Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 25.2.2026 vs State Of Hp on 5 March, 2026
2026:HHC:5600
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 69 of 2026
Reserved on: 25.2.2026
Date of Decision: 05.3.2026.
Mansoor Ali ....Petitioner
Versus
State of HP .... Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr Pankaj Mehta, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 10 of 2025, dated 18.1.2025,
registered at Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P., for
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2026:HHC:5600
2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution’s
story, the police apprehended the petitioner when they were on
patrolling duty on 18.1.2025 based on secret information and
recovered 12.5 grams of heroin. The petitioner was arrested on
the same day. The allegations against the petitioner are false. The
prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which is
violative of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 18.01.2025.
They received a secret information at 2:15 pm that Mansoor Ali
(the present petitioner) was selling heroin, and a huge quantity
of heroin could be recovered during his search. The police
reduced the information into writing and sent it to the Sub
Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Paonta Sahib. The police
reached the spot, indicated in the information, along with one
Kashmir Singh. The petitioner was found with a carry bag. He
identified himself as Mansoor Ali. The police searched the carry
bag and recovered 12.5 grams of heroin. The police seized the
heroin and arrested the petitioner. The heroin was sent to the
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State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga, for analysis,
and as per the result of the analysis, it was found to be a sample
of diacetylmorphine (heroin). The police filed the charge sheet on
17.03.2025. The prosecution has cited 18 witnesses, out of whom
16 have been examined. The remaining witnesses were
summoned for 27.1.2026. An FIR No. 374 of 2023, dated
19.02.2023 was registered against the petitioner in the Police
Station Vikas Nagar, Dehradun, for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20 read with Section 8 of the NDPS Act.
The petitioner would indulge in the commission of similar
offences if released on bail. The prosecution has filed a charge
sheet against the petitioner on 17.3.2025. Hence, it was prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
4. I have heard Mr Pankaj Mehta, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr Pankaj Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. As per the prosecution, the petitioner was found in
possession of 12.5 grams of heroin, which is an intermediate
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2026:HHC:5600
quantity. The petitioner was arrested on 18.1.2025, and he has
remained in prison for more than one year. The prosecution
failed to complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s
right to a speedy trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner
had earlier filed a bail petition which was dismissed by this
Court. A subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change
in circumstances. The petitioner has not shown any change in
circumstances. 16 witnesses have already been examined, and
there is no delay in the progress of the trial. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a
bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1804 of 2025
and was dismissed on 28.8.2025. It was held in State of
Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC
605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a
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2026:HHC:5600
subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a
change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question
of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
little or no consequence. ‘Between the two orders, there was
a gap of only two days, and it is nobody’s case that during
these two days, drastic changes had taken place,
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the
impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J.,
only a couple of days before, in the absence of any
substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is
necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that
the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an
impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either
successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure
an order which had hitherto eluded him.
9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
6
2026:HHC:5600have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the
said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite
of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application
should be granted.”
10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for the
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
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application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence
of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non
for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change
in circumstances. A material change in circumstances
settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that
requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the
earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of
judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to
be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at
the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the
power of a judge to consider the application and a person’s
right based on a material change in circumstances. A
material change in circumstance creates in a person
accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail
application. But the power to decide such a subsequent
application operates in a completely different sphere,
unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based
on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that
if successive bail applications on the same subject are
permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there
would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be
pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking
resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence
of the other side being put in issue and there would be
wastage of Court’s time and that judicial discipline
requires that such matter must be placed before the same
Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of
material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated
by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application.
Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether
there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the
8
2026:HHC:5600applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail
application.”
13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in circumstances, and it is
not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14. The status report shows that the petitioner was found
in possession of 12.5 grams of heroin, which is an intermediate
quantity. A person possessing 250 grams of heroin can be
punished with imprisonment for 10 years. If the principle of
proportionality is applied, the petitioner has undergone a
substantial part of the imprisonment, and that can be awarded to
him in case of his conviction.
15. The status report shows that the statements of 16
witnesses have been recorded, and two witnesses were
summoned for 27.1.2026. Some time would be taken in recording
the statement of the accused, leading the defence evidence and
addressing the arguments. Keeping in view the quantity of the
heroin, the pre-trial detention of the petitioner is not justified.
16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting
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2026:HHC:5600agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to
provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should
not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It
was observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective
of the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, however stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said
to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
17. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
10
2026:HHC:5600correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time….”
