Chattisgarh High Court
Jeevanlal Dhobi vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 21 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
Digitally
signed by
CGHC010011562021 2026:CGHC:30853-DB
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI Date: NAFR
2026.07.22
10:16:51
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 58 of 2021
1 - Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi S/o Shri Jagarsai Dhobi Aged About 48
Years R/o Village Aamapali, Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Santan Dansena S/o Shri Ratan Dansena Aged About 45 Years R/o
Village Aamapali, Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh
Chhattisgarh.
--- Appellants
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. of The Police Station Gharghoda,
District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
CRA No. 63 of 2021
Jeevanlal Dhobi S/o Shri Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi, Aged About 28
Years R/o. Village – Aamapali, Police Station – Gharghoda, District –
Raigarh Chhattisgarh.
— Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through – S.H.O. Of The Police Station –
Gharghoda, District – Raigarh Chhattisgarh.
… Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellants : Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General
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Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
21.07.2026
1. Since both the criminal appeals arise out of the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 24.12.2020, they were
clubbed together, heard analogously, and are being decided by
this common judgment.
2. CRA No.58/2021 has been filed by two accused persons namely
Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi and Santan Dansena and CRA
No.63/2021 has been filed by accused Jeevanlal Dhobi
challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 24.12.2020 passed by the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act),
Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case under
Atrocities Act No. 07 of 2018, whereby learned Special Judge has
convicted and sentenced the appellants Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi
and Santan Dansena, as follows:-
Conviction Sentence
Under Section 302/34 of : Life imprisonment and fine of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment
of fine, additional imprisonment
for 1 year
Under Section 201/34 of : Rigorous imprisonment for 07
Indian Penal Code, 1860 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in
default of payment of fine,
additional imprisonment for 1 year
Under Section 3(2)(v) of ---
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the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989
(Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently)
3. Likewise, appellant Jeevanlal Dhobi has been convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 201/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC‘) as well as under Section 3(2)(v) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 07 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, additional imprisonment for 1 year.
4. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that deceased Mehar
Prasad Rathia, a member of the Scheduled Tribe (Kanwar)
community and resident of Village Aamapali, Police Station
Gharghoda, District Raigarh, was found dead in the morning of
20.10.2017 near the toilet constructed in the premises of the
Government Primary School, Village Aamapali. The prosecution
alleged that during the intervening night of 19.10.2017 and
20.10.2017, accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi, in furtherance of
his common intention with co-accused Santan Dansena,
committed the murder of the deceased by strangulating him with
a rope in the verandah situated adjoining the backyard of the
house of accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi. It was further alleged
that after committing the murder, accused Ramkumar Dhobi
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Dhobi and Santan Dansena, with the assistance of accused
Jeevan Lal Dhobi, removed the dead body from the place of
occurrence and abandoned it near the toilet of the Government
Primary School with an intention to screen themselves from legal
punishment and to cause disappearance of the evidence of the
offence. Since the deceased belonged to a Scheduled Tribe
community and the accused persons did not belong either to the
Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste community, offences under
the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 were also invoked.
5. The prosecution further alleged that on the morning of
20.10.2017, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia, who was then the Up-
Sarpanch of Village Bahirkela, received information from his wife
Krishna Bai that Barato Bai, the mother of the deceased, had
informed her that the dead body of Mehar Prasad Rathia was
lying near the toilet of the Primary School situated in Village
Aamapali. Upon reaching the spot, PW-8 noticed that the
deceased was lying in a supine position with visible injuries on his
neck and left knee. Suspecting that the deceased had been
strangulated to death and recalling that two days earlier the
deceased had informed him that accused Ramkumar Dhobi
Dhobi had threatened to kill him because of the rape case
instituted by his wife, PW-8 immediately proceeded to Police
Station Gharghoda and lodged the merg intimation and
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information regarding the occurrence. On the basis of the said
information, Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/11A) and Dehati Merg Intimation
(Ex.P/12) were recorded, which subsequently culminated into
registration of FIR (Ex.P/16) for offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
6. During investigation, PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam, the
Investigating Officer, immediately visited the place of occurrence
and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/13A). In the presence of
witnesses, he issued notice under Section 175 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for preparation of the inquest proceedings
and thereafter prepared the inquest report (Ex.P/2). The dead
body was sent for post-mortem examination vide requisition
(Ex.P/14). PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, who conducted the autopsy,
proved the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) and opined that the
deceased had died on account of asphyxia caused by
strangulation with a rope, approximately 15 to 17 hours prior to
the examination. The Medical Officer categorically opined that the
nature of death was homicidal.
7. The prosecution further asserted that during investigation, a
tracker dog named “Ruby” was requisitioned to assist the
investigating agency. According to the prosecution, the tracker
dog, after smelling the place where the dead body was found,
proceeded towards the house of accused Ramkumar Dhobi
Dhobi. The proceedings relating to the tracker dog operation
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were reduced into writing vide Dog Running Panchnama
(Ex.P/10). The prosecution relied upon this circumstance as one
of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence connecting
accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi with the commission of the
crime.
8. The prosecution further relied upon the memoranda recorded
under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was alleged that
while in police custody on 21.10.2017, accused Ramkumar Dhobi
Dhobi made a disclosure statement (Ex.P/3) stating that he had
concealed the rope used for strangulating the deceased near the
wooden structure adjacent to his verandah. Pursuant to the said
memorandum, a green plastic rope measuring approximately 113
inches and containing four knots was allegedly recovered and
seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/4). Likewise, accused Jeevan
Lal Dhobi made a memorandum statement (Ex.P/5) leading to
the recovery of a torch allegedly used while shifting the dead
body during the night, which was seized vide Ex.P/6A. The
prosecution also recorded the memorandum of accused Santan
Dansena (Ex.P/6) during investigation.
9. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer also
seized the caste certificate of the son of the deceased vide
seizure memo (Ex.P/7A) to establish that the deceased belonged
to the Scheduled Tribe community. Subsequently, PW-10
Vandana Rathia, Patwari, prepared the spot map (Ex.P/12A) and
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spot inspection memorandum (Ex.P/9). Upon completion of
investigation, all the three accused persons were arrested, their
arrest memos (Ex.P/18, Ex.P/19 and Ex.P/20) were prepared,
intimation of arrest was furnished to their relatives and, after
recording the statements of the witnesses and collecting all
documentary evidence, the investigating agency submitted the
charge-sheet before the Court of the learned Special Judge,
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raigarh.
10. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the
prosecution examined twelve witnesses, namely PW-1 Dileshwar
Rathia, PW-2 Uttara Kumar, PW-3 Chandan Singh, PW-4
Parmeshwar Rathia, PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, PW-6 Ashok Kumar
Rathia, PW-7 Doleram, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia (informant),
PW-9 Ramesh, PW-10 Vandana Rathia (Patwari), PW-11 DSP
Neha Verma and PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam (Investigating
Officer), besides exhibiting documentary evidence including
Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/21. Upon appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence, the learned Special Judge convicted
accused Ramkumar Dhobi for offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3(2)
(v) of the SC/ST Act, convicted accused Santan Dansena under
Sections 302/34 and 201/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST Act, and convicted accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi under
Section 201/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(vi) of the SC/ST Act, by the
8
impugned judgment dated 24.12.2020, which is under challenge
in the present criminal appeals.
11. Mr. Abhishek Saraf, learned counsel appearing for the appellants
would vehemently submit that the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Special
Judge is contrary to the evidence available on record, suffers
from patent illegality and perversity and is liable to be set aside. It
is contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate
the entire evidence in its correct perspective and has recorded
the conviction merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures
without there being a complete chain of incriminating
circumstances. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has
utterly failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond all
reasonable doubt, yet the learned trial Court has erroneously
convicted them by ignoring the settled principles governing
appreciation of circumstantial evidence. He would submit that the
entire prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence and
none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution has
been proved in accordance with law. It is argued that the
prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of
circumstances which unerringly points towards the guilt of the
appellants and excludes every hypothesis consistent with their
innocence. According to learned counsel, each circumstance
relied upon by the prosecution suffers from serious infirmities,
9
material contradictions and omissions, rendering the entire
prosecution story highly doubtful. It is contended that the learned
trial Court has failed to appreciate these glaring deficiencies and
has recorded the conviction on wholly insufficient evidence.
12. Learned counsel would further submit that the alleged recoveries
made pursuant to the memorandum statements under Section 27
of the Indian Evidence Act have no evidentiary value. Inviting the
attention of this Court to the testimony of PW-3 Chandan Singh,
one of the seizure witnesses, it is argued that he has not
supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. In
the absence of independent corroboration, the alleged recovery
of the plastic rope and torch cannot be relied upon. It is further
submitted that the rope and torch are ordinary household articles
commonly available in every village household and their alleged
recovery from the open backyard or courtyard of the accused
persons does not constitute an incriminating circumstance.
Learned counsel would contend that the prosecution has not
produced any scientific or forensic evidence connecting the
seized rope with the alleged strangulation. Neither the rope was
subjected to forensic examination nor was any medical opinion
obtained from the autopsy surgeon regarding whether the injuries
found on the neck of the deceased could have been caused by
the seized rope. In these circumstances, according to learned
counsel, the alleged recoveries lose all evidentiary significance.
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13. Learned counsel would next contend that the medical evidence
completely belies the prosecution story. Drawing the attention of
this Court to the testimony of PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, who
conducted the post-mortem examination and proved Ex.P/8, it is
argued that in his cross-examination the doctor admitted that in
cases of strangulation the tongue and eyes generally protrude
and a distinct ligature mark is ordinarily found around the neck. It
is submitted that the doctor has not specified the dimensions or
characteristics of any ligature mark found on the neck of the
deceased. Learned counsel further submits that the doctor has
categorically admitted that if a person is forcibly overpowered by
sitting on his body while strangulating him, corresponding injuries
would normally be found on the back and other parts of the body,
whereas no such injuries were noticed during the post-mortem
examination. It is further contended that PW-5 has also admitted
that the seized rope was never shown to him for obtaining any
medical opinion regarding its compatibility with the injuries
sustained by the deceased. According to learned counsel, these
admissions create a serious dent in the prosecution case and
completely demolish the theory that the deceased was
strangulated by using the rope allegedly recovered from the
possession of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi.
14. Learned counsel would further submit that the evidence relating
to the alleged motive is equally weak and inconclusive. Merely
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because an earlier criminal case under Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code was pending against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi at
the instance of the wife of the deceased, the same by itself
cannot constitute proof of guilt. It is argued that motive, however
strong, cannot take the place of legal proof and in the absence of
reliable substantive evidence connecting the appellants with the
commission of the crime, the alleged motive loses all
significance. It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed
to establish any immediate provocation or surrounding
circumstances showing that the appellants acted upon such
alleged motive.
15. Learned counsel would further contend that the so-called “last
seen” circumstance projected by the prosecution is wholly
unreliable. Attention has been invited to the evidence of PW-9
Ramesh, who is alleged to have seen the appellants carrying a
heavy object during the intervening night. Learned counsel
submits that PW-9 has categorically admitted in paragraph 6 of
his cross-examination that neither he nor PW-4 Parmeshwar
Rathia was carrying any torch while returning during the night. He
has further admitted that he did not enquire from the appellants
as to what they were carrying and that he merely noticed some
heavy article being carried by them. He nowhere stated that he
had actually seen the dead body of the deceased being carried
by the appellants. According to learned counsel, in the absence
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of any source of light and in view of these admissions, the alleged
identification of the appellants during the dark hours of the night
becomes wholly doubtful and cannot safely be relied upon.
16. It is further contended that the testimony of PW-6 Ashok Kumar
Rathia also does not inspire confidence. Learned counsel
submits that during his deposition before the Court, PW-6 for the
first time stated that Parmeshwar and Ramesh had informed the
police that they had seen the appellants carrying the dead body
towards the school. This fact was admittedly never stated by him
during investigation under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Such material improvement made for the first time
before the Court, according to learned counsel, materially affects
the credibility of the witness and renders his testimony wholly
unreliable. The learned trial Court, however, failed to notice these
significant omissions and improvements while recording the
conviction. He would also submit that the testimony of the
complainant PW-8 Thandaram Rathia suffers from serious
infirmities. It is argued that during cross-examination he admitted
that before lodging the report he had discussions with the
villagers in the society and thereafter made the allegations
against the appellants. According to learned counsel, this
admission clearly demonstrates that the witness was a tutored
witness and his testimony was the result of collective deliberation
rather than his own personal knowledge. Such evidence, it is
13
contended, ought to have been scrutinized with great caution, but
the learned trial Court has accepted the same without any
independent corroboration.
17. Learned counsel would next submit that the investigation itself
suffers from serious lapses. Inviting the attention of this Court to
the testimony of PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam, the Investigating
Officer, it is argued that he has admitted during cross-
examination that the rope allegedly recovered pursuant to the
memorandum statement of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi was
never sent for forensic examination. He further admitted that no
opinion was sought from the doctor regarding whether the injuries
found on the neck of the deceased could have been caused by
the seized rope. The investigating officer also failed to collect nail
scrapings or other scientific evidence which could have
connected the appellants with the commission of the offence. He
submits that these omissions strike at the very root of the
prosecution case and make the investigation wholly unreliable.
