06.04.2026 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 21 April, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 06.04.2026 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 21 April, 2026

                                                                                          2025:HHC:46546




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                              Cr. MP (M) No. 451 of 2026
                                              Reserved on: 06.04.2026
                                              Date of Decision: 21.04.2026

    Rajesh Kumar                                                                 ...Petitioner
                                            Versus

    State of Himachal Pradesh                                                    ...Respondent


    Coram
    Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
    Whether approved for reporting?1 No.

    For the Petitioner                :         Dr Nidhi Singh, Advocate.
    For the Respondent                :         Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
                                                General.

    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking

regular bail in FIR No. 47 of 2022, dated 13.05.2022, registered for

the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354, 354-D

and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 12 Protection of

Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 at Police Station

Patlikuhal, District Kullu, H.P.

2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was released on

bail on 08.07.2022 by the learned Special Judge-I, Kullu, District
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Kullu, H.P. (learned Trial Court). The matter was listed before the

learned Trial Court on 03.11.2025. The petitioner could not appear

before the Court due to acute dysentery and fever. He could not

inform his counsel about his ailment. The learned Trial Court

issued non-bailable warrants of arrest (NBWs) against the

petitioner. The petitioner appeared before the Court on 26.02.2026

and filed an application for cancellation of non-bailable warrants

of arrest. The learned trial Court dismissed the application and

sent the petitioner to judicial custody. The absence of the

petitioner was not voluntary but due to the circumstances beyond

his control. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be

allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

asserting that the victim was residing with the informant and the

petitioner was her neighbour. He left the room but continued to

call the victim on her mobile No. 7xxxxxx014. The victim revealed

the incident to the informant. The informant asked the petitioner

not to harass the victim. The victim was present with the

informant and her sister-in-law in her home on 13.05.2022. The

petitioner visited her home and asked her to accompany him. The

informant objected, but the petitioner picked up a stone and threw
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it towards the informant. The stone hit victim’s sister-in-law,

who sustained injury. The matter was reported to the police, and

the police registered the FIR. The police detained the petitioner,

but the petitioner ran away from the police station. The police

arrested the petitioner. The victim was born on 27.08.2024 and

was aged 17 years 9 month and 14 days on the date of the incident.

The police obtained the call detail record and found that various

calls were made to the mobile No. 7xxxxx0014. FIR No. 276 of 2018

and FI.R. No. 139 of 2019 were registered against the petitioner.

The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar

offence in case of his release on bail and would intimidate the

victim. The prosecution has examined 6 witnesses, and the

statements of 7 witnesses are to be recorded. The matter is listed

for recording the statements of witnesses at serial No. 15 and 16 on

23.07.2026. Hence, the status report.

4. I have heard Dr Nidhi Singh, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General

for the respondent/State.

5. Dr Nidhi Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that the petitioner was earlier granted bail by the
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learned Trial Court. He could not appear before the Court due to

his ailment. Learned Trial Court issued the non-bailable warrants

of arrest, but the petitioner himself surrendered before the Court,

which shows his intention to comply with the judicial process. The

petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court

may impose. The police have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful

purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.

Hence, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the

petitioner be released on bail.

6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for

the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in

the commission of a heinous offence. He had intimidated the

victim and her family members. He failed to abide by the terms

and conditions imposed by the Court, and delayed the disposal of

the matter pending against him. Hence, he prayed that the present

petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
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8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.

8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.

[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”

(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
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criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in
irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted
as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will
entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the
accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,
reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused
at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and
similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind
that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has
used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead
of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the
grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there
is a genuine case against the accused and that the
prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in
support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for
bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
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Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to
case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it
may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the
matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled
with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for
the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the
greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though,
however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.”
(emphasis supplied)

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an
elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court
is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the
grant of bail.

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to
have guided the Court’s decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting
bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon
the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously,
cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic
principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court
on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:

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(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and
Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of
the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie
conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of
bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons
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and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts
of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)

9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC

261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the

gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests

otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,
except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating
other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or
intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who
seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend
to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.

So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

10. The present petition has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

11. The status report mentions that the petitioner had

stalked the victim and called her repeatedly on her mobile phone

7xxxxx0014. This fact was confirmed by the call detail records. The
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victim was found to be a minor on the date of the incident.

Therefore, the police have collected sufficient material to connect

the petitioner to the commission of the crime.

12. It is also not disputed that the petitioner was granted

bail by the learned Trial Court on 8th of July 2022. This means that

the learned Trial Court had not considered the offence against the

petitioner serious enough to justify his pre-trial detention. The

petitioner could not appear before the learned Trial Court, and the

learned Trial Court issued non-bailable warrants of arrest to

secure his presence. The order dated 26.02.2026 shows that the

petitioner had himself surrendered before the Court and applied

for the cancellation of the non-bailable warrants of arrest. The

Learned Trial Court dismissed the application, sent the petitioner

to judicial custody, and listed the matter on 23.07.2006, five

months after the passing of the order. The status report mentions

that the prosecution has cited 13 witnesses, out of whom 6 have

been examined and 7 are yet to be examined. Still, the learned

Trial Court only summoned 2 of the witnesses, which shows that

the learned trial Court is not interested in concluding the trial

expeditiously despite detaining the petitioner in custody.
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13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed

Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024

SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting agency

including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to provide the

right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should not be opposed

on the ground that crime committed is serious. It was observed at

page 820:

17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of
the nature of the crime.

18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, however stringent the penal law may be.

