Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 28.2.2026 vs State Of H.P on 23 March, 2026
2026:HHC:8209
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 58 of 2013
Reserved on: 28.2.2026
.
Date of Decision: 23.3.2026
Mohan Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
of
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr G.R. Palsra, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
of conviction dated 7.12.2013 and order of sentence dated
8.12.2013 passed by the learned Special Judge, Mandi (learned
Trial Court) vide which the appellant (accused before the learned
Trial Court) was convicted and sentenced as under:-
Under Section 354 of the IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for
one and a half years, pay a fine of
₹5,000/- and in default of payment of
fine, to undergo further simple1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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imprisonment for one month.
Under Section 341 of IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for 10
days.
.
Under Section 323 of the IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for
two months, pay a fine of ₹2,000/-
and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple
imprisonment for one month.
Under Section 324 of the IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for a
of
period of six months, pay a fine of
₹3,000/- and in default of payment of
rt fine, to undergo further simple
imprisonment for six months.
All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run
concurrently.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they
were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused
for committing offences punishable under Sections 376/511, 341,
323, and 324 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 3(xi) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC&ST Act). It was asserted that the
informant (the name being withheld to protect her identity) was
returning to her home after milking her cow on 16.9.2008. The
accused Mohan Lal met her on the way. He caught hold of the
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2026:HHC:8209informant’s arm, dragged her, bit her face and removed her
salwar. The informant shouted for help. The accused abused the
informant and gagged her mouth. The victim kicked the accused
.
and ran away from the spot without her salwar. Her daughter-
in-law (PW-5) met her at home, who consoled her. The
informant’s husband came to the home in the morning, and she
of
narrated the incident to him. She reported the matter to the
police. The police registered the FIR (Ex.PW4/A). Rajesh Kumar
rt
(PW7) sent the informant for her medical examination. Dr. Reena
Chandel (PW3) examined the informant and found multiple
injuries on her person, which could have been caused by a bite
and a fall. She issued the MLC (Ex.PW3/A). She preserved the
samples and handed them over to the police official
accompanying the victim. Rajesh Kumar (PW7) visited the spot.
He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW7/A). He found human hair (Ex.
P3) and a gas lighter (Ex. P4) on the spot. He put them into the
separate parcels, sealed the parcels with seal ‘N’ and seized them
vide memo (Ex.PW7/B). He also obtained the seal impression
(Ex.PW7/C) on a separate piece of cloth. The informant produced
her shirt (Ex. P6), which was put in a parcel, and the parcel was
sealed with eight seals of Seal ‘W’. The parcel was seized vide
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memo (Ex.PW7/D). Rajesh Kumar arrested the accused. He filed
an application (Ex.PW7/E) for the medical examination of the
accused. The Medical Officer found that there was nothing to
.
suggest that the accused was incapable of performing the sexual
intercourse. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW7/F). Rajesh Kumar
recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He
of
found during the investigation that Section 3 of the SC&ST Act
was applicable. Hence, he submitted the case file to the
rt
Superintendent of Police, Mandi, H.P. After the completion of the
investigations, the charge sheet was filed before the Court of
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 4, Mandi, HP,
who committed it to the learned Special Judge, Mandi, HP, for
trial.
3. Learned Special Judge, Mandi, HP charged the
accused with the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 376 read with Section 511, 341, 323, and 324 of IPC and
Section 3(xi) of SC&ST Act, to which the accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove
its case. Inspector Hari Pal Saini (PW1) prepared the challan.
Jiwan Lal (PW2) issued a certificate regarding the victim’s caste.
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Dr Reena Chandel (PW3) examined the victim. Victim (PW4)
narrated the incident. The victim’s daughter-in-law (PW5)
found the victim wearing the shirt. Hari Ram (PW6) investigated
.
the matter partly. Rajesh Kumar (PW7) investigated the matter.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.PC denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He
of
claimed that the witnesses had deposed falsely against him. He
did not produce any evidence in defence.
6.
rt
Learned Trial Court held that the testimony of the
informant/victim was reliable and was corroborated by the
testimony of her daughter-in-law and the medical evidence. The
informant’s statement did not show any attempt to commit rape.
The act of the accused would amount to an offence of outraging
the informant’s modesty. The accused had prevented the victim
from proceeding towards a direction where she had a right to
proceed. The accused had caused injury to the victim with his
teeth. It was not proved that the accused had committed the
offence merely because she belonged to the Scheduled Caste.
Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 354, 341, 323
and 324 of IPC and acquitted him of the commission of offence
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punishable under Section 3(xi) of SC&ST Act and sentenced him
as aforesaid.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
.
the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal,
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and
sentencing the accused. The relationship between the parties was
of
strained over the land. The victim had shouted for help, but
nobody came to the spot, even though the place of the incident
rt
was 20 mtrs. from her house. This is highly improbable. The
witnesses admitted that the houses were located in the vicinity,
but the Investigating Officer failed to join any independent
witness. The statements of the victim and her daughter-in-law
contradicted each other on material aspects. The victim had
turned hostile, and her testimony could not have been used to
record the conviction. The Medical Officer stated that the injuries
could have been caused by a fall, which makes the prosecution’s
case suspect. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be
allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be
set-aside.
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8. I have heard Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
.
9. Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, submitted that the appellant is innocent and
he was falsely implicated. The investigation in the present case
of
was conducted by an Inspector. Only a Gazetted Officer can carry
out the investigation. Learned Trial Court did not consider this
rt
aspect. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed
and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be
set aside. He relied upon State of A.P. v. Viswanadula Chetti Babu,
(2010) 15 SCC 103, Rajesh Dhiman v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC
740, State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan, (1977) 3 SCC 562 and Jai
Dev v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 84, in support of his
submission.
10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned
Trial Court had acquitted the accused of the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 3(xi) of the SC&ST Act. The
non-investigation by the Gazetted Officer only vitiates the
investigation under the SC&ST Act and does not affect the
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offence punishable under the IPC. The mere fact that the victim
had not narrated a part of the incident does not make her
testimony suspect. The victim had specifically mentioned that
.
the accused had pushed her, and she fell, after which the accused
tried to rape her. Therefore, the prosecution’s admitted case was
that the injuries were caused by means of a fall. Hence, the
of
opinion of the Medical Officer in the cross-examination supports
the prosecution’s case and does not make it doubtful. Learned
rt
Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while convicting the
accused, and no interference is required with it. Hence, he prayed
that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. In the present case, the learned Trial Court acquitted
the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 3(xi) of the SC&ST Act and Section 376 read with Section
511 of the IPC. The State has not preferred any appeal against the
acquittal, and there is no necessity to determine whether the act
of the accused constituted an attempt to rape and an offence
punishable under Section 3 (xi) of the SC & ST Act.
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13. It was submitted that only a Gazetted Officer could
have investigated the matter, and the investigation and trial in
the present case are vitiated. This submission cannot be
.
accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of M.P. v. Chunnilal, (2009) 12 SCC 649, that the investigation by
an unauthorised officer for the commission of an offence
of
punishable under Section 3 of the SC&ST Act is invalid; however,
the trial will proceed for the commission of offences punishable
rt
under IPC. It was observed: –
“8. The provisions in Section 9 of the Act, Rule 7 of the
Rules and Section 4 of the Code, when jointly read, lead to
an irresistible conclusion that the investigation of an
offence under Section 3 of the Act by an officer notappointed in terms of Rule 7 is illegal and invalid. But
when the offence complained are both under IPC and any
of the offences enumerated in Section 3 of the Act, theinvestigation which is being made by a competent police
officer in accordance with the provisions of the Codecannot be quashed for non-investigation of the offence
under Section 3 of the Act by a competent police officer. In
such a situation, the proceedings shall proceed in anappropriate court for the offences punishable under IPC,
notwithstanding investigation and the charge-sheet not
being liable to be accepted only in respect of the offence
under Section 3 of the Act for taking cognisance of that
offence.
9. In the present case, there is no denial of the fact that the
accusations related to offences both under the Act and the
IPC. The High Court was therefore not justified in
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2026:HHC:8209restricted to the offence under Section 3 of the Act and not
in respect of offences punishable under the IPC.
14. This position was reiterated in M.P. v. Babbu Rathore,
(2020) 2 SCC 577, wherein it was observed:-
.
9. By virtue of its enabling power, it is the duty and the
responsibility of the State Government to issue anotification conferring the power of investigation of cases
by a notified police officer not below the rank of Deputy
Superintendent of Police. Rule 7 of the 1995 Rules providesof
rank of an investigation officer shall not be below the rank
of Deputy Superintendent of Police. An officer below that
rank cannot act as investigating officer in investigating
reference to the offences committed under any provisions
rt
of the 1989 Act but the question arose for consideration is
that apart from the offences committed under the 1989Act, if the offence complained are both under IPC and the
offence enumerated in Section 3 of the 1989 Act and the
investigation being made by a competent police officer in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of CriminalProcedure (hereinafter being referred to as “the Code”),
the offences under IPC can be quashed and set aside for
non-investigation of the offence under Section 3 of the1989 Act by a competent police officer. This question has
been examined by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Stateof M.P. v. Chunnilal [State of M.P. v. Chunnilal, (2009) 12 SCC
649 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 683]. Relevant para is as under:
(SCC pp. 651-52, paras 7-8)
“7. … By virtue of its enabling power, it is the duty
and responsibility of the State Government to issue
a notification conferring the power of investigation
of cases by a notified police officer not below the
rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police for
different areas in the police districts. Rule 7 of the
Rules provided rank of investigating officer to be not
below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
An officer below that rank cannot act as an
investigating officer.