18. Learned counsel would further submit that the prosecution has
placed reliance upon the alleged tracker dog evidence; however,
the dog handler was not examined before the trial Court and no
material was brought on record to establish the training, capability
or reliability of the tracker dog. It is argued that the prosecution
has failed to prove the dog tracking proceedings in accordance
14
with law and, therefore, no reliance could have been placed upon
such evidence while recording the conviction.
19. Lastly, learned counsel would submit that the prosecution
evidence is replete with material contradictions, omissions and
improvements, particularly in the statements of the prosecution
witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure vis-Ã -vis their depositions before the Court. The
independent witnesses have either not supported the prosecution
or have made substantial improvements during trial. It is
contended that the cumulative effect of these infirmities
completely demolishes the prosecution case and creates more
than a reasonable doubt regarding the involvement of the
appellants. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has
failed to prove the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable
doubt and the learned trial Court has committed a manifest error
in recording the conviction. It is, therefore, prayed that the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set
aside and the appellants be acquitted of all the charges by
extending to them the benefit of doubt.
20. On the other hand, Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate
General vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on
behalf of the appellants and supported the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence. It is submitted that the learned
trial Court has meticulously appreciated the entire oral as well as
15
documentary evidence available on record and has rightly arrived
at the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
It is contended that the present case is based on circumstantial
evidence, and each circumstance relied upon by the prosecution
has been duly proved and forms a complete and unbroken chain
pointing only towards the guilt of the appellants, leaving no room
for any hypothesis consistent with their innocence. It is further
submitted that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are
based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer
from any perversity or illegality warranting interference by this
Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
21. Learned State counsel would further submit that the prosecution
has successfully established the motive behind the commission
of the offence. It is argued that the evidence on record clearly
demonstrates that a criminal case under Section 376 of the
Indian Penal Code was pending against appellant Ramkumar
Dhobi on the complaint lodged by the wife of the deceased, and
the deceased had refused to enter into any compromise despite
repeated pressure exerted by the appellant. According to the
prosecution, the deceased had even disclosed to PW-8
Thandaram Rathia that appellant Ramkumar Dhobi had
threatened to kill him if he did not settle the rape case. It is
submitted that the testimony of PW-8, coupled with the
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surrounding circumstances, sufficiently establishes the motive for
the crime. Learned State counsel would further contend that the
evidence of PW-9 Ramesh, who saw the appellants carrying a
heavy object during the intervening night and thereafter returning
empty-handed, constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance.
The recovery of the rope at the instance of appellant Ramkumar
Dhobi and the torch at the instance of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi
pursuant to their disclosure statements under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act further lends corroboration to the prosecution
case.
22. It is further submitted that the medical evidence adduced through
PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra fully corroborates the prosecution case. The
post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) unequivocally establishes that the
death of the deceased was homicidal and was caused by
asphyxia due to strangulation. Learned State counsel submits
that the alleged omissions or contradictions highlighted by the
appellants are minor in nature and do not go to the root of the
prosecution case. Similarly, the fact that one of the seizure
witnesses turned hostile would not render the recovery
proceedings illegal, particularly when the testimony of the
Investigating Officer PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam inspires
confidence and there is no reason to disbelieve the official acts
performed during investigation. It is contended that the evidence
relating to the tracker dog, the recoveries made pursuant to the
17
memorandum statements, the medical evidence, the motive and
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses constitute a complete
chain of circumstances which has been rightly relied upon by the
learned trial Court.
23. Learned State counsel lastly submits that the appellants have
failed to point out any material contradiction, omission or infirmity
which would render the prosecution case doubtful or make the
findings of the learned trial Court unsustainable. It is argued that
the prosecution has proved each link in the chain of
circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and the defence has not
been able to probabilise any plausible alternative hypothesis
consistent with the innocence of the appellants. The learned trial
Court has assigned cogent and convincing reasons while
convicting the appellants for the offences charged and the
impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal or factual
infirmity warranting interference by this Court. It is, therefore,
prayed that the present criminal appeals, being devoid of merit,
deserve to be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge be
affirmed.
24. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants and
learned State counsel at considerable length, bestowed our
anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced at the
Bar and carefully gone through the entire record of the case,
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including the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution, the statements of the witnesses, the exhibits proved
during trial, the memorandum and seizure proceedings, the
medical evidence, as well as the findings recorded by the learned
trial Court. We have also examined the grounds urged in the
present appeals and the legal principles governing appreciation
of circumstantial evidence in criminal jurisprudence.
25. In light of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the parties and the evidence available on record, the following
questions arise for consideration in these criminal appeals:
(i) Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the death of Mehar Prasad
Rathia was homicidal in nature?
(ii) Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon
by the prosecution, including the alleged motive, last seen
circumstance, recovery pursuant to the memoranda under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, tracker dog evidence and
other attending circumstances, forms a complete chain
pointing unerringly towards the guilt of accused Ramkumar
Dhobi and Santan Dansena, excluding every hypothesis
consistent with their innocence?
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(iii) Whether the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt that accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi shared
the common intention of the principal accused or knowingly
caused disappearance of evidence of the offence so as to
attract the offence punishable under Section 201 read with
Section 34 IPC?
Point No.(i)
26. Since the conviction of the appellants rests entirely upon
circumstantial evidence, the first and foremost question that falls
for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to
establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death of Mehar
Prasad Rathia was homicidal in nature. Unless the prosecution
first proves the homicidal nature of death by cogent, reliable and
unimpeachable evidence, the subsequent circumstances relied
upon to connect the appellants with the alleged crime lose much
of their significance. The burden to establish this foundational fact
squarely rests upon the prosecution and can never be shifted
upon the accused.
27. The learned Special Judge has answered the aforesaid issue in
the affirmative primarily relying upon the testimony of Dr. S.R.
Painkara (PW-5), the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8), and the
statements of certain prosecution witnesses who noticed injuries
on the neck and legs of the deceased. Having independently re-
20
appreciated the entire evidence available on record, this Court
finds that the conclusion so recorded by the learned trial Court
does not inspire complete confidence and suffers from material
omissions and infirmities, which assume considerable
significance in a case resting solely upon circumstantial evidence.
