Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Reserved On: 02.04.2026 vs The Commissioner/Secretary To Govt on 8 April, 2026
2026:JKLHC-JMU:987
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
WP(C) No.2030/2021
Reserved on: 02.04.2026
Pronounced on: 08.04.2026
Uploaded on:- 08.04.2026.
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced: Yes
S. Surinder Singh (66 yrs)
S/O late S. Suchet Singh
R/O H.No.23 Sector-7, Lane No.1,
Nanak Nagar, Jammu ..... Petitioner
Through :- Mr. S.M Choudhary, Sr. Adv., with
Mr. Bilal Choudhary, Adv.
V/S
1. The Commissioner/Secretary to Govt.,
Rural Development Department,
Civil Secretariat, Jammu.
2. The Director,
Rural Development, Jammu.
3. The District Collector,
District Jammu.
4. The Block Development Officer,
Marh.
.....Respondent(s)
Through :- Ms. Jagmeet Kour, Adv., vice
Mr. Raman Sharma, AAG.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M A CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. Petitioner claiming to be the son of his predecessor-in-interest namely
Suchet Singh, a displaced person from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, who had
occupied a piece of evacuees’ property land measuring 3 kanals and 16 marlas
falling under khasra No.234 min (old) new 159 situated at village Halqa, Tehsil
Jammu now Tehsil Marh District Jammu, has asserted that the aforesaid piece of
land was initially allotted to his predecessor-in-interest, vide Government Order
No.578-C and after coming into force, the Agrarian Reforms Act 1976,
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occupancy rights under section 3-A of Agrarian Reform Act, were also
conferred upon him; and that after the death of his father, the petitioner namely
Suchet Singh has acquired the occupancy rights in the land in question which
have been recognized in the Record of Rights (ROR) and Khasra-Girdawaris,
which is evident from the Record of Rights of Kharif 2006 and Khasra
Girdawari of Rabi 2013; that the father of the petitioner by way of Will had
bequeathed the aforesaid land in favour of the petitioner; that the land of the
petitioner was occupied by the respondents for construction of Block
Development Office at Marh; that the father of the petitioner had approached the
respondents for grant of compensation and after his death, the petitioner had also
been pursuing the case of compensation before the respondents but they were
denied the compensation, for their land.
2. It has been pleaded that when no compensation was provided to the
petitioner, he moved an RTI application in the year 2012 in the office of District
Collector, Jammu and he was provided information that the land of the
petitioner was under the occupation of Rural Development Department and a
Block Development Office has been constructed on his land; that as per the
demarcation conducted by the revenue field staff, the petitioner’s land was
found to have been taken over by the State authorities without following process
of acquisition; that the petitioner served a legal notice upon the respondents on
03.12.2020 seeking compensation of land and finally, it was prayed to direct the
respondents either to vacate the land of the petitioner and handover vacant
possession to the petitioner or in the alternate to pay compensation to the
petitioner, according to market rate of the land, prevailing in the area.
3. The respondents have filed their counter affidavit, stating therein that
the construction of Block Development Officer’s office at Marh was started in
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the year 1953-54 approximately; and that this building is here for the last more
than 65 years without any objection by the petitioner or his father; that the
petitioner has approached this Court now after inordinate delay and the petition
is liable to be dismissed for delay and laches.
4. The petitioner in his rejoinder to the counter affidavit has pleaded that
the official respondents filed reply raising preliminary objection that the writ
petition is hit by inordinate delay and laches and deserves to be dismissed out
rightly on the ground that the land in question has been donated to the
department long back and whereafter the construction of BDO office building
was completed and the land remained in the possession and occupation of the
BDO office; that neither the deceased father of the petitioner nor the petitioner
herein, ever donated or executed any document in favour of the respondent-
department for construction of BDO office; that the land had been occupied by
the department without any process of acquisition and paying any compensation,
to the petitioner; that the writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches as the petitioner and his father had been approaching the
department for payment of compensation but no compensation was paid to them.