And in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down
the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal
prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386
US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article
21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to
life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with
the actual restraint imposed by arrest and
consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of the investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any
possible prejudice that may result from the
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of
the commission of the offence till it consummates
into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may
be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a
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speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has
observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined
in Article 21. The question which would, however,
arise is as to what would be the consequence if a
person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial
and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.
Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally,
freed from the charge levelled against him on the
ground that trying him after an unduly long period
of time and convicting him after such a trial would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21?”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is
implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden
lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay;
that the Court must engage in a balancing test to
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determine whether this right had been denied in the
particular case before it.”
18. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union
of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot
be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived
of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time
without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the
near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community
and the nation needs to be safeguarded, looking to the
nature of the offences these undertrials have been charged
with. But the ultimate justification for such deprivation of
liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of
the offences for which they have been charged. If such a
finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable
time, some relief becomes necessary.”
19. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the
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2026:HHC:5600gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the
legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it
differently, no accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes
him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such
as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably
long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be
measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3
SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
20. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to
a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of
bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial
discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present
case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two
competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and
societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain
Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008)
17 SCR 369] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict
between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is
alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of
innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at
the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is
concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar
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2026:HHC:5600Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375]
made observations to this effect. In the Shaheen Welfare
Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366:
(1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the same
sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are
enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting
judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and
trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para
17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of
protecting the community and the nation against
terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities
harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that
investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an
adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to
bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes.
This is the only way in which society can be protected
against harmful activities. This would also ensure that
persons ultimately found innocent are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
21. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page
178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
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2026:HHC:5600their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling.
According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to
Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners
were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069
prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau,
Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-2021/Executiv
e_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were
convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are
at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242]
as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC
OnLine Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss
of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy
of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out
to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by
ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal”
[ Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966
U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer’s “The Prison Community”
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer’s
Concept of Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/
Sobecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic strata:
immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and
16
2026:HHC:5600alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an
acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and
ensure that trials–especially in cases where special laws
enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded
speedily.”
22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of
the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It
was observed at page 817: –
“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the
right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is
“implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable,
fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy
trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick
trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it
would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no
doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
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2026:HHC:5600would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied
a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty
by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar,
(1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court
re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held
that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option:
(Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269,
para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as
the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways
of law, where they do not often get competent legal
advice, the application of the said rule is wholly
inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused
demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it
may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle an accused from complaining of
infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the
ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
trial.”
23. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was
observed:
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7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in
“The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following
poignant lines while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
24. It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India, (2024) 20
SCC 57: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and the
delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to bail.
It was observed at page 63:
19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the
trial being completed in the near future have also been
taken as a ground for exercising its constitutional role by
the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of Arti-
cle 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees trial
be concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay in con-
clusion of the trial would justify such invocation, leading
to a conclusion of violation of Part III of the Constitution
of India, which may be taken as a ground to release an un-
dertrial on bail.
*****
21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be
appreciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the statu-
tory provisions in mind, but with the passage of time, the
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effect of that statutory provision would, in fact, have to be
diluted, giving way to the mandate of Part III of the Con-
stitution, where the accused, as of now, is not a convict
and is facing the charges. Constitutional right of speedy
trial in such circumstances will have precedence over the
bar/strict provisions of the statute and cannot be made the
sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the period of in-
carceration of an accused could also be a relevant factor to
be considered by the constitutional courts, not to be
merely governed by the statutory provisions.
25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322
that the accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was
observed:
10. However, many times we have made ourselves very
clear that howsoever serious a crime may be, the accused
has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution.
26. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
27. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration.
This submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024:INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents
may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long
incarceration. It was observed:
20
2026:HHC:5600
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer
for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes
out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact
situation and period of incarceration, the presence of
antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may
be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds
of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may
not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court
may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the
accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending
upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail
notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents.”
28. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions:-
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
21
2026:HHC:5600(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from
the date of the change.
29. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
30. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Model Central Jail,
Nahan, District Sirmour, HP and the learned Trial Court by
FASTER.
31. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the case’s merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
5th March, 2026 Digitally signed
(Chander) CHANDER by CHANDER
SHEKHAR
SHEKHAR Date: 2026.03.05
12:12:05 +0530