.

    22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting
    changing norms about the status and worth of

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    37 2026:HHC:30105

    actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions
    world­over have recognized that the value of a

    .

    child’s consortium far exceeds the economic

    value of the compensation awarded in the case
    of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions
    therefore permit parents to be awarded

    compensation under loss of consortium on the
    death of a child. The amount awarded to the
    parents is a compensation for loss of the love,
    affection, care and companionship of the

    of
    deceased child.

    23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial
    legislation aimed at providing relief to the
    rt
    victims or their families, in cases of genuine
    claims. In case where a parent has lost their
    minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the

    parents are entitled to be awarded loss of
    consortium under the head of filial consortium.
    Parental consortium is awarded to children
    who lose their parents in motor vehicle

    accidents under the Act. A few High Courts
    have awarded compensation on this count.
    However, there was no clarity with respect to
    the principles on which compensation could be

    awarded on loss of filial consortium.

    24. The amount of compensation to be awarded
    as consortium will be governed by the
    principles of awarding compensation under

    `loss of consortium’ as laid down in Pranay
    Sethi
    (supra). In the present case, we deem it
    appropriate to award the father and the sister
    of the deceased, an amount of Rs. 40,000 each
    for loss of Filial Consortium.”

    54. Before assessing the entitlement of the

    petitioners for compensation under conventional heads, it is

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    38 2026:HHC:30105

    apt for this Court to reproduce relevant paragraph 59.8 of

    .

    Pranay Sethi case (supra), which is reproduced as under:­

    “59.8 Reasonable figures on conventional heads,
    namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral

    expenses should be Rs. 15,000/­, Rs. 40,000/­ and
    Rs. 15,000/­ respectively. The aforesaid amount
    should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three

    of
    years.”

    55. In view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme

    Court in Pranay Sethi‘s case (supra), the petitioners are
    rt
    also held entitled for compensation under the heads: ‘loss of

    estate’, ‘funeral expenses’, and ‘loss of consortium’.

    56. Thus, the entitlement of the claimants, is

    adjudicated, as under:

    1. Loss of income = Rs. 12,85,200/­

    2. Loss of consortium = Rs.1,60,000/­

    3. Loss of estate = Rs. 15,000/­

    4. Funeral Expenses = Rs. 15,000 /­

    _________________________________________________________
    Total = Rs. 14,75,200/­.

    ________________________________________________________

    57. The entitlement of the petitioners with a view to

    grant just compensation, thus, comes to Rs. 14,75,200/­.

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    39 2026:HHC:30105

    58. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, the

    .

    learned MACT has rightly awarded the rate of interest at the

    rate of 7.5% and the same does not require any interference.

    59. The learned MACT has rightly fastened the

    ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation, along

    of
    with up­to­date interest, on the Insurance Company

    (respondent No.3), with whom, the offending vehicle was,
    rt
    admittedly, insured, at the time of accident.

    60. Having glance of the above discussion, the appeal

    of the Insurance Company is partly allowed; the amount of

    compensation is reduced from Rs. 16,02,000/­ to Rs.

    14,75,200/­, along with interest @ 7.5% per annum, from

    the date of filing of the petition, till the deposit of award

    amount.

    FAO (MV) No. 227 of 2017 arising out of Claim Petition

    No. 74/2014

    61. In the case of petitioner Dole Ram, who has filed

    the Claim Petition No. 74/2014, the learned MACT­I has

    awarded a sum of Rs. 5,91,600/­, along with interest @ 7.5%

    per annum.

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    40 2026:HHC:30105

    62. According to the petitioner Dole Ram, in the said

    .

    accident, he has sustained grievous injuries and suffered

    fracture. After the accident, he was firstly taken to PHC

    Thunag and thereafter, referred to Zonal Hospital Mandi,

    where, he remained admit as indoor patient on 21.12.2013

    of
    and 22.12.2013 and thereafter, he was referred to PGI

    Chandigarh and remained admit from 22.12.2013 to
    rt
    12.01.2014. Thereafter, he was again brought back to Zonal

    Hospital Mandi and remained admit w.e.f. 12.01.2014 to

    19.01.2014. Thereafter, he was again taken to PGI

    Chandigarh, where he remained admit from 20.01.2014 to

    28.01.2014. He was again admitted with Zonal Hospital

    Mandi from 29.01.2014 to 31.01.2014, and again admitted

    at PGI Chandigarh w.e.f. 01.02.2014 to 17.02.2014.

    Thereafter, he was advised to visit twice, per month, at PGI

    Chandigarh, by the Doctor. According to him, he was forced

    to spend a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/­ for his treatment.

