Managing Director Pepsu Road Transport … vs Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal … on 22 January, 2026

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Managing Director Pepsu Road Transport … vs Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal … on 22 January, 2026

CWP-22606-2017                                  -1-




247
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                       AT CHANDIGARH

                                 CWP-22606-2017
                                 Date of Decision: 22.01.2026

MANAGING DIRECTOR PEPSU ROAD TRANSPORT CORP
PATIALA AND ANOTHER
                                    -PETITIONERS

                                          V/S

PRESIDING OFFICER INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BATHINDA
AND ANOTHER

                                                           -RESPONDENTS

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present      Mr. Anil Shama, Advocate and
             Ms. Devyani Sharma, Advocate,
             for the petitioners.

             Ms. Anamika Sheoran, Advocate for
             Mr. Vikas Singh, Advocate,
             for respondent no.2.

        *****
KULDEEP TIWARI, J. (Oral)

1. The sole ground on which the petitioner-management has

challenged the Award dated 27.02.2017 (Annexure P-2), by way of the

present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is

due to an inordinate delay of 16 years in raising the industrial dispute,

inasmuch as the respondent no. 2-workman was terminated from service

on dated 22.06.1996, whereas the demand was raised vide demand notice

on dated 20.09.2012.

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2. In the instant case, the reference was answered in favour of

respondent no.2-workman, despite the issue of delay and latches having

been, specifically, raised by the petitioner-management before the learned

Tribunal concerned. However, the latter concerned, observed that since

the reference itself, has not been challenged, the delay would not be held

to be fatal, therefore, it had no other option except to decide the reference

on merits. Consequently, while exercising the powers as envisaged under

Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the learned Tribunal

concerned, answered the reference in favour of respondent no.2-

workman, and order of punishment was interfered with by converting the

punishment of termination from service to compulsory retirement with all

his retiral benefits intact, including the pension, as admissible to him,

alongwith the arrears of pension restricted to three years prior to

institution of claim/reference.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner addressed arguments only

on the ground of delay and latches. He submits that the stale claims,

cannot form the basis for an industrial dispute, and there must be a

reasonable explanation for such delay to raise such dispute. In the instant

case, there is an inordinate delay of 16 years, and there is not even a

whisper in the claim statement, explaining therein, the reasons of such

prolonged delay.

4. Learned counsel for respondent no.2-workman, on the other

hand, submits that the petitioner-management has never challenged the

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reference at any stage, therefore, now they cannot raise the issue of delay

and latches. Once the reference has been made by the State Government,

the learned Tribunal concerned, had no other option, except to decide the

issue on merits, including the issue relating to the legality of the

termination order.

5. This Court has considered the submissions, as made by

learned counsel for the parties concerned, and has perused the impugned

Award.

6. There is no wrangle amongst the parties, that the claim

statement/demand notice was filed after 16 years from the date of the

termination of respondent no.2-workman. Now, the issue arises for

consideration, as to whether, in view of Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, wherein, no period of limitation is prescribed, the

stale claim can still be entertained, and reference can be made; and

whether, the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Courts, is bound to

decide such reference without taking into account the issue of delay and

latches.

7. To answer the aforesaid query, lets have glimpse upon the

provision of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is

extracted hereinafter:-

(1)[Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by
order in writing-

(a)refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement
thereof; or

(b)refer any matter appearing to be connected with or

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relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or

(c)[ refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be
connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to
any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour
Court for adjudication; or,

(d)refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected
with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any
matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third
Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication:

Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter
specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than
one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so
thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c):]
[Provided further that where the dispute relates to a
public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given,
the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the
notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be
inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section
notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in
respect of the dispute may have commenced.

[Provided also that where the dispute in relation to
which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it
shall be competent for the Government to refer the dispute to a
Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be,
constituted by the State Government.

[(1-A) Where the Central Government is of opinion
that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the dispute
involves any question of national importance or is of such a nature
that industrial establishments situated in more than one State are
likely to be interested in, or affected by, such dispute and that the
dispute should be adjudicated by a National Tribunal, then, the
Central Government may, whether or not it is the appropriate
Government in relation to that dispute, at any time, by order in
writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected
with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter
specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a
National Tribunal for adjudication.

2) Where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed
manner, whether jointly or separately, for a reference of the dispute
to a Board, Court, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunall,
the appropriate Government, if satisfied that the persons applying
represent the majority of each party, shall make the reference
accordingly.

