Allahabad High Court
Sukhal @ Ravindra Yadav vs State Of U.P. on 22 July, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:150084
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 3125 of 1983
Sukhal @ Ravindra Yadav
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Janardan, S.P. Srivastava
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
A.G.A.
Reserved on 03.07.2026/Delivered on 22.7.2026.
Court No. - 90
HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned AGA for the State.
2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 16.12.1983, passed by IInd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Deoria in Sessions Trial No. 405 of 1982, convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 307 IPC to undergo 7 years RI.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the conviction and sentence of the appellant is against the weight of evidence on record because conviction and sentence of the appellant is bad in law. He has further submitted that the appellant is juvenile which has not been considered by the learned trial court.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that this Court passed an order dated 3.11.2025 as follows:- “……..6. Accordingly, it is directed that in case the appellant files an appropriate application before the Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria regarding claim of his juvenility, within a period of three weeks from today, the Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria shall conduct an inquiry in accordance with law and the inquiry shall be concluded expeditiously preferably within a period of three months. After inquiry, Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria shall forward the report of inquiry to this Court.”
5. The Juvenile Justice Board has sent his report dated 7.4.2026 and submitted that the accused/appellant- Sukhal alias Ravindra Yadav is declared as juvenile and his age is determined at the time of commission of offence as 17 years 10 month 16 days.
6. The genesis of this offence has been written in the complaint dated 1.5.1979, wherein the complainant has submitted he is the resident of village Deokarli, Police Station Gauri Bazar. He is having orchard on the south and east corner of the village. Around 3.00 p.m today, my brother, Vijendra Ojha (injured) had went to orchard to safeguard it. At the same time, Sukhal alias Ravindra Yadav son of Parmeshwar Yadav, came with Danda and started plucking mangoes. My brother (injured) had objected to it, on which, he had started hurling abuses to him. Thereafter, my brother told that you should stop hurling abuses, on which, Sukhal alias Ravindra Yadav had started beating to my brother with Lathi. Thereafter, my brother screamed. Thereafter, when my brother screamed, he tried to push his throat with intention to kill him. After hearing noise, Jagdish Rai, myself, Satya Narain Rai, Surendra Rai, Baleshwar Ojha and other persons came at the spot. On which, the accused/appellant fled away from the spot. After it my brother (injured) became unconscious. All the witnesses had seen the entire incident, they were present nearby. We took Vijendra Ojha (injured) in unconscious condition to the police station on tractor. The FIR has been registered which is exhibited as Ext. Ka-1. The FIR is lodged promptly, hence veracity of incident is not to be disputed. The injured Vijendra was about 13 years old.
7. The medical examination of the injured was conducted. He has suffered several injuries which is as under:-
(1) Contused swelling 5 cm x 4 cm Left side on parietal region on head, advised X-Ray skull red column. (sic).
(2) Linear abrasion 8 cm several 6 cm x 3/4 cm on length part a thin slimline blend for stenoclinical (sic) region to covered part of object advised X-Ray chest.
(3) Both injuries kept under observation advised X-Ray skull and chest.
Duration fresh. All injuries are caused by blunt object conceroncum-(sic) unconsciousness. Pulse 80% Resp. 20%.
8. The medical examination of the injured had taken place on 1.5.1979 at 6.45 pm and he has suffered head injuries and X-ray was advised. B.R.D. Medical College, Gorakhpur has submitted that the patient was admitted on 31.5.1979 and discharged on 6.7.1979. He was referred to KGMC, Lucknow. The injured had suffered injuries which has not been cured either at Deoria or at Gorakhpur and hence, he was referred to KGMC, Lucknow.
9. After entire investigation, charge sheet has been filed against the appellant. The charge sheet is verified as Ext. Ka-7. The charges have been framed on 24.9.1982 under Section 307 IPC against the sole appellant.
