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“Discretionary Privacy” to “Absolute Privacy”- Larger Bench of SC to decide

Introduction The challenge before SC centres on Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act, which amends Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act. While...
HomeHigh CourtMeghalaya High Court20.02.2026 vs Shri Nathaniel Thangkhiew on 20 February, 2026

20.02.2026 vs Shri Nathaniel Thangkhiew on 20 February, 2026

Meghalaya High Court

Date Of Decision: 20.02.2026 vs Shri Nathaniel Thangkhiew on 20 February, 2026

Author: W. Diengdoh

Bench: W. Diengdoh

                                                               2026:MLHC:103




Serial No. 01
Supplementary List


                     HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
                            AT SHILLONG

Cont.Cas(C) No. 4 of 2026
                                              Date of Decision: 20.02.2026
The Shillong Club Ltd.,
A company registered under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956,
having its registered office at Kachari Point,
Shillong, 793001, represented by its Director.
                                               ...... Petitioner

                                  - Vs-

1.     Shri Nathaniel Thangkhiew,
       Joint Rangbah Kur, Thangkhiew
       Laikpoh, Nongkseh Rim,
       Mylliem Syiemship, Upper
       Shillong- 793005 Meghalaya.
2.     Shri A. Luckystar
       Thangkhiew, Joint Rangbah Kur,
       Thangkhiew Laikpoh, Nongkseh Rim,
       Mylliem Syiemship, Upper
       Shillong- 793005, Meghalaya.
                                            ..... Respondents/Contemnors
Coram:
              Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
i)     Whether approved for reporting in                Yes/No
       Law journals etc.:
ii)    Whether approved for publication
       in press:                                        Yes/No




                                     1
                                                                2026:MLHC:103




Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :      Mr. S. Jindal, Adv
                                       Ms. A. Nongbri, Adv

For the Respondent(s)            :     Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Sr. Adv
                                       Mr. T. Dkhar, Adv
                                       Ms. D. Lyngdoh, Adv.

ORDER (ORAL)

1. Heard Mr. S. Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner, who has

submitted that this Court vide order dated 17.02.2026 has decided the case of

the parties herein, in Second Appeal No. 4 of 2023, wherein, on consideration

of the impugned judgment and order dated 05.10.2023, passed by the First

Appellate Court as well as the related judgment and order dated 23.12.2015,

passed by the Trial Court, had dismissed the said Second Appeal, though such

dismissal being conditional.

2. The learned counsel has also pointed out that the dispute between

the parties primarily revolves around a land covered by a Lease Deed

20.03.1923, which is a lease agreement entered into between the parties for

that piece and parcel of land measuring about 10.19 acres. This Court has

come to a finding that the said land is in the possession of the petitioner club

and that such possession has not been disturbed in any way.

3. The learned counsel went on to submit that the respondents on

18.02.2026, a day after the said judgment was passed has engaged workers to

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2026:MLHC:103

erect bamboo and wire fencing on the southern side of the suit property. This

portion measuring approximately 5.030 acres, is part of the 10.19 acres which

is the suit land in question.

4. The learned counsel has reiterated that this Court in the Second

Appeal at para 49 of the judgment (supra) has observed that there is no finding

or direction which has specifically bestowed the respondent clan with any

relief, for example, that the respondents are allowed to take possession of the

suit land. The suit land would remain intact as the possession of the appellant

club over such land has not been disturbed. Therefore, the action of the

respondents are designed to overturn and disregard the findings of this Court

and for such wilful violation, disregard and disobedient of this judgment dated

17.02.2026, the respondents may be called upon to appear in person and to

show cause as to why necessary order for such act contempt be not passed

against them.

5. The learned counsel has further submitted that, though, there is no

specific prohibition or direction issued upon the respondents in this regard,

however, the conduct of the respondents was aimed at frustrating court

proceedings and also to take advantage of the dismissal of the Second Appeal

by this Court, even though, the said dismissal is conditional in nature. The

respondents could have resorted to valid legal procedure, if they are so

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2026:MLHC:103

aggrieved, but as has been submitted, the manner in which they have

conducted themselves, would demonstrate the fact that they have no regard

for due process of law. In this connection, the case of Celir LLP vs. Sumati

Prasad Bafna and Ors, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727, para 199 and 200 have

been referred in support of this contention.