[(2-A) An order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section shall specify the
period within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National

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Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the appropriate
Government:

Provided that where such industrial dispute is connected with an
individual workman, no such period shall exceed three months:

Provided further that where the parties to an industrial dispute
apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, to the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for extension of such
period or for any other reason, and the presiding officer of such
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal considers it necessary
or expedient to extend such period, he may for reasons to be
recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he
may think fit:

Provided also that in computing any period specified in this sub-
section, the period, if any, for which the proceedings before the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal had been stayed by
any injunction or order of a Civil Court shall be excluded:

Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal
or National Tribunal shall lapse merely on the ground that any
period specified under this sub-section had expired without such
proceedings being completed.]

(3) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board,
[Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section,
the appropriate Government may by order prohibit the continuance
of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute disp
which may be in existence on the date of the reference

(4) Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to Ha Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section or in a
subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the
points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal
or the National Tribunal, as the case may be,] shall confine its
adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto.

(5) Where a dispute concerning any establishment or
establishments has been, or is to be, referred to a [Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section and the
appropriate Government is of opinion, whether on an application
made to it in this behalf or otherwise, that the dispute is of such a
nature that any other establishment, group or class of
establishments of a similar nature is likely to be interested in, or
affected by, such dispute, the appropriate Government may, at the
time of making the reference or at any time thereafter but before
the submission of the award, include in that reference such
establishment, group or class of establishments, whether or not at

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the time of such inclusion any dispute exists or is apprehended in
that establishment, group or class of establishments.]

[(6) Where any reference has been made under sub-section (1-A) to
a National Tribunal, then notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, no Labour Court or Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon any matter which is under adjudication before the
National Tribunal, and accordingly, –

(a) if the matter under adjudication before the National Tribunal is
pending in a proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal, the
proceeding before the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case
may be, in so far as it relates to such matter, shall be deemed to
have been quashed on such reference to the National Tribunal; and

(b) it shall not be lawful for the appropriate Government to refer
the matter under adjudication before the National Tribunal to any
Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication during the pendency of
the proceeding in relation to such matter before the National
Tribunal.

[Explanation. In this sub-section, “Labour Court” or “Tribunal”
includes any Court or Tribunal or other authority constituted under
any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes in force in any State.]

(7) Where any industrial dispute, in relation to which the Central
Government is not the appropriate Government, is referred to a
National Tribunal, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, any reference in section 15, section 17, section 19, section 33-
A, section 33-B and section 36-A to the appropriate Government in
relation to such dispute shall be construed as a reference to the
Central Government but, save as aforesaid and as otherwise
expressly provided in this Act, any reference in any other provision
of this Act to the appropriate Government in relation to that dispute
shall mean a reference to the State Government.]

[(8) No proceedings pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute shall lapse
merely by reason of the death of any of the parties to the dispute
being a workman, and such Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal shall complete such proceedings and submit its award to
the appropriate Government.]

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8. Admittedly, there is no time limit prescribed in the above

extracted provision, however, as to whether, the stale claim can be filed,

has been considered by this court in “State of Punjab and others vs.

Gurwinder Singh and another“, 2009 (3) SCT 119, wherein it was held

by a co-ordinate bench of this Court, that stale claims cannot become a

basis for an industrial dispute. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment

is extracted hereinafter:-

“5. The factual position with regard to the delay in making the
demand and claiming an industrial dispute has not been
disputed. As per the assertion of the workman, his services
were terminated on 8.9.1986. The demand notice is dated
17.10.1995. The delay is apparently of more than nine years.
No explanation whatsoever has come on record which can be
said to be justifiable for not approaching or claiming the
dispute within a reasonable time before the Appropriate
Government. The principles as enunciated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Limited Case
(supra) and Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam and another’s
case (supra), would be fully applicable to the present case.

There is a lapse of more than 9 years in making a demand to
the Appropriate Government. Therefore, by no stretch of
imagination it can be said that a dispute could exist after such
a long delay, moreso when no cogent reasons have come forth
explaining the delay in making the demand notice. The stale
claims cannot be said to form the basis of an industrial dispute
and as a matter of fact, no industrial dispute can be said to
have existed after a long period of 9 years from the date of
termination. Thus, relying upon the ratio of the judgments,
referred to above on the question of delay, the writ petition
deserves to be allowed on this ground alone. In view of the
above, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned
award dated 28.3.2008 (Annexure P-8) passed by the Labour
Court, Bathinda is hereby set aside.”

9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also considered the issue in

question, in its judgment in “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs.

