Himachal Pradesh High Court
Date Of Decision: 25.2.2026 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr on 25 February, 2026
Author: Sandeep Sharma
Bench: Sandeep Sharma
2026:HHC:4310
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MMO No. 36 of 2026
Date of Decision: 25.2.2026
.
_____________________________________________________________________
Vishwa Mohan Dev Chauhan
.........Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr.
.......Respondents
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
rt
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Parmod Singh Thakur, Mr. Mohit Jataik, Ms.
Swati Sharma and Mr. Nipun Thakur, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr.
Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for
respondent No.1/State.
Mr. Skandh Sharma, Advocate, for respondent
No.2/complainant.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
By way of instant petition, prayer has been made by the
petitioner for quashing of FIR No.301 of 2025, dated 23.9.2025, under
Sections 69 and 351 (ii) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (in short the
“BNS”), registered with Police Station Una Sadar, Tehsil and District Una,
Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent proceedings, if any, pending
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before the court below, on the basis of compromise/amicable settlement
arrived inter-se parties (Annexure P-2), whereby parties have resolved to
.
settle their dispute amicably inter-se them.
2. Though vide order dated 7.1.2026, this Court had directed
respondent-State to file status report, but fact remains that same has not
been filed till date. Respondent No.2, at whose instance, FIR sought to be
of
quashed came to be lodged, has come present and is being represented by
Mr. Skandh Sharma, Advocate.
3.
rt
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as
well as documents adduced on record by the petitioner are that in the
month of August 2025, respondent No.2-complainant came in contact of
the petitioner through social media. Allegedly, petitioner called the
respondent/complainant in his office several times. Allegedly, on
10.8.2025, petitioner sexually assaulted the respondent-complainant on
the pretext of marriage. Respondent/complainant also alleged that again
on 20.8.2025, she was taken to a rest house at Una by the petitioner,
where she was again sexually assaulted on the pretext of marriage and was
threatened of dire consequences if she discloses the same to anyone.
Though petitioner kept on maintaining contact with the
respondent/complainant on the pretext of marriage, but ultimately, he
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refused to solemnize marriage. In the aforesaid backdrop, FIR sought to be
quashed came to be lodged against the petitioner.
.
4. Though challan stands filed in the competent court of law, but
before same could be taken to its logical end, parties have entered into
compromise, whereby they have resolved to settle their dispute amicably
inter-se them.
of
5. Careful perusal of compromise placed on record reveals that
respondent/complainant immediately after lodging of FIR sought to be
rt
quashed made herself present before the police station concerned to state
that she does not intend to pursue the FIR, but since no action was taken
upon her request, she also gave statement before this court during the
pendency of the bail petition filed at the behest of the petitioner, thereby
stating that she is not interested to pursue the criminal case against the
petitioner. Since bail application, where respondent/complainant had
given aforesaid statement was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file
afresh before the learned trial Court, respondent-complainant again
reiterated her stand before learned trial Court and the petitioner was
enlarged on bail. In view of afore amicable settlement as has been
discussed herein above, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant
proceedings on the ground that no fruitful purpose would be served by
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prosecuting him on the basis of FIR, which otherwise has been lodged on
account of some mis-communication.
.
6. As has been noticed herein above, respondent-State has not
filed reply, but respondent No.2 has come present in person in the court,
who has been duly identified by Mr. Skandh Sharma, Advocate. She states
on oath that she of her own volition and without there being external
of
pressure has entered into compromise with the petitioner-accused,
whereby she has decided not to pursue the criminal case initiated against
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the petitioner at her behest. She states that FIR sought to be quashed is a
result of misunderstanding and since petitioner has apologized for his
misbehavior and has undertaken not to repeat such mistake in future, she
shall have no objection in case FIR as well consequent proceedings are
quashed and set-aside and accused is acquitted. While admitting contents
of the FIR to be correct she also admits her signatures upon the same. Her
statement made on oath is taken on record.
7. Having carefully perused documents adduced on record as well
as statement made on oath by the respondent/complainant, Mr. Vishal
Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that criminal case
sought to be quashed may not succeed, but this Court while considering
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the prayer made by the petitioner may take note of the fact that petitioner
is accused of heinous crime punishable under Section 69 of the BNS.
.
8. Though there cannot be any quarrel with the aforesaid
submission of learned Additional Advocate General, but once
respondent/complainant has categorically stated before this Court that FIR
sought to be quashed is result of misunderstanding and she does not
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intend to prosecute the case further, this Court sees no impediment in
considering the prayer of the petitioner for quashing of FIR.
9.
this Court
rt
Learned Additional Advocate General also invited attention of
to judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Narinder
Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014) 6
Supreme Court Cases 46 to state that compromise, if any, inter-se parties
in cases of heinous crimes like rape, cannot be accepted by the courts, but
having taken note of the fact that case under Section 69 of BNS has been
registered against the petitioner, no offence, if any, under Section 64 i.e.
rape, can be said to have been committed by the petitioner.