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8. The provisions in Section 9 of the Act, Rule 7 of
the Rules and Section 4 of the Code, when jointly
read, lead to an irresistible conclusion that the
investigation of an offence under Section 3 of the Act
by an officer not appointed in terms of Rule 7 is
.
illegal and invalid. But when the offence complained
are both under IPC and any of the offences enumerated
in Section 3 of the Act, the investigation which is being
made by a competent police officer in accordance with
the provisions of the Code cannot be quashed for non-
investigation of the offence under Section 3 of the Act by
a competent police officer. In such a situation, the
of
proceedings shall proceed in an appropriate court for
the offences punishable under IPC, notwithstanding
investigation and the charge-sheet not being liable to
rt
be accepted only in respect of the offence under Section
3 of the Act for taking cognisance of that offence.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Undisputedly, in the instant case, the respondents were
charged under Sections 302/34, 404/34 IPC apart from
Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act and the charges under IPC
have been framed after the investigation by a competent
police officer under the Code, in such a situation, in our
view, the High Court has committed an apparent error in
quashing the proceedings and discharging the
respondents from the offences committed under the
provisions of IPC, where the investigation has been made
by a competent police officer under the provisions of the
Code. In such a situation, the charge-sheet deserves to
proceed in an appropriate competent court of jurisdiction
for the offence punishable under IPC, notwithstanding the
fact that the charge-sheet could not have proceeded
confined to the offence under Section 3 of the 1989 Act.
15. In view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the submission that the accused is entitled to
acquittal because the investigation was conducted by an
unauthorised officer cannot be accepted. The learned Trial Court
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could have proceeded for the commission of offences punishable
under various Sections of the IPC, and there is no infirmity in it.
In State of A.P. v. Viswanadula Chetti Babu, (2010) 15 SCC 103, the
.
offence was registered under the SC&ST Act and not under the
various provisions of the IPC. Therefore, the cited judgment does
not apply to the present case.
of
16. The informant/victim (PW4) stated that she was
returning after milking her cow. The accused met her on the way.
rt
He caught her and laid her on the ground. She abused him. A
scuffle took place between her and the accused. The accused bit
on her cheek. He also removed her salwar. She pushed her with
her leg. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She admitted
that she had lodged the FIR (Ex.PW4/A), which was written as
per her version. She admitted that the accused had overpowered
and undressed her. She admitted that she had shouted for help.
She admitted that she had asked the accused whether he had a
mother and sister in his house, upon which the accused abused
her and gagged her mouth. She admitted that she had pushed the
accused and freed herself from him and went to her home, where
her daughter-in-law was present. She admitted that her husband
was not present at home, and he arrived the next morning. She
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admitted that she had narrated the incident to her husband, and
thereafter she reported the matter to the police. She admitted
that she had been medically examined, and the police had seized
.
one lighter and human hair from the spot. She stated that she
had forgotten the details because of the time lapse.
17. It is apparent from the statement of the victim that
of
she was not contradicted with her previous testimony, and she is
not shown to have made inconsistent statements on different
rt
occasions. Her credit was not impeached by the State. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Selvamani v. State, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 837, that the testimony of a hostile witness is not
effaced from the record and the version which is as per the
prosecution evidence or the defence version can be accepted if
corroborated by other evidence on record. It was observed:
“9. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Khujji @
Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC627: 1991 INSC 153, relying on the judgments of this Court
in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1
SCC 389: 1975 INSC 306, Sri Rabindra Kuamr Dey v. State of
Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 233: 1976 INSC 204, Syad Akbar v. State
of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30: 1979 INSC 126, has held that
the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in
toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as
hostile and cross-examined him. It was further held that
the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as
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2026:HHC:8209can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be
dependable on a scrutiny thereof.
10. This Court, in the case of C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil
Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567: 2010 INSC 553, has observed thus:
“81. It is a settled legal proposition that (Khujji
.
case, SCC p. 635, para 6)
‘6….. the evidence of a prosecution witness
cannot be rejected in toto merely because the
prosecution chose to treat him as hostile andcross-examined him. The evidence of such
witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or
washed off the record altogether, but theof
same can be accepted to the extent their
version is found to be dependable on a
rt scrutiny thereof.’
