11.03.2026 vs State Of H.P. & Others on 11 March, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Date Of Decision: 11.03.2026 vs State Of H.P. & Others on 11 March, 2026

Author: Sandeep Sharma

Bench: Sandeep Sharma

2026:HHC:6730

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.MMO No.1296 of 2024
Date of Decision: 11.03.2026

.

_______________________________________________________

Parmjit Singh …….Petitioner
Versus

State of H.P. & others … Respondents
_______________________________________________________
Coram:

of
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes.

For the Petitioner: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dogra, Advocate.

rt
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar,
Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi
Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy

Advocates General, for the respondent/State.
_______________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):

By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, prayer has been made on

behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.217 of 2023, dated

18.09.2023, under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC, registered at

police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh as well as

consequent proceedings pending adjudication in the competent court

of law.

2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the

record are that FIR sought to be quashed came to be instituted

against the petitioner, who at the relevant time was Sub-Inspector in

1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh,

alleging therein that though petitioner was not entitled to House Rent

.

Allowance, as he was living in his own house within the radius of 5

KM from the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, District

Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, but yet in connivance with co-accused

Manju Devi, who was also working as Clerk in the office of

of
Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, he fraudulently got his name

inserted in the order dated 17.11.2018, issued under the signatures of

Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Himachal
rt
Pradesh, thereby authorizing HRA to some of the police officials on

account of non-availability of Government accommodation at Bilaspur.

Contents of the FIR, if read in their entirety, reveal that petitioner filed

an application for grant of HRA, but since he was residing in his

personal house situate within the radius of 5 KM from the office of

Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, he was not entitled to HRA.

However, he, misusing his official position, prevailed upon Ms. Manju

Devi i.e. Clerk, who allegedly without there being any authority,

inserted the name of the petitioner in order dated 17.11.2018, issued

under the signatures of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, District

Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh. Though, above named Manju Devi

claimed before the authorities that the then Superintendent of Police,

Bilaspur had asked her to insert the name of the petitioner in order

dated 17.11.2018, but such claim of her was seriously refuted by the

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then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. In the afore background, FIR

came to be registered against the petitioner as well as co-accused

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Manju Devi. Besides the criminal proceedings, as detailed

hereinabove, the Department of police also conducted disciplinary

proceedings.

3. The Disciplinary authority i.e. Superintendent of Police,

of
Bilaspur vide order dated 19.01.2023, closed the departmental

proceedings and directed the petitioner herein to be careful in future.

Since in afore disciplinary proceedings, an amount of Rs.27,600/-

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allegedly received by the petitioner as HRA, was ordered to be

recovered from the petitioner, he accordingly deposited the sum of

Rs. 27, 600/-, but if aforesaid order is perused in its entirety, it clearly

suggest that disciplinary authority gave credence to the statement of

Lady ASI Manju, the then dealing hand in the office of Superintendent

of Police, Bilaspur, who had categorically stated that name of the

petitioner was inserted in order dated 17.11.2018 at the instance of

the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. Though, as per final

inquiry report, disciplinary authority found that Inspector Parmjit Singh

i.e. petitioner neither concealed any facts from the department

regarding his posting nor misused his official position for getting

HRA/HMA, but yet recovery of sum of Rs. 27, 600/- was ordered for

the reason that petitioner was not entitled to HRA for his having

resided in his personal accommodation situate within the radius of 5

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KM from the Superintendent of Police Office Bilaspur. Now since the

disciplinary proceedings stands closed against the petitioner, coupled

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with the fact that he had also deposited sum of Rs. 27, 600/-

unauthorizedly withdrawn by him, petitioner has approached this

Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR on the ground

that no case muchless under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC is

of
made out against the him.

4. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dogra, learned counsel representing

the petitioner, vehemently argued that at no point of time petitioner,
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while working as Inspector in the office Superintendent of Police,

Bilaspur, misused his position or attempted to induce co-accused

Manju to confer upon him the undue benefit of HRA. Learned counsel

for the petitioner submitted that, at first instance, petitioner filed an

application for grant of HRA, but since such prayer of him was not

accepted, he did not process the matter further. However,

subsequently, he came to know with the issuance of order dated

17.11.2018, issued under the signatures of Superintendent of Police,

Bilaspur that he has been also authorized HRA on account of his

residing in private accommodation at Bilaspur, as a result thereof, he

started drawing the said allowance. He submitted that there is no

evidence, worth credence, adduced on record by the prosecution to

prove that petitioner ever produced any fake and forged documents,

rather precise case of the prosecution is that co-accused Manju, in

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connivance with the petitioner incorporated his name in order dated

17.11.2018 unauthorizedly without there being any authority or order

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passed by Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur. He submitted that since

it has clearly emerged from the report of SFSL that name of the

petitioner was inserted by Manju in order dated 17.11.2018, which

fact otherwise stands admitted by co-accused Manju, no case under

of
aforesaid provision of law can be said to be made out against the

petitioner.