10. The brother of injured Rajendra Ojha as PW-1 has deposed in his examination-in-chief that my house is situated in Village Devkali. To the east of our village, there is a canal running from north to south. Adjacent to the eastern side of the canal, there is my orchard. This orchard is situated towards the south-east of the village. The orchard contains mangoes, sheesham and mahua trees. The accused Sukhal alias Rabindra, who is present in Court, has no concern or connection with this orchard. The other person present in Court is Brijendra, he is my brother. At the time of the incident, he was studying in Class IX. Prior to the incident he was mentally and physically healthy. However, after this incident, he has become completely disabled; he can neither speak, nor eat by himself, nor walk. This incident is of 1.5.1979. It was 3′ O’clock of the day. I was going to the orchard to call my brother Brijendra for food. I saw that the accused person was assaulting my brother under a mango tree in my orchard itself. The accused struck my brother on the head with a lathi and he fell down. After he fell, the accused started pressing his neck with the lathi with the intention of killing him. As soon as the accused saw us, he fled away and I reached to near my brother and found him lying injured and unconscious. The incident was also witnessed by Jagdish, Surendra, Satyanarayan and Baleshwar. I took my brother from the place of occurrence to our house and thereafter took him to Gauri Bazar by tractor-trolley. I lodged a report at the police station. The report shown to me is Exhibit Ka-1, and it bears my handwriting and signature. After writing the report, the police officer sent my brother to Deoria for medical treatment. My statement was recorded at the police station. Thereafter, my brother was sent to the District Hospital at Deoria, from where he was referred to the Medical College at Gorakhpur, and later to the Banaras Hindu University Hospital.
11. This witness is real brother of the injured and eye witness and supported the entire prosecution story and superficially given evidence against the accused/appellant and fully supported the prosecution story.
12. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that at the time of the incident, my brother was studying at Bakhra Inter College. I do not know whether the accused Rabindra was also studying in the same college on that day. Bakhra College is situated about two miles from my village and lies to its south. The accused is a resident of Village Sirsia, which is about 250 yards from my village. There is no other habitation between the two villages. Sirsia lies to the east of the aforesaid canal. The place of occurrence is situated between the two villages. My village consists of about 100 houses and is spread more in the north-south direction. Surendra’s Khalihan is situated about 175 yards towards the east-south of my village. This Khalihan lies to the west of the canal. The place of occurrence is about 200 yards from my village. There are about five or six mango trees in my orchard, and at that time they bore fruits. My brother used to stay in the orchard to guard the mangoes so that boys would not pluck or throw stones at them. On that day, my brother’s school was open and classes were being held in the morning session. He had returned home from school around 12 noon or 1 p.m. Food in our house is usually prepared by 10 a.m. On that day he had not taken his meal before going to the orchard, though he had eaten breakfast before leaving home and had not eaten lunch after returning from school. I did not mention in the report that I was going to call my brother for food, nor did I tell this fact to the Investigating Officer. Baleshwar is my brother and we all live together. I first looked towards my brother after hearing his cries. He shouted, “Aare Baap re, save me.” When I looked towards him, I saw that the accused was pressing my brother’s neck while my brother was lying on the ground. The ground was hard, as is usually the case in orchards during dry weather. My brother was lying on his back and the accused was pressing the left side of his neck with the lathi. As soon as I reached there, the accused fled away. The accused was sitting on top of my brother and my brother was trying to free himself from his grip. My brother’s clothes had torn. No blood had come out from any injury on his body, but there was swelling on his neck. At that time, there were no other boys present in the orchard. The accused was carrying a lathi. In the report, I had mentioned that the accused came carrying a stick; I used the word “stick” wrongly, whereas in fact he was carrying a lathi. I saw about twenty to twenty-five mangoes lying plucked on the ground. When we took my brother away, we left those mangoes there. I did not see any lumps of bricks there, though there were small clods of earth which boys often use to throw at mangoes. The witnesses reached the place almost together with me. After the incident I remained at home with my brother for about half an hour. We reached the police station at about 5 p.m., after which I lodged the report. Exhibit Ka-1 is the same written report which I handed over to the clerk at the police station.