82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra,(1996) 10
SCC 360, this Court held that (at SCC p. 363, para 7)
evidence of a hostile witness would not be totallyrejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the
accused but required to be subjected to scrutiny and
that portion of the evidence which is consistent withthe case of the prosecution or defence can be relied
upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this
Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra,(2002) 7 SCC 543, Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab,
(2006) 13 SCC 516, Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P.,(2006) 2 SCC 450, Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga
Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 and Subbu Singh v. State,
(2009) 6 SCC 462.
83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect
that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be
discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof,
which are admissible in law, can be used by the
prosecution or the defence.”
18. Therefore, the submission that the victim’s testimony
is to be discarded because she was declared hostile and was
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permitted to be cross-examined by a learned Public Prosecutor
cannot be accepted.
19. She stated in her cross-examination that her cowshed
.
is located at a distance of 40-50 mtrs. from her house. She
admitted that the houses of Dhanna Ram and Bhoop Singh were
located on the way. She had earlier gone to the house of her
of
parents and had got traditional food with her. She denied that
she and her husband sat near the house of Mohan Singh to take
rt
the meal and consume liquor. She denied that the accused
objected to their activities, and a scuffle took place between her
husband and the accused. She stated that no one came to the spot
on hearing her cries. She volunteered to say that the accused had
gagged her mouth. She reached her house at about 9.00 PM. The
scuffle continued between her and the accused for more than
three hours. She denied that she was making a false statement.
20. There is nothing in her cross-examination to show
that she was making a false statement. The suggestions made to
her in the cross-examination that she and her husband were
consuming meals and taking liquor, which were objected to by
the accused and led to the scuffle between the accused and the
informant’s husband, were denied. A denied suggestion does not
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amount to any proof, and no reliance can be placed upon it to
discredit the testimony of the informant.
21. It was submitted that her testimony shows that the
.
houses of Dhanna Ram and Bhoop Singh were located near the
place of the incident, and it is highly unlikely that they would not
have heard the noise raised by her. This submission will not help
of
the accused. There is no evidence that any person was present in
the houses of Dhanna Ram and Bhoop Singh. Further, the victim
rt
has explained that the accused had gagged her mouth. Therefore,
no person could have heard the victim’s cries. Hence, her
testimony cannot be discarded simply because the inmates of the
houses of Dhanna Ram and Bhoop Singh had not heard her cries.
22. The victim stated in her cross-examination that the
scuffle had continued for about three hours. It was submitted
that this statement is not believable. This submission will not
help the accused. The victim is illiterate. She had put her
thumbprint on her statement. Therefore, her testimony that the
incident continued for three hours cannot be accepted at its face
value.
23. The victim’s testimony is corroborated by the
statement of her daughter-in-law (PW5). She stated that she was
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present in her home. The victim returned to the house and called
for her elder daughter. She (PW5) came out of the house and
found the victim lying unconscious in the verandah. She was
.
wearing only the shirt and no salwar. She noticed tooth bite and
injury marks on the victim’s face. The victim’s husband had gone
to the house of his brother-in-law. She (PW5) tried to contact
of
him but could not do so. He returned in the morning, and the
incident was narrated to him. The victim and her husband left
rt
the house. She stated in her cross-examination that she had not
told the police that the victim had narrated the incident after
regaining consciousness. Her parents-in-law had gone to the
victim’s parental home at about 12.30 PM. She had not disclosed
the incident to any of the villagers. She denied that her father-
in-law and his brother-in-law had quarrelled with the accused
on the date of the incident, and a false case was made against the
accused due to the quarrel.
24. The testimony of this witness corroborates the
victim’s testimony in material particulars. She specifically stated
that she had noticed the victim without any salwar. She had also
noticed the injury marks on the victim’s face. Therefore, the
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learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon the testimony of this
witness.
25. It was submitted that she had exaggerated her version
.
by saying that the victim was unconscious, which was not
narrated by the victim. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Achhar Singh v. State of H.P., (2021) 5 SCC 543: 2021 SCC
of
OnLine SC 368 that the testimony of a witness cannot be
discarded because of exaggeration alone. It was observed at page
555:
rt
“25. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cam-
bridge Dictionary defines “exaggeration” as “the fact of
making something larger, more important, better or
worse than it really is”. Merriam-Webster defines the term
“exaggerate” as to “enlarge beyond bounds or the truth”.
