Chattisgarh High Court
Shami Akhtar @ Chand vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 2 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:27118-DB
MANPREET
KAUR NAFR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
Date: 2026.07.03
15:59:42 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1518 of 2024
Shami Akhtar @ Chand S/o Late Kainul Hassan Aged About 20 Years
R/o - Ward No. 05, Mouharpara Police Station Manendragarh,
Manendragarh-Chirmiri- Bharatpur (C.G)
... Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police
Station Manendragarh, District Manendragarh, District Manendragarh-
Chirmiri- Bharatpur (C.G)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer
For Objector : Mr. Ravi Kumar Banjare, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
02.07.2026
1. This criminal appeal under Section 415 of the BNSS is directed
against the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2024 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.S.C. (POCSO),
2
Manendragarh, District- Koriya (C.G.) in Special Criminal Cae
(POCSO) No. 63/2022 whereby learned trial Court has convicted
the appellant as under :-
Conviction Sentence Fine Additional
under Section Imprisonment in
default of
payment of fine
Section 376(3) of R.I. for 20 years Rs. 1000/- 2 months R.I.
the IPC
Section 6 of the R.I. for 20 years Rs. 1000/- 2 months R.I.
POCSO Act
Both sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 05.06.2022, the victim
lodged a written complaint at Police Station Manendragarh
alleging that on 20.03.2020, while she had gone to her friend’s
house, the appellant allegedly took advantage of an opportunity
when she was alone and committed penetrative sexual assault
upon her against her will. It was further alleged that thereafter the
appellant threatened to kill her and also threatened to circulate her
photographs, thereby compelling her to maintain physical relations
with him on subsequent occasions. The complaint further alleged
that the appellant induced the victim with a promise of marriage
and continued to establish physical relations with her on that
pretext. It was also alleged that the appellant obtained a sum of
Rs.40,000/- from the victim on the pretext of purchasing a mobile
phone. As the victim was stated to be a minor at the relevant time,
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FIR No. 209/2022 was registered for offences punishable under
Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3) and 506 Part II of the Indian Penal
Code, along with Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
3. During investigation, the statements of the victim and her mother
were recorded. The victim was medically examined after obtaining
the requisite consent, and the spot map of the place of occurrence
was prepared. During the course of investigation, the
memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded, and
various articles, including biological samples, the appellant’s
clothing, and a mobile phone allegedly used in connection with the
offence, were seized in accordance with law. The seized articles
were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory for
examination.
4. The investigating agency also collected the school admission and
birth records of the victim for determination of her age. Her
statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
was recorded before the jurisdictional Magistrate. Upon
completion of the investigation and after receipt of the forensic
reports, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for
offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
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5. The appellant denied the charges and claimed trial. In his
statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against
him and pleaded false implication.
6. In support of its case, the prosecution examined eight witnesses,
including the victim, her parents, the concerned teacher, the
medical experts, and the Investigating Officer. The defence
examined one witness in support of its case
7. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned
trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced
him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence are contrary to the
evidence available on record and are liable to be set aside. It was
contended that the appellant has been falsely implicated and is
innocent of the charges. It was further argued that there are
material contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of
the victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. and in her
deposition before the Trial Court, particularly regarding the place
of occurrence and her date of birth, thereby rendering the
prosecution case doubtful. Learned counsel submitted that the
prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident,
especially in view of the discrepancies in the evidence of her
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parents and the school records relating to her age. It was also
urged that the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of more
than four years from the alleged first incident, which casts serious
doubt on the prosecution version. Referring to the medical
evidence, it was submitted that the medical examination does not
corroborate the allegation of forcible sexual assault. It was further
contended that the appellant has no criminal antecedents and that
the learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the
evidence on record, resulting in an erroneous finding of guilt
based on conjectures and surmises rather than legally admissible
and reliable evidence. It was, therefore, prayed that the appeal be
allowed, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set
aside, and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges.
9. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned
judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court
and submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated
the oral and documentary evidence available on record. It was
contended that the testimony of the victim is cogent, trustworthy
and inspires confidence, and the same stands duly corroborated
by the other prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence
on record. Learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution
has successfully established the age of the victim and proved the
charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was
argued that the alleged discrepancies pointed out by the appellant
are minor in nature and do not go to the root of the prosecution
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case so as to discredit the otherwise reliable evidence. It was,
therefore, prayed that the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves
to be dismissed and the conviction and sentence recorded by the
learned Trial Court be affirmed.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the objector opposed the appeal
and supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly
appreciated the evidence available on record and has rightly
convicted the appellant. It was, therefore, prayed that the appeal,
being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and went through the
records with utmost circumspection.
12. The first question which arises for consideration is, “whether the
prosecution has been able to establish that the victim was a minor
on the date of the alleged incident” ?
13. To prove the age of the victim, the prosecution examined PW-3,
the concerned teacher of St. Patrick’s Academy, Manendragarh,
who produced the original admission register (Ex.P/10) and its
certified copy (Ex.P/10C). As per the said register, the date of birth
of the victim is recorded as 23.04.2004 and the date of her
admission in KG-II is shown as 28.06.2008. However, in his cross-
examination, PW-3 categorically admitted that he had neither
made the entry relating to the date of birth nor was he aware of
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the basis on which the said date of birth came to be recorded in
the admission register. He further admitted that the same date of
birth is also reflected in the Class-X marksheet of the victim.
14. On the other hand, the oral evidence led by the prosecution itself
presents a different picture. The victim (PW-2), in her
examination-in-chief, stated that her date of birth is 11.07.2006.
Her mother (PW-1), in her cross-examination, also stated that the
victim was born on 11.07.2006, whereas her father (PW-5)
deposed that the victim was born in the year 2006. Thus, the oral
testimony of the victim and her parents is not consistent with the
documentary evidence relied upon by the prosecution.
15. It is, therefore, evident that there exists a discrepancy regarding
the exact date of birth of the victim. While the school records
indicate her date of birth as 23.04.2004, the victim herself and
both her parents have stated that she was born in the year 2006,
the victim and her mother specifically mentioning the date as
11.07.2006. Although no birth certificate has been exhibited during
trial, the evidence on record consistently indicates that the victim
was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged
incident. The controversy, therefore, is confined to her exact date
of birth and not to her minority.
16. It is settled law that although an entry in a school admission
register is relevant under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act,
its evidentiary value depends upon proof of the source from which
8
such information was derived. Where the witness producing the
register is unable to disclose the basis of the entry and the entry
itself is contradicted by the oral evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, the Court is required to scrutinize such evidence with
greater caution before acting upon it.
17. The learned Trial Court, while considering the aforesaid evidence,
observed that irrespective of whether the date of birth of the victim
is taken to be 23.04.2004, as reflected in the school records, or
11.07.2006, as stated by the victim and her parents, she would
still be below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged
incident. Proceeding on the said premise, the learned Trial Court
concluded that the victim was a minor at the relevant point of time.
18. During the course of hearing, learned State counsel submitted
that the Investigating Agency had also subsequently seized the
birth certificate of the victim, which also reflects that she was
below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident,
though the said document does not form part of the paper-book
transmitted to this Court. Be that as it may, upon an overall
appreciation of the evidence available on record, we find that
notwithstanding the discrepancy regarding the exact date of birth,
the evidence of PW-2, PW-1 and PW-5, coupled with the school
admission register (Ex.P/10), consistently indicates that the victim
was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged
incident. We are, therefore, in agreement with the finding of the
9
learned Trial Court to the extent that the prosecution has
established that the victim was a minor within the meaning of
Section 2(1)(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012. However, having regard to the inconsistency regarding
the exact date of birth, we refrain from affirming the finding that
the victim was below sixteen years of age on the date of the
alleged incident, as the evidence in that regard is not free from
doubt.
19. This leads naturally into the next point that having held that the
prosecution has failed to satisfactorily establish the age of the
victim, the next question which arises for consideration is whether
the prosecution has nevertheless succeeded in proving the
charges against the appellant under the provisions of the Indian
Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt.