K.P.Madhavankutty” 2000 (1) SCT 1088, wherein, it was held that if

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the demand notice is issued after a lapse of a long time, the Government,

has to consider, as to whether, at that time, some industrial dispute

existed, and, further, the dispute does not arise merely by issuing a

demand notice. In this case, the reference was made after a lapse of 07

years, which was held to be unjustified. The relevant paragraphs are

extracted hereinafter:-

“6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the
appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section
10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any
point of time and to revive matters which had since been
settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational
manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which
the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after
lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent
from service. At the time reference was made no industrial
dispute existed or could be even said to have been
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-
matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a
dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final,
it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be
made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the
present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute
pending at the time when the reference in question was made.
The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two
other employees who were dismissed from service were
reinstated. Under that circumstances they were dismissed and
subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised
by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad
and incompetent.

7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent
that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his
dismissal were in any way illegal or there was even any
irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules
governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in
the circumstances industrial dispute did arise or was even
apprehended after lapse of about seven years of the dismissal
of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it
does not become industrial dispute and appropriate
Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference
of the alleged dispute terming as industrial dispute. Central

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Government lacked power to make reference both on the
ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the
Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even
apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial
peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive
to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose
of the Act. Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court
seeking an order to quash the reference in question.

8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference
has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has
to decide the same and High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot
interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a
correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does
not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels
outside that it is certainly subject to judicial review limited
though it might be. High Court can exercise its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of very
jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engineering
Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2000(1) SCT 717
(SC): JT 1999(9) SC 377 this Court observed :-

“It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition when there is allegation that
there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended
which could be subject matter of reference for
adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10
of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the
industrial dispute, which could be examined by the
High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of
the industrial tribunal which would clothe the
appropriate Government with power to make the
reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If
there is no industrial dispute in existence or
apprehended appropriate Government lacks power to
make any reference.”

10. Similarly, in “Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam and

another vs. Sham Lal” 2006 (3) SCT 468, also, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that though there is no provision in the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, under which the limitation may be applied to the reference

under Section 10 of the said Act, however, belated claim will not be

entertained, and referred by the appropriate government. In this case, the

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delay of 4-5 years was held to be fatal to the case of the workman. The

relevant paragraphs are extracted hereinafter:-

“9. So far as delay in seeking the reference is concerned, no
formula of universal application can be laid down. It would
depend on facts of each individual case.

However, certain observations made by this Court need to be
noted. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and
Ors., 2000(1) SCT 1088: (2000(2) SCC 455) it was noted at
paragraph 6 as follows:

“6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the
appropriate Government to exercise its powers under
Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be
exercised at any point of time and to revive matters
which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised
reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to
us to be no rational basis on which the Central
Government has exercised powers in this case after a
lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the
respondent from service. At the time reference was
made no industrial dispute existed or could be even
said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale
could not be the subject-matter of reference under
Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said
to be stale would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. When the matter has
become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous
that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act
in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it
could be said that there was no dispute pending at the
time when the reference in question was made. The
only ground advanced by the respondent was that two
other employees who were dismissed from service
were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were
dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere
mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for
raising an industrial dispute was ex-facie bad and
incompetent.”

10. In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka, 2003(2) SCT 1013: (2003(4) SCC 27)
the position was reiterated as follows: (at para 17)

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on
account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants
the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

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appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s.
Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra) (AIR
1959 SC 1217), that merely because the Industrial
Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising
the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be
raised at any time and without regard to the delay and
reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for
reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it
is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as
soon as possible after they have arisen and after
conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when
disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A
delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even
reemployment of the most of the old workmen was held
to be fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their
Workmen, (AIR 1959 SC 1217). (supra) In Nedungadi
Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others AIR 2000
SC 839 (supra), a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal
and disentitled to workmen to any relief. In Ratan
Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union of India and
others (1993 AIR SCW 2214, (supra) it was held that a
casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives
himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse
of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well.
The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and
rendered not available. However, we do not think that the
delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to
disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the High
Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in
raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we find the
High Court factually not correct. The employment of the
appellants was terminated sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-

87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily Rated Casual
Employees Under P&T Department v. Union of India
(AIR 1987 SC 2342), the department was formulating a
scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the
appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome
thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were refused to be
accommodated in the scheme. On 28-12-1990 they
initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes
Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the
dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal cum-
Labour Court. We do not think that the appellants
deserve to be non sulted on the ground of delay.”

The above position was highlighted recently in
Employers in relation to the Management of Sudamdih
Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Their

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Workmen represented by Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor
Sangh, 1995(1) S.C.T. 392: (2006(1) Supreme 282).

