05.03.2026 vs Of on 21 April, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 05.03.2026 vs Of on 21 April, 2026

                                                                                           2026:HHC:12493




     IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                              CR. MMO No. 242 of 2022
                                              Reserved on: 05.03.2026




                                                                                   .

                                              Date of Decision: 21.4.2026


    Vijay Kumar                                                                  ...Petitioner





                                          Versus




                                                    of
    State of H.P. and others                                                 ...Respondents

    Coram

    Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
                        rt
    Whether approved for reporting?1                    No.

    For the Petitioners               :         Mr Rajiv Jiwan, Senior Advocate,
                                                with M/s Prashant Sharma and Yug
                                                Singhal, Advocate
    For the Respondents               :         Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional



                                                Advocate General.




    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of F.I.R. No.11 of 2022, dated 29.01.2022, registered at

police Station Sujanpur, District Hamirpur, H.P., for the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 379 of the

Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 20 and 22 of the Mines and

Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act 1957 (Mining Act).

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the police were on patrolling duty on

.

28.01.2022. They received secret information at Jangalberi at

11:30 PM regarding the theft of minor minerals from a Khad with

the help of JCB and Tippers. The police prepared a rukka and sent

it to the police station, where an FIR was registered. The police

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went to the spot and found 13 tippers/trucks bearing registration

numbers HP68A-2227, PB06-2974, PB06L-2724, HP68B-1574,
rt
HP53A-2575, HP57-8833, HP57-8832, HP73A-0713, HP65-

3572, HP67-1605, HP68-2074, HP67-5252, and HP57A-6084

on the spot. Three tippers were filled with minor minerals. The

police took the photographs and video recorded illegal mining.

These minor minerals were being taken to Vijay Stone Crusher,

District Kangra, H.P. The police arrested the accused and

investigated the matter. The police obtained the demarcation of

the spot and found that the mining was being carried out on the

land belonging to the State, which was not leased to any person.

No extraction of minor minerals was being carried out in Khasra

No. 1049. The police prepared the charge sheet after the

completion of the investigation and filed it before the Court.

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3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R and

filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner filed the present

.

petition for quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings

arising out of the said F.I.R., asserting that the site where the

mining was stated to be carried out was leased to one Sh. Bhim

Singh Rangra, as per the lease deed dated 20.03.2021. No mining

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was being carried out on the land owned by the government. FIR

does not mention the Khasra number over which the mining was
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being carried out. The machinery was not functioning, and

Tippers were empty which fact can be verified from the

photographs taken by the police. There was no violation of the

terms and conditions of the Mining Lease. The offences under

the Mining Act are non-cognizable, and no FIR could have been

registered for the commission of those offences. The provisions

of Section 120B of the IPC were wrongly invoked, as there is no

evidence of any conspiracy; hence, it was prayed that the present

petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings

arising out of it be quashed.

4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by

respondents No. 1 to 3, making a preliminary submission

regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the FIR

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were reproduced. It was submitted that police had impounded 13

tippers and 5 JCBs. Twenty-nine owners and drivers were

.

released after serving them notices under Section 41A of the

Cr.P.C. Police associated Raj Singh as an independent witness

during the operation. It was found after the investigation that

the illegal mining was being carried out in Khasra No. 1050 and

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not in Khasra No. 1050/1. The police had also taken the

photographs of the illegal mining and video recorded it. The
rt
removal of the minor minerals from the earth constitutes theft,

which is a cognizable offence. Therefore, it was prayed that the

present petition be dismissed.

5. A separate reply was filed by respondent Nos. 4 and 5,

denying the contents of the petition. It was asserted that the

industries department had executed a Mining lease of he land

measuring 4-65-85 hectares, bearing Khasra number 1685/1

and 1685/2 in favour of the petitioner for 5 years with effect

from 26.09.2018 till 25.09.2023 to run the Stone crusher in the

name and style of M/s. Vijay Stone crusher. A Mining lease was

also executed regarding Khasra No. 1050/1 in favour of Bhim

Singh Rangra. The department had never allowed the petitioner

to extract the minerals from the area leased to Bhim Singh

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Rangra, for feeding his Stone crusher. Hence, it was prayed that

the present petition be dismissed.

.

6. Separate rejoinders denying the contents of the

replies and affirming those of the petition were filed.

