11Th March vs Of on 11 March, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Decided On: 11Th March vs Of on 11 March, 2026

                                            2026:HHC:6970




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
    .



                                                          CWPOA No.2181 of 2019
                                     Decided on: 11th March, 2026




                                                                            .
    ___________________________________________________________________





    Prakash Chand (deceased) through
    his LRs Arun Kumar and others                                          ...Petitioners





                                              Versus




                                                 of
    State of Himachal Pradesh and others              ...Respondents
    _____________________________________________________________________
    Coram
    Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge

rt
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes
For the petitioners: Mr. Surender Sharma, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Hemant Kumar Verma, Deputy
Advocate General.

Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge (Oral)

By way of the present petition, the original

petitioner Prakash Chand, who expired on 25.11.2021 and

substituted by his Legal heirs, (for short “petitioner) has prayed

for the following substantive reliefs:-

“(i) That the respondents may kindly be directed to
grant the petitioner three ACP increments, on
completion of his 4-9-2014 years of regular services
as JBT Teacher and to pay the arrears and other
allowances along with interest @12% per annum;

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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(ii) That the respondents may kindly be directed to
pay the salary for a period of 68 days during which
the services of the petitioner remained terminated by
the regularizing the period of termination;”

.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the key facts of the

case are that the petitioner vide office order dated 14.02.1992

(Annexure P/A) was appointed as Volunteer Teacher (Primary) in

of
Government Primary School Simbal. In sequel to said office

order, he joined duties on 03.03.1992 as claimed in letter dated
rt
10.08.2012 (Annexure P/E).

3. Feeling aggrieved by the appointment of the

petitioner as Volunteer Teacher, one Smt. Meeran Devi (wrongly

mentioned as Meera Devi), who also participated in the

selection process, had preferred Original Application before the

Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, which was

registered as O.A. No.816 of 1993.

4. It has been mentioned in the petition that another

Original Application preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi (wrongly

mentioned as Meera Devi) against appointment of one Sh.

Pardhan Singh, was registered as O.A. No.431 of 1992. In this

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Original application, Sh. Pardhan Singh was offered

appointment in Government Primary School Chobhu (Baijnath

.

Block).

5. The Original Application filed by Smt. Meeran Devi

against the selection of the petitioner as Volunteer Teacher

(Primary remained pending before the Tribunal, but in the

of
meantime, the services of the petitioner were regularized as

Junior Basic Teacher w.e.f. 01.08.1998. After regularizing the
rt
services of the petitioner as JBT, the original application

preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi was decided on 29.07.2004

(Annexure R-I) by the Tribunal holding that selection of private

respondent i.e. the petitioner was not the result of fair play,

rather the procedure adopted by the respondents-State vitiates

and the selection smacks of malafides. Consequently, the

selection proceedings appointing the petitioner as Volunteer

Teacher (Primary) vide Annexure A-5 appended with the original

application were quashed and respondents-State were given

liberty to hold the interview afresh for the post of Volunteer

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Teacher in Government Primary School, Simbal, within a period

of four months.

.

6. Despite categorical directions given by the Court to

hold the interview afresh for the post of Volunteer Teacher in

Government Primary School, Simbal within a period of four

months, the authorities of the respondents-State did not take

of
any action, however, later on services of the petitioner were

terminated on 21.02.2005. After termination, the petitioner had
rt
filed writ petition bearing CWP No.181 of 2005, titled, Parkash

Chand vs. State of H.P. and others, before this Court, laying

challenge to the order dated 29.07.2004, passed by the Tribunal

and also the order of termination of his services dated

21.02.2005 and this Court vide order dated 21.04.2005

(Annexure P/C) stayed the order of termination of the

petitioner.

7. Subsequently, vide judgment dated 26.03.2007, in

CWP No.181 of 2005, the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court

had set aside the judgment passed by the Tribunal in O.A.

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No.816 of 1993 and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for

decision afresh on merits after hearing the parties (Annexure R-

.

II). However, the said petition could not be decided by the

Tribunal after remand, as the petition was transferred to this

Court on abolition of the Tribunal and registered as CWP(T)

No.2134 of 2008, titled, Meeran Devi vs. State of H.P. and

of
others.

8. The petition instituted by Smt. Meeran Devi was
rt
dismissed on 09.05.2011 by the learned Single Judge of this

Court. Smt. Meeran Devi feeling aggrieved by the judgment

dated 09.05.2011 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court

had preferred LPA No.455 of 2011, titled, Meeran Devi vs. State

of H.P. and others, and the same was dismissed on 27.03.2014.