20. The star witness of the prosecution is the victim (PW-2). In her
examination-in-chief, she deposed that she had known the
appellant since the year 2019. According to her, on the date of the
first incident, she had gone to the house of the appellant’s sister
for applying mehendi. After having refreshments, when she went
to wash her hands, the appellant allegedly took advantage of the
situation and committed penetrative sexual assault upon her. She
further stated that the appellant took her photographs and
threatened to make them viral, because of which she did not
disclose the incident to anyone. She further deposed that
10
thereafter the appellant continued to establish physical relations
with her on several occasions by extending threats and on the
pretext of marriage. She identified the written complaint (Ex.P/3),
the First Information Report (Ex.P/4) and also proved her
statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
21. In her cross-examination, the victim admitted that several
residential houses are situated adjacent to the house of the
appellant. She further admitted that despite the alleged
occurrence having taken place in the house of the appellant, she
neither raised any alarm nor informed any of the neighbouring
persons about the incident. She also admitted that she had
voluntarily gone to the house of the appellant’s sister on her
invitation. She denied the suggestion that the report was lodged
falsely on account of a monetary dispute between her family and
the appellant.
22. A careful scrutiny of the testimony of the victim reveals certain
inconsistencies on material particulars. In the written complaint
and in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the allegation is that the first incident
occurred inside the room of the appellant. However, in her
statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure as well as in her deposition before the Trial Court, she
stated that the first incident occurred in the courtyard of the
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appellant’s house. The prosecution has not offered any
explanation for the aforesaid variation regarding the place of
occurrence.
23. It is true that every discrepancy occurring in the testimony of a
witness cannot be treated as fatal to the prosecution case. Minor
inconsistencies arising from lapse of memory or passage of time
are liable to be ignored. However, where the inconsistencies
relate to the genesis of the prosecution case or to material
particulars having a bearing on the occurrence itself, the Court is
required to examine such evidence with greater circumspection.
The contradiction regarding the place where the first alleged
incident occurred assumes significance in the facts of the present
case, particularly when the prosecution seeks conviction primarily
on the sole testimony of the victim.
24. PW-1, the mother of the victim, deposed that the victim used to
work as a mehendi artist and had gone to the house of her friend
on the date of the alleged incident. According to her, the victim
subsequently informed her that the appellant had committed
sexual assault upon her and had threatened to circulate her
photographs if she disclosed the incident to anyone. She further
stated that the appellant continued to call the victim and establish
physical relations with her. In her cross-examination, she denied
the defence suggestion that she had received money from the
12
appellant or that a false case had been lodged due to a monetary
dispute.
25. The testimony of PW-1 is, however, not based on her personal
knowledge of the occurrence. Her evidence is entirely founded
upon what was allegedly narrated to her by the victim after the
incident. Consequently, her testimony is corroborative in nature
and does not constitute direct evidence of the alleged occurrence.
26. PW-5, the father of the victim, did not claim to have any direct
knowledge of the alleged incident. He deposed that he came to
know about the incident through his wife. During his cross-
examination, he denied the defence suggestion that a false case
had been lodged against the appellant on account of a monetary
dispute. Thus, the testimony of PW-5 is also hearsay insofar as
the occurrence is concerned and does not materially advance the
prosecution case.
27. PW-6, Woman Head Constable Sunita Ekka, proved the
registration of the First Information Report and the procedural
steps taken during investigation, including forwarding the victim
for medical examination. Her testimony is formal in nature.
28. PW-7, Dr. Archana Kumhare, medically examined the victim on
06.06.2022 after obtaining the requisite consent. She proved the
medical examination report (Ex.P/13). In her deposition, she
stated that secondary sexual characteristics were present, the
hymen was found torn and there were no external or internal
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injuries over the body or genitalia of the victim. Vaginal slides
were prepared, sealed and handed over to the police for forensic
examination. The doctor opined that there were signs suggestive
of sexual intercourse, however, she did not express any opinion
regarding the time, manner or identity of the person with whom
such intercourse may have taken place.
29. PW-4, Dr. Aditya Dubey, examined the appellant pursuant to the
requisition sent by the Investigating Officer and proved his
medical examination report (Ex.P/11). He opined that the
appellant was physically capable of performing sexual intercourse.