It has been further reiterated that neither the petitioner nor his predecessor in
interest have ever donated the land in question to the respondents-department;
and that the respondents have failed to place on record any revenue record or
document which can show that the land was donated to the department.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the
petitioner’s land during the time of his predecessor-in-interest, is stated to have
been under the possession of the respondents, who had constructed on it Block
Development Office at Marh in the 1950s, when the right to hold property was a
fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of the country and such a
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fundamental right could not have been waived off by a citizen by remaining
silent for pretty long time, more particularly, when the State has failed in its
constitutional obligation to follow the process of land acquisition before taking
over the private property of the citizens. He has further been argued that the
respondents have failed to place on record either any document so as to suggest
that land in question had been donated by the predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioner to the respondents as claimed by them or any revenue entry with
regard to this fact and in such a situation the respondents cannot take a refuge
under the plea of delay and laches, so as to deny the legitimate right of the
petitioner to hold his property or to seek compensation for that and it is prayed
that the petition be allowed and the respondents be directed to either handover
the vacant possession of the land to the petitioner or to pay its compensation to
the petitioner.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, ex-adverso, argued that the
Block Development Office at Marh over the land in question, was stated to have
been constructed in the early 1950s, apparently on the land having been donated
by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner to the Rural Development
Department; and that after such an inordinate delay, the petitioner cannot
maintain his claim and his petition is liable to be dismissed, suffering from delay
and laches. It was prayed that the petition be dismissed.
7. Heard learned counsel for both the sides and considered.
8. The facts which emerged out of the pleadings are that the subject
matter of this petition i.e., land measuring 3 kanals and 16 marlas comprising of
khasra No.234 min was in the name of one Abdul Haq; that this land was
declared as evacuee’s property and came under the possession of one Suchet
Singh who was a displaced person from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, who was
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later allotted this land in terms of Government Order No.578-C and with the
enforcement of Agrarian Reforms Act 1976, occupancy rights were conferred
upon him under Section 3-A of the Act; that after the death of said Suchet Singh,
the occupancy rights devolved upon the petitioner. The land in question was
admittedly used for the construction of Block Development Office at Marh.
Though the respondents claim that this piece of land had been donated by the
father and predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, however, during hearing of
this case, the learned counsel for the respondents failed to substantiate this fact
by making any reference to any document evidencing the donation or to any
entry made in the revenue record regarding the fact of donation. As such, the
respondents failed to substantiate the claim with regard to donation of the land.
The respondents-State having occupied the private property in the year 1953-54
without following due process of law or paying of compensation amount cannot
claim to have perfected their title to the land in question through adverse
possession and also cannot deny compensation based on delay and laches. So far
as the donation is concerned, such a claim must be supported by evidence and
mere presumption, based on lack of contemporaneous protest by the land owner,
is not enough. In absence of evidence, plea of donation is liable to be rejected.
9. The contention of the respondents that the land in question had been
donated in their favour by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner besides
being not substantiated, cannot be accepted, as in a similar plea raised before the
Apex Court by the State of Himachal Pradesh in case “Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & Ors.“, reported as 2020 (2) SCC 569, that predecessor of
the appellants therein had orally consented to the acquisition but the Hon’ble
Supreme Court rejected the same, terming it as a case of lack of authority and
legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the
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State. Paragraphs 12.1 to 12.12 of Vidya Devi are worth taking note of and are
thus set-out below: –
“12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated
of her property in 1967, when the right to property
was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in
Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed
the right to private property which could not be
deprived without due process of law and upon just
and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be
a human right in a welfare State, and a
Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the
Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of
law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly included
in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his
private property, without following due process of
law, would be violative of a human right, as also the
constitutional right under Article 300 A of the
Constitution.
Reliance is placed on the judgment
in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai, wherein this Court held that: (SCC
p.634, para 6)“6. … Having regard to the provisions
contained in Article 300A of the
Constitution, the State in exercise of itsWP(C) No.2030/2021 Page 6 of 12
2026:JKLHC-JMU:987power of “eminent domain” may interfere
with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be
for a public purpose and reasonable
compensation therefor must be paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna
Reddy, this Court held that: (SCC p.526, para 21)
“21. If the right of property is a human right
as also a constitutional right, the same
cannot be taken away except in accordance
with law. Article 300A of the Constitution
protects such right. The provisions of the
Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in
view of the provisions of Article 300A of
the Constitution of India, must be strictly
construed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
v. State of U.P.& Ors. this Court recognized the right
to property as a basic human right in the following
words (SCC p.379, para 30
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and
by different political thinkers that some
amount of property right is an indispensable
safeguard against tyranny and economic
oppression of the Government. Jefferson was
of the view that liberty cannot long subsist
without the support of property. “Property
must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist”
was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed, the
view that property itself is the seed bed
which must be conserved if other
constitutional values are to flourish is theWP(C) No.2030/2021 Page 7 of 12
2026:JKLHC-JMU:987consensus among political thinkers and
jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat, this Court held as follows: (SCC p.627,
para 48)
“48. … In other words, Article
300A only limits the powers of the State that
no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. There has to be no
deprivation without any sanction of law.