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “en-
larged or altered beyond normal proportions”. These ex-
pressions unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an
“exaggerated statement” lies in a true fact, to which ficti-
tious additions are made so as to make it more penetrative.
Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of
“truth”. No exaggerated statement is possible without an
element of truth. On the other hand, Advanced Law Lexi-
con defines “false” as “erroneous, untrue; opposite of
correct, or true”. Concise Oxford English Dictionary states
that “false” is “wrong; not correct or true”. Similar is the
explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a
marked differentia between an “exaggerated version” and
a “false version”. An exaggerated statement contains both
truth and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of
truth in it (being the “opposite” of “true”). It is well said
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that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill
shall have to exist primarily. A court of law, being mindful
of such a distinction is duty-bound to disseminate “truth”
from “falsehood” and sift the grain from the chaff in case
of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and
.
the chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in their sep-
aration, no real evidence survives that the whole evidence
can be discarded. [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7
SCC 643, para 18: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1697]
26. The learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gan-
gadhar Behera [Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002)
8 SCC 381: 2003 SCC (Cri) 32] to contend that even in cases
of
where a major portion of the evidence is found deficient, if
the residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused,
conviction can be based on it. This Court in Hari
rt
Chand v. State of Delhi [Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9
SCC 112: 1996 SCC (Cri) 950] held that : (Hari Chand
case [Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112: 1996 SCC
(Cri) 950], SCC pp. 124-25, para 24)
“24. … So far as this contention is concerned, it must be
kept in view that while appreciating the evidence of wit-
nesses in a criminal trial, especially in a case of eyewit-
nesses, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot
apply and the court has to make efforts to sift the grain
from the chaff. It is of course true that when a witness is
said to have exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of
trial and has tried to involve many more accused and if
that part of the evidence is not found acceptable the re-
maining part of evidence has to be scrutinised with care
and the court must try to see whether the acceptable part of
the evidence gets corroborated from other evidence on
record so that the acceptable part can be safely relied
upon.”(emphasis supplied)
26. In the present case, the victim’s daughter-in-law
(PW5) made the statement on 24.8.2012, whereas the incident
had taken place on 16.9.2008. The memories fail with the lapse of
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time, and her statement cannot be discarded because of minor
exaggeration.
27. The victim’s testimony is also corroborated by the
.
statement of Dr Reena Chandel, who found a small abrasion on
the right side of the forehead above the middle eyebrows, small
abrasion below lateral side of right lower lid, multiple teeth
of
marks over right side of cheek, contusion over the left knee,
contusion over the right shin below knee and multiple abrasions
rt
on both thighs. As per the opinion of the Medical Officer, the
injuries could have been caused by a bite, a fall or a scuffle.
28. It was submitted that the Medical Officer admitted
that injuries could have been caused by a fall, and the medical
evidence has not unequivocally supported the prosecution’s
version. This submission will not help the accused because the
victim had specifically stated that the accused had pushed her,
and she fell. Thus, the injuries noticed by the Medical Officer,
which could have been caused by a fall, corroborate her version
rather than contradict it.
29. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly
accepted the prosecution’s version and held that the accused had
restrained the victim from proceeding further, caused simple
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21
2026:HHC:8209
injuries to her and removed the victim’s salwar, showing the
intent to outrage the victim’s modesty.
30. Learned Trial Court had convicted the accused of the
.
commission of an offence punishable under Section 324 of the
IPC for biting the victim’s cheek. This cannot be sustained. It was
laid down by the Delhi High Court in Neetu Bhandari v. State, 2019
of
SCC OnLine Del 11383, that the injury caused by the teeth does not
fall within the definition of Section 324 of the IPC. It was
observed:
rt
“5. This Court is of the view that the question whether
human teeth fall within the scope of an instrument for
cutting as mentioned under Section 324 of the IPC is no
longer res integra. The Supreme Court in the case of ShakeelAhmed v. State (Delhi), (2004) 10 SCC 103 has
authoritatively held that “teeth of a human being cannot be
considered as a deadly weapon as per the description of deadlyweapon enumerated under Section 326 IPC”
16. Section 326 of the IPC set out below-
“326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
weapons or means-
Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of
any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or
any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence,
is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any
heated substance, or by means of any poison or any
corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive
substance, or by means of any substance which it is
deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow,
or to receive into the blood, or by means of any
animal, shall be punished with [imprisonment for::: Downloaded on – 23/03/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:8209life], or with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine.”