13. In the cross-examination, he has further deposed that it is belied to state that I had first gone to the police station without any written report and that I prepared the report only on the advice of the police clerk. I had entered the police station carrying the written report with me. The police officer detained me at the police station and during that time, my brother was sent to Deoria in the same tractor. I remained at the police station until about 6 p.m. My brother was sent to Deoria at about 5:30 p.m. My father and Baleshwar accompanied him. I travelled from the police station to Deoria by auto-rickshaw and reached there at about 7 p.m. I went straight to the hospital and found my brother lying unconscious in a serious condition. About five and a half months after the incident, I spoke to my brother about the occurrence. This conversation took place at home. It is belied to state that I was not present at the spot and did not witness the incident. It is belied to state that boys had been throwing bricks or stones at mangoes in the orchard and that one of them accidentally struck my brother causing him to fell down. It is belied to state that the accused neither assaulted my brother with a lathi nor pressed his neck. It is also belied to state that Brijendra and the accused studied in the same college and there was some quarrel took place, and due to which, he had been falsely implicated in this case.
14. This witness, who is the real brother of the injured had completely supported the prosecution story and specifically given the evidence against the accused/appellant.
15. PW-2, Brijendra Ojha, who is the injured witness. It is not expected from an injured person that he would spare real culprits and implicate any innocent person in the said crime. Prior to recording of statement, the concerned court has recorded a specific note that he was being see the boy when he was being brought into the courtroom in the lap. He had neither a beard nor a moustache, and even the signs of facial hair had not yet appeared. He could neither stand nor sit on his own. He was seated on a table placed at the witness stand, and his elder brother, Baleshwar Ojha, hold and supported him because he could not sit himself independently. His voice was so weak, and the Court had to listen very carefully to understand him. He could not speak clearly, and even in the quiet courtroom, his voice was barely audible. The words did not come out clearly from his mouth. After that, he was administered the oath.
16. This witness deposed in his examination-in-chief that it was daytime and I was in my orchard. It was about 3:00 p.m. The incident had taken place about four and a half years ago. The accused present in Court, whose name is Sukhal, assaulted me with a lathi. The witness is speaking very slow voice and not very specifically. After hearing his voice, I understood that he was taking care of his mangoes. There were mangoes in the tree. The accused person came and started plucking mangoes. He had objected and stop to him, then he told that “Babhan Ram” now we will hit you and he hit on my head by lathi. I had fell down and become unconscious. I do not know what happened thereafter.
17. There is a further note of the concerned court that this boy was extremely thin, weak, innocent and simple-looking. His brother, who was holding him in his lap, started crying and shedding tears. He was therefore, moved away, and the Court Moharrir held and stand nearby the witness. The injured has suffered very serious and grievous injury. He is very thin and weak and he is unable to walk or stand or sit himself or even eat properly.
18. In his cross-examination, he stated that he became in conscious after six months. When I became in consciousness, I also remembered the earlier events. The accused Sukhal used to study in the same school during those days. At that time I was studying in Class IX. There had never been any quarrel or dispute between us. On the day of the incident, I returned home from school in the afternoon. After coming from school, I went home and kept my school bag there. After returning from school, I went to the orchard without eating anything at home. In the morning I had gone to school after having my meal. I do not know the exact time when I reached the orchard. The accused had already been plucking mangoes before I reached there.
19. The concerned court has further made a note that these deposition had been made by the injured by using of force in a very difficult way, that has to be considered very serious that the court himself has noted down specific condition of the injured that the injuries caused to the injured was very serious and grievous in nature. In his cross-examination, the injured stated that there was no other person, who was plucking mangoes from the orchard. The accused persons not came on the ground from the tree and he had not collected the mangoes and first started to beat myself. The lathi was there near to the tree and he started beating with that lathi. I have remembered blows of two lathi and thereafter I was not in conscious condition and I became unconscious and fell down. He had hit two lathi on my head and thereafter I became unconscious. He had hit lathi simultaneously. It was lathi and not danda. I had near the root of the tree when he beaten myself. I had not able to see any witness that who had come there. It is belied to state that any unknown person had hit stones on the mangoes and by falling it, I had injured.