Above being the position, impugned judgment of the
High Court is indefensible and is set aside.

The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs. In
case the respondent has been reinstated pursuant to the order
of the Labour Court or the High Court, salary and other
emoluments paid to him shall not be recovered.

Appeal allowed.”

11. Similarly, in “UP State Road Transport Corporation vs.

Babu Ram” 2006 (3) SCT 486, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, observed

and held as under:-

“5. So far as delay in seeking the reference is concerned, no
formula of universal application can be laid down. It would
depend on facts of each individual case.

However, certain observations made by this Court need to be
noted. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and
Ors., 2000(1) SCT 1088: (2000(2) SCC 455) it was noted at
paragraph 6 as follows:

“6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the
appropriate Government to exercise its powers under
Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be
exercised at any point of time and to revive matters
which had since heel) settled. Power is to be exercised
reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us
to be no rational basis on which the Central Government
has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about
seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from
service. At the time reference was made no industrial
dispute existed or could be even said to have been
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the
subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act.
As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be
rather incongruous that the reference be made under
Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the
present one. In fact it could be said that there was no
dispute pending at the time when the reference in
question was made. The only ground advanced by the

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respondent was that two other employees who were
dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what
circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently
reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the
respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex-facie
bad and incompetent.”

In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager,
Karnataka, 2003(2) SCT 1013: (2003(4) SCC 27) the
position was reiterated as follows: (at para 17)

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that
on account of delay in raising the dispute by the
appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief
to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in
M/s. Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra)
(AIR 1959 SC 1217), that merely because the Industrial
Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for
raising the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can
be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and
reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for
reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it
is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as
soon as possible after they have arisen and after
conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so
when disputes relate to discharge of workmen
wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after
even reemployment of the most of the old workmen was
held to be fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their
Workmen (AIR 1959 SC 1217) (supra). In Nedungadi
Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others, AIR 2000
SC 839 (supra), a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal
and disentitled to workmen to any relief in Ratan
Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union of India and
others (1993 AIR SCW 2214), it was held that a casual
labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of
remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time
results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The
delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and
rendered not available. However, we do not think that
the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to
disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the
High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9
years in raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we
find the High Court factually not correct. The
employment of the appellants was terminated sometime
in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in
Daily Rated Casual Employees Under P&T Department

v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 2342), the department
was formulating a scheme to accommodate casual
labourers and the appellants were justified in awaiting
the outcome thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were refused to
be accommodated in the scheme. On 28-12-1990 they
initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes
Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the
dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal cum-
Labour Court. We do not think that the appellants
deserve to be non-suited on the ground of delay.”

The above position was highlighted recently in Employers in
relation to the Management of Sudamdih Colliery of M/s
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Their Workmen represented by
Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh 2006(1) S.C.T. 766:

(2006(1) Supreme 282).

6. It is to be noted that the High Court has very cryptically
disposed of the writ petition. The workman has not placed any
material to show that it had raised dispute within a reasonable
time, and/or that he was not responsible for delayed decision if
any in the conciliation proceedings. It was for him to show that
the dispute was raised within a reasonable time and that he was
not responsible for any delay. The High Court, on a
hypothetical basis, has assumed that the dispute might have
been raised promptly but delayed by the State Government and
he cannot be penalised for delay in finalising the conciliation
proceedings and the reference. But neither the Labour Court
nor the High Court has even noted the factual position. The
conclusion was based on surmises and conjectures.

That being so, the order of the High Court is clearly
unsustainable. We, therefore, set aside the order of the High
Court and remit the matter to the High Court to consider the
question of delay in seeking reference and decide the matter
afresh in accordance with law.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.

Appeal allowed.”

12. In the anvil of the above settled legal prepositions, this

Court finds that the learned Tribunal concerned, has erroneously,

recorded findings with regard to the delay and latches, which requires

interference. Even though no specific period of limitation is prescribed

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under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is now well settled that stale

and belated claims cannot be entertained, as the same defeats the very

object of industrial adjudication, and unsettle settled rights. In the present

case, the respondent no. 2-workman raised the industrial dispute after an

inordinate delay of 16 years from the date of termination, without

furnishing any explanation, whatsoever, for such prolonged silence.

13. Resultantly, the instant petition, is hereby, allowed, and the

impugned Award is ordered to be set aside.

                                                 (KULDEEP TIWARI)
January 22, 2026                                      JUDGE
dharamvir


             Whether speaking/reasoned.          :   Yes/No
             Whether Reportable.                 :   Yes/No




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