17. It is at once clear that the language of Section 326 of
the IPC is almost identical to the language of Section 324 of
.
the IPC. While Section 326 of the IPC relates to an offence
of causing grievous hurt by means of instruments as
specified therein, Section 324 of the IPC is attracted if the
hurt caused by those instruments is not grievous. The
essential ingredients of both sections, apart from the
nature of hurt, remain the same.
of
18. In Shakeel Ahmed (supra), the Supreme Court had
considered a case where the assailant had bitten off the
phalanx of the index finger of the injured. The injury
caused fell within the description of grievous hurt and
rt
therefore, the appellant was convicted of an offence under
Section 326 of the IPC. The Supreme Court held that the
offence could not be considered as an offence under
Section 326 of the IPC and, at best, had remained an
offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. The Court
reasoned that the teeth of a human being could not be
considered as a deadly weapon as enumerated under
Section 326 of the IPC.
19. In Khemchand Soni v. The State of Madhya Pradesh: Crl.
Rev. No. 2411/2012, decided on 20.03.2013, the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh had proceeded on the basis that the
question whether teeth could be considered as a cutting
weapon or not would depend on the wound inflicted. The
Court reasoned that if a thumb is chopped by teeth, then it
would be considered a sharp cutting weapon. However, if a
bone was broken due to the pressure exerted by the teeth,
then the injury could be considered as caused by a blunt
object. This Court does not find the said reasoning
persuasive. The question of whether the teeth are an
instrument for cutting would not be dependent on the
manner in which the teeth are used. Similarly, the question
of whether an instrument is for shooting or stabbing
would not be dependent upon the manner in which it is
used.
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2026:HHC:8209
20. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to the
observations made by the Supreme Court in Anwarul
Haq v. State of U.P., (2005) 10 SCC 581. The Court had set out
the provisions of Section 324 of the IPC and had observed
as under:–
.
“12….The expression “any instrument, which is used as
a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death” should be
construed with reference to the nature of theinstrument and not the manner of its use. What has to
be established by the prosecution is that the accused
voluntarily caused hurt and that such hurt was causedof
by means of an instrument referred to in this
Section….”
21. In view of the above, the contention that the complaint
did not indicate an offence punishable under
rt
Section 324 of the IPC is merited. The status report does
indicate commission of an offence under Section 323 of
the IPC. However, the said offence is not cognizable and
therefore, the police authorities could not have
investigated the same without the order of a Magistrate.
22. In view of the above, the FIR, to the extent that it
records commission of an offence under Section 324 of
the IPC, is set aside. It would be open for respondent no. 2
to seek an appropriate order from the concerned
Magistrate.”
31. Madhya Pradesh High Court also took a similar view
in Ramkesh v. State of M.P., 2019 SCC OnLine MP 2615, wherein it
was observed:
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and gone through the judgment and order passed by both
the Courts below and also perused the record, particularly
the statement of Bhawanideen (PW-1) and Ganesh (PW-2)
and the medical expert Dr. Surendra Sharma (PW-7), the
finding of both the courts below that the applicant
voluntarily caused simple injury to Ganesh (PW-2) and
also caused injury on the cheek of Bhawanideen (PW-1) by::: Downloaded on – 23/03/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:8209biting are not required any interference. However, the
injury caused by biting cannot be considered to be caused
by a deadly weapon or a cutting weapon, as held by the
Apex Court in the case of Shakeel Ahmed v. State of
Delhi, (2004) 10 SCC 103. Therefore, the applicant’s.
conviction under Section 324 of the IPC is not sustainable.
However, looking to the other evidence and concurrent
findings of the trial court and appellate court, there is no
hesitation to confirm the conviction under Section 323 of
the IPC (on two counts). Accordingly, the conviction is
modified.
of
32. A similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in
Ponnusamy v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 13455, wherein it was
observed:
rt
“9. The learned Counsel for the appellant/accused took a
defence that teeth cannot be termed as a weapon. From the
evidence of the Doctor [PW8] and the Accident Register
[Ex. P5], it is clear that the victim [PW1] has sustained anavulsion injury in the thumb of the right hand with loss of
pulp and nail, and it is a grievous injury due to amputation
of the tip of the thumb. The thumb is a very important partof the body. Amputating a part of the body, no doubt, is a
grievous one, but the offence has been committed bybiting.
30. Though several High Courts around the Country took
different stands as to the definition of ‘instrument’ to
attract the offence under Sections 324 and/or 326 IPC, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shakeel Ahmed v. State, Delhi,
reported in (2004) 10 SCC 103, has held as follows:
“2. The appellant stands convicted under Section 326
read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. Injuries,
no doubt, are grievous as the phalanx of the index
finger has been snipped off. But the allegation is that
the assailant had bitten the index finger and caused the
said injury. The teeth of a human being cannot be
considered as a deadly weapon as per the description of::: Downloaded on – 23/03/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
25
2026:HHC:8209a deadly weapon enumerated under Section 326 IPC.