9. The petitioner by way of the present petition had

claimed that he was entitled to 3 ACP increments on completion

of his 4, 9 and 14 years of regular services as JBT as well as that

he may be paid the salary for a period of 68 days during which

period he remained out of job on account of termination order

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passed against him, since the termination order was quashed

by this Court and the writ petition filed by Smt. Meeran Devi

.

against his selection as Volunteer Teacher was dismissed by

this Court.

10. The respondents-State filed reply to the writ petition

and contested the same on the ground that the grant of ACP

of
increment to the petitioner could not be decided on account of

the fact that the matter remained pending before this Court due
rt
to which termination period remained undecided and further

the plea raised by the petitioner that he is entitled to salary for a

period of 68 days during which his services remained

terminated, is not sustainable, because the period for which the

petitioner has not worked cannot be counted for the purpose of

salary on the principle of “No Work No Pay”. The respondents

have not disputed that services of the petitioner were

regularized w.e.f. 01.08.1998 and also the order of termination

was set aside by this Court.

11. The petitioner filed rejoinder to the reply and

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controverted the facts and reiterated the facts narrated in the

petition. It has also been averred that once the petitioner was

.

reinstated by virtue of the orders passed by this Court, the

period during which he remained out of job, is to be regularized

for all intents and purposes.

12. I have heard Mr. Surender Sharma, learned counsel

of
for the petitioners and Mr. Hemant Kumar Verma, learned

Deputy Advocate General, for the respondents-State and also
rt
perused the record carefully.

13. It is not in dispute that petitioner’s services were

regularized on 01.08.1998 on the post of JBT and the order of

termination was set aside by this Court. It is also not in dispute

that the petition preferred by one Smt. Meeran Devi against the

appointment of the petitioner though was initially allowed by

the Tribunal on 29.07.2004, but subsequently, the same was

dismissed by this Court on 09.05.2011 (Annexure P/D).

14. The appeal preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi was also

dismissed by this Court on 27.03.2014 (Annexure R-III).

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15. No doubt, the petitioner had remained out of

service on account of termination order passed against him by

.

the authorities after the decision on the original application on

29.07.2004, but subsequently the said order was quashed by

this Court vide judgment dated 26.03.2007 when the Court had

returned specific findings that the Tribunal had wrongly noticed

of
the facts of some other case while quashing the appointment of

the petitioner and thereafter also this Court had dismissed the
rt
petition and LPA preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi respectively on

09.05.2011 and 27.03.2014.

16. The respondents have not denied the entitlement of

the petitioner for grant of ACP, but the plea which has been

taken is only to the effect that the matter remained pending

before this Court due to which termination period remained

undecided and the petitioner could not be extended the benefit

of ACP increments. Since the respondents have not disputed the

fact that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit claimed in the

writ petition, the same could have been extended to him after

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dismissal of the LPA preferred by Smt. Meeran Devi on

27.03.2014 and thus, the action on the part of the respondents-

.

State is illegal and wrong.

17. Another plea, taken for the non-grant of the salary

qua the period during which the petitioner remained out of job

is that he did not work during that period and, therefore, on the

of
principle of “No Work No Pay”, he is not entitled to the salary.

18. It is a settled law that if there is no fault on the part
rt
of an employee and further once the termination is held to be

illegal, the natural corollary would be to grant him the salary of

the period of his absence. The petitioner could not perform the

duties only for the reason that he was not permitted to perform

his duties.

19. In the present case, it was not the petitioner who

had approached this Court as evident from the facts stated

above. His appointment was assailed by a candidate, who

remained unsuccessful in the selection process and the Tribunal

had though quashed the appointment of the petitioner, but this

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Court had subsequently dismissed the writ petition preferred by

the unsuccessful candidate and thus, the petitioner was entitled

.

to all the benefits, which were to be given to him, had said

unsuccessful candidate not approached the Court.

20. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Court had the

occasion to deal similar proposition in M/s Hindustan Tin Works

of
Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt.

Ltd. And others, (1979) 2 SCC 80, wherein it was held that full
rt
back wages would be normal rule and the party objecting to it

must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. The

relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as hereunder:-

“9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of
industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given

that the termination of service is bad and the

workman continues to be in service. The spectre of
com-mon law doctrine that contract of personal
service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine

of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this
branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with
continuity of service can be granted where
termination of service is found to be invalid. It would
mean that the employer has taken away illegally the
right to work and simultaneously deprived the
workman of his earnings. If thus the of the workman
contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract

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employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of
which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the
employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying
the wages which the workman has been deprived of

.

by the illegal or invalid action of the employer.