10. At this stage it would be apt to take note of Section 69 of BNS,
which reads as under:
“Section 69: Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means etc.
Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry a woman
without any intention of fulfilling the same, and has sexual intercourse with
her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be::: Downloaded on – 26/02/2026 20:30:59 :::CIS
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6punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.”
Explanation-“deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false
.
promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.”
11. Careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law clearly reveals that
sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape is punishable
under Section 69 of BNS. Since contents of the FIR clearly reveal that
respondent/complainant was allegedly sexually assaulted on the pretext of
of
marriage and there is no specific allegation, if any, with regard to rape,
provisions, if any, under Section 64 otherwise cannot be attracted in the
rt
case at hand. If it is so, offence alleged to have been committed by the
petitioner does not fall in the category of heinous crime like rape.
12. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of judgment
passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh‘s case supra, whereby
Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated guidelines for accepting the settlement
and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with
direction to continue with the criminal proceedings. Perusal of judgment
referred above clearly depicts that in para 29.1, Hon’ble Apex Court has
returned the findings that power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound
the offences under section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under section 482 of
the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
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proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the
parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is
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to be exercised sparingly and with great caution. Para Nos. 29 to 29.7 of
the judgment are reproduced as under:-
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the
following principles by which the High Court would be guided in givingof
adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
rt
29.1Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to bedistinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of
the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, wherethe parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guidingfactor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High Court is
to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
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29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
.
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have
been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
of
pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their
rt
entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to
whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as
crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However,
the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to
whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or
the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved,
would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of
injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect
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of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On
the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to
whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
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conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to
accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in
the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the
plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between
the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that
the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony
between them which may improve their future relationship.
of
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of
the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases
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where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the
criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at
this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not
been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High
Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned
above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the
stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases
the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits
and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction
is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate
stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties
would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the
offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge
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is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a
heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict
found guilty of such a crime”.
.
13. Careful perusal of para 29.3 of the judgment suggests that
such a power is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on
of
society. Apart from this, offences committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants
rt
while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender. On the other hand, those
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes may be quashed when the
parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that power of the High
Court in quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a
Criminal Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.PC. Even
in the judgment passed in Narinder Singh‘s case, the Hon’ble Apex Court
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has held that while exercising inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC the
Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its
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social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to exercise the power for
quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity,
murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through Administrator,
of
UT, Chandigarh and Ors. (2013( 11 SCC 497 has also held as under:-
“7. In certain decisions of this Court in view of the settlement arrived at by
the parties, this Court quashed the FIRs though some of the offences were
rt
non-compoundable. A two Judges’ Bench of this court doubted the
correctness of those decisions. Learned Judges felt that in those decisions,this court had permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences. The
said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench.
The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the judgments of thiscourt and concluded as under: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61)
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing acriminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to acriminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutorylimitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be
exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute
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12category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of
the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or.
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have
settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between thevictim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes
like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provideof
for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-
dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes
rt
of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions orthe offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the
family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in
nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if inits view, because of the compromise between the offender and
victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppressionand prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement andcompromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must
consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation ofthe criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of
law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to
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13within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” (emphasis
supplied)
8. In the light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel
.
that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would
tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not
heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the
society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them wouldbring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances
of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26.10.2006 registered under Section 147,
148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3,of
Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising there from including
the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges
framed by the trial Court are hereby quashed.
15.
rt
Recently Hon’ble Apex Court in its latest judgment dated 4th
October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in
Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016,
reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh‘s case
supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would
be profitable to reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein:
“13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v.
Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of two learned Judges of thisCourt. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent
power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467,
468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the
appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra
(as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved
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14such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank
would not justify a recourse to thepower under Section 482:
“…In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that
.
money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but
also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft
of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is
well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with aneye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at
large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the
accused has settled the amount with the bank would be aof
misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic
offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is
aggrieved.”
rt
14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi
Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376, the court rejected the submission that the first
respondent was a woman “who was following the command of her husband”
and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the
fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission,
this Court held that:
“… Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be
considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submissionassiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence
under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend uponthe gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in
Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under
Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a differentsphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a
financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or
acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither
constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is
gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score…”
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“…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that
matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the
financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the
.
ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the
matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on
the system…”
15.The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject may be summarized in the following propositions:
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends ofof
justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes
and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
rt
First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground
that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and thevictim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the
purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence,
the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section
320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quashunder Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint
should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482,
the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would
justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice
or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report
should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have
settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated;
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(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with
a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have
.
due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and
serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as
murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though
the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a
serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the
trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
of
interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases
rt
which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil
dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of
the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial,
financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an
essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for
quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in
view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility
of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal
proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii)
and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and
economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond
the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The
High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the
offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic
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17
fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained
of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
.