    63. By examining PW­1 Dr. Sandeep Vaidya, the

    petitioner has proved the temporary disability certificate as

    Ext. PW1/A, in which, the disability has been mentioned as

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    41 2026:HHC:30105

    32% in relation to right lower limb. No doubt, the Doctor

    .

    has deposed that there are chances of permanent disability,

    in this type of injuries, but, till date the permanent disability

    certificate has not been placed on record.

    64. Moreover, PW­1, who has been examined as

    of
    expert, has categorically admitted in cross­examination that

    petitioner may recover and there are chances of decrease of
    rt
    the disability, suffered by the petitioner.

    65. In addition to this, the petitioner has also

    examined PW­3 Diwan Chand, who allegedly, took the

    petitioner for treatment to Shimla, Chandigarh and Mandi,

    in his vehicle bearing No. HP01M­1610 and proved receipts

    Ext. PW3/A­1 to Ext. PW3/A­20.

    66. By examining PW­5, the petitioner has made

    efforts to prove the fact that the driver of HP01M­0964 took

    him to Chandigarh on five­six occasions for treatment, vide

    bills Ext. P­86 to Ext. P­92.

    67. Petitioner Dole Ram, while appearing as PW­4,

    has deposed on the similar lines, as pleaded, in the claim

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    42 2026:HHC:30105

    petition and he has also proved the bills Ext. P­1 to Ext. P­

    .

    85.

    68. By examining PW­6 Dr. M.A. Bassit, the

    petitioner has proved the discharge slip Ext. P­93, treatment

    chart Ext. P­94 to Ext. P­98, discharge slip Ext. P­99 and

    of
    medical bills Ext. P­100 to Ext. P­113.

    69. Learned MACT­I has taken the income of the
    rt
    petitioner, at the time of his accident, as Rs. 6,000/­ per

    month. The said findings do not require any interference, as

    petitioner has pleaded that he was agriculturist and also

    doing business. He has made the deposition on oath that he

    was earning Rs. 8000/­ per month. He has admitted that he

    is not having any document to prove that he was earning Rs.

    8,000/­ per month, but, this does not mean that the

    petitioner was not earning anything. As such, the learned

    MACT­I has rightly taken his income as Rs. 6,000/­ per

    month.

    70. In the present case, the learned MACT­I, has

    given the 50% increase in the monthly income of petitioner

    and thus held his notional income as Rs. 9,000/­ per

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    43 2026:HHC:30105

    month. The disability is proved to be temporary and till

    .

    date, no certificate demonstrating the permanent disability

    has been placed on record. As such, the increase is not

    liable to be given, while assessing the monthly income of the

    petitioner, as there is no permanent disability.

    of

    71. The increase, on account of future prospects, is

    to be given only in case of permanent disablement, as held
    rt
    by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Sidram Versus Divisional

    Manager, United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr.,

    (2023) 3 Supreme Court Cases 439”. Relevant paragraph

    31 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­

    “31. It is now a well­settled position of law that even in

    cases of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a
    motor accident, the claimant can seek, apart from

    compensation for future loss of income, amounts for future
    prospects as well. We have come across many orders of
    different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different
    High Courts, taking the view that the claimant is not entitled

    to compensation for future prospects in accident cases
    involving serious injuries resulting in permanent
    disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is
    no justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for
    future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries
    resulting in permanent disablement. Such a narrow reading
    is illogical because it denies altogether the possibility of the
    living victim progressing further in life in accident cases –
    and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case of
    the victim’s death.”

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    44 2026:HHC:30105

    72. The learned MACT­I, while giving the addition of

    .

    50%, has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court

    in “Rajesh and others Versus Rajbir Singh and others,

    reported in (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 54”, but the

    same is held to be not a binding precedent, in view of the

    of
    Pranay Sethi‘s case (supra). Relevant paragraph 59.2 of the

    judgment, is reproduced, as under:­
    rt
    “59.2 As Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54, has not
    taken note of the decision of Reshma Kumari v. Madan

    Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65, which was delivered at earlier
    point of time, the decision of Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013)
    9 SCC 54, is not a binding precedent.”

    73. Moreover, in Rajesh’s case (supra) the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court, has given increase, on account of future

    prospects, in a case involving death, and not in a case,

    where the petitioner had sought compensation on account of

    the injuries sustained by him.

    74. Thus, the income of Sh. Dole Ram, is liable to be

    taken as Rs. 6,000/­ per month.