28. PW-1 Dileshwar Rathia, who is the Sarpanch of the village and a
witness to the inquest proceedings (Ex.P/2), merely deposed that
on the morning following the incident he saw the dead body lying
near the toilet of the Primary School, Aamapali, and noticed
certain injuries on the neck and legs of the deceased. His
evidence is confined only to the factum of recovery of the dead
body and preparation of the inquest. He neither witnessed the
occurrence nor stated anything regarding the manner in which
the injuries could have been caused. His testimony, therefore, is
of a formal nature and does not advance the prosecution case on
the crucial issue whether the death was homicidal.
29. Likewise, PW-2 Uttara Kumar deposed that after receiving
information he reached the spot and noticed swelling and
scratches on the neck, injury on the left knee and certain marks
on the feet of the deceased. PW-3 Chandan Singh also stated
that he saw injuries on the neck and legs of the deceased. Similar
statements have been made by PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia, PW-
7 Doleram and PW-8 Thandaram Rathia. None of these
witnesses possesses any medical expertise. Their observations
21
are confined only to noticing external injuries after the body had
already been discovered. Their evidence, therefore, cannot by
itself establish the exact cause or nature of death.
30. The principal reliance of the prosecution is upon the testimony of
PW-5 Dr. S.R. Painkara, who conducted the post-mortem
examination and proved the report (Ex.P/8). According to the
doctor, multiple abrasions were present over the neck, a ligature
mark was noticed around the neck, scratches were present over
different parts of the body and fractures of the hyoid bone and
thyroid cartilage were detected during internal examination. On
that basis, he opined that death occurred due to asphyxia caused
by strangulation.
31. Ordinarily, the opinion of a medical expert deserves due weight.
However, it is equally well settled that the opinion of an expert is
only advisory in nature and cannot be accepted mechanically,
particularly where the medical evidence itself suffers from
inherent inconsistencies or is unsupported by scientific
examination. The Court is under an obligation to test such opinion
on the touchstone of surrounding circumstances and the
evidence available on record.
32. During an elaborate cross-examination, PW-5 made several
admissions which substantially dilute the certainty of his opinion.
In paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, he admitted that in
22
cases of strangulation, the eyes ordinarily protrude, the tongue
usually protrudes outside the mouth and a distinct ligature mark is
generally found around the neck. Surprisingly, while the doctor
opined that the deceased had been strangulated, neither the
post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) nor his deposition mentions the
dimensions, width, depth or complete description of the alleged
ligature mark. Such particulars assume considerable importance
because the prosecution specifically alleged that the deceased
was strangulated with a rope recovered during investigation.
Equally significant is the admission of PW-5 that although a rope
had allegedly been seized during investigation, the same was
never shown to him for examination. Consequently, the doctor
could not express any opinion whether the alleged ligature mark
corresponded to the width, texture or characteristics of the seized
rope. In a prosecution founded upon circumstantial evidence,
where the alleged weapon of offence is a rope, the failure to
obtain a medical opinion regarding its compatibility with the
injuries assumes serious significance.
33. The doctor further admitted that if a person is forcibly pinned
down and strangulated while another person sits upon his chest
or abdomen, corresponding pressure injuries or abrasions would
ordinarily be expected on the back or heel depending upon the
surface. He candidly admitted that no such injuries were noticed
on the back or heel of the deceased. The learned trial Court
23
brushed aside this admission by observing that such injuries may
vary depending upon the place of occurrence. In the opinion of
this Court, such reasoning amounts to conjecture rather than
judicial appreciation of evidence. Criminal conviction cannot rest
upon assumptions intended to fill up lacunae in the prosecution
case.
34. It is further noteworthy that the prosecution did not obtain any
forensic examination of the alleged rope. PW-12 Arun Netam, the
Investigating Officer, unequivocally admitted during cross-
examination that the seized rope was neither sent to the Forensic
Science Laboratory nor subjected to any scientific examination.
He further admitted that no query was made to the doctor
regarding the compatibility of the rope with the injuries found on
the neck of the deceased. Thus, one of the most vital links sought
to be relied upon by the prosecution remained wholly
unestablished.
35. Modern criminal jurisprudence increasingly emphasizes the
importance of scientific investigation. Where the prosecution
alleges death by ligature strangulation and claims recovery of the
very rope used in the commission of the offence, failure to subject
such article to forensic examination creates a significant gap in
the chain of evidence. The omission becomes more glaring when
the prosecution seeks conviction solely on circumstantial
evidence.
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36. Another important aspect which escaped the attention of the
learned Special Judge is that the prosecution has not produced
any biological, serological or forensic evidence connecting the
alleged rope with the deceased. There is no report indicating the
presence of blood, skin tissues, fibres, epithelial cells or any other
biological material on the seized article. The alleged weapon,
therefore, remained nothing more than an ordinary rope
commonly available in rural households.
37. The evidence of PW-5, read as a whole, undoubtedly suggests
that the deceased sustained injuries before death. However, the
medical evidence falls short of conclusively establishing, beyond
every reasonable doubt, the precise mechanism by which those
injuries were inflicted. The admissions made during cross-
examination create substantial uncertainty regarding the
prosecution theory that the deceased was strangulated with the
seized rope in the manner alleged.
38. The learned Special Judge has extensively referred to passages
from Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Cox’s Medical
Jurisprudence while affirming the prosecution case. In the
considered opinion of this Court, medical literature undoubtedly
furnishes valuable guidance to understand scientific principles.
Nevertheless, authoritative textbooks cannot substitute legal
proof. Criminal Courts are required to decide cases on legally
admissible evidence adduced before them and not merely upon
25
theoretical propositions contained in medical treatises. Where the
prosecution evidence itself suffers from material deficiencies,
reference to medical literature cannot cure those defects.
39. The Supreme Court has consistently held that expert opinion is
advisory and must be evaluated along with the entire body of
evidence. In Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020)
10 SCC 166, the Court observed that though medical evidence is
an important piece of evidence, it cannot be read in isolation and
must be tested against the surrounding circumstances. Similarly,
in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2022)
8 SCC 536, the Supreme Court reiterated that where material
inconsistencies exist between medical evidence and the
prosecution case, the accused is entitled to the benefit arising
therefrom.
40. Equally instructive is the principle reiterated in Nagendra Sah v.
State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein the Supreme Court
observed that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof
and that every link forming the foundation of a criminal conviction
must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Where two
possible views emerge from the evidence, the one favourable to
the accused must necessarily prevail.
41. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds
that although the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the
26
deceased suffered ante-mortem injuries and died an unnatural
death, the evidence led by it falls short of conclusively proving,
beyond all reasonable doubt, the precise homicidal manner
alleged by the prosecution. The absence of forensic
corroboration, failure to correlate the seized rope with the injuries,
material admissions of PW-5 during cross-examination and
significant investigative omissions introduce a reasonable doubt
regarding the prosecution version.