20. This witness is a very natural witness and recorded his statement very naturally. He deposed that the accused person had hit him by Lathi simultaneously and he become unconscious.
21. PW-3, Satya Narain Rai, in his examination-in-chief has stated that around four and a half years ago, at about 3:00 p.m., I was at my threshing floor (khalihan), which is about one bigha away from Brijendra’s orchard. There was no obstruction in between; it was open land. While I was urinating, I saw Sukhal entering the orchard. At that time there was no one else in the orchard. After finishing, I returned to my Khalihan. After some time, I heard cries coming from the orchard saying, ‘Are Baapre’. Then I went towards the orchard and saw Brijendra lying under a mango tree. By the time I reached there, I saw the accused running away from the orchard. Brijendra was lying unconscious and injured under the tree. There was some mangoes were lying under the tree. At that time, Jagdish and Surendra had already reached the orchard prior to me. Both of them had run towards the orchard. I was also running from my Khalihan and we all reached there almost together. I saw a lathi in the hands of Sukhal while he was running away from the spot.
22. In the cross-examination, this witness deposed that there is a canal in between my orchard and Khalihan, and it is having depth. This canal is 90 fit width including Patriya/lane and the vehicle are running on the canal. The vehicle of canal department are also moving by those lane. On the date of incident, there was no water in the canal and I reached after crossing the said canal. The accused had ran away towards his village. He is the resident of village Sirsiya. Sirsiya is situated around 5 bigha therefrom. He was running towards south side. When I saw, he ran away approximately one Bigha from the orchard. It is belied to state that I had not seen the incident. It is also belied to state that I am companion of Rajendra.
23. PW-4, Surendra Rai has deposed in his examination-in-chief and has supported the prosecution story that the incident is of four and half years old. In his cross-examination, he has stated that when he saw first time on the accused, he was running from inside the orchard.
24. PW-5 Dr. H.N. Singh has deposed that he was Lecturer in Surgery on 1.5.1979. On 1.5.1979 at 11.00 pm, the injured was admitted in my Medical College by reference of District Combined Hospital, Deoria. His bedhead ticket was prepared by Casualty Medical Officer, Sri Vaish in his hand writing and he verified it which is exhibited as Ext. Ka-2. He further deposed that the injured was admitted in unconscious condition. He was in very serious condition and he was referred for Surgery. At that time. Dr. K. B. Mishra was Demonstrator. He had examined the patient and called myself. I had also examined him on the same night. I started his treatment immediately so that he may be fit to be operated. On that date, there was no improvement in his condition. On 2.5.1979, it was found that there is no respond by the patient, hence immediately, he was operated. I have operated his head. There was blood clotting in his head in between bone and brain. We know it evacuation of extra dural blood clot or haemotoma in our language and removed it. I had mentioned it in bedhead ticket which is in my hand writing which is exhibited as Ext. Ka-3. This condition of patient is due to head injury. The patient started conscious since 9.5.1979. He was becoming conscious very slowly. He had never responded full consciousness, hence for his better treatment, he has been referred to Varanasi or Lucknow Medical College to Neuro Surgery department and accordingly, he was advised and he was discharged from my hospital on 22.5.1979. The order of discharge was of myself and that has been entered by Dr. K.B. Misra, the aforesaid Demonstrator in his bedhead ticket. The patient went to B.H.U and that person had discharged him because in their opinion, nothing much more was possible to the patient. This patient further came to our Hospital on 31.5.1979. At that time, Dr. P.K. Basu, Reader in Surgery and he has admitted him and his order is Exht. Ka-4 which is in his hand writing and signature and I am aware of it. Nothing extra could be done by the Medical College, BHU. The medical treatment was continued in our Hospital and he was further discharged on 6.7.1979. Dr. Basu has discharged him. Now, he has further improved by this treatment and he became conscious and he started sitting and walking with some support and he started speaking very slightly and very slowly. There is further slight improvement in his condition. Even after discharge, this patient was brought to me time to time and continued his treatment.