16. True it is that Hon’ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh supra, has
cautioned High Courts not to exercise power under Section 482 CrPC, for
quashing of criminal proceedings in the offence involving rape, dacoity,
murder, but if the aforesaid judgment is read in its entirety, it does not
of
suggest that there is complete bar for this Court to accede to the request
for quashing of FIR in cases of rape, dacoity, murder etc. If, while
considering prayer for quashing of FIR in these cases, court comes to the
rt
conclusion that quashing of FIR would result in harmony inter se parties
and continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law and
wastage of time of the court, it can proceed to quash FIR in such like cases
also.
17. Aforesaid view taken by this court is fortified by judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in Kapil Gutpa v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr, Cr.
Appeal No. 1217 of 2022, decided on 10.8.2022, wherein Hon’ble Apex
Court, specifically taking note Narinder Singh Supra, has held that though
court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and
serious offences are involved, the high court is not foreclosed from
examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an
offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would
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lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The court has also
to taken into consideration as to whether the settlement between the
.
parties is going to result into harmony between them, which may improve
their mutual relationship. Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
“12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments
of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious
offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. Itof
will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this
Court in the case of Narender Singh versus State of Punjab1, which read
thus:
“29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to
rt
whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to greatoppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated ascrime against the society and not against the individual alone. However,
the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under thisprovision.
It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, wouldlead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained,
whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body,
nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
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19On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as
to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to.
accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in
the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the
plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between
the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact thatthe settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony
between them which may improve their future relationship.
29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 ofof
the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases
where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
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High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the
criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that atthis stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not
been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High
Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, butafter prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned
above.
On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete
or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of
argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising itspower under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a
conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC iscommitted or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is
already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate
stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties
would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the
offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge
is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a::: Downloaded on – 26/02/2026 20:30:59 :::CIS
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20heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict
found guilty of such a crime.”
13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the
.
Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and
serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from
examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an
offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would
lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also
to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties
is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their
of
mutual relationship.
14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what
is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is
rt
made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is
at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise
the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is
made at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will
weigh with the court in exercising its power.”
18. Since in the case at hand, respondent complainant has herself
stated that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings is result of
misunderstanding and she has sorted out all differences with the petitioner
and they have decided to live in harmony in future, no fruitful purpose
would be served, rather proceedings initiated on the basis of FIR sought to
be quashed, if allowed to continue would unnecessarily put the parties to
ordeal of protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to fail on account of
statement made by the respondent/complainant as per compromise arrived
inter-se parties.
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21
19. At this stage, this Court also finds it relevant to take note of
recent judgment dated 14.7.2025, passed in case titled Madhukar and Ors.
.
V. The State of Maharadhtra and Anr. in Crminal Appeal arising out of
SLP(Crl) Nos. 7212 & 7495 of 2025 (alongwith connected matter), wherein
Hon’ble Apex Court proceeded to quash the FIR registered under Section
376 IPC on the basis of compromise arrived inter-se parties. Since stand of
of
the complainant in the afore case was categorical and she was not willing
to support the case of the prosecution, Hon’ble Apex Court categorically
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stated that continuance of the trial would not serve any meaningful
purpose, rather it would only prolong the distress for all concerned,
especially the complainant and burden the Courts without the likelihood of
a productive outcome. Relevant paras of the afore judgment read as under:
“6. At the outset, we recognise that the offence under Section 376 IPC is
undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature. Ordinarily, quashing of
proceedings involving such offences on the ground of settlement betweenthe parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly. However, the
power of the Court under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice isnot constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to
the facts of each case.
7.In the present matter, we are confronted with an unusual situation where
the FIR invoking serious charges, including Section 376 IPC, was filed
immediately following an earlier FIR lodged by the opposing side. This
sequence of events lends a certain context to the allegations and suggests
that the second FIR may have been a reactionary step. More importantly,
the complainant in the second FIR has unequivocally expressed her desire::: Downloaded on – 26/02/2026 20:30:59 :::CIS
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22not to pursue the case. She has submitted that she is now married, settled
in her personal life, and continuing with the criminal proceedings would
only disturb her peace and stability. Her stand is neither tentative nor.
ambiguous, she has consistently maintained, including through an affidavit
on record, that she does not support the prosecution and wants the matter
to end. The parties have also amicably resolved their differences and arrived
at a mutual understanding. In these circumstances, the continuation of thetrial would not serve any meaningful purpose. It would only prolong distress
for all concerned, especially the complainant, and burden the Courts
without the likelihood of a productive outcome.”
of
20. Consequently, in view of the averments contained in the
petition as well as the submissions having been made by the learned
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counsel for the parties that the matter has been compromised and keeping
in mind the well settled proposition of law as well as the compromise being
genuine, FIR No.301 of 2025, dated 23.9.2025, under Sections 69 and 351
(ii) of the BNS, registered with Police Station Una Sadar, Tehsil and District
Una, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent proceedings, if any, pending
before the learned trial Court, are ordered to be quashed and set-aside.
Petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him.
21. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
February 25, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma),
(manjit) Judge
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