7. I have heard Mr Rajiv Jiwan, learned Senior Counsel

assisted by M/s Prashant Sharma and Yug Singhal, learned

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counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned

Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

rt

8. Mr Rajiv Jiwan, learned Senior Counsel, for the

petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not show

the commission of any cognizable offence. The police had found

after the investigation that mining was being carried out in

Khasra No.1050/1, which area was allotted/leased to Bhim Singh

Rangra, for carrying out mining activities. He has not filed any

complaint against the petitioner. The petitioner was not even

present on the spot, and he could not have been roped in by

invoking the provisions of Section 120-B of the IPC. The offence

punishable under the Mining Act is non-cognizable, and the

police could not have filed any FIR. Hence, he prayed that the

present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential

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proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon the

judgment of this Court in Shamsher Singh & another versus State

.

of H.P. 2025:HHC:28248 in support of his submissions

9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate

General, for the respondent/State, submitted that illegal mining

was being carried out for the benefit of the Stone crusher owned

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by the petitioner, and the petitioner cannot claim that he has no

concern with it. The industries department has categorically
rt
stated that Bhim Singh Rangra was not permitted to sell minor

minerals to the petitioner, and the petitioner was not authorised

to feed his Stone crusher from the land leased to Bhim Singh

Rangra. Therefore, there was a violation of the provisions of the

lease agreement entered into by Bhim Singh Rangra with the

State, and the police had rightly registered the FIR and filed the

charge sheet before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized

of the matter, and this Court should not exercise extraordinary

jurisdiction in the present case; hence, he prayed that the

present petition be dismissed.

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10. I have given a considerable thought to the

submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records

.

carefully.

11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 7 as under: –

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
rt
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein
this Court has summarised some of the principles under

which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in
the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of

the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which

we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they

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are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first

.

information report and other materials, if any,

accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the

Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made

of
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.

rt
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a

non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned

Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

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ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)

.

would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

of
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
rt
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal

proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”

12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,

may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound
nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear

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abuse of process or where intervention is essential to
uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles

.

and guidelines that High Courts must follow before

quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby
pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case
before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter

alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the
criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the
FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima

of
facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature;
(v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
rt
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

13. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri)

437: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 672 that the Court cannot take the

cognizance of the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 21 of the Mining Act without the complaint made by the

authorized officer. However, the police can file a charge sheet

for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379

of the IPC. It was observed:

“72. From a close reading of the provisions of the MMDR
Act and the offence defined under Section 378 IPC, it is
manifest that the ingredients constituting the offence are

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different. The contravention of terms and conditions of
mining lease or doing mining activity in violation of
Section 4 of the Act is an offence punishable under
Section 21 of the MMDR Act, whereas dishonestly

.

removing sand, gravel and other minerals from the river,

which is the property of the State, out of the State’s
possession without the consent, constitute an offence of
theft. Hence, merely because initiation of proceeding for

the commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the
basis of the complaint cannot and shall not debar the
police from taking action against persons for committing

of
theft of sand and minerals in the manner mentioned
above by exercising power under the Code of Criminal
Procedure and submit a report before the Magistrate for
taking cognizance against such persons. In other words,
rt
in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravel from the
government land, the police can register a case,
investigate the same and submit a final report under

Section 173 CrPC before a Magistrate having jurisdiction
for the purpose of taking cognisance as provided in
Section 190(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

73. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the
matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act
vis-à-vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal

Code, we are of the definite opinion that the ingredients
constituting the offence under the MMDR Act and the

ingredients of dishonestly removing sand and gravel
from the riverbeds without consent, which is the property
of the State, is a distinct offence under IPC. Hence, for the

commission of an offence under Section 378 IPC, on
receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having
jurisdiction can take cognisance of the said offence
without awaiting the receipt of a complaint that may be
filed by the authorised officer for taking cognisance in
respect of the violation of various provisions of the
MMDR Act. Consequently, the contrary view taken by the
different High Courts cannot be sustained in law and,
therefore, overruled. Consequently, these criminal

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appeals are disposed of with a direction to the
Magistrates concerned to proceed accordingly.”

15. This judgment was followed in Kanwar Pal Singh v.

.

State of U.P., (2020) 14 SCC 331: (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 815: 2019 SCC

OnLine SC 1652, wherein it was observed:

11. As noticed above, in the written submissions the
appellant has relied upon Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. [Belsund
Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1999) 9 SCC 620], Sharat

of
Babu Digumarti [Sharat Babu Digumarti v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2017) 2 SCC 18 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 628] and Suresh
Nanda [Suresh Nanda v. CBI, (2008) 3 SCC 674 : (2008) 2
SCC (Cri) 121] to contend that where there is a special Act
rt
dealing with a special subject, resort cannot be taken to a
general Act. The said submission has no force in view of

the ratio in Sanjay [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9
SCC 772 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 437] as quoted above which
specifically refers to Section 26 of the General Clauses Act
and states that the offence under Section 4 read with

Section 21 of the MMDR Act, 1957 is different from the
offence punishable under Section 379 IPC. Thus, they are
two “different” and not the “same offence”. It would be

relevant to state here that the Delhi High Court in its
decision in Sanjay v. State [Sanjay v. State, 2009 SCC

OnLine Del 525 : (2009) 109 DRJ 594], which was impugned
in Sanjay [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 :

(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 437], had accepted an identical

argument to hold that once an offence is punishable
under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, 1957, the offence
would not be punishable under Section 379 IPC. This
reasoning was rejected by this Court, and the judgment of
the Delhi High Court was reversed. The contention relying
on the same reasoning before us, therefore, must be
rejected.

12. We would also reject the contention raised by the
appellant in the written submissions that the alleged

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theft of sand is not punishable under Section 379 read
with Section 378 IPC, as sand is an immovable property as
per Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act. In the
present case, sand had been excavated and was,

.

thereupon, no longer an immovable property. The sand,

on being excavated, would lose its attachment to the
earth; ergo, it is a movable property or goods capable of
being stolen. (See Explanation 1 to Section 378 IPC

and Sanjay [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772:

(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 437] as quoted above.)
xxxxxx

of

15. We would again advert to the decision in Sanjay [State
(NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 : (2014) 5 SCC
(Cri) 437], which had overruled the decision of the
Calcutta High Court in Seema Sarkar v. State [Seema
rt
Sarkar v. State, 1994 SCC OnLine Cal 277 : (1995) 1 Cal LT 95]
wherein the High Court held the proceedings to be invalid

and illegal as the Magistrate had taken cognizance on the
basis of a charge-sheet submitted by the police under
Section 21(2) of the MMDR Act, 1957 and Section 379 IPC,
observing that the cognizance was one that cannot be

split or divided. The High Court had further observed that
as the complaint was not made in terms of Section 22 of
the MMDR Act, 1957, the cognisance was bad and

contrary to law. We have already noted the decision of the
Delhi High Court, which had directed that the FIR should

not be treated as registered under Section 379 IPC but
only under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, 1957. These
decisions of the Calcutta High Court and the Delhi High

Court were reversed and set aside by this Court
in Sanjay [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 :

(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 437] after referring to Section 26 of the
General Clauses Act and the meaning of the expression
“same offence”, to observe that the offence under Section
21 read with Section 4 of the MMDR Act, 1957 and Section
379 IPC are different and distinct. The aforesaid
reasoning compels us to reject the contention of the
appellant that the action as impugned in the FIR is a mere

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violation of Section 4, which is an offence cognizable only
under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, 1957 and not under
any other law. There is no bar on the court from taking
cognisance of the offence under Section 379 IPC. We

.

would also observe that the violation of Section 4 being a

cognizable offence, the police could have always
investigated the same, there being no bar under the
MMDR Act, 1957, unlike Section 13(3)(iv) of the TOHO Act.

16. A similar view was taken in Shamsher Singh (supra).

17. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of the

of
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Court cannot take cognisance of the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the
rt
Mining Act on a police report, therefore, the cognizance taken

by the learned Trial Court of the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 21 of the Mining Act on the police

report is bad.

18. The status report submitted by the police mentions

that the land was demarcated, and it was found that the mining

was being carried out outside the land leased to Bhim Singh

Rangra in Khasra No. 1050. The Field Kanungo issued a

clarification that the area where the mining was being carried

out belonged to the State of H.P. The area mentioned in the

report was pointed out by the lease holder, but no mutation was

sanctioned. The police have also recorded the statements of

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Field Kanungo and Patwari, in which they stated that they had

carried out the demarcation as per the law and issued the report.

.

Therefore, the material on record prima facie shows that the

theft of minor minerals was being carried out from the land

owned by the State.