5. While referring to Section 120-B of IPC, learned counsel
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for the petitioner submitted that there is no evidence suggestive of the

fact that there existed any agreement interse petitioner and co-

accused to commit an offence. He submitted that since co-accused

Manju had categorically stated that she had inserted the name of the

petitioner in order dated 17.11.2018 at the askance of the then

Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, coupled with the fact that there is

no evidence that there was an agreement interse petitioner and co-

accused Manju and as such, charge of criminal conspiracy sought to

be levelled against the petitioner is not sustainable. He further

submitted that since petitioner has already deposited the amount

allegedly received by him unauthorizedly, coupled with the fact that he

has retired from the service, criminal case registered against him

deserves to be quashed.

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6. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional

Advocate General, while refuting aforesaid submissions made by

.

learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that mere

factum of depositing of Rs. 27,600/- received by the petitioner as

HRA, itself justifies criminal prosecution of the petitioner. He

submitted that since petitioner was fully aware that he was not entitled

of
to HRA on account of his residing in personal accommodation situate

within the radius of 5 KM from the office of Superintendent of Police,

Bilaspur, coupled with the fact that his application was rejected by the
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competent authority, there was no occasion, if any, for him to receive

HRA. He submitted that bare perusal of order dated 17.11.2018

placed on record clearly reveals that name of the petitioner was

inserted with a pen by co-accused Manju, who otherwise would not

have benefited in any manner with the grant of HRA in favour of the

petitioner. However, taking note of the fact that application made by

the petitioner was rejected, coupled with the fact that he, in terms of

rules, was not entitled to HRA, there is reason to believe and presume

that petitioner, in connivance with co-accused Manju, who at the

relevant time was working as Clerk, got his name inserted in order

dated 17.11.2018 and thereafter, in terms of the same, kept on

drawing HRA unauthorizedly. He submitted that agreement interse

petitioner and co-accused, in terms of Section 120-B of IPC, can be

easily inferred from the fact that rejection of the application filed by

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the petitioner for grant of HRA by the competent authority was very

much in the knowledge of both the petitioner as well as co-accused

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Manju, but yet both the aforesaid persons in connivance with each

other, inserted the name of the petitioner in order dated 17.11.2018,

as a result of which, petitioner rightly came to be booked under

Section 120-B of IPC alongwith co-accused Manju. He further

of
submitted that since petitioner in order to avail undue benefit of HRA

induced co-accused Manju to get his name inserted in order dated

17.11.2018, as a result whereof, monetary loss was caused to the
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State exchequer, petitioner rightly came to be booked under Section

420 of IPC. He further submitted that factum with regard to

preparation of forged or fake document by the petitioner in

connivance with co-accused Manju is to be proved by the prosecution

in totality of evidence in trial. He submitted that since prima facie case

can be inferred against the petitioner from the contents of the FIR as

well as final report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C, prayer made on

behalf of the petitioner for quashing of the FIR deserves outright

rejection.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have

gone through the record carefully.

8. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of

the aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf

of learned counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it

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necessary to discuss /elaborate the scope and competence of this

Court to quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings, while

.

exercising power under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita.

9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was

explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under:-

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now
more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the
court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in
rt
State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein
this Court has summarised some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following

words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent

powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases

wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a

case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent

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person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the

.

proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or

the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of
relevance to us in this case.

of
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made
in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by

the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC,
and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act
under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings
can be quashed.”

10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its

extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue
orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the

ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled
nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the
broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court
must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such

powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself,
allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of
justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines
that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal
proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the
Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The
grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following
situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala
fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii)
no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in
nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and

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compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).”

10. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is clear that

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power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.( Now section 528 of BNSS) can be

exercised in the following conditions:(i) the criminal complaint has

been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal

process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil

of
in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;

and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute

amicably.

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11. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law

laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an

endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant

petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case.

12. Admittedly, in the case at hand, name of the petitioner,

who at the relevant time was working as Inspector, was inserted in the

office order dated 17.11.2018 with a Pen. It is also not in dispute that

name of the petitioner was inserted in afore order by co-accused

Manju, who at the relevant time was working as a Clerk. Vide

aforesaid order, some of the police officials, who were residing in

private quarters, were granted HRA/HMA. Since petitioner was

residing in his personal accommodation situate within radius of 5 KM

from the office of Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, he was not

entitled to HRA as per rules, but allegedly he, in connivance with co-

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accused Manju, got his name inserted in order dated 17.11.2018. It is

not in dispute that co-accused Manju categorically stated that name of

.

SI Parmjit was inserted in office order dated 17.11.2018 on the

direction of the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur.

13. True it is that the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur

refuted aforesaid claim of co-accused Manju, but admittedly no

of
evidence, worth credence, ever came to be adduced on record by the

prosecution to prove connivance, if any, interse petitioner and co-

accused Manju. It is also not in dispute that disciplinary proceedings
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were initiated against the petitioner for his having unauthorizedly

availed the benefit of HRA. It is also not in dispute that it came to be

concluded in final inquiry report that Inspector Parmjit Singh i.e.

petitioner herein, neither concealed any fact from the department

regarding his posting nor misused his position to get HRA/HMA. As

per final inquiry report, it was found that allegations levelled against

the petitioner could not be proved, but he had availed HRA/HMA

amounting to Rs. 27,600/-, which was not proper.