25. This witness has further stated in his examination-in-chief that these injuries was more than sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause virtually operation saved him from death, because it could have proved fatal ordinarily. I am submitting bedhead ticket which is Ext. Ka-5. He further stated that this injury was serious, grievous and dangerous to life.
26. In the cross-examination by the defence counsel, he deposed that his condition to speak and to understand and expresses which may be happened to him after second time discharge to him from the Hospital. When he was in my Hospital as indoor patient, all these developments were not found in him. This patient is not before me today. He has been cross-examined by the court, then he had recorded this observation before the court that there must have been a very powerful blow dealt on the head of this boy which culminated haematoma, by which his entire nervous system has been damaged. Hence, his entire development has finished physically as well as mentally. He was retarded, lost things, cannot be regained. It is virtually crippled for whole life.
27. PW-6 has deposed that he is Investigating Officer of said crime. He was posted as Sub-Inspector at the police station Gauribazar since 1.5.1979 to 21.6.1979. He has deposed that said case was registered in his presence and he has recorded statement of the complainant on the very same day. The condition of the injured was very serious, hence he has sent him to Sadar Hospital, Deoria and his statement was not recorded. He further deposed that he inspected the place on 2.5.1979 and prepared site plan which is verified by him as Ext. Ka-6. He deposed that on 8.5.1979, he went to Medical College, Gorakhpur, where injured was lying unconscious on Bed no. 40 in the ward, hence his statement could not be recorded. The concerned doctors had told his condition as very serious. The witness Baleshwar had met myself in the Hospital and I had recorded his statement there. On 10.5.1979, Bahadur had tried to escape, I had arrested him. After complete investigation, I had filed charge sheet which is verified by him as Ext. Ka-7. He has further deposed this fact that the injured was completely in unconscious condition and, hence, he was not able to record his statement. The check FIR has been verified by him as Ext. Ka-8 and GD report No. 25 dated 1.5.1979 is verified by him.
28. PW-7, Dr. K. P. Verma has deposed that he had conducted the medical examination of the injured on the day of incident i.e. 1.5.1979 at 6.45 pm and found following injuries:-
“1. Contused swelling 5 cm x 4 cm left side on parietal region of head Adv. X-Ray skull, Red colmn.
2. Linear abrasion circular 6 cm x 3/4 cm ( in length) front on the sternum extends from sterio clevicular region towards front of chest. Adv. X-Ray chest.
Both injuries kept under observation. Adv. X-Ray skull and chest. Duration Fresh.
Injury caused by blunt object. The patient was unconscious. Pulse 80 pm, Respiration 20 per minutes.”
29. This witness has verified said medical injuries as Ext. ka-10. He had also verified the opinion and treatment as Ext. ka-11. He has deposed in the court that condition of the injured was very much serious. Said injury could be caused by some blunt object. The opinion of the doctor that it is dangerous for life in ordinary course of nature. It could have resulted in death. It was serious and grievous nature and was on most vital part viz. brain.
30. In the cross-examination, this witness has deposed that there was no injury on the head of the injured except injury no.1. The court asked question to this injured and doctor opined that injury no.1 could not be caused through fall down from the mango tree. This type of injury could neither be caused by any brick or stone nor by felling down from the tree. The lathi which had been hit on the head of the injured was hit with a very strong force behind it; at the time of hitting, hence, this type of injury has been caused.
31. PW-8 Dr. J.L. N. Srivastava had deposed in his examination-in-chief that I had also examined the injured on 1.5.1979. Dr. K.P. Verma had admitted him. It was a case of several head injury, hence he was in unconscious condition. He was suffering from fits. I had understood that it is case of internal hemorrhage, hence I had referred him to Gorakhpur Medical College, so that brain operation could be performed. There was blood clot in the brain. Blood was collected outside the dura matter. The finding was found at the time of operation at Gorakhpur as mentioned in the document of that institution. My diagnosis was confirmed there. This injury was very serious as also most dangerous to life. It could have ended in death any moment. Timely medical aid saved him from death. It had developed conversation that was the sign of compression of brain. Operation is the only treatment to save the life. In brain injuries, there is damage to brain cell and that is irreparable. All faculties are badly impaired leading to a crippled state of health. This will continue till inevitable times. For whole life, he is crippled. This boy is now a cripple and liabilities for his whole life.