Speaking realistically, where termination of service is
questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has
to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to

sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is
itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive
to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our

of
system where the law’s proverbial delay has become
stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy
consuming litigation during which period the
workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be
rt
told that though he will be reinstated, he will be
denied the back wages which would be due to him,

the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty
for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved.
Ordinarily, therefore, a work-man whose service has

been illegally terminated would be entitled to full
back wages except to the extent he was gainfully
employed during the enforced idleness. That is the

normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on
the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If

the employer terminates the service illegally and the
termination is motivated as in this case, viz., to resist
the workmen’s demand for revision of wages, the

termination may well amount to unfair labour
practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being
the normal rule, it should be followed with full back
wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would
assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect.
By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U. P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavoured to
secure work to the workmen. In breach of the

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statutory obligation the services were terminated and
the termination is found to be invalid; the workmen
though willing to do the assigned work and earn their
livelihood, were kept away therefrom. On top of it

.

they were forced to litigation up to the apex Court

now they are being told that some-thing less than full
back wages should be awarded to them. If the
services were not terminated the workmen ordinarily

would have continued to work and would have
earned their wages. When it was held that the
termination of services was neither proper nor

of
justified, it would not only show that the workmen
were always willing to serve but if they rendered
service they would legitimately be entitled to the
wages for the same. If the workmen were always
rt
ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on
account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no

justification for not awarding due to them. sion
Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram
Panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal, and a Division

Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Postal Seals
Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court II,
Lucknow, have taken this view and we are of the

opinion that the view taken therein is correct.

10. The view taken by us gets support from the

decision of this Court in Workmen v. Calcutta Dock
Labour Board. In this case seven workmen had been
detained under the Defence of India Rules and one of

the disputes was that when they were released and
reported for duty, they were not taken in service and
the demand was for their reinstatement. The tribunal
directed reinstatement of five out of seven workmen
and this part of the award was challenged before this
Court. This Court held that the workmen concerned
did not have any opportunity of explaining why their
services should not be terminated and, therefore,

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reinstatement was heid to be the appropriate relief,
and set aside the order of the Tribunal. It was
observed that there was no justification for not
awarding full back wages from the day they offered

.

to resume work till their reinstatement. Almost an

identical view was taken in Management of Panitole
Tea Estate v. Workmen.

11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a

strait-jacket formula for awarding relief of back
wages. All relevant considerations will enter the
verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed

of
to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages
would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it
must establish the circumstances necessitating
departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its
rt discretion keeping in view all the relevant
circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised

in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for
exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing
and must appear on the face of the record. When it is

said that something is to be done within the
discretion of the authority, that something is to be
done according to the rules of reason and justice,

according to law and not humour. It is not to be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular

(see Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield).”

21. The similar view had again been reiteratedby the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Kumar Verma and others

versus Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour

Court, New Delhi and another, (1980) 4 SCC 443, holding that

only in exceptional circumstances reinstatement can be avoided

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with full back wages. The relevant paragraph of this judgment is

reproduced as under:-

.

“6. We do not propose to refer to the cases arising

under Sections 33 and 33-A of the Industrial Disputes
Act or to cases arising out of references under
Sections 10 and 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Nor do we propose to termination of the services of a
workman in violation of the provisions of engage
ourselves in the unfruitful task of answering the

of
question whether the Section 25-F is void ab initio or
merely invalid and inoperative, even if it is possible to
discover some razor’s edge distinction between the
Latin ‘void ab initio’ and the Anglo-Saxon ‘invalid and
rt inoperative’. Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the
interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statutes. Welfare

statutes must, of necessity receive a broad
interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give
relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is

not to make inroads by making etymological
excursions. Void ab initio’, ‘invalid and inoperative’ or
call it what you will, the workmen and the employer

are primarily concerned with the consequence of
striking down the order of termination of the services

of the workmen. Plain common sense dictates that
the removal of an order terminating the services of
workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of

the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has
never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back
wages too. But there may be exceptional
circumstances which make it impossible or wholly
inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to
direct reinstatement with full back wages. For
instance, the industry might have closed down or
might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen

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15

concerned might have secured better or other
employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations,
there is a vestige of discretion left in the court to
make appropriate consequential orders. The court

.

may deny the relief of reinstatement where

reinstatement is impossible because the industry has
closed down. The court may deny the relief of award
of full back back wages where that would place an

impossible burden on the employer. In such and
other exceptional cases the court may mould the
relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be

of
reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must
be awarded where no special impediment in the way
of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True,
occasional hardship may be caused to an employer
rt but we must remember that, more often than not,
comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be

caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to
the employer if the relief is granted.”