6. Maintaining that the said violation or rather the said action of the

respondents on the suit land is continuing till date, the learned counsel has

submitted that the court in contempt proceedings can also resort to restitutive

measures at any stage of the proceedings. The authority to back this contention

was referred to being the case of Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik,

A Registered Society v. Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust,

(2024) 11 SCC 679, para 15, 16 and 17, wherein the Supreme Court citing

several judgments have observed that when there is any disobedient and wilful

violation of a courts order, the court has a duty to issue appropriate directions

for remedying or rectifying the things done in violation and to take restitutive

measure at any stage of the proceedings. This is to ensure that the contemnor

does not continue to enjoy the benefits of his disobedient by merely suffering

the punishment meted out to him. The said principle being reiterated in the

case of DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. Ltd also in case of Mohd. Idris vs.

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2026:MLHC:103

Rustam Jehangir Babuji. This Court, therefore, can also apply this principle

and pass necessary direction in this instant case.

7. In reply, Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Sr. counsel along with Mr.

T. Dkhar, learned counsel who has entered appearance on behalf of the

respondents, has submitted that though, there are two respondents herein, the

respondent No. 2 has however expired in the year 2024, as such, defence is

made on behalf of respondent No. 1 herein.

8. The learned Sr. counsel has also narrated the case of the parties to

say that the suit land which is under adjudication before the Trial Court refers

to the land measuring about 10.19 acres. It is on record that apart from the suit

land, there is an area of 6.72 acres which figures in the Lease Deed of 1914

executed between the parties, making the total area under lease to be 16.91

acres, but by virtue of the Lease Deed of 1923, 6.72 acres of the land have

been retained by the respondent’s clan. The respondents herein are concerned

only with that portion of land falling within 6.72 acres. The cause of action

arose when the petitioner club has made a claim that the 6.72 acres of land is

part of the suit land.

9. The learned Sr. counsel has submitted that no act of contempt

whatsoever has been committed by the respondents, since whatever action has

been taken is only within the plot of land situated outside the suit land, that is,

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2026:MLHC:103

not touching the boundaries of the 10.19 acres land. The petitioner club has

raised the same issue of alleged encroachment on their land and want to

succeed in this contempt proceeding what they could not do so before the Trial

Court and the First Appellate Court. The way the petitioner club has

interpreted the judgment of this Court is as, if they have got their relief, but

the fact remains that it is not so. On the point of conflict or presence of two

interpretations of the judgment in question, the respondents holding one view,

the act or acts cannot be ascribed to be otherwise contumacious in nature. In

such a case, success in a contempt petition would not arise as has been held

by the Supreme Court at para 15 in the case of Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. v.

Hirak Ghosh and Ors., reported in (2002) 4 SCC 21.

10. The learned Sr. counsel has also submitted that the law is clear that

in contempt proceedings, no further direction would be issued by the court.

This has been observed in the case of V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam

Raju and Anr, (2004) 13 SCC 610, para 7, the relevant portion being

reproduced as under:

“7. …There is no doubt about the position under the law that in
contempt proceedings no further directions could be issued by
the court. In case it is found that there is violation of the order
passed by the court the court may punish the contemnor
otherwise notice of contempt is to be discharged. An order passed
in the contempt petition, could not be a supplemental order to the
main order granting relief….”

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2026:MLHC:103

11. Yet another contention raised by the learned Sr. counsel is that in

a contempt proceeding, the only question to be answered by the court is

whether the order in question has been complied with or not. It is not open for

such court to re-examine the correctness of the earlier decision and to take a

different view. This aspect is to be considered by a higher court, if so

approach. At para 5 in the case of Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand

and Ors, (2004) 7 SCC 261, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

5. …. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court
is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision
which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It
would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness
of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a
view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A
similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India,
(2001) 10 SCC 496. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction
is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious
conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in
complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there
was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party
concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the
same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be
agitated before the higher court. The court exercising contempt
jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original
proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the
judgment or order…..”

12. It is therefore, the assertion of the learned Sr. counsel that no

contempt of this Court’s order has been made out by the petitioner, and as

such, this petition may be dismissed at the threshold.

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2026:MLHC:103

13. This Court upon hearing of the parties have also perused the

petition in hand. The case of the petitioner is that the parties herein are the

contesting parties in the said Second Appeal No .4 of 2023 which was since

disposed of by this Court vide order dated 17.02.2026, the same being

accordingly dismissed.

14. The grievance of the petitioner club herein is that inspite of this

Court holding and maintaining the right of the petitioner club to possess the

suit land measuring about 10.19 acres, the respondents in violation of this

finding, has entered into the suit land by engaging workers to erect bamboo

and barbed wire fencing on the southern side of the suit property. This action

according to the petitioner club constitutes an act of contempt of this Court’s

order for which necessary proceedings is required to be initiated against the

respondents.

15. It is the further contention of the petitioner club that the land

which was attempted to be fence measures about 5.030 acres, and such land

is within the 10.19 acres land of the petitioner club, and as such, the claim of

the respondents that there is an adjacent land of 6.72 acres belonging to the

clan of the respondents belie this fact.

16. The respondents on the otherhand, has insisted that the claim of

the respondents is not connected to the 10.19 acres of land, but is confined

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2026:MLHC:103

only to 6.72 acres of land situated on the southern side of the land of the

petitioner club, and as such, the action taken by the respondents to fence of

the area is not connected to the suit land, and accordingly, there has been no

act of contempt committed, either wilfully or unintentionally.

17. It need not be reminded that in a case where contempt or wilful

violation or deliberate disobedience of a court’s order or direction has been

made out, the court would initiate necessary proceedings by calling upon the

alleged contemnor to show cause etc. However, prima facie, case has to be

made out to warrant such proceedings.

18. In the case between the parties herein, what is borne out from

evidence is that, there is a parcel of land measuring about 10.19 acres and

another plot measuring about 6.72 acres situated side by side. Though the

respondents have been making a claim as far as the said 6.72 acres of land is

concerned, the petitioner club have also categorically admitted that they are

not claiming that portion of land measuring 6.72 acres, but by virtue of the

1923 Lease Deed, 10.19 acres of land is within their possession for perpetuity.

Therefore, when this issue was settled by, firstly the Trial Court and then the

First Appellate Court and finally by this Court, the alleged action of the

respondents can be understood as an interpretation of the related judgments

by the said respondents.

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2026:MLHC:103

19. What has been brought out by the petitioner at this point of time is

another factual aspect of the matter in the form of the introduction of the said

plot of land measuring about 5.030 acres. This area has never figured in the

pleadings of the parties before the courts below. As such, in this instant

petition, the same cannot be taken note being a disputed question of facts.

20. Though the petitioner has annexed a number of photographs to

buttress his contention, on perusal of the same, this Court is unable to

comprehend as to the exactness of such extra-judicial evidence at this

juncture. The petitioner would be better off to approach the proper forum for

settlement of his grievance.

21. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner club has filed a related

complaint before the police authorities, however, since there was no apparent

response, this instant petition was filed.

22. Since the petitioner club has resorted to an alternative legal

remedy, the outcome of the same may be awaited.

23. Being persuaded by the proposition put forth by the learned Sr.

counsel for the respondents, and under the facts and circumstances indicated

herein, prima facie, no act of contempt has been made out at this stage.

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2026:MLHC:103

24. Accordingly, this petition is found devoid of merits and the same

is hereby dismissed.

25. Petition disposed of. No costs.

Judge

Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by 11
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2026.02.21 18:35:07 IST



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