His testimony is confined to the physical capability of the appellant
and does not establish the commission of the alleged offence.
30. PW-8, Hiralal Kujur, the Investigating Officer, deposed regarding
the various steps undertaken during investigation. He proved the
spot map (Ex.P/5), the memorandum statement of the appellant
(Ex.P/18), seizure memos relating to the vaginal slides, the
appellant’s underwear and the mobile phone (Exs.P/20 to P/22),
the requisitions for medical examination (Exs.P/12 and P/19), the
forwarding letter sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory
(Ex.P/24), the acknowledgment thereof (Ex.P/25) and the
Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ex.P/26). He further deposed
regarding the collection of the school admission records and the
filing of the charge-sheet.
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31. The prosecution has also relied upon the medical and forensic
evidence to corroborate its case. The medical report (Ex.P/13)
does not record any external or internal injury on the person of the
victim. Though the doctor noticed that the hymen was torn and
opined that there were signs of sexual intercourse, no opinion
could be expressed regarding the age of the injury or the identity
of the person responsible.
32. The articles seized during investigation, including the vaginal
slides of the victim, the semen slides and underwear of the
appellant, were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory,
Ambikapur. The FSL report (Ex.P/26) did not detect semen stains
or human spermatozoa on the exhibits forwarded for examination.
While it is true that a negative FSL report by itself is not conclusive
to discard the prosecution case, at the same time it does not lend
any corroboration to the allegations levelled against the appellant.
33. Having considered the entire oral and documentary evidence on
record, it is evident that the prosecution case rests substantially
upon the testimony of the victim (PW-2). It is well settled that
conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the victim,
provided her evidence is of sterling quality, wholly reliable and
inspires confidence. However, where material discrepancies or
circumstances creating reasonable doubt emerge from the record,
the Court is duty-bound to examine such evidence with greater
care before recording a conviction.
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34. In the present case, the victim, in her examination-in-chief,
deposed that the first incident occurred in the courtyard of the
appellant’s house when she had gone there for applying mehendi.
However, from the written complaint (Ex.P/3), the statement
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the submissions
advanced on behalf of the appellant, it appears that the
prosecution version regarding the place of the first alleged
occurrence has not remained consistent throughout. While one
version indicates that the alleged incident took place inside a
room of the appellant’s house, another version refers to the
courtyard. The prosecution has not offered any satisfactory
explanation for this inconsistency, which relates to the very place
of occurrence.
35. The First Information Report was admittedly lodged on
05.06.2022, whereas the first alleged incident is stated to have
taken place on 20.03.2020. Although delay in lodging an FIR in
cases of sexual offences cannot, by itself, be treated as fatal to
the prosecution, such delay is nevertheless a relevant
circumstance while appreciating the evidence on record. The
explanation furnished by the prosecution is that the victim
remained silent due to threats allegedly extended by the
appellant. The said explanation has to be tested in the light of the
overall evidence and surrounding circumstances.
16
36. It is also noteworthy that the medical evidence and the forensic
evidence do not furnish any independent corroboration connecting
the appellant with the alleged offence. As noticed hereinabove, no
external or internal injuries were found on the person of the victim
and the FSL report (Ex.P/26) did not detect any incriminating
biological material on the exhibits examined. Though such
evidence is not conclusive by itself, its absence assumes
significance when the prosecution case is otherwise attended with
material inconsistencies.
37. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
medical and forensic evidence does not provide the degree of
assurance necessary to sustain the conviction of the appellant.
38. In Alamelu & Another (supra), where the facts and
circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Supreme
Court observed as under:
“51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan
{AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the
sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the
aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court
observed as follows:-
“The rule, which according to the cases has
hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration
is essential before there can be a conviction but
that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of
prudence, except where the circumstances make it
safe to dispense with it, must be present to the
mind of the judge, … The only rule of law is that this
rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the
judge or the jury as the case may be and be
17understood and appreciated by him or them. There
is no rule of practice that there must, in every case,
be corroboration before a conviction can be
allowed to stand.”
52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated
by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently.