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had again reiterated the

same view in Pawan Kumar Agarwala vs. General Manager-II &

Appointing Auth. State Bank of India and others, (2015) 13

SCALE 45, and had come to the conclusion that the view taken

in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. versus K.P. Agrawal and another, (2007) 2

SCC 433, that on reinstatement, the employee/workman cannot

claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of

the judgments in M/s Hindustan Tin Works case (supra), and

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Surendra Kumar‘s case (Supra) cannot be treated as good law.

The relavant para of the judgment is reproduced as hereunder:

.

“19. Further, the learned Single Judge has examined

the opinion sought for from the C.V.O. by the
disciplinary authority on the penalty to be imposed
upon the appellant, the C.V.O. has suggested the

major penalty of removal, the same is inconsistent
with the norms applicable in the Bank’s disciplinary
proceedings. The learned Single Judge examined the

of
action of the disciplinary authority in relation to the
Branch Manager Hallydayganj Branch that
facilitating the second loan to the loanee, Mr. Tapan
Kumar Sangma, closely known to the said Manager,
rt the same allegation has been treated as a minor
lapse, but in the context of the appellant they have

imposed major penalty, which is a clear case of
discrimination. The appellant’s admission with regard
to writing the loan applications of Abdul Kuddus

Mondal and Hasanuzzaman to enable them to avail
contract finance from the Hallydayganj Branch, the
contention urged on behalf of the appellant is

examined and held that the said applicants had
availed loans to the extent of 10,000/-and 15,000/-

respectively from the Phulbari Branch of the S.B.I.,
projecting that minimal loss and both the loans were
cleared of, assuming that the disciplinary

proceedings were just and fair, learned senior
counsel for the appellant argued that the minor
punishment proposed by the disciplinary authority of
pay reduction should have been considered
reasonable in the context of the charges. The learned
Single Judge, after considering the opinion/report
DEX-4, held that the enquiry officer did not base his
conclusion on any incriminatory materials and in fact

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the report DEX-4 was totally ignored which would
have established the innocence of the delinquent and
further held that the enquiry officer conducted the
enquiry sans furnishing the copies of crucial

.

documents and furnishing the list of witnesses. It

appears to be a case of denial of fair opportunity to
the delinquent in gross violation of the procedural
requirements of the Service Rules. That finding is

based on factual, undisputed facts and in conformity
with Single Judge has rightly held that the enquiry the
law, therefore, in our opinion, the learned conducted

of
against the appellant was unfair and the findings
recorded on the charges are finding the learned
Single Judge has also perverse in law. While recording
such a proceeded to hold that the enquiry was found
rt
to be vitiated for the reason that the then Branch
Manager Mr. Pradeep Kumar Das of Hallydaygani

Branch was never examined in the enquiry and
without his evidence, conclusion on culpability of the
delinquent on the loans disbursed by the Branch

Manager of Hallydayganj to the loanee could not
have been reasonably reached by anyone, including
the enquiry officer and imposing major penalty on

the basis of the C.V.O. without there being any legal
evidence on record, the enquiry was not properly

conducted due to non-furnishing the list of witnesses
and copies of the documents, therefore, the exercise
of power on the basis of the C.V.O.’s opinion for

removal of the appellant from service entail serious
consequences. Therefore, placing reliance on K.P.
Narayanan Kutty (supra), the learned Single Judge
held that the action taken in accepting the C.V.O.’s
view and passing order of removal is arbitrary,
unreasonable and gross violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Having said so, the learned
Single Judge has set aside the order of removal and

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granted reinstatement of the appellant with 25%
back wages in the absence of any proof to show that
he was gainfully employed from the date of order of
removal till the date of the decision rendered by the

.

learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the

High Court, therefore, the same is contrary to the law
laid down by this Court in the case of Deepali Gundu
Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya

(D. ED.) & Ors., (2013) 10 SCC 324, para 38 is quoted
hereinunder:

“38. The propositions which can be culled out

of
from the aforementioned judgments are:

i) In cases of wrongful termination of service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back
wages is the normal rule.

rtii) The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that
while deciding the issue of back wages, the

adjudicating authority or the Court may take into
consideration the length of service of the
employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if

any, found proved against the
employee/workman, the financial condition of the
employer and similar other factors.