32. This doctor has been cross-examined by defence. He deposed that fracture is not necessary for blood clotting in brain. Dr. H.N. Singh of Gorakhpur has not mentioned fracture in his report. He did not find it. The lathi which has been hit and caused this injury that must be hit in a very speed and with force, otherwise this type of serious injury would not be caused.
33. All the evidences recorded by the witnesses of fact has been examined and in all the opinion, the injuries is of very grievous and serious in nature and this injured had crippled for his entire life and he is liability for his whole life. The nature of the injury has been corroborated with the statement of doctor that this type of injury which was caused on the head of the injured be caused with a hard and blunt object. The lathi which has been used with great speed and in great force, hence injured had suffered this type of serious and grievous injury. His entire life become crippled.
34. The accused/appellant has recorded his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C, in which he could not have given any statement which could confront the prosecution story and role of the appellant/accused in the said offence.
35. It is true and correct that learned Second Additional Sessions Judge in Special Session Trial No. 405 of 1982 under section 307 IPC after considering the appellant/accused as major and found him guilty under Section 307 IPC convicted him and also passed sentence of rigorous imprisonment of seven years vide judgment and order dated 16.12.1983.
36. During the pendency of the appeal on the application moved by the appellant/accused that he was juvenile at the time of commission of said offence, hence this Court has passed an order dated 3.11.2025 as follows:
“……..6. Accordingly, it is directed that in case the appellant files an appropriate application before the Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria regarding claim of his juvenility, within a period of three weeks from today, the Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria shall conduct an inquiry in accordance with law and the inquiry shall be concluded expeditiously preferably within a period of three months. After inquiry, Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria shall forward the report of inquiry to this Court.”
37. In compliance of said order, the Juvenile Justice Board has sent his report dated 7.4.2026 and submitted that the accused/appellant- Sukhal alias Ravindra Yadav is declared as juvenile and his age is determined at the time of commission of offence as 17 years 10 month 16 days.
38. Learned counsel for the appellant had relied on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hari Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and another; 2009 LawSuit (SC) 750, wherein the Court held as under:-
“37. Of the two main questions decided in Pratap Singh’s case (supra), one point is now well established that the juvenility of a person in conflict with law has to be reckoned from the date of the incident and not from the date on which cognizance was taken by the Magistrate. The effect of the other part of the decision was, however, neutralised by virtue of the amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, by Act 33 of 2006, whereunder the provisions of the Act were also made applicable to juveniles who had not completed eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence. The law as now crystallized on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(1), 7A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1st April, 2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted.
40. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 Act was in force and under Clause (h) of Section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years. It is with the enactment of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, that in Section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of age which was given prospective prospect. However, as indicated hereinbefore after the decision in Pratap Singh’s case (supra), Section 2(1) was amended to define a juvenile in conflict with law to mean a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed eighteen years of age as on the date of commission of such offence; Section 7A was introduced in the 2000 Act and Section 20 thereof was amended whereas Rule 12 was included in the Juvenile Justice Rules, 20.07, which gave retrospective effect to the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, made provision for the claim of juvenility to be raised before any Court at any stage, as has been done in this case, and such claim was required to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the Act. Accordingly, a juvenile who had not completed eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence was also entitled to the benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as if the provisions of Section 2(k) had always been in existence even during the operation of the 1986 Act.
41. The said position was re-emphasised by virtue of the amendments Introduced in Section 20 of the 2000 Act, whereby the Proviso and Explanation were added to Section 20, which made it even more explicit that in all pending cases, including trial, revision, appeal and any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile would be in terms of clause (1) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force when the alleged offence was committed.