42. This Court is conscious that every omission in investigation may
not necessarily enure to the benefit of the accused. However,
where the entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence and the
prosecution seeks conviction for the gravest offence known to
criminal law, every foundational circumstance must be proved
with certainty. The deficiencies noticed herein are not minor
irregularities but strike at very substratum of prosecution case.
43. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered by holding that although the
prosecution has established that the death of Mehar Prasad
Rathia was unnatural and accompanied by ante-mortem injuries,
it has failed to establish, with the degree of certainty required in
criminal law, that the prosecution version regarding homicidal
death by ligature strangulation stands proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Point No. (ii)
27
44. Having held while answering Point No.(i) that the prosecution has
not established with complete certainty the precise homicidal
manner of death alleged by it, this Court now proceeds to
examine whether the circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution independently constitute an unbroken chain leading
only to the hypothesis of the guilt of appellants Ramkumar Dhobi
and Santan Dansena. Since admittedly there is no ocular account
of the occurrence, the conviction rests entirely upon
circumstantial evidence. The settled principles governing
appreciation of such evidence are too well entrenched to require
elaborate reiteration, yet their application to the facts of the
present case assumes paramount importance.
45. The law is now firmly settled by the Constitution Bench decision
in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984)
4 SCC 116, that before a conviction can be based solely on
circumstantial evidence, each incriminating circumstance must be
firmly established; the proved circumstances must be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; they must
exclude every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence; and
the chain must be so complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that in all human probability the crime was committed
by the accused and none else. These principles have consistently
been reaffirmed in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., 1989
Supp (2) SCC 706, Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10
28
SCC 725, Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440
and Ravi Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2022) 8 SCC 536.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that suspicion,
however grave, can never substitute legal proof and that every
missing link in the chain necessarily enures to the benefit of the
accused.
46. The learned Special Judge has founded the conviction principally
upon the following circumstances: (i) motive arising out of the
earlier rape case allegedly lodged against appellant Ramkumar
Dhobi; (ii) the testimony of PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia and PW-9
Ramesh Rathia regarding the appellants allegedly carrying a
heavy object during the night; (iii) recovery of rope and torch
pursuant to memoranda under Section 27 of the Evidence Act;
(iv) tracker dog evidence; and (v) the conduct of the accused
coupled with other surrounding circumstances. This Court shall
examine each of these circumstances independently and
thereafter cumulatively.
47. The prosecution has projected motive on the premise that the
wife of the deceased had earlier lodged a criminal case alleging
commission of rape against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi, and that
the deceased had refused to compromise the said criminal case
despite repeated pressure exerted by the appellant. It is true that
certain prosecution witnesses have made a general reference to
the existence of such a criminal case and the alleged refusal of
29
the deceased to enter into a compromise. However, it is equally
well settled that motive, however strong, can never take the place
of proof and assumes significance only when the prosecution has
otherwise succeeded in establishing a complete chain of
incriminating circumstances. In Anwar Ali (supra), the Supreme
Court reiterated that motive by itself cannot sustain a conviction
where the remaining circumstances are not conclusively
established. Likewise, in Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022)
8 SCC 440, it was held that although motive may lend support to
the prosecution case, its existence cannot compensate for the
absence of reliable evidence establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
48. Even otherwise, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged
motive in accordance with law. Though an assertion has been
made that a rape case was earlier instituted against appellant
Ramkumar Dhobi, the prosecution has not produced any
documentary evidence whatsoever relating to the said criminal
proceedings. Neither the First Information Report, nor the charge-
sheet, nor the judgment of conviction, if any, nor the order of
sentence allegedly imposed upon appellant Ramkumar Dhobi
has been brought on record. There is absolutely no material to
indicate whether the said prosecution culminated in conviction or
acquittal, whether the case was pending on the date of
occurrence, what was the stage of the proceedings, or whether
30
appellant Ramkumar Dhobi had actually undergone any
sentence. In the absence of such foundational evidence, the
prosecution has failed to establish that the alleged criminal case
had assumed such seriousness as to furnish a compelling motive
for the commission of the present offence. Mere oral assertions
by interested witnesses regarding the existence of an earlier
criminal case cannot be treated as proof of motive, particularly
when the best documentary evidence was admittedly available
but deliberately withheld.
49. Furthermore, none of the prosecution witnesses has deposed
with certainty regarding the date, time, place or specific
circumstances in which the alleged threat was administered by
appellant Ramkumar Dhobi to the deceased for effecting a
compromise. No independent witness has been examined to
corroborate the allegation that any demand for compromise was
ever made or that the deceased had categorically refused the
same. Even the Investigating Officer has not collected any
material during investigation demonstrating that such
compromise talks had actually taken place or that any immediate
dispute had arisen shortly before the occurrence.
50. The evidence, therefore, merely establishes the existence of a
prior dispute, if at all, but falls far short of proving a motive so
immediate, proximate and compelling as to irresistibly point
towards the guilt of the appellants. The learned trial Court, in the
31
considered opinion of this Court, has elevated suspicion into
proof while appreciating this circumstance, which approach is
wholly impermissible in a criminal trial founded exclusively upon
circumstantial evidence.
51. The prosecution next relies upon the so-called “last seen”
evidence of PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia and PW-9 Ramesh Rathia.
At the outset, it deserves notice that the evidence of PW-4
remained incomplete as his examination-in-chief was not
concluded owing to his unfortunate demise before cross-
examination. Such testimony, having remained untested by
cross-examination, could not have been relied upon as
substantive evidence against the appellants. The learned Special
Judge committed a manifest error in placing reliance upon such
incomplete testimony.
52. The entire prosecution case, therefore, substantially rests upon
the evidence of PW-9 Ramesh Rathia. According to him, while he
and Parmeshwar were proceeding to catch fish at about 3.00
a.m. on the night of Deepawali, he noticed two persons carrying a
heavy object and thereafter saw three persons, namely
Ramkumar Dhobi, Santan Dansena and Jeevan Lal Dhobi,
returning empty-handed from the direction of the school. The
testimony of PW-9, when carefully scrutinized, does not inspire
the confidence necessary for recording a conviction for murder.
During cross-examination, PW-9 categorically admitted that
32
neither he nor Parmeshwar was carrying any torch. He further
admitted that he did not ask the appellants where they were
going nor did he notice what article they were allegedly carrying.
Significantly, he stated that he merely saw “some heavy object”.