iii) Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose
services are terminated and who is desirous of

getting back wages is required to either plead or
at least make a statement before the adjudicating
authority or the Court of first instance that he/she

was not gainfully employed or was employed on
lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid
payment of full back wages, then it has to plead
and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the
employee/workman was gainfully employed and
was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was
drawing prior to the termination of service. This is
so because it is settled law that the burden of

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19

proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on
the person who makes a positive averments about
its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive
fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once

.

the employee shows that he was not employed,

the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead
and prove that the employee was gainfully
employed and was getting the same or

substantially similar emoluments.

iv) The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of

of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that
even though the enquiry held against the
employee/workman is consistent with the rules of
natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if
rt
any, but holds that the punishment was
disproportionate to the misconduct found proved,

then it will have the discretion not to award full
back wages. However, if the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee

or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct
or that the employer had foisted a false charge,
then there will be ample justification for award of

full back wages.

v) The cases in which the competent Court or

Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in
gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or
the principles of natural justice or is guilty of

victimizing the employee or workman, then the
Court or Tribunal concerned will be fully justified
in directing payment of full back wages. In such
cases, the superior Courts should not exercise
power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution
and interfere with the award passed by the
Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a
possibility of forming a different opinion on the

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20

entitlement of the employee/workman to get full
back wages or the employer’s obligation to pay
the same. The Courts must keep in view that in the
cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service,

.

the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is

the employee/workman and there is no
justification to give a premium to the employer of
his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to

pay to the employee/workman his dues in the
form of full back wages.

vi) In a number of cases, the superior Courts have

of
interfered with the award of the primary
adjudicatory authority on the premise that
finalization of litigation has taken long time
ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are
rt
not to infrastructure and manpower is the
principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases.

For this the litigants cannot be blamed or
penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to
an employee or workman if he is denied back

wages simply because there is long lapse of time
between the termination of his service and finality
given the order of reinstatement. The Courts

should bear in mind that in most of these cases,
the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-

vis the employee or workman. He can avail the
services of best legal brain for prolonging the
agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee or

workman, who can ill afford the luxury of
spending money on a lawyer with certain amount
of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be
prudent to adopt the course suggested in
Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited vs.
Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Private
Limited, (1979) 2 SCC 80.

vii) The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v.

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21

K.P. Agrawal, (2007) 2 SCC 433 that on
reinstatement the employee/workman cannot
claim continuity of service as of right is contrary
to the ratio of the judgments of three Judge

.

Benches referred to hereinabove and cannot be

treated as good law. This part of the judgment is
also against the very concept of reinstatement of
an employee/workman.”

23. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

of
Court in the aforementioned pronouncements, since there is no

fault on the part of petitioner in not being in service with the
rt
respondents during the period he remained out of service, he is

held entitled to the salary for the said period of absence.

24. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the

petitioner was regularized as JBT by the respondents on

01.08.1998. Once the petitioner was made regular with the

respondents and the respondents themselves have admitted

this fact while filing reply and furthermore, once the

termination order has been set aside by this Court which fact

has also not been disputed by the respondents, the petitioner is

held entitled to both the reliefs; benefit of ACP increments and

the salary of the absence period.

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25. The plea taken by the respondents that since the

petitioner has not worked for the said period is rejected for the

.

reason that the petitioner was compelled not to serve with the

respondents on account of the termination order. As already

observed above, once the said termination order has been

quashed, the petitioner cannot be denied the salary qua the

of
said period.

26. rt One more glaring fact is to be taken note of that in

the present case, the services of the petitioners were not

terminated on account of misconduct or misbehaviour. Further

his selection was made by the respondents, which was set aside

by the Tribunal and thereafter his services were terminated

after expiry of our months period given to the respondents to

do the entire exercise of making selection. The services of the

petitioner were regularized to the post of JBT on 01.08.1998 and

further once, this Court had already quashed the said order, the

petitioner is held entitled to all the benefits as given to other

employee and also the salary qua the period of absence.

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27. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and

the respondents are directed to grant three ACP increments to

.

the legal heirs of the petitioner on completion of his 4, 9 and 14

years of regular service as JBT Teacher from due date and

further the salary of the absence period of 68 days w.e.f.

23.02.2005 to 30.04.2005 be also paid to them.

of

28. Since the original petitioner has died, the benefits

be given to his legal heirs, who have been brought on record
rt
vide order dated 25.11.2021. In case, the arrears on account of

the grant of ACP and salary are not released in favour of the

legal heirs of the petitioner within a period of three months

from today, the same shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per

annum from the date of filing of the petition till its payment.

29. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall

also stand disposed of.

    11th March, 2026                                ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj )
          (ankit)                                           Judge




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