    75. Learned MACT­I, in the present case, has

    awarded a sum of Rs. 40,000/­ under the head ‘pain and

    sufferings’. As per the documents produced by the

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    45 2026:HHC:30105

    petitioner especially Ext. P­36, Ext. P­37, the period of

    .

    hospitalization in PGI Chandigarh, from 22.12.2013 to

    31.12.2013 is 10 days, from 01.02.2014 to 17.02.2014 is 17

    days, and as per document Ext. P­93, period of

    hospitalization from 29.08.2014 to 03.09.2014 is six days.

    of
    Similarly, from the document Ext. P­99, it has been proved

    by the petitioner that he was admitted in the hospital on
    rt
    23.05.2016 and was discharged on 25.05.2016 i.e. three

    days, as he was admitted for bone grafting. Thus, the total

    period of hospitalization comes to 36 days. The said period

    of 36 days, must be traumatic and painful for the petitioner,

    for which, he is entitled, atleast, for a sum of Rs. 72,000/­

    (36 x 2000), as such, the amount of compensation, which

    has been awarded as Rs. 40,000/­, under the head ‘pain and

    sufferings’ is liable to be enhanced to Rs. 72,000/­. Ordered

    accordingly.

    76. The period of hospitalization is held to be 36

    days, as apparent from the documents, referred to above, in

    the preceding paragraph. The period of treatment has been

    proved to be spanning from 22.12.2013 to 25.05.2016, when

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    46 2026:HHC:30105

    he was discharged from Mannat Hospital. The said period is

    .

    held to be spanning over two and half years. During that

    period, he could not enjoy the life of a normal human being.

    As such, the amount of compensation, which has only been

    awarded by learned MACT­I as Rs. 40,000/­ is liable to be

    of
    enhanced, as the petitioner has also suffered 32% temporary

    disability. Thus, the ends of justice would meet, if a sum of
    rt
    Rs. 2,00,000/­ is awarded to the petitioner, under the head

    ‘Loss of enjoyment of life’. Ordered accordingly.

    77. In the absence of any evidence on the record to

    demonstrate that on account of the injuries/disability,

    sustained/ suffered by the petitioner, the life span of the

    petitioner has been shortened, no amount of compensation

    is being awarded, under the head ‘shorten expectancy of life’.

    78. So far as the ‘Loss of earning and earning

    capacity’, is concerned, in the present case, the petitioner

    could not prove the fact that the temporary disability, as

    shown in the certificate Ext. PW1/A, has resulted into

    permanent disability. The learned MACT­I has granted a

    sum of Rs. 1,72,800/­, to the petitioner, under the head

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    47 2026:HHC:30105

    ‘Loss of earning and earning capacity’, by assuming that

    .

    32% disability would result into permanent disability into

    10%. Although, the proceedings under M.V. Act are

    summary in nature, but, this does not mean to grant the

    compensation merely on the basis of assumptions. Had

    of
    there been any permanent disability, then, there would have

    been no legal hesitation to the petitioner to get himself

    examined from
    rtthe Board of Doctors to assess the

    permanent disability. The temporary disability has already

    been taken into consideration, while awarding the

    compensation under the head ‘Loss of enjoyment of life’, as

    such, learned MACT­I has fallen into an error by assuming

    the loss of earning capacity as 10%. Said findings are liable

    to be interfered with. Ordered accordingly, by holding that

    petitioner is not entitled for any compensation under the

    head ‘Loss of earning and earning capacity’.

    79. The period of treatment is held to be two and half

    years and he might have taken, at least, four months for

    convalescence, after getting discharged from Mannat

    Hospital, after bone grafting on 25.05.2016, as per

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    48 2026:HHC:30105

    document Ext. P­99. Thus, for a period of about 33 months,

    .

    the petitioner could not contribute anything for his family,

    as such, he is held entitled for a sum of Rs. 1,98,000/­ (Rs.

    6000/­ x 33).

    80. Under the head ‘Medical expenses’, the learned

    of
    MACT­I has granted a sum of Rs. 2,93,800/­, for medical

    expenses and taxi charges. The said amount is not liable to
    rt
    be interfered with, as the same is based on the documents

    Ext. P­1 to Ext. P­113 and Ext. PW3/A­1 to Ext. PW3/A­20.

    81. So far as the special diet is concerned, learned

    MACT­I, has awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000/­, on account of

    special diet and attendant charges, which is liable to be

    enhanced, keeping in view the span of treatment. As such,

    the petitioner is held entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/­,

    under the head “Special Diet and attendant charges’, as, the

    petitioner might have taken ‘special diet’ and might have

    taken help of an attendant. Even, for the pro bono services

    rendered by his family members, to help the petitioner to

    follow his daily pursuits, this amount is required to be

    awarded to him. Ordered accordingly.

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    49 2026:HHC:30105

    82. In view of the above, the total amount of

    .

    compensation, which was awarded by the learned MACT, as

    Rs. 5,91,600/­, is liable to be enhanced, to Rs. 72,000/­ +

    Rs. 2,00,000/­ + Rs. 1,98,000/­ + Rs. 2,93,800/­ + Rs.

    2,00,000/­ = Rs. 9,63,800/­. Ordered accordingly.

    of

    83. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, the

    learned MACT has rightly awarded the rate of interest at the
    rt
    rate of 7.5% and the same does not require any interference.