He never identified the object as a human body. He did not
depose that any limb, clothing or other feature of a human body
was visible. Thus, the entire inference drawn by the learned
Special Judge that the object carried by the appellants was the
body of the deceased is purely speculative.
53. The circumstance becomes even more doubtful when viewed in
the backdrop of the admitted fact that the incident occurred on
the night of Deepawali, during the early hours of the morning.
PW-9 admitted that there was no torch with him. Although the
learned trial Court presumed that the appellants could be
identified in starlight because they belonged to the same village,
such reasoning overlooks the fundamental principle that criminal
conviction cannot rest upon presumptions. Identification under
difficult lighting conditions without any independent corroboration
necessarily calls for cautious scrutiny.
54. It is equally significant that PW-9 admitted that he did not disclose
certain material facts to the police during investigation. PW-6
Ashok Kumar Rathia admitted in paragraph 22 of his deposition
that the fact that Parmeshwar and Ramesh had allegedly seen
the appellants carrying the dead body was disclosed for the first
33
time before the Court and had not been stated to the police under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such material improvement strikes at the root
of the prosecution case. The Supreme Court in Jafarudheen
(supra) has held that material improvements touching the core of
the prosecution story render the testimony unsafe for sustaining
conviction in a case based on circumstantial evidence.
55. Another circumstance heavily relied upon by the prosecution is
the recovery of a rope and torch pursuant to the memoranda
allegedly recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The
evidentiary value of such recovery is, however, extremely limited.
It is well settled that for a discovery under Section 27 to acquire
incriminating significance, the recovered article must have a
direct nexus with the commission of the offence. In the present
case, PW-3 Chandan Singh, one of the seizure witnesses, did not
support the prosecution and was declared hostile. His evidence
completely demolishes the prosecution version regarding the
recoveries. The remaining seizure witnesses are either interested
witnesses or formal witnesses. More importantly, PW-12 Arun
Netam admitted that neither the rope nor the torch was sent for
forensic examination. The rope was not shown to PW-5 Dr. S.R.
Painkara for obtaining an opinion whether it could have caused
the alleged ligature mark. No blood, hair, skin tissue, fibre or DNA
was detected on the rope. The torch likewise yielded no
incriminating material. Thus, the recovered articles remain
34
ordinary household articles commonly available in every rural
dwelling.
56. In Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11
SCC 724, and subsequently reiterated in Ravi Sharma (supra),
the Supreme Court has held that mere recovery of ordinary
articles without establishing their nexus with the crime does not
constitute an incriminating circumstance. Applying the aforesaid
principle, this Court finds that the alleged recoveries in the
present case are wholly innocuous and incapable of connecting
the appellants with the alleged offence.
57. Equally untenable is the reliance placed by the learned Special
Judge upon the tracker dog evidence. According to PW-7
Doleram, PW-6 Ashok Kumar and PW-2 Uttara Kumar, the
tracker dog allegedly proceeded from the place where the dead
body was found to the house of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi.
However, the prosecution failed to examine the dog handler, who
alone could have proved the manner in which the tracking was
conducted. PW-12 Investigating Officer admitted that there was
no order deputing the dog squad, no station diary entry, no
contemporaneous record regarding the deployment of the tracker
dog and even the breed and characteristics of the dog were not
mentioned in Ex.P/10.
35
58. It is a settled principle that tracker dog evidence is merely
corroborative and cannot form substantive evidence of guilt. In
Abdul Razak Murtaza Dafadar v. State of Maharashtra, (1970)
2 SCC 593, the Supreme Court held that evidence relating to
police dogs is inherently weak and unsafe to form the basis of
conviction unless independently corroborated. The same principle
has consistently been followed in subsequent decisions. In the
present case, the tracker dog evidence is unsupported by the
testimony of the dog handler and suffers from glaring procedural
deficiencies. Consequently, the same deserves to be excluded
from consideration.
59. The learned Special Judge has further relied upon the conduct of
the appellants and certain surrounding circumstances. However,
none of these circumstances possesses any definite incriminating
character. Suspicion generated by the conduct of an accused
cannot substitute proof. Criminal Courts are concerned not with
probabilities or conjectures but with legal evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
60. Another serious infirmity which has escaped the notice of the
learned trial Court is the cumulative effect of the investigative
lapses. The prosecution failed to seize or scientifically examine
any biological material connecting the appellants with the alleged
occurrence. No fingerprints, footprints, DNA, bloodstains or fibre
analysis has been produced. The place where the prosecution
36
alleges the murder to have occurred was never scientifically
linked with the deceased. The alleged rope remained
unexamined. The torch yielded nothing incriminating. Even the
tracker dog evidence remains legally inadmissible in the absence
of the handler’s testimony. Each of these omissions assumes
greater significance in a case entirely dependent upon
circumstantial evidence.
61. It is true that every lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer
does not necessarily entitle the accused to acquittal.
Nevertheless, where such lapses destroy the evidentiary value of
the principal incriminating circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution, the Court cannot ignore them. The burden of proving
every link of the chain beyond reasonable doubt always remains
upon the prosecution and cannot be diluted by deficiencies in
investigation.
62. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence of PW-2, PW-3,
PW-4, PW-6, PW-7, PW-9 and PW-12, read together with Ex.P/8,
Ex.P/10 and the memoranda and seizure proceedings, this Court
is unable to hold that the prosecution has established a complete
chain of circumstances consistent only with the guilt of appellants
Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena. Each of the principal
circumstances suffers either from evidentiary weakness, material
improvement, lack of scientific corroboration or legal
37
inadmissibility. The chain is not merely incomplete; several links
are altogether missing.
63. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), the Supreme Court
emphatically held that if any one of the essential links in the chain
of circumstantial evidence is not proved, the accused is entitled to
the benefit of doubt. The same principle has been reiterated in
Nagendra Sah (supra) and Jafarudheen (supra). Applying these
well-settled principles, this Court has no hesitation in holding that
the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution do not exclude
every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellants.
64. Consequently, Point No.(ii) is answered in the negative. The
prosecution has failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing
unerringly towards the guilt of appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and
Santan Dansena.
Point No. (iii)
65. Having held while answering Point No.(ii) that the prosecution has
failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances against
the principal accused, this Court now proceeds to examine
whether the independent conviction of appellant Jeevan Lal
Dhobi under Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC can
nevertheless be sustained. The prosecution was under a legal
obligation to establish, beyond all reasonable doubt, either (i) that
38
appellant Jeevan Lal shared the common intention with the
principal offenders in commission of the alleged offence, or (ii)
that after having knowledge or reason to believe that an offence
of murder had been committed, he intentionally caused
disappearance of evidence with the object of screening the
offenders from legal punishment. Unless these essential
ingredients are affirmatively established by reliable evidence,
conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot legally stand.