Hence, the offence cannot escalate to Section 326. It can
best remain only at Section 325 IPC. We, therefore, alter
the conviction to Section 325 IPC read with Section 34
IPC.”
.
31. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement, irrespective of
the nature of injury, ie, simple and grievous, the tooth of a
human being cannot be considered as a deadly weapon, as
such, the injury caused by a human tooth cannot attract
Sections 324 and/or 326 IPC, but, attract Sections 323
and/or 325 IPC.”
of
33. Jammu and Kashmir High Court also held similarly in
Satish Kumar v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 739 as under:
rt
“25. Various High Courts across the country have taken
the view that a human tooth may be described as aninstrument of cutting and that causing a tooth bite injury
on a delicate part of the body by the accused may fall under
Section 324 or 326 of the Penal Code, depending upon the
nature of the injury- ‘simple’ or ‘grievous’. In thiscontext, reference may be made to Jagat Singh v. State, 1984
Cri LJ 115, Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 WLN (UC)
59, Hari Chandra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 104 AIC755, Chaurasi Manji v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 Pat
322, Chotta @ Akash v. State of Madhya Pradesh, dated16.10.2015 and Gopal Bhai Chhaganlal Soni v. State of
Gujarat, (1972) 13 GLR 848.
26. Let us have a look at Sections 324 and 326 RPC: —
324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or
means
“Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any
instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any
instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is
likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any
heated substance, or by means of any poison or any
corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive
substance or by means of any substance which it is::: Downloaded on – 23/03/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
26
2026:HHC:8209deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow,
or to receive into the blood, or by means of any
animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.”
.
326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
weapons or means
“Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of
any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or
any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence,
of
is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any
heated substance, or by means of any poison or any
corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive
substance, or by means of any substance which it is
rt
deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow,
or to receive into the blood, or by means of any
animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for
life, or with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine.”
27. Sections 324 and 326 of the Penal Code respectively
deal with causing ‘hurt’ or ‘grievous hurt’ by dangerous
weapons or means. In view of the text and context in which
the word “any instrument” is used in the aforesaid
Sections, it cannot be considered a body part. The language
employed in the provisions is voluntarily causing hurt or
grievous hurt, “by means of any instrument for shooting,
stabbing or cutting or any instrument which is used as a
weapon of offence”. A human bite, no doubt, is capable of
causing ‘hurt’ or ‘grievous hurt’, as it can sever a body
part. However, it is evident from the plain language of the
provisions and the context in which the expression
“instrument” is employed that a body part cannot be
treated as an instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting
or as a weapon of offence. It necessarily refers to an
instrument other than a body part.
28. The prosecution’s case on hand is that the appellant bit
the complainant’s right ear, and it got severed. In a similar
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27
2026:HHC:8209
fact situation, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shakeel
Ahmed v. State of Delhi, (2004) 10 SCC 103, where the
allegation was that the accused bit the index finger and a
phalanx was snipped off, held that human teeth cannot be
considered a deadly weapon within the meaning of
.
Section 326 IPC and that such an offence would at best fall
under Section 325 IPC. The relevant excerpt of the
judgment for ease of reference is given below: —
“The appellant stands convicted under Section 326 read
with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. Injuries, no
doubt, are grievous as the phalanx of the index fingerof
has been snipped off. But the allegation is that the
assailant bit the index finger and caused the said injury.
The teeth of a human being cannot be considered a
deadly weapon as per the description of a deadly
rt
weapon enumerated under Section 326 IPC. Hence, the
offence cannot escalate to Section 326. It can bestremain only at Section 325 IPC. We, therefore, alter the
conviction to Section 325 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.”
29. It is evident from the afore-quoted observation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that a human tooth does not fall
under the definition of a dangerous weapon within the
meaning of Section 324 or 326 of the Penal Code, and if
grievous hurt is caused by a human bite, the offence would
likely fall under Section 325 of the Penal Code. No doubt,
the severity of the injury, particularly the chopping of a
body part, is a relevant consideration, but the charge must
be based on the means used, i.e., the teeth, which are a part
of the human body and not a deadly weapon per se. Based
on the principle of law enunciated by the Apex Court
in Shakeel Ahmed, although a human tooth may be
described as an instrument or weapon in a broad sense, but
it cannot automatically be treated as a deadly weapon
within the scope of Sections 324 or 326 of the Penal
Code because human tooth being a natural part of the
human body, cannot be equated with weapons specifically
categorised as a dangerous weapons in law. Therefore, if
“hurt” or “grievous hurt” is caused by a human bite,
Sections 324 or 326 of the Penal Code would not be
attracted, and the charge would fall within the limits of
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28
2026:HHC:8209
“hurt” and “grievous hurt” as envisaged under Section
323 or 325 of the Penal Code.