14. Disciplinary authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police,

Bilaspur, taking note of the report of inquiry officer, though ordered

recovery of Rs. 27,600/ from the petitioner for his having

unauthorizedly availed HRA, but at the same time gave credence to

the statement of Lady ASI Manju, the then dealing hand in SP Office,

Bilaspur, who categorically stated that name of the petitioner was

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incorporated in the office order dated 17.11.2018 at the askance of

the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur.

.

15. Though, in the disciplinary proceedings the petitioner was

asked to be more careful in future, but that does not mean that he

was indicted or held guilty, rather recovery was effected only for the

reason that as per rules, he could not have availed the benefit of

of
HRA. At no point of time allegation of misuse of office and connivance

with co-accused Manju was ever proved. Though, this Court is

persuaded to agree with learned Additional Advocate General that
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outcome of disciplinary proceedings may not be of much bearing on

the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner, but this Court

cannot lose sight of the fact that in disciplinary proceedings the

charge of connivance interse petitioner and co-accused Manju was

never proved.

16. Similarly, the disciplinary authority, while passing order

dated 19.01.2023 gave credence to the statement of Lady ASI Manju,

if it is so, statement made by co-accused Manju to the effect that

name of the petitioner in office order dated 17.11.2018 was inserted

at the instance of the then Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, cannot

be ignored. If aforesaid version of co-accused Manju is taken into

consideration, no case muchless under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B

of IPC can be said to be made out against the petitioner. Otherwise

also, there is no evidence to prove that petitioner himself inserted his

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name in office order dated 17.11.2018, rather it has come on record in

the disciplinary proceedings that he never concealed any fact from

.

the department regarding his posting nor misused his office for

getting HRA/HMA. Once it is not in dispute that petitioner had

submitted an application for grant of HRA and thereafter, similar

prayer of some official for grant of HRA was considered by the then

of
Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, version put forth by co-accused

Manju that name of the petitioner was inserted in office order dated

17.11.2018 on the askance of Superintendent of Police cannot be
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brushed aside easily.

17. Most importantly, order dated 17.11.2018, which is the

subject matter of the case at hand, was signed by Superintendent of

Police, Bilaspur. It is none of the case of the prosecution that name of

the petitioner was inserted in aforesaid order subsequent to the

signing of afore order by Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur.

Moreover, there is no evidence adduced on record to suggest that

petitioner dishonestly induced the person to deliver any property. In

the case at hand, person, who was dishonestly induced to deliver any

property can be said to be Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, who

actually signed the document. The case of the prosecution is that co-

accused Manju, without there being any authority, inserted the name

of the petitioner in office order dated 17.11.2018. Since there is

nothing to prove that petitioner induced or prevailed upon the

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Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur to do something unlawful, as a

result of which, petitioner availed the benefit of HRA, to which he was

.

not entitled , no case muchless under Section 420 of IPC can be said

to be made out against the petitioner. To prove the case, if any, under

Section 420, there has to be dishonest intention from the very

beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the guilty of the accused for

of
commission of offence.

18. Even if the allegations made in the complaint are

accepted to be true and correct, petitioner cannot be said to have
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committed the offence of cheating. Since petitioner was not in the

picture at all when co-accused allegedly inserted his name

unauthorizedly in order dated 17.11.2018, neither any dishonest

intention can be attributed to him nor can there be possible intention

on his part to deceive the department. The offence of cheating is

established only when the accused dishonestly induces a person to

deliver any property or to do or omit to do something, which he would

not otherwise have done or omitted. Similarly this Court finds that it is

none of the case of the prosecution that petitioner forged any

document or produced any fake document to avail benefit of HRA.

The documents allegedly used to avail the benefit of HRA was

allegedly prepared by co-accused Manju and signed by the

Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur and as such, it is not understood

how a case under Section 468 of IPC is made out against the

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petitioner, who subsequently on the basis of afore document reaped

the benefit of HRA only with other similar situate persons.

.

19. In view of the discussion made hereinabove as well as

material adduced on record alongwith the challan filed under Section

173 Cr.P.C, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for

the petitioner that no case much less under Sections 420, 468 and

of
120-B of IPC is made out against the petitioner and as such, no

fruitful purpose would be served in continuation of trial against the

petitioner under the aforesaid provisions of law, rather continuation
rt
of the same besides causing mental agony to the petitioner would

amount to sheer abuse of process of law.

20. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well

as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No.217 of

2023, dated 18.09.2023, under Sections 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC,

registered at police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, Himachal

Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings, if any, pending

adjudication in the competent court of law, are quashed and set aside

qua the petitioner -accused and he is acquitted of the offences

alleged in the FIR. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Pending

applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

21.

(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
March 11,2026
(shankar)

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