42. In the instant case, there is no controversy that the appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into force. In view of Sections 2(k), 2(1) and 7A read with Section 20 of the said Act, the provisions thereof would apply to the appellant’s case and on the date of the alleged incident it has to be held that he was a juvenile.
43. The appeal has, therefore, to be allowed on the ground that notwithstanding the definition of “juvenile” under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, the appellant is covered by the definition of “juvenile” in Section 2(k) and the definition of “juvenile in conflict with law” in Section 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended.
44. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and in keeping with the provisions of Sections 2(k), 2(1), 7A and 20 of the. Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and Rules 12 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, hold that since the appellant was below 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence and also when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into force, the provisions of the said Act would apply in his case in full force.”
39. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Vijay Singh Vs. State of Delhi; 2012 LawSuit (SC 567, where the Court held as under:
“21. In Upendra Kumar, this Court reiterated the position that has been adopted in the aforementioned cases. The appellant had been handed down a life imprisonment for his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. He had been a juvenile, as under the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000, on the day of the commission of the offence but, however, the protection of the Act had not been afforded to him. Through the report of the Medical Board, it had been fully established that the appellant was between the age of 17 and 18 years on the date of the report which was dated some three months after the day of incident in question. Even the order of sentence recorded the age of the appellant as 17 years. The Court thus concluded that the appellant was liable to be granted the protection of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. As regards the course to be adopted as a sequel to such conclusion, this Court referred to the earlier decisions such as in the case of Bhola Bhagat, Bhoop Ram etc. The Court observed in this regard:-
“4. Mr Sharan has cited various decisions but reference may be made only to the case of Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar since earlier decisions on the issue in question have been noticed therein. In Bhola Bhagat case referring to the decisions in the case of Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B., Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P. and Pradeep Kumar v. State of U.P. this Court came to the conclusion that the accused who were juvenile could not be denied the benefit of the provisions of the Act then in force, namely, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.
5. The course this Court adopted in Gopinath Ghosh case as also in Bhola Bhagat case was to sustain the conviction but, at the same time, quash the sentence awarded to the convict. In the present case, at this distant time, the question of referring the appellant to the Juvenile Board does not arise. Following the aforesaid decisions, we would sustain the conviction of the appellant for the offences for which he has been found guilty by the Court of Session, as affirmed by the High Court, at the same time, however, the sentence awarded to the appellant is quashed arid the appeal is allowed to this extent. Resultantly, the appellant is directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.”
22. Similar course of action was taken in a recent decision of this Court in Vaneet Kumar Gupta alias Dharminder Challenge in that appeal was mainly on the award of sentence of life imprisonment to the appellant and to determine whether adequate material had been available on record to hold that the appellant had not attained the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence. Upon an affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police pursuant to inquiries made by him, it was reported that the age of the appellant as on the date of occurrence had been about 15 years.
The inquiry report inspired confidence of the Court and the Court held that the appellant cannot be denied the benefits of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000. As regards the question of sentence, this Court observed:-
“12. The inquiry report, which inspires confidence, unquestionably establishes that as on the date of occurrence, the appellant was below the age of eighteen years; was thus, a “juvenile” in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act and cannot be denied the benefit of the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, having been found to have committed the aforementioned offence, for the purpose of sentencing, he has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 15 thereof. As per clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, the maximum period for which the appellant could be sent to a special home is a period of three years.
13. Under the given circumstances, the question is what relief should be granted to the appellant at this juncture. Indisputably, the appellant has been in prison for the last many years and, therefore, at this distant time, it will neither be desirable nor proper to refer him to the Juvenile Justice Board. Accordingly, we follow the course adopted in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar; sustain the conviction of the appellant for the offence for which he has been found guilty by the Sessions Court, as affirmed by the High Court and at the same time quash the sentence awarded to him.
14. Resultantly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. We direct that the appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.”