66. It is settled law that the offence under Section 201 IPC is not
attracted merely because an accused is related to the principal
offender or is present near the place of occurrence. The
prosecution must prove conscious knowledge of commission of
the principal offence coupled with a positive act intended to cause
disappearance of evidence. Suspicion, conjectures or moral
probabilities can never substitute proof. The Supreme Court in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), V.L. Tresa v. State of
Kerala, (2001) 3 SCC 549, Suresh v. State of Haryana, (2018)
18 SCC 654, and recently in Jumail Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1259, has reiterated that
before recording conviction under Section 201 IPC, the
prosecution must establish conscious knowledge of commission
of the principal offence and deliberate acts designed to obliterate
evidence. Mere suspicion or post-occurrence presence is legally
insufficient.
39
67. In the present case, the learned trial Court has convicted
appellant Jeevan Lal principally on the reasoning that since he
was allegedly seen accompanying the other accused persons
after the occurrence and was present when the dead body was
allegedly shifted, he must have known about the murder and
therefore shared the common intention to cause disappearance
of evidence. This reasoning, in the opinion of this Court, is legally
unsustainable and contrary to the settled principles governing
criminal jurisprudence. Furthermore, the learned trial Court
appears to have been influenced by the alleged motive attributed
to appellant Ramkumar Dhobi. However, once the prosecution
has failed to prove, by legally admissible evidence, the very
existence and outcome of the alleged rape case said to constitute
the motive, no inference of shared common intention can be
drawn against appellant Jeevan Lal on the basis of an unproved
circumstance.
68. The principal circumstance relied upon by the prosecution against
appellant Jeevan Lal is the testimony of PW-9 Ramesh Rathia. A
careful reading of his deposition shows that he merely stated that
while he and deceased witness Parmeshwar were proceeding for
fishing at about 3.00 a.m., they allegedly noticed two persons
carrying a heavy object and after a short while noticed three
persons returning from the direction of the school. Even if this
testimony is accepted in its entirety, the witness nowhere states
40
that the heavy article being carried was the dead body of Mehar
Prasad Rathia. Equally significant is the fact that the witness
nowhere deposed that he actually saw appellant Jeevan Lal
carrying the body, assisting in shifting the body or participating in
concealment of evidence.
69. On the contrary, PW-9 categorically admitted during cross-
examination that he neither questioned the appellants regarding
the article being carried nor could he identify what exactly was
being transported. He further admitted that he and deceased
witness Parmeshwar were not carrying any torch and that
because of darkness they merely noticed some heavy article
being carried. These admissions substantially dilute the
evidentiary value of his testimony. In criminal jurisprudence, when
the witness himself is unable to identify the alleged object being
carried, it would be wholly unsafe to infer that it was necessarily
the dead body of the deceased.
70. More importantly, the prosecution itself admits that the alleged
eye witness PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia expired before completion
of his evidence. His cross-examination could never be conducted.
Consequently, his incomplete examination cannot be treated as
substantive evidence against any of the appellants. Therefore,
the only surviving witness regarding the alleged movement during
the night is PW-9 whose testimony, as discussed hereinabove, is
itself inconclusive.
41
71. The prosecution further attempted to connect appellant Jeevan
Lal through the alleged recovery of torch under memorandum.
However, the seizure witnesses themselves do not inspire
confidence. PW-3 Chandan Singh, one of the seizure witnesses,
did not support the prosecution and was declared hostile. The
seized articles namely rope and torch are ordinary household
articles commonly available in every rural household. The
Investigating Officer PW-12 Arun Netam has candidly admitted
that neither the rope nor the torch was ever sent for any scientific
or forensic examination. No fingerprint examination, no biological
examination, no fibre comparison, no blood analysis and no DNA
profiling were undertaken.
72. The absence of forensic linkage assumes great significance
because the prosecution sought to connect appellant Jeevan Lal
only through these recoveries. In Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen
(supra), the Supreme Court has categorically held that recovery
of common household articles without scientific corroboration
cannot become an incriminating circumstance. Similarly, in Pattu
Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2019) 4 SCC 771, it has been
held that recoveries under Section 27 lose much of their
evidentiary value where the recovered articles are common
articles and no scientific evidence connects them with the
offence.
42
73. The learned trial Court further relied upon the alleged conduct of
appellant Jeevan Lal after the incident. The Court observed that
since he reached the spot after discovery of the dead body and
did not disclose the alleged murder to police, an inference should
be drawn that he had knowledge of commission of the offence.
Such reasoning, in the considered opinion of this Court, directly
offends the settled principles governing criminal trials.
74. Silence or failure to volunteer information to police cannot by itself
constitute proof of guilt. Every accused enjoys the constitutional
protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and
cannot be compelled to become a witness against himself.
Unless there exists independent evidence proving conscious
participation in concealment of evidence, adverse inference
cannot be drawn merely because the accused remained silent.
The Supreme Court in Nizam & Another v. State of Rajasthan,
(2016) 1 SCC 550, observed that conduct of an accused can
constitute an incriminating circumstance only when it is clearly
established and incapable of any innocent explanation.
75. Equally important is the complete absence of any independent
witness proving that appellant Jeevan Lal actually assisted in
shifting the dead body. Neither PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia, PW-7
Dole Ram, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia, nor any other prosecution
witness has deposed that appellant Jeevan Lal physically
participated in transporting the body. Even according to the
43
prosecution, nobody witnessed the alleged murder or subsequent
concealment. The finding recorded by the learned Special Judge
is therefore founded upon assumptions rather than legal
evidence.
76. The prosecution has also failed to establish any motive
whatsoever against appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi. The only motive
projected throughout the prosecution case relates to the
allegation that the deceased had refused to compromise an
earlier rape case allegedly registered against appellant
Ramkumar Dhobi. Even this alleged motive has not been legally
established. Apart from vague oral assertions made by certain
witnesses, no documentary evidence whatsoever has been
produced to prove the registration, pendency or ultimate outcome
of the alleged rape case. The prosecution has neither brought on
record the FIR, charge-sheet, judgment of conviction, nor any
other judicial record to demonstrate that appellant Ramkumar
Dhobi was ever convicted in the said case or had undergone any
sentence. Significantly, the only reference to the alleged rape
case appears in the memorandum statement of appellant
Ramkumar Dhobi recorded during investigation, which, being hit
by Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act except to the
limited extent permissible under Section 27, cannot be treated as
substantive evidence to establish motive. In the complete
absence of any legally admissible evidence proving the existence
44
and outcome of the alleged rape case, the prosecution has failed
to establish the very foundation of the alleged motive.