19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said
to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.

14. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,

(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
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that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the

accused. It was observed at page 298:

“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:

“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.”

14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:

“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time….”

And in its second sub-article, that:

“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].

16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life
and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent
incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the
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stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result
from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the offence till it
consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this
context, it may be noted that the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar
[(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing with
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed thus:

(SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable,
fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There
can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is
an integral and essential part of the fundamental
right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The
question which would, however, arise is as to what
would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of
a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental
right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be
released unconditionally, freed from the charge
levelled against him on the ground that trying him
after an unduly long period of time and convicting
him after such a trial would constitute a violation of
his fundamental right under Article 21?”

17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is
implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected
in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that
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it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court
must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this
right had been denied in the particular case before it.”

15. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union

of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot

be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being

concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:

“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant
some relief to those persons who have been deprived of
their personal liberty for a considerable length of time
without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the
near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and
the nation needs to be safeguarded, looking to the nature of
the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But
the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty
pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the
offences for which they have been charged. If such a finding
is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some
relief becomes necessary.”

16. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3

SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be

subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at

page 335:

“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as
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an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not
necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the
gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the
legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it
differently, no accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes
him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as
in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably
long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be
measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of India v.
K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713,
paras 15 and 17] ).”

17. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),

(2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a

speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail

is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded

expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –

13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to
secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion
(like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this
Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values
i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the
presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as
observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan
[Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281:

(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the concept of
bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to
restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a
crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged
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criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on the
condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899:
(1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this effect. In the
Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen
Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC
(Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the
same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions
are enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting
judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and
trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para

17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting
the community and the nation against terrorist and
disruptive activities or other activities harmful to
society, it is all the more necessary that investigation of
such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number
of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons
accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in
which society can be protected against harmful
activities. This would also ensure that persons ultimately
found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long
periods.”

18. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention

and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178:

“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail
may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not
concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is
immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living
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conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to
the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-
12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails
against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country
[ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-
2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these,
1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.

24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are
at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Prisoner v.
State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a radical
transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para

13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of
freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of
personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to
be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
standards. Self-perception changes.”

25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [
Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966 U.K.]
(also see Donald Clemmer’s “The Prison Community”

published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community
(1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in
Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer’s Concept of
Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/So
becki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).

Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate
loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of
families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from
society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these
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aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the
accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials–especially in
cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are
taken up and concluded speedily.”

19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed

Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of the

offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article

21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the

conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It

was observed at page 817: –

“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar
[Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81:

1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to
speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is
“implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair
or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall
foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article

21. The question which would, however, arise is as to
what would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
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deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”

11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State
of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671:

1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992
SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the
right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused,
facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman
Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as
the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of
law, where they do not often get competent legal advice,
the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy
trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant
factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his right to a
speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or
insist upon a speedy trial.”

20. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State

of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:

7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

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8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:

“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;

All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;

And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”

21. It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India, (2024) 20

SCC 57: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and the

delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to bail.

It was observed at page 63:

19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the
trial being completed in the near future have also been
taken as a ground for exercising its constitutional role by
the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of Article
21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees trial be
concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay in
conclusion of the trial would justify such invocation,
leading to a conclusion of violation of Part III of the
Constitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to
release an undertrial on bail.

*****

21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be
appreciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the
statutory provisions in mind, but with the passage of time,
the effect of that statutory provision would, in fact, have to
be diluted, giving way to the mandate of Part III of the
Constitution, where the accused, as of now, is not a convict
and is facing the charges. Constitutional right of speedy
trial in such circumstances will have precedence over the
21
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bar/strict provisions of the statute and cannot be made the
sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the period of
incarceration of an accused could also be a relevant factor to
be considered by the constitutional courts, not to be merely
governed by the statutory provisions.

22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322

that the accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was

observed:

10. However, many times we have made ourselves very clear
that howsoever serious a crime may be, the accused has a
fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21
of the Constitution.

23. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the

violation of his right to a speedy trial.

24. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal

antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration.

This submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024

SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024:INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents

may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long

incarceration. It was observed:

“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for
bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a
strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation
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and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents
may not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where
a Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long
incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be
relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant
default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are
irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar
facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the
existence of the antecedents.”

25. Considering that the petitioner had himself

surrendered and applied for cancellation of non-bailable warrants

of arrest, and the learned Trial Court does not show any interest in

expediting the hearing of the case, the petitioner is entitled to a

concession of bail. Hence, the present petition is allowed, and the

petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his

furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in

the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.

While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions:

(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.

(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing
the address of the intended visit to the SHO
concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial
Court.

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(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from the
Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media
Account. In case of any change in the mobile number
or social media accounts, the same will be intimated
to the Police/Court within five days from the date of
the change.

26. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of

any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a

petition for cancellation of the bail.

27. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of

this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District Jail, Kullu,

District Kullu, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.

28. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the

disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on

the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
21st April, 2026.

(ravinder)

Digitally signed by RAVINDER KUMAR
DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA,

RAVINDER KUMAR Phone=35ecb6f93c6891a7dae90f163e34d7ecaa420b13af1363204ab0e0f5c87077dc, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh,
SERIALNUMBER=f6cc63c55495d14ce1f8623eacdb6cb9ef2c553803537a2f53c4ee637cbebaff, CN=RAVINDER KUMAR
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:

Date: 2026-04-21 14:18:38