34. Bombay High Court also took a similar view in Tanaji
Shivaji Solankar and Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
.
(04.04.2025 – BOMHC): MANU/MH/3261/2025 and observed:
6. We would like to go by the contents of the First
Information Report, statements of witnesses and other
documents to consider whether the offence under Sectionof
324 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out or not. The
other offences, i.e. Sections 323, 504, 506, read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, are non-cognizable in
nature, and in that event First Information Report under
rt
Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be
maintainable. First Information Report and statements ofwitnesses, especially the injured, would also show that
when the informant had allegedly requested applicants not
to transport bricks from the brick kiln till the decision of
the case, she states that she was assaulted. She levels anallegation against applicant No. 1 that he took a bite (i.e. by
using his teeth as a weapon) to the left forearm of her
brother Laxman, and she also states that applicant No. 2had taken a bite of her right hand. That means, she has
levelled an allegation that applicants Nos. 1 and 2 bothhave used teeth as a weapon. As per the ingredients of
Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, the hurt should be by
means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting,or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is
likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated
substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive
substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by
means of any substance which it is deleterious to the
human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the
blood etc. As aforesaid, the medical certificates of the
informant and her brother show that there was simple
hurt to both of them. Now, the weapon that is used is
stated to be a hard and blunt object. The teeth marks were
not noted by the Medical Officer, and he has given the::: Downloaded on – 23/03/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
29
2026:HHC:8209description of injury as Contused Lacerated Wound. The
dimensions given cannot match the injury that might be
caused by human teeth. The natural curve in the case of a
bite is not noted. Therefore, it is hard to believe that
injuries which were noted on the person of the informant.
and her brother would have been caused by human teeth.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shakeel Ahmed (supra), while
considering the offence under Section 326 of the Indian
Penal Code, observed that the teeth of a human being
cannot be considered as a deadly weapon as per the
description of a deadly weapon enumerated under Section
326 of the Indian Penal Code. If we consider Section 326 of
of
the Indian Penal Code, then as compared to Section 324 of
the Indian Penal Code, there is only the difference of the
word ‘hurt’ and ‘grievous hurt’ in the respective sections
rt
and then the change in the sentence. Therefore, the
observations in Shakeel Ahmed (supra) are applicable to
the case under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code also.
In Shakeel Ahmed (supra) injury was grievous as the
phalanx of the index finger was snipped off, and,
therefore, it was considered under Section 325 of the
Indian Penal Code. If we apply the same rule, then the
injury would come down to Section 323 of the Indian Penal
Code, which is non-cognizable in nature. Therefore, with
this evidence, though there appears to be a cross case, yet,
it would be an abuse of the process of law to ask the
applicants to face the trial, as the ingredients of the
offence under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code are not
attracted for the aforesaid reasons.”
35. Thus, the predominant view of the High Courts in the
country is that injury caused by teeth does not fall within the
purview of Section 324 of the IPC. I respectfully agree with the
same. Hence, the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and
sentencing the accused of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 324 of the IPC.
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2026:HHC:8209
36. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo
one and a half years and pay a fine of ₹5,000/-, and in default of
payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one
.
month. This cannot be said to be excessive, considering that the
accused had taken advantage of the victim at a lonely place and
outraged her modesty. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused
of
to undergo simple imprisonment for ten days for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 341 of the
rt
IPC. This is also not excessive. Learned Trial Court sentenced the
accused to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and
pay a fine of ₹2,000/-, and in default to undergo further simple
imprisonment for one month for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 323 IPC. The offence punishable under
Section 323 of the IPC can be punished with imprisonment of one
year, and the imprisonment of two months is not excessive.
37. In view of the above, the present appeal is partly
allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Trial
Court convicting and sentencing the accused of the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC is ordered to be
set aside, and the accused is acquitted of the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC. Subject to this
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2026:HHC:8209
modification, the rest of the judgment and order passed by the
learned Trial Court are upheld.
38. A modified warrant be prepared accordingly.
.
39. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the
learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
of
(Rakesh Kainthla)
rt Judge
23rd March, 2026
(Chander)
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