Deprivation by any other mode is not
acquisition or taking possession
under Article 300A. In other words, if there
is no law, there is no deprivation.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have
been forcibly dispossessed of her property without
any legal sanction, and without following due
process of law, and depriving her payment of just
compensation, being a fundamental right on the date
of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the
Appellant or her predecessors had “orally”
consented to the acquisition is completely baseless.
We find complete lack of authority and legal
sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of
her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the
rule of law, the State could not have deprived a
citizen of their property without the sanction of law.
Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court
in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C &
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Ors., wherein it was held that the State must comply
with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or
any other permissible statutory mode. The State
being a welfare State governed by the rule of law
cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is
provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v.
Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now
considered to be not only a constitutional or
statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights
have been considered in the realm of individual
rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health,
employment, etc. Human rights have gained a
multifaceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by
the State before the High Court, that since it has
been in continuous possession of the land for over
42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse”
possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot
be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession,
which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a
tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such
property for over 12 years. The State cannot be
permitted to perfect its title over the land by
invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab
the property of its own citizens, as has been done in
the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of
delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the
Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches
cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of
action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial
conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a
matter of judicial discretion, which must be
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exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and
circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the
breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is
no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to
exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do
substantial justice.”
10. Otherwise also, the plea of the donation of the subject matter is plea of
fact which needs to be proved by reference to evidence whether documentary or
oral. The respondents seem to have presumed it as donation of land on the
ground that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest during his life time and
thereafter the petitioner for pretty long time did not dispute the possession of the
respondents by approaching them for payment of compensation, there cannot be
any justification of donation by a displaced person of a small parcel of land
having been allotted to him by the Government for his settlement after being
displaced from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, particularly, when no evidence has
been placed on record.
11. A Division Bench of this Court in case titled “Mushtaq Ahmad Jan &
Ors. Vs. Govt. of J&K“, reported as 2025 AIR Jammu and Kashmir 135, has
also held that the right to property as a constitutional and human right, and State
cannot forcibly occupy the private property without due process of law or
paying compensation and the delay and laches cannot be a ground to deny
compensation for continuing unauthorized possession by the State. Paragraph
no.13 being relevant is extracted as under:
“13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the
judgment passed by the Writ Court runs contrary to the view
taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of VidyaWP(C) No.2030/2021 Page 10 of 12
2026:JKLHC-JMU:987Devi supra. Under somewhat similar circumstances, a case of one
Amina Begum was considered by a Division Bench of this Court
in LPA No. 105/2019 titled Amina Begum vs. State of JK & Ors.
The Division Bench relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Vidya Devi and the other one titled State of
UP & Ors. vs. Manohar reported in AIR 2005 SC 488 rejected
the similar plea of delay and laches put forth by the Union
Territory of J&K in the aforesaid case.”
12. Having regard to above referred legal precedents and the indisputed
facts that the land in question before partition of the sub-continent was in the
name of the one Abdul Haq which was later declared as Evacuee Property,
initially allotted to one Suchet Singh a displaced person from Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir and then conferred occupancy rights under J&K Agrarian Reforms Act
1976, had been divested of this land by the respondent-Rural Development of
the Government of Jammu & Kashmir, unauthorizedly. Both the contentions of
the respondent-department (a) with regard to donation and (b) defeating the
claim of the petitioner as succession-in-interest of his father, being inordinately
delayed cannot be accepted, in view of the factual background that there is
neither any documentary evidence with regard to donation by the petitioner or
his predecessor-in-interest or any revenue entry in this behalf and that the
landholder cannot be divested of his landed estate by the State or its
functionaries, without resorting to its acquisition or payment of compensation
and even a delayed claim for compensation cannot be turned down.
13. Viewed thus, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner is
entitled to be compensated for deprivation of his property. The petition is, thus,
allowed with a direction to the respondent no.1 to immediately and forthwith
initiate the process of acquisition, in accordance with The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
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Resettlement Act, 2013, within a period of four weeks from the date a copy of
this judgment is supplied today and determine the compensation payable to the
owner of the subject land under possession of the Rural Development
Department and thereafter the compensation be paid to the petitioner,
expeditiously.
14. The petition stands disposed of along with connected application(s) on
the above terms.
(M A Chowdhary)
Judge
JAMMU
08.04.2026
Surinder
Whether the order is speaking: Yes
Whether the order is reportable: Yes
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