These observations leave no manner of doubt that a
conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated
testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any
basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it
unworthy of credence.
xxx xxx xxx
54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that
Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house
and told him that he had married her. They had come to
see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness
categorically stated that he thought that they were
newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door
No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his
responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police
inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this
witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by
threatening her and “spoiled her”. The girl, according to
the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid
premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying
with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did
not even complain to this witness or any other residents
in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to
anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly
abducted would be wholly unnatural.
55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to
complain or to run away, but she made no such effort.
It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing
some known persons near the car, after her alleged
abduction. She did not make any complaint at the
residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti.
Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives
allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives
apparently took no steps at the time when
mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by
Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a
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car was available. She made no complaint when she
was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru
Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there
was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police
station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at
the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been
married. The above behaviour would not be natural for
a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected
to illicit sexual intercourse.
56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with
which the appellants had been charged. It appears
that the entire prosecution story has been concocted
for reasons best known to the prosecution.”
39. In the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of
Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has
held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very
much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong
for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:-
“16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of
the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to
18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the
offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not
be made out.
17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of
Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an
occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for
consideration in the present case. This Court has
observed thus:
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“7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away
a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an
essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here,
we are not concerned with enticement but what we
have to find out is whether the part played by the
appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the
lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that
though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the
house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued
to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the
question remains as to what is it which the appellant
did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word
in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference
could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan
at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant.
In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of
October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to
meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that
place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car
of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not
tell the appellant where to go and that it was the
appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then
to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has
stated that she had decided to marry the appellant.
There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to
the Sub-Registrar’s office and got the agreement of
marriage registered there (thinking that this was
sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force
or blandishments or anything like that. On the other
hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the
insistence of marriage came from her side. The
appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no
stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of
20the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the
registration of the agreement both the appellant and
Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different
places. There is no suggestion in Savitri’s evidence,
who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of
discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority
that she was made by the appellant to accompany him
by administering any threat to her or by any
blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the
appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri’s own
desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the
desire of accompanying him wherever he went was
course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing
from which an inference could be drawn that the
appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of
the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied
him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of
taking her back to her father’s house or even of telling
her not to accompany him. She was not a child of
tender years who was unable to think for herself but,
as already stated, was on the verge of attaining
majority and was capable of knowing what was good
and what was bad for her…….”
18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according
to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was
between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the
age of understanding as to what was right and wrong
for her.
19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be
clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the
appellant herein, travelled to various places and also
resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.”
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40. Having given our anxious consideration to the entire evidence
available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
prosecution has not been able to establish the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
41. As discussed hereinabove, although the prosecution has
established that the victim was below eighteen years of age on
the date of the alleged incident, it has failed to conclusively
establish that she was below sixteen years of age. In such
circumstances, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Tilku @ Tilak Singh (supra), that a girl between sixteen and
eighteen years of age is capable of understanding the nature and
consequences of her acts, assume relevance while appreciating
the overall evidence on record. The said circumstance, however,
is not by itself decisive, but is one of the factors to be considered
along with the other evidence available on record.
42. In the present case, the testimony of the victim is attended by
material inconsistencies with regard to the place of the first
alleged occurrence. The FIR came to be lodged after a
considerable lapse of time. The medical evidence does not
disclose any injuries and the FSL report does not furnish any
incriminating material connecting the appellant with the alleged
offence. Though each of these circumstances, taken individually,
may not be sufficient to discard the prosecution case, their
22
cumulative effect creates a reasonable doubt regarding the
prosecution version.
43. Criminal jurisprudence mandates that the prosecution must prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence leaves
room for two possible views, the one favourable to the accused
must prevail. On an overall appreciation of the oral, documentary,
medical and forensic evidence, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant
is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
44. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 31.07.2024 passed by the
learned trial Court is hereby set aside. The accused / appellant is
acquitted of the said charges levelled against him.
45. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now
Section 481 of BNSS), the appellant is directed to furnish a
personal bonds in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of
Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties in
the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be
effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that
in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant
judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt
of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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46. The trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent
back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Manpreet