77. Once the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged motive even
against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi, there is absolutely no
material on record to infer that appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi shared
any grievance, animosity or common object arising therefrom. No
prosecution witness has stated that appellant Jeevan Lal had any
dispute with the deceased or that he participated in any earlier
incident relating to the alleged rape case. There is not even a
suggestion that appellant Jeevan Lal stood to gain by the death
of the deceased. In a prosecution resting exclusively upon
circumstantial evidence, failure to establish motive assumes
considerable importance, particularly where the prosecution
seeks to invoke Section 34 IPC by alleging common intention.
The absence of any independent motive against appellant
Jeevan Lal constitutes yet another missing link in the chain of
circumstances.
78. Section 34 IPC postulates existence of prior meeting of minds
resulting in common intention. Such common intention may
undoubtedly develop on the spot; however, there must be cogent
evidence demonstrating participation in furtherance of such
common intention. Mere presence at the place of occurrence or
relationship with another accused is wholly insufficient. In
Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (1996) 10 SCC 508, Pandurang v.
45
State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216, and recently Rohtas v.
State of Haryana, (2020) 18 SCC 290, the Supreme Court
reiterated that common intention cannot be inferred merely from
association or presence unless supported by clear overt acts and
surrounding circumstances.
79. The learned trial Court proceeded on the assumption that
because appellant Jeevan Lal allegedly accompanied the other
accused while returning from the school, he necessarily shared
their criminal intention. Such inference overlooks the settled
principle that every incriminating circumstance must be proved
independently before cumulative inference can be drawn. Since
the prosecution has itself failed to establish that the alleged
heavy article was the dead body or that appellant Jeevan Lal
participated in shifting the body, the foundational facts necessary
for invoking Section 34 IPC are completely absent.
80. Another significant circumstance ignored by the learned trial
Court is that the prosecution has failed to establish the exact
place of occurrence. According to the prosecution, the murder
occurred in the courtyard of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi and
thereafter the body was shifted near the school. However, no
blood stains, drag marks, biological material, fingerprints or other
forensic evidence were recovered from the alleged place of
murder. Even the Investigating Officer admitted that no scientific
examination was conducted to establish that the murder had
46
actually taken place at the alleged spot. Once the alleged place
of occurrence itself remains doubtful, the theory regarding shifting
of the body with assistance of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi
becomes equally doubtful.
81. The evidence regarding tracker dog has already been held
inadmissible and unreliable while considering Point No.(ii).
Therefore, no corroboration is available from that circumstance
either. Likewise, the recoveries under Section 27 have also been
found incapable of connecting appellant Jeevan Lal with the
offence.
82. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies is that the prosecution
has failed to establish any positive act attributable to appellant
Jeevan Lal constituting disappearance of evidence. At best, the
material creates suspicion that he may have been present in the
vicinity of the occurrence. However, suspicion, however grave,
can never take the place of legal proof. Criminal courts cannot
sustain conviction on assumptions or probabilities where two
views are reasonably possible.
83. The settled principle of criminal jurisprudence is that where the
foundational facts themselves remain unproved, every
consequential inference necessarily falls to the ground. In the
present case, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged
motive, has failed to establish the place of occurrence, has failed
47
to prove that the object allegedly carried by the accused was the
dead body of the deceased, has failed to connect the recovered
articles through any scientific evidence, and has failed to prove
any overt act attributable to appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi. The
prosecution having failed to establish the foundational
circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of such
failure must necessarily enure to the appellant.
84. Consequently, this Court answers Point No.(iii) in the negative by
holding that the conviction of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi under
Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC is wholly unsustainable in
law. The evidence led by the prosecution falls far short of the
standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence and appellant
Jeevan Lal is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
85. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon an independent re-
appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence
available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. Though the prosecution has
succeeded in proving that the death of deceased Mehar Prasad
Rathia was homicidal in nature, it has failed to establish a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing
unerringly towards the guilt of the appellants. The prosecution
48
has failed even to establish the alleged motive, as no legally
admissible evidence has been produced to prove the alleged
earlier rape case, its outcome, or that appellant Ramkumar Dhobi
had suffered any conviction or sentence therein. The only
reference to such alleged case is found in the memorandum of
the accused, which is not substantive evidence and is wholly
insufficient to establish motive. Likewise, the prosecution has
failed to satisfactorily prove the last seen circumstance, the
recoveries made pursuant to the memoranda under Section 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act, the tracker dog evidence, and the other
attendant circumstances in a manner which excludes every
hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellants. The
material contradictions, omissions and investigative lapses
noticed hereinabove create substantial doubt regarding the
prosecution case. It is trite that however grave the suspicion may
be, the same cannot take the place of legal proof. Where two
views are reasonably possible on the evidence on record, the one
favourable to the accused must necessarily be adopted.
86. Consequently, this Court holds that the learned Special Judge
has erred in recording the conviction of the appellants by relying
upon circumstances which do not satisfy the well-settled
principles governing conviction in a case resting solely on
circumstantial evidence. The learned trial Court further committed
an error in treating an unproved allegation of motive as an
49
incriminating circumstance despite the absence of any
documentary or legally admissible evidence establishing the
alleged earlier criminal case or its result. The findings recorded
by the trial Court are not supported by legally admissible and
reliable evidence and, therefore, cannot be sustained. The
appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt.
87. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.58 of 2021 preferred by
appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena, and Criminal
Appeal No.63 of 2021 preferred by appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi,
deserve to be and are hereby allowed. The judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2021 passed by the
learned Special Judge (Atrocities), Raigarh, in Special Sessions
Trial No.07 of 2018, convicting and sentencing the appellants for
the offences punishable under Sections 302/34, 201/34 of the
Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi), as
applicable, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are hereby set aside.
88. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges by extending to
them the benefit of doubt.
89. It is brought on record that the appellants in Criminal Appeal
No.58 of 2021, namely Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena,
have remained in custody for more than eight years. Since their
conviction has been set aside by this judgment, they shall be
50
released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection
with any other case. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No.63 of
2021, namely Jeevan Lal Dhobi, is already on bail. His bail bonds
shall stand discharged, subject to compliance with the provisions
of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, if applicable).
90. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.
(now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023), the accused-appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a
personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of
Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable
sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which
shall be effective for a period of six months along with an
undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition
against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid
appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
91. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent
back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu
