Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 12.03.2026 vs Of on 24 April, 2026
2026:HHC:13274
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 103 of 2013
Reserved on: 12.03.2026
Date of Decision: 24.04.2026
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Satish Kumar ...Appellant
Versus
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State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
rt
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr Amit Singh Chandel, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.01.2013, passed by
learned Special Judge-I, Sirmour District at Nahan, H.P. (learned
Trial Court), vide which the appellant (accused before learned
Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 22(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹20,000/-
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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and in default of payment of fine to undergo further
imprisonment for six months. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred
to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
.
Court for convenience.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned
Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence
of
punishable under section 22 of the NDPS Act. It was asserted that
SI/ Additional SHO Jawahar Singh (PW-12), PSI Naresh Kumar
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(PW-11), Constable Ravinder Kumar (PW-8), HHC Maan Singh
and HHC Jagdish Chand were present at Shamsher Ganj on
19.02.2012 at about 3:30 p.m, when they saw two persons riding a
motorcycle from Chamba ground towards the Naya bazaar. They
turned their motorcycle towards Masjid Gali after seeing the
police. The pillion rider lost his balance and fell along with a bag.
The motorcyclist sped away from the spot. The police inquired
about the pillion rider’s name, and he identified himself as Satish
Kumar (the present appellant). He disclosed that Pritam Singh
was driving the motorcycle. The police saw that the bag being
carried by Satish Kumar was torn from the fall, and some vials
were visible in it. The police became suspicious, joined
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Mohammed Islam and Sohail Khan (PW-2), searched the bag
being carried by Satish Kumar, found 148 vials (Ext.P-3 to Ext.P-
150) bearing the mark ‘Rexcof’, four packets containing 138
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capsules of Spasmo-Proxyvon, ₹965 in the form of currency
notes, one coin of ₹5, one driving license, one ATM card and a
mobile phone. The police put all the articles into the bag from
which they were recovered and demanded the documents for
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possessing the vials and the capsules. The accused could not
produce any document. The police sewed the bag and put it in a
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cloth parcel. The police put the currency notes, ATM card, driving
license and mobile in another parcel. The parcel containing the
bag was sealed with twelve seals of seal ‘T’, and the parcel
containing currency notes, a mobile phone, etc., was sealed with
six seals of seal ‘T’. The seal impression (Ext.PW-12/A) was
taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the NCB-I form (Ext.PW-
3/B). The seal was handed over to Sohail Khan (PW-2) after its
use. All the articles were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-2/A), and
signatures of witnesses Mohammed Islam, Sohail Khan (PW-2)
and PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11) were obtained. SI Jawahar Singh
(PW-12) prepared the Rukka (Ext.PW-7/A) and sent it to Police
Station, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. through Constable
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Ravinder Kumar (PW-8). He handed over the Rukka to the ASI
Mast Ram (PW-7), who registered the F.I.R. (Ext.PW-7/B) and
handed over the case file to Constable Ravinder Kumar (PW-8)
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with a direction to carry it to the spot. SI Jawahar Singh
investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-12/B).
He arrested the accused and communicated the grounds of arrest
to him vide memo (Ext.PW-12/C). He conducted the personal
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search of the accused and prepared the memo (Ext.PW-11/A). He
handed over the case property in the police station to HC Kunwar
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Singh (PW-4), who made an entry in the Malkhana register at
Serial No. 312 (Ext.PW-4/A) and deposited all the articles in
Malkhana. SI Jawahar Singh (PW-12) prepared the special report
(Ext.PW-6/A) and handed it over to Superintendent of Police
Rameshwar Thakur, who made the endorsement on the Special
Report and handed it over to HC Ramesh Kumar (PW-6). HC
Kunwar Singh (PW-4) sent the parcel containing bottles and
capsules, sample seal, NCB-I form in triplicate to SFSL, Junga,
through Constable Subhash Chand (PW-5) vide RC No. 12
(Ext.PW-4/B). He handed over all the articles at SFSL, Junga and
handed over the receipt to HC Kunwar Singh (PW-4) on his
return to the police station. Dr Kapil Sharma (PW-3) analysed
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the case property and issued the report (Ext.PW-3/A), stating
that the exhibit, stated as Spasmo Proxyvon, is a sample of
Dextropropoxyphene Napsylate Capsules and the vials of Rexcof
.
contained Codeine Phosphate in them. Statements of witnesses
were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of
the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before
the learned Trial Court.
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3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of an offence punishable under section 22 of the
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NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its
case. HHC Jagdish Kumar (PW-1), Sohail Khan (PW-2), Constable
Ravinder Kumar (PW-8), and PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11) are the
witnesses to the recovery. Dr Kapil Sharma (PW-3) analysed the
case property. HC Kunwar Singh (PW-4) was working as MHC
with whom the case property was deposited. Constable Subhash
Chand (PW-5) carried the case property to SFSL, Junga. HC
Ramesh Kumar (PW-6) was working as a Reader to the
Superintendent of Police to whom the Special report was handed
over. ASI Mast Ram (PW-7) signed the F.I.R. HHG Ved Parkash
(PW-9) and HC Gurdayal Singh (PW-10) witnessed the recovery
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of the motorcycle. SI Jawahar Singh (PW-12) investigated the
matter.
5. The accused, in their statement recorded under
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Section 313 of Cr.PC denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety.
Accused Satish Kumar stated that witnesses Sohail Khan and
Mohammad Islam were joined as witnesses in an earlier case
where police officials were beaten by some persons. PSI Naresh
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Kumar (PW-11) had an altercation with Satish Kumar around
fifteen days before the incident, and he had threatened to involve
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the accused Satish Kumar in a false case. The accused Satish
Kumar had also made complaints against PSI Naresh Kumar
(PW-11) regarding this fact. Accused Pritam Singh stated that he
was falsely implicated because Satish Kumar is his friend. They
did not produce any evidence in their defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the
witnesses corroborated each other. There was nothing in their
cross-examination to show that they were making false
statements. Minor contradictions regarding the exact spot
where the accused had fallen, the time taken for completing the
proceedings and the place of conducting proceedings were bound
to occur with a passage of time and did not affect the recovery.
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The defence taken by the accused Satish Kumar regarding some
altercation with PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11) was not proved by
any evidence on record. The fact that Sohail Khan (PW-2) and
.
Mohammad Islam were joined as witnesses in an earlier case did
not show that they were stock witnesses. Their shops were
located near the place of the incident, and they were natural
witnesses. The integrity of the case property was duly
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established. The report of the analysis showed that capsules of
Spasmo Proxyvon contain Dextropropoxyphene Napsylate and
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bottles of Rexcof contained Codeine Phosphate. The bag
containing the vials and packet was in the possession of the
accused Satish. The accused, Pritam, had turned the motorcycle
after seeing the police, which may give rise to a suspicion, but it
is not sufficient to fasten him with liability; hence, the learned
Trial Court acquitted the accused Pritam but convicted the
accused Satish Kumar and sentenced him as aforesaid.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
7.
the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and
sentencing the accused. The ownership of the bag was not
established. The police had not joined any independent witnesses
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but had joined Sohail Khan and Mohammed Islam, who had
earlier appeared as the witnesses of the prosecution. The
testimonies of police officials were required to be seen with
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utmost care and caution. The statements of the prosecution
witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The
integrity of the case property was not established. The defence
taken by the accused Satish that a false case was made against
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him due to an altercation with PSI Naresh Kumar (PW11) was
highly probable, and the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting it.
rt
Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the
judgment and sentence passed by the learned Trial Court be set
aside.
8. I have heard Mr Amit Singh Chandel, learned counsel
for the appellant/accused, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
9. Mr Amit Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, submitted that the statements of prosecution
witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The
statement of Sohail Khan (PW-2) was wrongly relied upon by the
learned Trial Court. He had appeared as a witness on behalf of the
police in an earlier case. The police had failed to join independent
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witnesses even though the incident had occurred in the middle of
the Bazaar. The police had not collected any material to connect
the accused to the bag, and the possibility of Pritam Singh being
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the owner of the bag could not be ruled out because he had sped
away from the spot. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal
be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned
Trial Court be set aside.
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10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the statements
rt
of witnesses corroborated each other on material aspects. There
was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were
making false statements. Merely because the witnesses had
appeared earlier in a police case will not make them stock
witnesses. Learned Trial Court had properly appreciated the
material on record, and this Court should not interfere with the
well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he
prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given a considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
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12. HHC Jagdish Kumar (PW-1) stated that he, PSI Naresh
Kumar (PW-11), HHC Maan Singh, Constable Ravinder Kumar
(PW-8), and SHO Jawhar Singh (PW-12) were present at
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Shamsher Ganj on 19.02.2012 on routine patrolling duty. One
motorcycle came from the Chamba ground at about 3:30 p.m.
The accused Pritam Singh was driving the motorcycle, and the
accused Satish Kumar was the pillion rider. The accused Satish
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Kumar held a bag on his lap. The accused Pritam turned the
motorcycle towards Masjid Gali after seeing the police, and the
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accused Satish fell from the motorcycle along with the bag.
Accused Pritam fled away from the spot along with the
motorcycle, but accused Satish Kumar was apprehended. The bag
was found to contain bottles; hence, Mohammad Islam and
Sohail Khan (PW-2) were called from the nearby shop. The police
searched the bag in their presence and recovered 149 vials of 100
ml of Rexcof and four cartons containing 576 capsules. The
accused could not produce any license for carrying these drugs.
The police put the drugs into the bag and sealed the bag in a cloth
parcel. The police conducted a personal search of the accused and
recovered currency notes worth ₹965/-, a driving license, an
ATM card and a mobile phone. These were put in a separate cloth
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parcel. Both parcels were sealed with seal T and seized vide
memo (Ex. PW. All the articles were seized by the police vide
memo (Ext.PW-2/A).
.
13. He stated in his cross-examination that the shortcut
from the police station to Nahan Bazaar is through a gate via the
police line. The other gate near the SP office is on the longer
route. He admitted that Chowgan is situated in the heart of
of
Nahan. Accused Satish Kumar was already involved in criminal
cases, but he was not aware of the number of cases pending
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against him. He was known to the police because of his previous
involvement in criminal cases, but the investigating officer had
enquired about his name. The witnesses were present inside the
shop. The accused Satish Kumar fell on the main road, and not on
the road leading to Masjid Gali. The place where the accused was
apprehended is a thickly populated area that comprises
residential houses and the shop. It took about 3-3 ½ hours to
investigate the matter. The Constable Ravinder Kumar (PW-8)
left the spot with Rukka at 5:00 pm. He denied that the accused
Satish was not apprehended on the spot.
14. Sohail Khan (PW-2) stated that he was present in his
shop on 19.02.2012 at about 3:00-3:30 p.m. when two persons
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riding on a scooter or motorcycle crossed his shop towards Gali
and they were apprehended by the police. They were carrying one
bag. He identified the accused Satish as one of the occupants of
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the motorcycle. The police checked the bag and recovered 148
vials. The police put the drugs into the bag from which they were
recovered and sealed the bag. The search of the accused was
conducted, and ₹965/-, a driving licence and an ATM card were
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recovered. These were put in another cloth parcel, and the parcel
was also sealed. The person who was driving the motorcycle sped
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away from the spot. He identified the case property in the Court.
15. He stated in his cross-examination that the Gali is not
visible from his shop. He volunteered to say that he came out
because somebody had fallen. He admitted that the area around
his shop was thickly populated. The bag was lying at a distance of
7 – 8 meters on the main road in the Gali. The Gali leading to the
Masjid and the Lal Jewellery shop is narrow, and it is not possible
to drive a vehicle in a Gali at high speed. 15-20 people had
gathered on the spot. The police officials left the spot after
checking the bag for about 20 minutes. He was called by the
police after 2 ½ hours to the police station. Mohammad Islam
also accompanied him. The police sealed the parcels and obtained
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his signature on the document. He admitted that he and
Mohammad Islam were cited as witnesses in a case titled State vs
Sandeep, in which allegations of beating the police officials were
.
made.
16. Constable Ravinder Kumar (PW-8) stated that he, PSI
Naresh Kumar, HHC Maan Singh and Additional SHO Jawhar
Singh were patrolling. They were present at Shamsher Ganj
of
Mohalla at about 3:30 p.m. when two persons came on a
motorcycle from the HRTC Workshop. The motorcyclist tried to
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turn it towards Masjid Gali after seeing the police. The pillion
rider holding the bag fell with the bag. The motorcyclist sped
away from the spot. The person who had fallen was apprehended
by the police, and he disclosed his name as Satish Kumar and the
name of the motorcycle driver as Pritam. The bottles of drugs
were visible in the bag; hence, Mohammad Islam and Sohail
Khan (PW-2) were called from nearby shops, and the bag was
opened. 148 vials of Rexcof and 576 capsules were found inside
the bag. Accused Satish Kumar was asked to produce the
documents for processing the medicines, but he could not
produce any documents. The drugs were put in the bag from
which they were recovered, the bag was put in a cloth parcel, and
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the parcel was sealed with seal impression ‘T’. A personal search
of the accused Satish Kumar was conducted, and ₹965/-, a
driving license, a mobile phone and an ATM card were recovered.
.
These were put in a separate cloth parcel, and the parcel was
sealed with seal ‘T’. SI Jawhar Singh (PW-12) prepared a rukka
and handed it over to him. He handed over the Rukka to ASI Mast
Ram (PW-7) in the police Station.
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17. He stated in his cross-examination that they had left
the police Station at 3:00 p.m. They went from the police station
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up to the gate of the HRTC workshop, which is located at a
distance of about a hundred metres from the police station. They
had not carried out any checking in the HRTC workshop. They
were walking towards the rest house at the time of the arrival of
the motorcycle. The Gali was 4 – 5 feet wide, but he could not tell
its length. The pillion rider fell on the turn from the main road to
Gali, and the bag also fell with him. They remained on the spot
for about 1½ hours. The investigation was completed by 5:00
p.m., and his statement was recorded on the spot. The people had
not gathered on the spot. The distance between the spot and the
police station was about 50-55 meters. The Investigating Officer
had not marked the bottles that were recovered and sealed by the
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police. No identification mark was put on the strips of Spasmo-
Proxyvon. He denied that no recovery was effected, and the
accused was falsely implicated.
.
18. PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11) also supported the
prosecution’s case. Since his examination in chief is on a similar
line as the statement of Constable Ravinder Kumar (PW-8), the
same is not being reproduced to avoid prolixity and repetition. He
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stated in his cross-examination that the house of the accused
Satish was beside Villa Road. He was not aware of the house of
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the accused, Pritam. Many cases were registered against the
accused Satish before the present case, but he could not say
anything about the cases registered against the accused Pritam.
They left the Police Station at 3:00 p.m. and reached the spot at
3:30 p.m. They were going towards Naya Bazar through the
sentry gate. A speed breaker is ahead of the spot and Masjid Gali,
but he cannot say its distance from Masjid Gali. Accused Satish
Kumar fell at the curve with the bag. He admitted that the place
was thickly populated. He could not say that the Vice President of
Municipal Corporation Nahan was residing in the vicinity. The
Investigating Officer had not made any efforts to join other
witnesses. Many people had gathered on the spot, but he could
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not tell their number. It took about four hours to complete the
proceedings on the spot. The proceedings were conducted beside
the shop by sitting on the stool by the Investigating Officer. He
.
had written some of the documents on the spot. The
investigating officer wrote other documents. The search and
seizure memo was prepared in his presence, but he had not
signed it. No identification marks were put on the bottles and
of
capsules. He denied that he had an altercation with the accused
Satish Kumar, and he falsely implicated him (the accused Satish
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Kumar) because of the enmity.
19. SI Jawhar Singh (PW-12) has also deposed in similar
lines as the other witnesses; hence, his examination-in -chief is
not being reproduced to avoid prolixity and repetition. He stated
in his cross-examination that the name of the accused, Pritam,
was disclosed by Satish Kumar, soon after he was apprehended.
He admitted that Purbia Mohalla is located at a distance of 2
furlongs from the Police Station. He voluntarily said that the
house of the accused Pritam was raided several times, but he was
not available at home. He had not carried out any investigation to
find out the name of the shop from where the drugs were
purchased by the accused. The proceedings were conducted by
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sitting inside the shop of Mohammad Islam. Satish Kumar fell
with the bag at point ‘H’ shown in the site plan (Ext.PW-12/B).
He had not made any effort to join any other person except Sohail
.
Khan and Mohammad Islam. The statement of Sohail Khan was
recorded by PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11), whereas the statements
of HHC Jagdish and Mohammad Islam were recorded by him.
Ravinder Kumar (PW-8) came back with the case file within 1½
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hours. He denied that no proceedings were conducted on the spot
and that the accused were falsely implicated.
20. It
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was submitted that the statements of the
prosecution’s witnesses contain the following contradictions:
i) HHC Jagdish Kumar (PW-1) stated in his cross-
examination that the accused Satish Kumar fell
from the motorcycle on the main road. Constable
Ravinder Kumar (PW-8) stated that the pillion
rider fell from the motorcycle at a curve from the
main road to Gali. PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11)
stated that the accused Satish fell at the place
where the road turns towards Gali. SI Jawhar
Singh (PW-12) stated that the accused Satish fell
on a curve shown at point ‘H’ (Ext.PW-12/B)
ii) HHC Jagdish Kumar (PW-1) stated that it took
about 3 to 3 ½ hours to carry out the investigation.
Sohail Khan (PW-2) stated that the police left the
spot within 20 minutes. Constable Ravinder
Kumar (PW-8) stated in his cross-examination
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that he remained on the spot for about 1½ hours.
PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11) stated that it took
about 4 hours to complete the investigation. SI
Jawhar Singh (PW-12) stated that it took about 1 ½
.
to 2 hours to complete the proceedings on the
spot.
iii). HHC Jagdish Kumar (PW-1) stated that the
distance from the spot to the Police Station Sadar
was around 100 yards. Constable Ravinder Kumar
(PW-8) stated that the distance between the spot
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and the Police Station was 50-55 meters.
iv). HHC Jagdish Kumar (PW-1) stated that they
rt remained present on the main road during the
entire proceedings. Sohail Khan (PW-2) stated
that the proceedings were conducted in the police
station where the parcels were sealed, and
signatures were obtained. Constable Ravinder
Kumar (PW-8) stated in his cross-examination
that the proceedings were conducted by sitting on
the side of the road. PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11)
stated that proceedings were conducted beside the
shop by sitting on the stool. SI Jawhar Singh (PW-
12) stated that proceedings were conducted by
sitting inside the shop of Mohammad Islam.
v) HHC Jagdish Kumar (PW-1) stated in his cross-
examination that no person had arrived on the
spot besides the witnesses. Sohail Khan (PW-2)
stated that 15-20 people had gathered on the spot,
including the people living in the vicinity.
Constable Ravinder Kumar (PW-8) stated in his
cross-examination that people had not gathered
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on the spot. PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11) stated that
several persons had gathered during the
proceedings, but he could not tell their names.
21. It was submitted that the prosecution’s case has
.
become suspect because of these contradictions, and the learned
Trial Court erred in relying upon the statements of the
prosecution witnesses. This submission will not help the accused.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025
of
SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of
the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case
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unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: –
“32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task.
There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the
appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved
principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in acriminal case can be enumerated as under:
“I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness,
read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Oncethat impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more
particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacksand infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole
and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the
general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and
whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken
as to render it unworthy of belief.
II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence
had the opportunity to form the opinion about the
general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the
appellate court which had not this benefit will have to::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
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trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and
formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence
on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the
matter of trivial details.
.
III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is
quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But
courts should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are soincompatible with the credibility of his version that the
court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touchingof
the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by
taking sentences torn out of context here or there from
the evidence, attaching importance to some technical
error committed by the investigating officer, not going
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to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole.
V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations
falling in the narration of an incident (either as
between the evidence of two witnesses or as between
two statements of the same witness) is an unrealisticapproach for judicial scrutiny.
VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess
a photographic memory and to recall the details of anincident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the
mental screen.
VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken
by events. The witness could not have anticipated theoccurrence, which so often has an element of surprise.
The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to
be attuned to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An
object or movement might emboss its image on one
person’s mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the
part of another.
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IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by them. They can only recall the main
purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a
witness to be a human tape recorder.
.
X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at
the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect peopleto make very precise or reliable estimates in such
matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of
individuals, which varies from person to person.
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XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events that take place in
rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is
liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated
rt
later on.
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness,
mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of
events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur ofthe moment. The subconscious mind of the witness
sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking
foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness isgiving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence
witnessed by him.
XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent
with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to
amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statementhas the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if
the latter statement is at variance with the former to
some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that
witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983
SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC
525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of
UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)”
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22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479:
2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the
.
evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of
truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to
omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to
the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: –
of
“38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it
appears that no specific question was put to him as to
whether the appellant was present at the place of
rt
occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of
Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessaryfor the court to scrutinise the evidence more,
particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidenceas a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by thewitnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue
importance to omissions, contradictions and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the
matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution
witness.”
39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr
Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in
memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this
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case, there was no contradiction, only minor
discrepancies.
40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this
Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32)
.
“30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the
discrepancies or improvements which do not
materially affect the case of the prosecution and are
insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting thecase of the prosecution. The courts may not
concentrate too much on such discrepancies or
improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearlyof
sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from
the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect
the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy
should not be attached undue significance. The normal
rt
course of human conduct would be that while narrating
a particular incident, there may occur minordiscrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law,
render credentials to the depositions. The
improvements or variations must essentially relate to
the material particulars of the prosecution case. Thealleged improvements and variations must be shown
with respect to the material particulars of the case and
the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directlyrelated to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the
testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definitecircumstance of the prosecution case cannot be
weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant
improvements. Reference in this regard can be made tothe judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v.
State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat,
(2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan
Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan
Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8
SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of
Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC
205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:13274Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5
SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961].
31. What is to be seen next is whether the version
presented in the Court was substantially similar to
what was said during the investigation. It is only when.
exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the
case that the Court has to consider whether the witness
was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State
(NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]].
32. These are variations which would not amount to any
serious consequences. The Court has to accept the
of
normal conduct of a person. The witness who is
watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten
by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute-
by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and
rt
more particularly a person who is known to or is related
to the deceased, would give all his attention to take
steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to
make every effort to provide him with medical aid and
inform the police. The statements which are recorded
immediately upon the incident would have to be given a
little leeway with regard to the statements being made
and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled
principle of law that every improvement or variation
cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the
accused by the witness. The approach of the court has
to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this
regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana
[Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350:
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh
[Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3
SCC (Cri) 777].”
41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v.
State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this
Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49)
“46. Then, it was argued that there are certain
discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of
the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses
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have given different timings as to when they had seen
the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the
accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or
variations are traceable in the statements of these
witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether
.
these variations are material and affect the case of the
prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be
enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution.
***
49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should
examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and
read the said statement along with the statements of
of
other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational
conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in
part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any
material or serious contradiction in the statement of
rt
these witnesses which may give any advantage to the
accused.”
42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v.
State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238],
this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,
particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by the
witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue
importance to omissions, contradictions and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the
matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution
witness.”
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23. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar,
2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was
observed: –
.
“17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions
with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries
attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrativeof the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the
place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the
injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of
a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merelyof
because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed
by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs.
State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while
considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony
rt
while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held
that only contradictions in material particulars and notminor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the
testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para
42 of the judgment reads as under:
“42. Only such omissions which amount to a
contradiction in material particulars can be used to
discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission
in the police statement by itself would notnecessarily render the testimony of the witness
unreliable. When the version given by the witness inthe court is different in material particulars from
that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of
the prosecution becomes doubtful and nototherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear
in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory
sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation
differs from person to person. The omissions in the
earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as
in the present case, the same would not cause any
dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a
contradiction of a statement of a witness on any
material point, that is no ground to reject the whole::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:13274of the testimony of such witness.”
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Achchar Singh vs. State of H.P., AIR 2021 SC 3426, that the
.
testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration
alone. It was observed:
“24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false.
Cambridge Dictionary defines “exaggeration” as “the factof
of making something larger, more important, better or
worse than it is”. Merriam-Webster defines the term
“exaggerate” as to “enlarge beyond bounds or the truth”.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as “enlarged or
rt
altered beyond normal proportions”. These expressions
unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an
‘exaggerated statement’ lies in a fact, to which fictitious
additions are made to make it more penetrative. Every
exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of ‘truth’. No
exaggerated statement is possible without an element of
truth. On the other hand, the Advanced Law Lexicon
defines “false” as “erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct,
or true”. Oxford Concise Dictionary states that “false” is
“wrong; not correct or true”. Similar is the explanation in
other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked
differential between an ‘exaggerated version’ and a ‘false
version’. An exaggerated statement contains both truth
and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth
in it (being the ‘opposite’ of ‘true’). It is well said that to
make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have
to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such
distinction, is duty-bound to disseminate ‘truth’ from
‘falsehood’ and sift the grain from the chaff in case of
exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the
chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in their
separation, no real evidence survives that the whole
evidence can be discarded. [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2003) 7 SCC 643, 18.]
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2026:HHC:13274
25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar
Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major
portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a conviction
can be based on it. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of
.
Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112 held that:
“24. …So far as this contention is concerned, it
must be kept in view that while appreciating the
evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial, especiallyin a case of eyewitnesses, the maxim falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus cannot apply, and the court has to
make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is ofof
course true that when a witness is said to have
exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial and
has tried to involve many more accused and if that
rt part of the evidence is not found acceptable the
remaining part of the evidence has to be scrutinised
with care and the court must try to see whether the
acceptable part of the evidence gets corroboratedfrom other evidence on record so that the
acceptable part can be safely relied upon…”
26. There is no gainsaying that homicidal deaths cannot be
left to judicium dei. The Court, in their quest to reach the
truth, ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of
the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the
authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its best
efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of
the doubt is extended.
27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The
statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be
analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the
difference between exaggeration and falsity. We find that
the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their
statements. The trial Court fell in grave error and
overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while
proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated
statements made by the eyewitnesses belie their version.”
25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
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2026:HHC:13274
Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and others Versus State of Rajasthan,
2022 Cri. L.J. 374, that the testimony of a witness cannot be
discarded because he had made a wrong statement regarding
.
some aspect. The principle that when a witness deposes
falsehood, his entire statement is to be discarded does not apply
to India. It was observed: –
“48. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood,
of
the evidence in its entirety has to be eschewed may not
have a strict application to the criminal jurisprudence in
our country. The principle governing sifting the chaff from
the grain has to be applied. However, when the evidence is
rt
inseparable and such an attempt would either be
impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable, thenatural consequence would be one of avoidance. The said
principle has not assumed the status of law but continues
only as a rule of caution. One has to see the nature of the
discrepancy in a given case. When the discrepancies arevery material, shaking the very credibility of the witness,
leading to a conclusion in the mind of the court that it is
neither possible to separate it nor to rely upon, it is for thesaid court to either accept or reject.”
26. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot
be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies.
The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively
affect the prosecution’s case and whether they pertain to the core
of the case rather than the details.
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2026:HHC:13274
27. The contradiction regarding the place where the
motorcycle had fallen is no contradiction at all. Site plan
(Ext.PW-12/B) shows that the pillion rider had fallen with the
.
bag on the main road on a curve leading towards the Masjid.
Therefore, the statements of the witnesses support each other
that the pillion rider had fallen on the main road on a curve
leading to Masjid, even though they have described the place of
of
fall differently.
28. The contradiction regarding the time is not
rt
significant because no person remembers the time by looking at
the watch, and when anyone is asked about the time, he gives a
different time, which may or may not be correct. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai
v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 that people make their
estimates by guesswork regarding the time on the spur of the
moment, and one cannot expect people to make very precise or
reliable estimates in such matters. It was observed:-
“(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the
time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to
make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters.
Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which
varies from person to person.”
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2026:HHC:13274
29. Therefore, the contradiction regarding the time
cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s version.
30. Similarly, the contradiction regarding the distance
.
between the spot and the police station is also no contradiction
because no person measures the distance by using a measuring
tape. Every person has a different perception of the distance,
which may vary among different individuals. Therefore, the
of
discrepancy regarding the distance will not make the statements
of the witnesses doubtful.
31.
rt
The contradictions regarding the place where the
investigation was conducted and the number of people who had
gathered during investigations are related to matters of detail,
which are bound to come with time because of failure to
remember the facts identically. They do not affect the core of the
prosecution’s case and cannot be used to discard the
prosecution’s version.
32. The statement of Sohail Khan (PW2) that the
investigation was conducted in the police station and he was
called to the police station will not make the prosecution’s case
false because the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus does
not apply in the India and falsity in his statement regarding the
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2026:HHC:13274
investigation will not make the prosecution’s case regarding
recovery doubtful.
33. Therefore, the testimonies in the statements of
.
prosecution witnesses could not have been used to discard the
prosecution’s version.
34. It was submitted that Sohail Khan (PW-2) and
Mohammad Islam were joined as witnesses in an earlier case by
of
the police, and this is sufficient to discard their testimonies. This
submission cannot be accepted. Learned Trial Court had rightly
rt
held that the mere fact that they were witnesses in a previous
case does not show that they are the stock witnesses. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Zakaullah,
(1998) 1 SCC 557: 1998 SCC (Cri) 456, that if a person had provided
help to the police, that will not destroy his independent outlook.
It was observed at page 561: –
“10. The necessity for “independent witness” in cases
involving police raid or police search is incorporated in the
statute, not for the purpose of helping the indicated personto bypass the evidence of those panch witnesses who have
had some acquaintance with the police or officers
conducting the search at some time or another.
Acquaintance with the police by itself would not destroy a
man’s independent outlook. In a society where police
involvement is a regular phenomenon, many people would
get acquainted with the police. But as long as they are not
dependent on the police for their living or liberty, or any
other matter, it cannot be said that those are not::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
33
2026:HHC:13274independent persons. If the police, in order to carry out
official duties, have sought the help of any other person,
he would not forfeit his independent character by giving
help to police action. The requirement to have an
independent witness to corroborate the evidence of the.
police is to be viewed from a realistic angle. Every citizen
of India must be presumed to be an independent person
until it is proved that he was a dependant of the police or
other officials for any purpose whatsoever. [HazariLalv.State (Delhi Admn.)[(1980) 2 SCC 390: 1980 SCC (Cri)
458: (1980) 2 SCR 1053].]
35. The site plan shows that the shop of Sohail Khan
of
(PW-2) is near the place of the incident. Hence, he was a natural
witness, and his testimony cannot be discarded simply because
rt
he had appeared as a prosecution witness in an earlier case.
36. It was submitted that the police failed to collect any
material to connect the petitioner to the bag. The bag could have
belonged to Pritam Singh, who was riding the motorcycle and
had sped away from the spot. This submission will not help the
accused. The accused Satish Kumar was found carrying the bag in
his lap. He never claimed that the bag belonged to the accused
Pritam Singh. His defence is one of denial. Since the accused
Satish was carrying the bag, he has to be treated as in possession.
The possibility that the accused Pritam might have been in
possession of the bag is merely a hypothesis, not supported by
any evidence and does not constitute a reasonable doubt. Prof.
Glanville Williams explained the degree of reasonable doubt in
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The Hamlyn Lectures, seventh series, The Proof of Guilt (Stevens
& Sons Ltd. 1955) on page 133 as under: –
“It is then a question of degree; some risk of convicting
.
an innocent person must be run. What this means in terms
of the burden of proof is that a case need not be proved
beyond all doubt. The evidence of crime against a person
may be overwhelming and yet it may be possible toconjecture a series of extraordinary circumstances that
would be consistent with his innocence by supposing that
some stranger of whose existence there is no evidence,of
interposed at a crucial moment and committed the crime
when all the evidence points to the fact that accused was
alone on the spot, or by supposing in a charge of murder
that the deceased died of heart failure the moment before
rt
the bullet entered his body. The fact that these unlikely
contingencies do sometimes occur so that by neglecting
them there is, on rare occasions, a miscarriage of justicecannot be held against the administration of law, which is
compelled to run this risk.”
37. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302: 1988 SCC (Cri) 928:
1988 SCC OnLine SC 230that a reasonable doubt is not an
imaginary, fanciful or trivial doubt but must be borne out from
the evidence. It was observed at page 313:
“25. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Though this standard is a higher standard, there is,
however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability
amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case.
Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the
confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, a
learned Author says [ See: “The Mathematics of Proof-II”:
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
35
2026:HHC:13274
Glanville Williams: Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and
Maxwell, p. 340 (342)]:
“The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the
separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events
are dependent when they tend to occur together, and.
the evidence of such events may also be said to be
dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of
evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did
the prohibited act with the specified state of mind aregenerally dependent. A juror may feel doubt whether to
credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to
infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled fromof
justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than
innocent people who make confessions, and guilty
rather than innocent people who run away, the two
doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece
rt
of evidence may confirm the other.”
Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a
zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any
favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt,
it must be free from an over-emotional response. Doubts
must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the
accused person arising from the evidence, or from the lack
of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A
reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely
possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and
common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the
case.
26. The concepts of probability and the degrees of it
cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There is an
unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic
probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust
common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions
of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal
process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the
same time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would
make a mockery of the administration of criminal justice.”
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2026:HHC:13274
38. The accused Satish claimed that he had an altercation
with PSI Naresh Kumar, and he had filed complaints against him.
Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that this version was
.
not proved. No copy of the complaint filed by accused Satish
Kumar against PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-12) was brought on
record. No person was examined to show that he had an
altercation with PSI Naresh Kumar (PW-11); therefore, this
of
version was not proved by any material on record and was rightly
discarded by the learned Trial Court. It was laid down by this
rt
Court in Budhi Ram Vs State, 2021 (4) Shim. L.C. 1945, that where
the defence asserts that the accused was falsely implicated
because of some quarrel, it must be proved that enmity or quarrel
between the accused and the police was such as to push the police
to wrongly frame the accused. It was observed:-
“[16] We have considered the contentions as well as the
evidence of DW-1. The evidence of DW-1 is not to such an
extent that would support the contentions of the learned
counsel for the appellant. The evidence of DW-1 onlyindicates that a quarrel took place between the accused
and the police. What was the quarrel, and what was the
intensity of the enmity between the accused and the police
has not been stated. The enmity or hatred between the
appellant and the police should be to such an extent which
would push the police into wrongly framing the accused.
The incident should have hurt the police to such an extent
that they had no other option but to falsely implicate the
accused. We do not find that the intensity of the evidence::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
37
2026:HHC:13274is to such an extent as to lead to such a conclusion. The
evidence only indicates that there was an altercation
between the accused and the police. It may not be possible
for us to conclude that this particular quarrel between the
accused and the police has led to the wrong implication for.
the accused. We do not find that there is any nexus
between the contention of a false implication of the
accused with the evidence of DW-1. Therefore, we are
unable to accept the evidence of DW-1 to the extent whichis sought to be argued.”
39. In the present case, no details of the altercation have
of
been given, and it cannot be held that any altercation had
occurred or that it was of such a nature as to push the police to
falsely implicate the accused.
rt
40. It was submitted that the prosecution did not examine
Mohammed Islam, and an adverse inference should be drawn
against the prosecution. This submission cannot be accepted.. It
was held in Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 7 SCC 490:
2000 SCC (Cri) 1416: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1311 that the Public
Prosecutor is not obliged to examine the witness who will not
support the prosecution. It was observed at page 495:
“13. When the case reaches the stage envisaged in Section
231 of the Code, the Sessions Judge is obliged “to take all
such evidence as may be produced in support of the
prosecution”. It is clear from the said section that the
Public Prosecutor is expected to produce evidence “in
support of the prosecution” and not in derogation of the
prosecution case. At the said stage, the Public Prosecutor
would be in a position to take a decision as to which::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
38
2026:HHC:13274among the persons cited are to be examined. If there are
too many witnesses on the same point, the Public
Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some among them
alone so that the time of the Court can be saved from
repetitious depositions on the same factual aspects. That.
principle applies when there are too many witnesses cited
if they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence. The
Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine
all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examiningany two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the
Court that he does not propose to examine the remaining
persons in that category. This will help not only the
prosecution in relieving itself of the strain of adducingof
repetitive evidence on the same point but also help the
Court considerably in lessening the workload. The time
has come to make every effort possible to lessen the
workload, particularly those courts crammed with cases,
rt
but without impairing the cause of justice.
14. The situation in a case where the prosecution cited two
categories of witnesses to the occurrence, one consisting
of persons closely related to the victim and the other
consisting of witnesses who have no such relation, the
Public Prosecutor’s duty to the Court may require him toproduce witnesses from the latter category, also subject to
his discretion to limit to one or two among them. But if the
Public Prosecutor got reliable information that anyoneamong that category would not support the prosecution’s
version, he is free to state in court about that fact and skipthat witness from being examined as a prosecution
witness. It is open to the defence to cite him and examine
him as a defence witness. The decision in this regard hasto be taken by the Public Prosecutor in a fair manner. He
can interview the witness beforehand to enable him to
know well in advance the stand which that particular
person would be adopting when examined as a witness in
court.
15. A four-judge Bench of this Court had stated the above
legal position thirty-five years ago in Masalti v.State of::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
39
2026:HHC:13274U.P.[AIR 1965 SC 202: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226] It is contextually
apposite to extract the following observation of the Bench:
“It is not unknown that where serious offences like the
present are committed, and a large number of accused
persons are tried, attempts are made either to terrorise.
or win over prosecution witnesses, and if the
prosecutor honestly and bona fide believes that some of
his witnesses have been won over, it would be
unreasonable to insist that he must tender suchwitnesses before the court.”
16. The said decision was followed inBava Hajee
Hamsav.State of Kerala[(1974) 4 SCC 479: 1974 SCC (Cri) 515:
of
AIR 1974 SC 902]. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobadev.State of
Maharashtra[(1973) 2 SCC 793: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033], Krishna
Iyer J., speaking for a three-judge Bench, had struck a note
of caution that while a Public Prosecutor has the freedom
rt
“to pick and choose” witnesses, he should be fair to the
court and the truth. This Court reiterated the sameposition in Dalbir Kaurv.State of Punjab[(1976) 4 SCC 158:
1976 SCC (Cri) 527].
41. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Pohlu v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 196: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1496:
2004 SCC OnLine SC 1393 that the intrinsic worth of the testimony
of witnesses has to be assessed by the Court, and if the testimony
of the witnesses appears to be truthful, the non-examination of
other witnesses will not make the testimony doubtful. It was
observed at page 199: –
“10. It was then submitted that some of the material
witnesses were not examined, and in this connection, it
was argued that two of the eyewitnesses named in the FIR,
namely, Chander and Sita Ram, were not examined by the
prosecution. Dharamvir, son of Sukhdei, was also not
examined by the prosecution, though he was a material::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
40
2026:HHC:13274witness, being an injured eyewitness, having witnessed the
assault that took place in the house of Sukhdei, PW 2. It is
true that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply
witnesses if it prefers to rely upon the evidence of the
eyewitnesses examined by it, which it considers sufficient.
to prove the case of the prosecution. However, the intrinsic
worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the
prosecution has to be assessed by the court. If their
evidence appears to be truthful, reliable and acceptable,the mere fact that some other witnesses have not been
examined will not adversely affect the case of the
prosecution. We have, therefore, to examine the evidence
of the two eyewitnesses, namely, PW 1 and PW 2, and toof
find whether their evidence is true, on the basis of which
the conviction of the appellants can be sustained.”
42. This position was reiterated in Rohtash Kumar v. State
rt
of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 496, and it was
held that the prosecution is not bound to examine all the cited
witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid multiplicity or
plurality of witnesses. It was observed at page 442:
“Whether the prosecution must examine all the witnesses
14. A common issue that may arise in such cases where
some of the witnesses have not been examined, though thesame may be material witnesses, is whether the
prosecution is bound to examine all the listed/cited
witnesses. This Court, inAbdul Ganiv.State of M.P.[(1952) 1SCC 253: AIR 1954 SC 31: 1954 Cri LJ 323], has examined the
aforesaid issue and held that as a general rule, all
witnesses must be called upon to testify in the course of
the hearing of the prosecution, but that there is no
obligation compelling the public prosecutor to call upon all
the witnesses available who can depose regarding the facts
that the prosecution desires to prove. Ultimately, it is a
matter left to the discretion of the public prosecutor, and
though a court ought to, and no doubt would take into::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
41
2026:HHC:13274consideration the absence of witnesses whose testimony
would reasonably be expected, it must adjudge the
evidence as a whole and arrive at its conclusion
accordingly, taking into consideration the persuasiveness
of the testimony given in the light of such criticism, as.
may be levelled at the absence of possible material
witnesses.
15.InSardul Singhv.State of Bombay[AIR 1957 SC 747: 1957
Cri LJ 1325], a similar view has been reiterated, observingthat a court cannot normally compel the prosecution to
examine a witness which the prosecution does not choose
to examine, and that the duty of a fair prosecutor extendsof
only to the extent of examination of such witnesses, who
are necessary for the purpose of disclosing the story of the
prosecution with all its essentials.
16. In Masalti v.State of U.P.[AIR 1965 SC 202 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ
rt
226], this Court held that it would be unsound to lay down
as a general rule, that every witness must be examined,even though the evidence provided by such witness may
not be very material, or even if it is a known fact that the
said witness has either been won over or terrorised.
In such cases, it is always open to the defence to examinesuch witnesses as their own witnesses, and the court itself
may also call upon such a witness in the interests of
justice under Section 540 CrPC. (SCC p. 209, para 12)emphasis supplied)
(See alsoBir Singhv.State of U.P.[(1977) 4 SCC 420: 1977 SCC(Cri) 640])
17.InDarya Singhv.State of Punjab[AIR 1965 SC 328 : (1965) 1
Cri LJ 350], this Court reiterated a similar view and held
that if the eyewitness(s) is deliberately kept back, the court
may draw an inference against the prosecution and may, in
a proper case, regard the failure of the prosecutor to
examine the said witnesses as constituting a serious
infirmity in the proof of the prosecution case.
18. In Raghubir Singhv.State of U.P.[(1972) 3 SCC 79: 1972
SCC (Cri) 399: AIR 1971 SC 2156] this Court held as under:
(SCC p. 84, para 10)
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
42
2026:HHC:13274“10. … Material witnesses considered necessary by the
prosecution for unfolding the prosecution’s story alone
need to be produced without unnecessary and
redundant multiplication of witnesses. The appellant’s
counsel has not shown how the prosecution’s story is.
rendered less trustworthy as a result of the non-
production of the witnesses mentioned by him. No
material and important witness was deliberately kept
back by the prosecution. Incidentally, we may point out
that the accused, too, have not considered it proper to
produce those persons as witnesses for controverting the
prosecution version.”(emphasis added)
of
19.InHarpal Singhv.Devinder Singh[(1997) 6 SCC 660: 1997
SCC (Cri) 981: AIR 1997 SC 2914], this Court reiterated a
similar view and further observed : (SCC p. 668, para 24)
“24. … Illustration (g) in Section 114 of the Evidence Act
rt
is only a permissible inference and not a necessary
inference. Unless there are other circumstances also to
facilitate the drawing of an adverse inference, it should
not be a mechanical process to draw the adverse
inference merely on the strength of non-examination
of a witness, even if it is a material witness.”
20.InMohanlal Shamji Soniv.Union of India[1991 Supp (1)
SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595: AIR 1991 SC 1346], this Court
held: (SCC p. 277, para 10)
“10. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the
best available evidence should be brought before the
court to prove a fact or the points in issue. But it is left
either for the prosecution or for the defence to establish
its respective case by adducing the best available
evidence, and the court is not empowered under the
provisions of the Code to compel either the prosecution
or the defence to examine any particular witness or
witnesses on their side. Nonetheless, if either of the
parties withholds any evidence which could be
produced and which, if produced, be unfavourable to
the party withholding such evidence, the court can
draw a presumption under Illustration (g) to Section 114
of the Evidence Act. … In order to enable the court to
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
43
2026:HHC:13274
find out the truth and render a just decision, the
salutary provisions of Section 540 of the Code (Section
311 of the new Code) are enacted whereunder any court
by exercising its discretionary authority at any stage of
enquiry, trial or other proceeding can summon any
.
person as a witness or examine any person in
attendance though not summoned as a witness or recall
or re-examine any person in attendance though not
summoned as a witness or recall and re-examine any
person already examined who are expected to be able to
throw light upon the matter in dispute; because if
judgments happen to be rendered on inchoate,
inconclusive and speculative presentation of facts, the
of
ends of justice would be defeated.”
21. In Banti v.State of M.P.[(2004) 1 SCC 414: 2004 SCC (Cri)
294: AIR 2004 SC 261], this Court held : (SCC p. 419, paras
rt
12-14)
“12. In trials before a Court of Session, the prosecution
shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. Section 226
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 … enjoins on
him to open up his case by describing the charge
brought against the accused. He has to state what
evidence he proposes to adduce for proving the guilt of
the accused. … If that version is not in support of the
prosecution case, it would be unreasonable to insist on
the Public Prosecutor to examine those persons as
witnesses for prosecution.
13. When the case reaches the stage as envisaged in
Section 231 of the Code, the Sessions Judge is obliged ‘to
take all such evidence as may be produced in support of
the prosecution’. It is clear from the said section that
the Public Prosecutor is expected to produce evidence
‘in support of the prosecution’ and not in derogation of
the prosecution case. At the said stage, the Public
Prosecutor would be in a position to take a decision as
to which among the persons cited are to be examined. If
there are too many witnesses on the same point, the
Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some
among them alone so that the time of the court can be
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
44
2026:HHC:13274
saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual
aspects. … This will help not only the prosecution in
relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive
evidence on the same point but also help the court
considerably in lessening the workload. The time has
.
come to make every possible effort to lessen the
workload, particularly of those courts crammed with
cases, but without impairing the cause of justice.
14. … It is open to the defence to cite him and examine
him as a defence witness.”
22. The said issue was also considered by this Court in R.
Shaji[R. Shajiv.State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266: AIR 2013
of
SC 651] and the Court, after placing reliance upon its
judgments in Vadivelu Thevarv.State of Madras[AIR 1957 SC
614: 1957 Cri LJ 1000] and Kishan Chandv.State of
Haryana[(2013) 2 SCC 502: JT (2013) 1 SC 222], held as
rt
under : (SCC pp. 281-82, para 39)
“39. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of
witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the
quality of their evidence which is important, as there is
no requirement in the law of evidence stating that a
particular number of witnesses must be examined in
order to prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured
principle that evidence must be weighed and not
counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of
truth, is cogent, credible, trustworthy, or otherwise.
The legal system has laid emphasis on the value
provided by each witness, as opposed to the multiplicity
or plurality of witnesses. It is thus the quality and not
quantity which determines the adequacy of evidence, as
has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act.
Where the law requires the examination of at least one
attesting witness, it has been held that the number of
witnesses produced over and above this does not carry
any weight.”
23. Thus, the prosecution is not bound to examine all the
cited witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid
multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. The accused can also
examine the cited, but not examined, witnesses, if he so
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
45
2026:HHC:13274
desires, in his defence. It is the discretion of the prosecutor
to tender the witnesses to prove the case of the
prosecution, and “the court will not interfere with the
exercise of that discretion unless, perhaps, it can be shown
that the prosecution has been influenced by some oblique
.
motive”. In an extraordinary situation, if the court comes
to the conclusion that a material witness has been
withheld, it can draw an adverse inference against the
prosecution, as has been provided under Section 114 of the
Evidence Act. Undoubtedly, the public prosecutor must not
take the liberty to “pick and choose” his witnesses, as he
must be fair to the court and, therefore, to the truth. In a
given case, the court can always examine a witness as a
of
court witness if it is so warranted in the interests of justice.
In fact, the evidence of the witnesses must be tested on the
touchstone of reliability, credibility and trustworthiness. If
the court finds the same to be untruthful, there is no legal
rt
bar for it to discard the same.
43. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150, wherein it was
observed at page 224: –
Non-examination of the witness
34. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not
vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon thequality and not the quantity of the witnesses and their
importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation
given by the prosecution, along with the adequacy of thematerials sufficient to proceed with the trial and convict
the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if
the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened
and could well be produced by the other side in support of
its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. The onus is on
the part of the party who alleges that a witness has not
been produced deliberately to prove it.
35. The aforesaid settled principle of law has been laid
down in Sarwan Singh v.State of Punjab[Sarwan Singh v.
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
46
2026:HHC:13274
State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369: 1976 SCC (Cri) 646]: (SCC
pp. 377-78, para 13)
“13. Another circumstance which appears to have
weighed heavily with the Additional Sessions Judge was
that no independent witness of Salabatpura had been
.
examined by the prosecution to prove the prosecution
case of assault on the deceased, although the evidence
shows that there were some persons living in that
locality like the “pakodewalla”, hotelwalla, shopkeeper
and some of the passengers who had alighted at
Salabatpura with the deceased. The Additional Sessions
Judge has drawn an adverse inference against the
of
prosecution for its failure to examine any of those
witnesses. Mr Hardy has adopted this argument. In our
opinion, the comments of the Additional Sessions
Judge are based on a serious misconception of the
rt
correct legal position. The onus of proving the
prosecution’s case rests entirely on the prosecution, and it
follows as a logical corollary that the prosecution has
complete liberty to choose its witnesses if it is to prove its
case. The court cannot compel the prosecution to examine
one witness or the other as its witness. At most, if a
material witness is withheld, the court may draw an
adverse inference against the prosecution. But it is not the
law that the omission to examine any and every witness,
even on minor points, would undoubtedly lead to rejection
of the prosecution’s case or drawing of an adverse
inference against the prosecution. The law is well-settled
that the prosecution is bound to produce only such
witnesses as are essential for the unfolding of the
prosecution narrative. In other words, before an adverse
inference against the prosecution can be drawn, it must be
proved to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses
who had been withheld were eyewitnesses who had
actually seen the occurrence and were, therefore, material
to prove the case. It is not necessary for the prosecution to
multiply witnesses after witnesses on the same point; it is
the quality rather than the quantity of the evidence that
matters. In the instant case, the evidence of the
eyewitnesses does not suffer from any infirmity or any
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
47
2026:HHC:13274
manifest defect on its intrinsic merit. Secondly, there is
nothing to show that at the time when the deceased
was assaulted, a large crowd had gathered, and some of
the members of the crowd had actually seen the
occurrence and were cited as witnesses for the
.
prosecution and then withheld. We must not forget that
in our country, there is a general tendency amongst the
witnesses in mofussil to shun giving evidence in courts
because of the cumbersome and dilatory procedure of
our courts, the harassment to which they are subjected
by the police and the searching cross-examination
which they have to face before the courts. Therefore,
nobody wants to be a witness in a murder or any
of
serious offence if he can avoid it. Although the evidence
does show that four or five persons had alighted from
the bus at the time when the deceased and his
companions got down from the bus, there is no
rt
suggestion that any of those persons stayed on to
witness the occurrence. They may have proceeded to
their village homes.” (emphasis supplied)
36. This Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in
Gulam Sarbarv.State of Bihar[Gulam Sarbarv.State of Bihar,
(2014) 3 SCC 401: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 195]: (SCC pp. 410-11,
para 19)
“19. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of
witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the
quality of their evidence which is important, as there is
no requirement under the Law of Evidence that any
particular number of witnesses is to be examined to
prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle
that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The
test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is
cogent, credible, trustworthy or otherwise. The legal
system has laid emphasis on the value provided by each
witness rather than the multiplicity or plurality of
witnesses. It is quality and not quantity which
determines the adequacy of evidence, as has been
provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Even in
probate cases, where the law requires the examination
::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
48
2026:HHC:13274
of at least one attesting witness, it has been held that
the production of more witnesses does not carry any
weight. Thus, the conviction can even be based on the
testimony of a sole eyewitness if the same inspires
confidence. (Vide Vadivelu Thevarv.State of Madras
.
[Vadivelu Thevar v.State of Madras, 1957 SCR 981: AIR
1957 SC 614], Kunju v.State of T.N.[Kunjuv.State of T.N.,
(2008) 2 SCC 151 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 331], Bipin Kumar
Mondal v.State of W.B.[Bipin Kumar Mondalv.State of
W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150],
Maheshv.State of M.P.[Maheshv.State of M.P., (2011) 9
SCC 626 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 783], Prithipal Singhv.State of
Punjab[Prithipal Singhv.State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10 :
of
(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and Kishan Chandv.State of
Haryana[Kishan Chandv.State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC
502 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 807].
44.
rt
In the present case, Mohammed Islam was given up
as having been won over, and no adverse inference can be drawn
for his non-examination.
45. It was submitted that the police had conducted the
personal search of the accused without complying with the
requirements of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Hence, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal. This submission cannot be accepted. No
recovery of any narcotics was found during the personal search.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjan Kumar
Chadha v. State of H.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1262: AIR 2023 SC 5164,
that where the recovery was effected from the backpack being
carried by the accused, and not from the personal search, there is
no requirement to comply with the provision of Section 50 of the
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49
2026:HHC:13274
NDPS Act. This position was reiterated in Firdoskhan
Khurshidkhan v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 680, wherein
it was observed:
.
“19. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the
appellants that the search and seizure proceedings are
vitiated on account of the non-compliance of Section 50 of
the NDPS Act is concerned, the same is also noted to berejected because admittedly, the seizure in this case was
not effected during the personal search of the appellant
Anwar Khan(A-1). Admittedly, the contraband was beingof
carried in a polythene bag held by the appellant Anwar
Khan(A-1) in his hand, and hence, there was no
requirement for the Seizure Officer to have acted under the
provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act before
rt
conducting the search and seizure proceedings.”
46. Hence, the submission that the prosecution case is to
be discarded due to the non-compliance of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act is not acceptable.
47. The prosecution’s witnesses consistently deposed
about the recovery. There is nothing in their cross-examination
to discard their testimonies. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 5 SCC
646: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 680: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 207, that the
testimonies of the police officials cannot be ignored because they
are police officials. It was observed at page 656:
“21. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant that recovery has not been proved by any
independent witness is of no substance for the reason that,::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
50
2026:HHC:13274in the absence of an independent witness to support the
recovery, in substance cannot be ignored unless proved to
the contrary. There is no such legal proposition that the
evidence of police officials, unless supported by an
independent witness, is unworthy of acceptance or that.
the evidence of police officials can be outrightly
disregarded.”
48. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus
State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police
officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to
of
the police force. It was observed:
“11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole
rt
testimony of the police official, which, if otherwise is
reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by
other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only onthe ground that he is a police official and may be
interested in the success of the case. There is also no rule
of law that lays down that no conviction can be recorded
on the testimony of a police officer, even if such evidenceis otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may
require more scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the
evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspiresconfidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it
can form the basis of conviction, and the absence of someindependent witness of the locality does not in any way
affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution’s case. No
infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officersmerely because they belong to the police force.”
49. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State,
AIR 2003 S.C. 3011, wherein it was held:
“The testimony of police personnel should be treated in
the same manner as the testimony of any other witness,
and there is no principle of law that, without::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
51
2026:HHC:13274corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony
cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts
honestly applies as much in favour of police personnel as
of other persons, and it is not a proper judicial approach to
distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all.
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and
no principle of general application can be laid down.”
(Emphasis supplied)
50. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of
Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed:
of
22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police
officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In
other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of
such a police officer is found to be reliable and
rt
trustworthy, then basing the conviction thereupon cannot
be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground.
This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
2013 (6) SCC 588after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil
Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248]
and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007)
2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri
Lal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR 2013 SCW
3102] that there is no absolute command of law that the
police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their
testimony should always be treated with suspicion.
Ordinarily, the public at large shows its disinclination to
come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the
police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the
court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of
scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of
the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the
court may disbelieve him, but it should not do so solely on
the presumption that a witness from the police
department should be viewed with distrust. This is also
based on the principle that the quality of the evidence
outweighs the quantity of evidence.
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52
2026:HHC:13274
23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001
(1) SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6
SCC 674, this court held that: —
“23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution
cannot be rejected solely on the ground that.
independent witnesses have not been examined
when, on the perusal of the evidence on record,
the Court finds that the case put forth by the
prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence ofthe official witnesses is trustworthy and credible,
there is no reason not to rest the conviction on
the basis of their evidence.”
of
24. We must note that in the former it was observed: —
“21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are
untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the
rt presumption should be the other way around.
That official acts of the police have been
regularly performed is a wise principle of
presumption and recognised even by the
legislature… If the court has any good reason to
suspect the truthfulness of such records of thepolice, the court could certainly take into account
the fact that no other independent person was
present at the time of recovery. But it is not alegally approvable procedure to presume the
police action as unreliable to start with, nor tojettison such action merely for the reason that
police did not collect signatures of independent
persons in the documents madecontemporaneous with such actions.”
25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of
Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the
testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out
memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of
independent witnesses.
26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as
reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official
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53
2026:HHC:13274
witnesses cannot be discarded simply because
independent witnesses were not examined. The
correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any
good reason”, which, quite apparently, is missing from
the present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the
.
Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies of
PW-1 and PW-2, which the courts below have found
absolutely to be inspiring in confidence. Therefore, basing
the conviction on the basis of testimony of the police
witnesses as undertaken by the trial court and confirmed
by the High Court vide the impugned judgment, cannot be
faulted with.”
of
51. Learned Trial Court had accepted the testimonies of
police officials as correct. Nothing was shown to this Court that
rt
these findings are incorrect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) SCC
Online SC 69 that the Appellate Court should not interfere with
the findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses recorded
by the learned Trial Court unless there is some illegality in it. It
was observed: –
“83. The trial court, after recording the testimony of the
PW-10, and on consideration of the same, found her
evidence trustworthy and credible. We see no reason toquestion the assessment of the credibility of the witness
by the Trial Court, which had the advantage of seeing and
hearing the witness and all other witnesses. Nothing has
been brought to our notice of any serious illegality or
breach of fundamental law to warrant taking a different
view of the evidence of PW-10.
In this regard, we may keep in mind the valuable
observations made by this Court in Jagdish::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
54
2026:HHC:13274Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, in the following
words:
“28. At the same time, however, the appellate court
is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding
recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should.
not be forgotten that the trial court had an
advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour
of witnesses and, hence, the trial court’s
conclusions should not normally be disturbed. Nodoubt, the appellate court possesses the same
powers as the original court, but they have to be
exercised with proper care, caution andof
circumspection. When a finding of fact has been
recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of
oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed
rtunless the approach of the trial court in the
appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-
established principles of law or unreasonable.
29. …………………………………..
30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48)
75 IA 252: AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council, after referring to relevant
decisions on the point, stated [Quoting from
Watt v. Thomas, [1947] 1 All ER 582, pp. 583 H-584A.]: (IA p. 255)
“…but if the evidence as a whole can reasonablybe regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived
at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion
has been arrived at on conflicting testimony bya tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses,
the appellate court will bear in mind that it has
not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view
of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is
entitled to great weight. This is not to say that
the Judge of the first instance can be treated as
infallible in determining which side is telling
the truth or is refraining from exaggeration.
Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
55
2026:HHC:13274question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance
that a Judge of first instance, when estimating
the value of verbal testimony, has the
advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal)
of having the witnesses before him and.
observing how their evidence is given.”
52. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly
accepted the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
53. SI Jawahar Singh (PW-12) stated that he had
of
deposited the case property in the police station. His statement is
duly corroborated by HC Kunwar Singh (PW-4), who stated that
rt
SI Jawhar Singh (PW-12) had deposited the case property with
him, he made an entry in the register of Malkhana at Sl. No. 312
(Ext.PW-4/A) and deposited the case property in the Malkhana.
His statement is corroborated by the entry made by him in the
register of Malkhana. He further stated that he had sent the case
property and other articles to SFSL Junga through Constable
Subhash Chand (PW-5). Constable Subhash Chand (PW-5) stated
that MHC Kunwar Singh (PW-4) had handed over the sealed
parcel sealed with seal ‘T’, NCB-I form and sample seal to him.
He delivered all these articles at SFSL Junga and handed over the
receipt to MHC on his return. He stated in his cross-examination
that he had visited SFSL Junga on .22.02.2012 at 10:30 a.m. and
had stayed in the police Post Junga, during the night.
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2026:HHC:13274
54. The statements of these witnesses are corroborated
by the statement of Dr Kapil Sharma (PW-3), who stated that one
cloth parcel was received in the laboratory through Constable
.
Subhash Chand (PW-5). The seals were found intact and tallied
with the specimen seal sent by the forwarding authority and the
seal impression impressed on the NCB-I form. He was not cross-
examined regarding this part of his testimony, but was cross-
of
examined regarding the contents of his report related to the
analysis; therefore, it was duly proved on record that the sample
rt
seals were intact when the case property was received in SFSL
Junga. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707,
where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, and
the prosecution’s case that the case property remained intact is
to be accepted as correct. It was observed:
“A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows
that the samples were received by the expert in a safe
manner, and the sample seal was separately sent and
tallied with the specimen impression of a seal takenseparately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal,
and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent
to the expert also.”
55. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of
Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held:
“It has also come on evidence that till the date the parcels
of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner,::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
57
2026:HHC:13274the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself
proves and establishes that there was no tampering with
the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage,
and the sample received by the analyst for chemical
examination contained the same opium, which was.
recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that
view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending
the samples did not and could not have caused any
prejudice to the appellant.”
56. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC
402, the High Court had concluded that there could have been
of
tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven
days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
rt
Supreme Court that case property was produced in the Court, and
there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be
intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was
observed:
“The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that
the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained
poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized aftertaking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. The
defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid
seizure and seal put in the samples were in any mannertampered with before it was examined by the Chemical
Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in
sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is
not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has
affected the said examination, when it could not be proved
that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered
with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the
examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact
having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
58
2026:HHC:13274the High Court that the case property might have been
tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and
conjectures and cannot take the place of proof.
17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in
Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557.
in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the
sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the
said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and
reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed andthat the samples were intact till they were handed over to
the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not
fatal to the prosecution’s case. In our considered opinion,of
the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the
facts of the present case in this regard.
18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there
is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered
rt
with.”
57. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563, wherein it
was held:-
“10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant,
Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3),handed over the case property for producing the same
before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same tohim after such production was not examined, as such link
evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed
that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property toJoginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After
producing the case property before the Court, he returned
the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals
intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was
not in possession of the seals of either the investigating
officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property
before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13.
The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after
verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
59
2026:HHC:13274Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial
malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be
kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till
further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in
possession of the seals of either the SHO or the.
Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the
case property by him did not arise at all.
11. Further, he has returned the case property, after
production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, withthe seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the
matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly
held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not,of
in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is
evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10,
that the sample was received with seals intact and that the
seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view
rt
of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.”
(Emphasis supplied)
58. Therefore, the prosecution’s version is to be accepted
as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis
at FSL, Junga.
59. The report of the analysis mentions that the Spasmo-
Proxyvon contained the sample of Dextropropoxyphene
Napsylate and Rexcof contained codeine phosphate. Thus, it was
duly proved that the capsules recovered on the spot contained
Dextropropoxyphene Napsylate and the bottles of Rexcof
contained codeine Phosphate, which are prohibited drugs under
the NDPS Act. Therefore, the Ld. The Trial Court had rightly held
that the accused was found in possession of narcotic drugs and
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2026:HHC:13274
had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an
offence punishable under section 22(b) of the NDPS Act.
60. It was submitted that the case property was not
.
resealed, and this is fatal to the prosecution’s case. This
submission cannot be accepted. The recovery was made by
SI/Additional SHO Jawhar Singh, and if he thought that, being an
SHO, he was not supposed to comply with the requirement of
of
Section 55, he cannot be faulted. It was laid down by this Court in
Prem Bahadur Vs State of H.P., 2009 (1) Shim. L.C. 65, that the
rt
provisions of Sections 52 and 55 are not mandatory and
directory. When the investigating officer was the SHO, and he
had not resealed the case property, believing that, since he was
the SHO and there was no such requirement, it was not sufficient
to acquit the accused. It was observed:-
“12. From a perusal of the aforesaid two judgments, it is
apparent that the provisions of Sections 52 and 55 are not
mandatory but only directory. If there is substantial
compliance with the same, the accused cannot beacquitted. If there are sufficient reasons for non-
compliance with the Sections, then the accused cannot
claim the benefit of acquittal under these provisions. At
best, the Court may have to scrutinise the prosecution’s
evidence with greater care and caution.
13. In the present case, the recovery of the Charas has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot lose sight of
the fact that the investigating officer, PW6, was also the
SHO of the Police Station, Manali. He presumed that he::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
61
2026:HHC:13274was in charge of the police station and, therefore, the
provisions of Sections 52 and 55 were not applicable to
him. At best, it can be presumed that when he was the
investigating officer, some other police officer must be
deemed to be in charge of the police station. At best, we.
can presume that MHC Khem Chand (PW 2) was in charge
of the police station. However, even if we presume that
MHC Khem Chand (PW 2) was the in-charge of the police
station, then the mere non-compliance of Sections 52 and55 by not putting the seal on the sample would not by
itself be a ground to acquit the accused.”
61. It was submitted that there is a violation of a
of
provision of Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act, which is mandatory.
This submission will not help the accused. A perusal of the
rt
impugned judgment shows that no samples were drawn in the
present case, and the whole bulk was sent to FSL. It was laid
down by this Court in Narayan Singh v. State of H.P. 2023 HHC 9715
that the provision of Section 52-A will not apply when the
samples were not drawn, and the entire contraband was sent to
the FSL for analysis. It was observed:-
19. After going through the aforesaid judgments, we are of
the considered view that the same does not apply to thefacts of the instant case. It would be noticed that in all the
earlier judgments, the Hon’ble Court was dealing with
cases where samples had been drawn from the bulk and
then samples had been sent for chemical analysis, and the
residue or bulk sample remained with the investigating
agency. However, this is not the fact of the obtaining
situation in the instant case. Here, the entire contraband
had been sent for chemical analysis, that to be done on the
very next date of its recovery. In such circumstances, there::: Downloaded on – 25/04/2026 10:06:01 :::CIS
62
2026:HHC:13274could be no better and primary evidence for the purpose of
the trial.
62. Similarly, it was laid down in Sandeep Kumar Vs State
of H.P., 2022 Law Suits (HP) 149, that the provisions of Section
.
52-A are not mandatory and non-compliance with Section 52-A
is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed:-
“24. It has also been strenuously argued on behalf of the
appellants that the investigating agency had failed toof
comply with the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS
Act and thus cast a shadow of doubt on its story. The
contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the
rules framed for investigations under the NDPS Act are
rt
mandatory and have to be strictly followed. Neither the
required sample was taken on the spot nor were the
samples preserved by complying with Section 52-A of theAct. It has been argued that compliance with Section 52-A
of the Act is mandatory…..
xxxxxx
27. The precedent relied upon on behalf of the appellants,
however, did not lay down the law that non-compliance
with Section 52-A of the Act is fatal to the prosecution’scase under the NDPS Act. On the other hand, in State of
Punjab vs. Makhan Chand, 2004 (3) SCC 453, the Hon’bleSupreme Court, while dealing with the question of the
effect of non-compliance of Section 52-A, has held as
under: –
10. This contention, too, has no substance for two
reasons. Firstly, Section 52A, as the marginal note
indicates, deals with the “disposal of seized narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances”. Under Sub-
section (1), the Central Government, by notification
in the Official Gazette, is empowered to specify
certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability
to theft, substitution, constraints of proper storage
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space and such other relevant considerations, so
that even if they are material objects seized in a
criminal case, they could be disposed of after
following the procedure prescribed in Sub-sections
(2) & (3). If the procedure prescribed in Sub-
.
sections (2) & (3) of Section 52A is complied with
and upon an application, the Magistrate issues the
certificate contemplated by Subsection (2), then
Sub-section (4) provides that, notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 or the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, such inventory, photographs of
narcotic drugs or substances and any list of samples
of
drawn under Sub-section (2) of Section 52A as
certified by the Magistrate, would be treated as
primary evidence in respect of the offence.
Therefore, Section 52A(1) does not empower the
rt
Central Government to lay down the procedure for
the search of an accused but only deals with the
disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances.
11. Secondly, when the very same standing orders
came up for consideration in Khet Singh v. Union of
India, 2002 (4) SCC 380, this Court took the view that
they were merely intended to guide the officers to
see that a fair procedure is adopted by the Officer-
in-Charge of the investigation. It was also held that
they were not inexorable rules, as there could be
circumstances in which it may not be possible for
the seizing officer to prepare the mahazar at the
spot if it is a chance recovery, where the officer may
not have the facility to prepare the seizure mahazar
at the spot itself. Hence, we do not find any
substance in this contention.”
63. It was laid down in Bharat Aambale v. State of
Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 110, that non-compliance with
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Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act does not vitiate the trial. It was
observed:
“50. We summarise our conclusion as under:–
.
(I) Although Section 52A is primarily for the
disposal and destruction of seized contraband in a
safe manner yet it extends beyond the immediate
context of drug disposal, as it serves a broaderpurpose of also introducing procedural safeguards
in the treatment of narcotics substance after seizure
inasmuch as it provides for the preparation ofof
inventories, taking of photographs of the seized
substances and drawing samples therefrom in the
presence and with the certification of a magistrate.
rtMere drawing of samples in the presence of a
gazetted officer would not constitute sufficient
compliance with the mandate under Section 52A
sub-section (2) of the NDPS Act.
(II) Although there is no mandate that the drawing
of samples from the seized substance must take
place at the time of seizure as held
in Mohanlal (supra), yet we are of the opinion that
the process of inventorying, photographing and
drawing samples of the seized substance shall as far
as possible, take place in the presence of the
accused, though the same may not be done at the
very spot of seizure.
(III) Any inventory, photographs or samples of
seized substance prepared in substantial compliance
of the procedure prescribed under Section 52A of the
NDPS Act and the Rules/Standing Order(s)
thereunder would have to be mandatorily treated as
primary evidence as per Section 52A subsection (4)
of the NDPS Act, irrespective of whether the
substance in the original is actually produced before
the court or not.
(IV) The procedure prescribed by the Standing
Order(s)/Rules in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS
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2026:HHC:13274
Act is only intended to guide the officers and to see
that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer in
charge of the investigation, and as such, what is
required is substantial compliance with the
procedure laid therein.
.
(V) Mere non-compliance of the procedure under
Section 52A or the Standing Order(s)/Rules
thereunder will not be fatal to the trial unless there
are discrepancies in the physical evidence rendering
the prosecution’s case doubtful, which may not have
been there had such compliance been done. Courts
should take a holistic and cumulative view of the
of
discrepancies that may exist in the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and appreciate the same
more carefully, keeping in mind the procedural
lapses.
rt
(VI) If the other material on record adduced by the
prosecution, oral or documentary inspires
confidence and satisfies the court as regards the
recovery as well as conscious possession of the
contraband from the accused persons, then even in
such cases, the courts can without hesitation
proceed to hold the accused guilty notwithstanding
any procedural defect in terms of Section 52A of
the NDPS Act.
(VII) Non-compliance or delayed compliance of the
said provision or rules thereunder may lead the
court to draw an adverse inference against the
prosecution; however, no hard and fast rule can be
laid down as to when such inference may be drawn,
and it would all depend on the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case.
(VIII) Where there has been a lapse on the part of
the police in either following the procedure laid
down in Section 52A of the NDPS Actor the
prosecution in proving the same, it will not be
appropriate for the court to resort to the statutory
presumption of commission of an offence from the
possession of illicit material under Section 54 of
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the NDPS Act, unless the court is otherwise satisfied
as regards the seizure or recovery of such material
from the accused persons from the other material
on record.
(IX) The initial burden will lie on the accused to first
.
lay the foundational facts to show that there was
non-compliance of Section 52A, either by leading
evidence of its own or by relying upon the evidence
of the prosecution, and the standard required would
only be preponderance of probabilities.
(X) Once the foundational facts laid indicate non-
compliance of Section 52A of the NDPS Act, the onus
of
would thereafter be on the prosecution to prove by
cogent evidence that either (i) there was substantial
compliance with the mandate of Section 52A of
rtthe NDPS Act OR (ii) satisfy the court that such non-
compliance does not affect its case against the
accused, and the standard of proof required would
be beyond a reasonable doubt.
64. Therefore, the non-compliance of Section 52-A of the
ND&PS Act will not make any difference to the present case.
65 The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of
₹20,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further
imprisonment for six months, which cannot be said to be
excessive considering the quantity of narcotics found in
possession of the accused.
66 No other point was urged.
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67. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is
dismissed.
68. Record of learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith
.
along with a copy of the judgment. Pending applications, if any,
also stand disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
of
Judge
24th April, 2022
(ravinder)
rt
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