19. The copy of the charge sheet filed by the police shows

of
that the minor minerals were being stolen and carried to Vijay

Stone Crusher, owned by the petitioner. The petitioner has not
rt
disputed in the petition that mining activity was being carried

out on the spot and has claimed in para 9A of the petition that

the site in question, where the illegal mining was being carried

out, was leased in favour of one Bhim Singh Rangra. He further

stated that the mining activity, which was being carried out, was

strictly in compliance with the Lease deed and no illegal mining

was being carried out. The petitioner had parked his vehicles,

which were at the disposal of the lessee, and there was no theft.

Therefore, it is undisputed that the mining activity was being

carried out at the petitioner’s instance, and the police were

justified in adding Section 120-B of the IPC.

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20. It was submitted that the petitioner was not present

on the spot, and he could not have been held liable. Reliance was

.

placed upon Shamsher Singh (supra) in support of this

submission. The Court had specifically found out in Shamsher

Singh (supra) that execution of the power of attorney in favour of

a person does not make a persona conspirator, especially when

of
the power of attorney was executed after the incident. In the

present case, the mining activity was being carried out at the
rt
petitioner’s instance for his benefit, even as per the petition.

Therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case

21. The police have filed the chargesheet before the

Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was

laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P.,

(2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge

sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to

appreciate it. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact
that the investigation has been completed and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the
allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any
confidence, particularly in the absence of any
specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet
we are of the view that the appellants should prefer
a discharge application before the trial court under

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Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC). We say so because even according to the
State, the investigation is over and the charge
sheet is ready to be filed before the competent

.

court. In such circumstances, the trial court should

be allowed to look into the materials which the
investigating officer might have collected forming
part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge

application is filed, the trial court shall look into
the materials and take a call whether any case for
discharge is made out or not.”

of

22. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are

false. This submission will not help the case of the petitioner
rt
because the Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction has to

take the allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet to be correct,

and it is not permissible to carry out a mini-trial to determine

the truthfulness or otherwise of these allegations. It was laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Jaiswal vs. State

of Jharkhand, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 685, that the Court exercising

extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot

conduct a mini-trial or enter into an appreciation of evidence of

a particular case. It was observed:-

“13. We say so for reasons more than one. This Court, in a
catena of judgments, has consistently held that at the time
of examining the prayer for quashing of the criminal
proceedings, the court exercising extraordinary
jurisdiction can neither undertake to conduct a mini-trial
nor enter into an appreciation of evidence of a particular

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case. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made
in the complaint cannot be examined on the touchstone of
the probable defence that the accused may raise to stave
off the prosecution, and any such misadventure by the

.

Courts resulting in proceedings being quashed would be

set aside. This Court, in the case of Akhil Sharda 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 820, held to the following effect:

“28. Having gone through the impugned judgment

and order passed by the High Court, by which the
High Court has set aside the criminal proceedings in
the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., it

of
appears that the High Court has virtually conducted
a mini-trial, which as such is not permissible at this
stage and while deciding the application under
rt Section 482 Cr. P.C. As observed and held by this
Court in a catena of decisions no mini-trial can be
conducted by the High Court in the exercise of

powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. jurisdiction and at
the stage of deciding the application under
Section 482 Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot get into
an appreciation of evidence of the particular case

being considered.”

23. A similar view was taken in Maneesha Yadav’s case

(supra), wherein it was held that: –

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the

allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage
of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of
an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the
cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at its face value,
do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out
a case against the accused. We are of the considered view

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that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the
categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra).

.

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this

Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC
1060:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for

of
quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the
position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
rtGujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj
A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC

59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding
the question of whether the High Court could
entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of
FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police

during the pendency of the Section 482 petition,
observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the

various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would

show that the same are not made out even
prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned

Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have
still examined whether the offences alleged
to have been committed by the appellant
were prima facie made out from the
complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet,
documents, etc. or not.”

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20

2026:HHC:12493

24. Hence, it is not permissible for this Court to

determine the veracity of the contents of the F.I.R. and to quash

.

the same by holding that the contents of the same are false.

25 No other point was urged.

26. In view of the above, the present petition is partly

allowed, and the FIR registered for the commission of offences

of
punishable under sections 21 and 22 of the Mining Act is ordered

to be quashed. The FIR will proceed for the commission of
rt
offences punishable under section 379 read with 120-B of IPC.

27. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so

also pending applications, if any.

28. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain

confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no

bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge

21st April, 2026
(ravinder)

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