    84. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed by

    modifying the award passed by the learned MACT­I and the

    amount of compensation is enhanced from Rs. 5,91,600/­ to

    Rs. 9,63,800/­, along with interest @ 7.5% per annum, from

    the date of filing of the petition, till the realization of the whole

    amount, with upto date interest.

    FAO (MV) No. 228 of 2017 arising out of Claim Petition No.

    76/2014

    85. By way of above titled claim petition, petitioner

    Gumti Devi, has sought the compensation on account of the

    injuries suffered by her, in the accident, in question.

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    50 2026:HHC:30105

    86. As per the stand taken by the petitioner Gumti Devi,

    .

    at the time of accident, she was 31 years of age and

    agriculturist by profession and earning Rs. 6,000/­ per month.

    According to her, after the accident, in which, she has

    sustained injuries, she was taken to Regional Hospital Bagsaid

    of
    and thereafter, to Zonal Hospital Mandi, where, she remained

    admitt as indoor patient from 21.12.2013 to 30.01.2014 and
    rt
    she was forced to spend a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/­ for her

    treatment. She has proved the bills Ext. PW2/C­1 to Ext.

    PW2/C­29.

    87. The learned MACT­I in the present case, has

    awarded a sum of Rs. 40,300/­ along with interest, at the rate

    of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing the petition, till the

    payment. The petitioner has not examined any Doctor from

    Zonal Hospital Mandi, nor, any document has been exhibited

    and from the MLC Ext. PW2/B, it can be said that she was

    referred to Zonal Hospital Mandi, but, the document is totally

    silent about the period of hospitalization. Although, the

    photocopy of the discharge slip has been produced, but said

    document has not been exhibited.

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    51 2026:HHC:30105

    88. Considering the amount, which has been awarded

    .

    to the petitioner under various heads, this Court is of the view

    that the same does not require any interference by this Court.

    89. As such, the findings recorded by the learned

    MACT­I need no interference. The appeal preferred by the

    of
    appellant­Insurance Company is dismissed.

    FAO (MV) No. 229 of 2017 arising out of Claim Petition No.
    rt
    90/2014

    90. This claim petition has been filed by petitioner

    Dhani Ram, alleging therein that after sustaining injuries in the

    accident in question, he was taken to Regional Hospital

    Bagsaid, from where, he was taken to Zonal Hospital Mandi,

    where, he remained admit from 21.12.2013 to 27.01.2014 and

    spent about Rs. 1,00,000/­ on his treatment. At the time of

    accident, the petitioner was 32 years of age and agriculturist by

    profession and earning Rs. 7,000/­ per month.

    91. The petitioner has placed on record the copy of MLC

    Ext. PW2/B and medical bills Ext. PW2/C­1 to Ext. PW2/C­17.

    The learned MACT­I has awarded a sum of Rs. 40,000/­, along

    with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of

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    52 2026:HHC:30105

    filing the petition, which does not require any interference, as

    .

    no document, qua the admission, has been proved by the

    petitioner, by examining any Doctor/employee of Zonal Hospital

    Mandi.

    92. As such, the findings recorded by the learned

    of
    MACT­I need no interference. Consequently, the appeal of the

    Insurance Company is dismissed.

    rt
    FAO (MV) No. 376 of 2019 arising out of Claim Petition No.
    44/2015 (32/2017/2015)

    93. This claim petition has been filed by Hira Singh,

    alleging that after the accident, he was taken to Regional

    Hospital Bagsaid, from where, he was referred to Zonal Hospital

    Mandi, where, he remained admit from 22.12.2013 to

    09.01.2014 and again admitted on 16.01.2014 and discharged

    on 18.01.2014. According to him, he was forced to spent Rs.

    1,00,000/­ on his treatment. Learned MACT­III, in the present

    case, has awarded a sum of Rs. 21,173/­, along with interest,

    at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the

    petition, till payment.

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    53 2026:HHC:30105

    94. The petitioner, when appeared in the witness box,

    .

    as PW­1, produced the medical bills Ext. PW1/A­1 to Ext.

    PW1/A­32 and discharge slips Mark X and Mark Y. In this

    case, the petitioner has not proved any document to

    demonstrate that after the accident, he was taken to Zonal

    of
    Hospital Mandi, where, he remained admit, as asserted by him.

    In the absence of any evidence, mere bald assertions of the
    rt
    petitioner, cannot be accepted as gospel truth.

    95. Hence, the findings of learned MACT­III, do not

    require any interference. Consequently, the appeal of the

    Insurance Company is dismissed.

    96. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

    97. Memo of costs be prepared accordingly.

    98. Record be sent back.

    99. Copy of the judgment be placed on record, in the

    connected appeals.

    (Virender Singh)
    21 July, 2026
    st
    Judge
    (Pramod Kumar)

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