40. It is held by the Supreme Court by Three Judges Bench in Karan alias Fatiya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023 5 SCC 504 as under:
“33. The above judgments relate to an offence covered by either the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (“the 1986 Act”) or the 2000 Act. We now proceed to briefly discuss the provisions under the 2015 Act. Section 9 of the 2015 Act is already reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. According to sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the 2015 Act, the Court which finds that the person who committed the offence was a child on the date of commission of such offence would forward the child to the JJB for passing appropriate orders and sentence, if any, passed by the court shall be deemed to have no effect. This does not specifically or even impliedly provide that the conviction recorded by any court with respect to a person who has subsequently after the disposal of the case been found to be juvenile or a child, would also lose its effect; rather it is only the sentence if any passed by the court would be deemed to have no effect.
34. There is another reason why a trial conducted and conviction recorded by the Sessions Court would not be held to be vitiated in law even though subsequently the person tried has been held to be a child.
35. The intention of the legislature was to give benefit to a person who is declared to be a child on the date of the offence only with respect to its sentence part. If the conviction was also to be made ineffective then either the jurisdiction of regular Sessions Court would have been completely excluded not only under Section 9 of the 2015 Act but also under Section 25 of the 2015 Act, provision would have been made that on a finding being recorded that the person being tried is a child, a pending trial should also be relegated to the JJB and also that such trial would be held to be null and void. Instead, under Section 25 of the 2015 Act, it is clearly provided that any proceeding pending before any Board or court on the date of commencement of the 2015 Act shall be continued in that Board or court as if this Act had not been enacted.
36. Section 25 of the 2015 Act is reproduced hereunder:
“25. Special provision in respect of pending cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law pending before any Board or court on the date of commencement of this Act, shall be continued in that Board or court as if this Act had not been enacted.”
37. Having considered the statutory provisions laid down in Section 9 of the 2015 Act and also Section 7-A of the 2000 Act which is identical to Section 9 of the 2015 Act, we are of the view that merits of the conviction could be tested and the conviction which was recorded cannot be held to be vitiated in law merely because the inquiry was not conducted by JJB. It is only the question of sentence for which the provisions of the 2015 Act would be attracted and any sentence in excess of what is permissible under the 2015 Act will have to be accordingly amended as per the provisions of the 2015 Act. Otherwise, the accused who has committed a heinous offence and who did not claim juvenility before the trial court would be allowed to go scot-free. This is also not the object and intention provided in the 2015 Act. The object under the 2015 Act dealing with the rights and liberties of the juvenile is only to ensure that if he or she could be brought into the mainstream by awarding lesser sentence and also directing for other facilities for welfare of the juvenile in conflict with law during his stay in any of the institutions defined under the 2015 Act.
38. In view of the above discussion and the position in law as laid down by the aforesaid judgments and many others referred to in the above judgments, we approve the view taken by this Court in Jitendra Singh, Mahesh and Satya Deo.
39. For all the reasons recorded above, it is ordered as follows:-
“The conviction of the appellant is upheld; however, the sentence is set aside. Further as the appellant at present would be more than 20 years old, there would be no requirement of sending him to the JJB or any other child care facility or institution. The appellant is in judicial custody. He shall be released forthwith. The impugned judgment shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent.”
41. The person in the present case has suffered serious and grievous injuries and the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the alleged incident took place on 1.5.1979 which is approximately 47 years ago that has to be considered. The conviction passed by the learned Session Judge vide judgment and order dated 16.12.1983, is hereby confirmed. Whereas, so far as the question of sentence is concerned, that has to be modified for a period of three years in view of all consideration of facts, reasons and circumstances and the judgments referred to above. Accordingly conviction of the appellant is hereby modified and upheld for a period three years.
42. The present appeal is hereby allowed partly. The appellant-Sukhal alias Ravindra Yadav is directed to surrender before the Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria and the Juvenile Justice Board, Deoria is directed to consider his period of sentence and if he has not completed sentence for a period of three years, then pass appropriate order to complete the sentence of three years. If he had already completed the sentence of three years, he shall be released forthwith.
43. The present criminal appeal is allowed in part accordingly.
(Abdul Shahid,J.)
July 22, 2026
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