Bombay High Court
Mandar Mahesh Vaidya vs The State Of Maharashtra Thr Prin. Sec. … on 13 February, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:7704-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.6746 OF 2024
ALONG WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.14169 OF 2024
Pawan Rajaramrao Kadam, ].. Petitioner/
R/o. Panvel, Dist. Raigad ] Applicant
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra, ]
Thru Department of Urban Development ]
2. Joint Director, Town Planning, ]
Konkan Division, Navi Mumbai ]
3. Panvel Municipal Corporation, Panvel ]
4. City Industrial & Develop. Corporation, ]
CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai ]
5. CREDAI BANM-RAIGAD Welfare Association ]
CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai ]
6. Okay Developers Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai ]
7. Sharad Ghodke, ]
Social Worker, Sukhpar, New Panvel ] .. Respondents
ALONG WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.10964 OF 2025
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.6746 OF 2024
Okay Developers Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai ] .. Applicant
ALONG WITH
WRIT PETITION (STAMP) NO.17210 OF 2024
Haresh Manohar Keni, ]
R/o. Pethali, Taloje Majkur, Raigad ] .. Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra, ]
Through Office of the Govt. Pleader ]
2. The Principal Secretary (UD-1), ]
Urban Development Department ]
Government of Maharashtra ]
3. Panvel Municipal Corporation, ]
Tal. Panvel, Dist. Raigad ] .. Respondents
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ALONG WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.12870 OF 2025
Mandar Mahesh Vaidya, ]
R/o. Agar Bazar, Dadar, Mumbai ].. Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra, ]
Through Dept. of Urban Development ]
2. Joint Director, Town Planning, ]
Konkan Division, Navi Mumbai ]
3. Panvel Municipal Corporation, ]
Panvel, Dist. Raigad ]
4. City Industrial & Development Corpn., ]
CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai ] .. Respondents
ALONG WITH
WRIT PETITION (STAMP) NO.31132 OF 2025
1. Anuj Mahendra Banthia ]
2. Tanuj Mahendra Banthia ]
3. Akash Mahendra Banthia ]
4. Virendra Ratanchand Banthia ]
5. Sunil Shashikant Banthia ]
6. Neeta Anuj Bhandari ]
7. Manoj Shashikant Banthia ]
8. Rajendra Kantilal Banthia ]
9. Narendra Kantilal Banthia ]
10. Prakash Harakchand Banthia ]
11. Suresh Harakchand Banthia ]
12. Deepali Hemant Bafna ]
13. Subhashchandra Motilal Banthia ] .. Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra, ]
Through Dept. of Urban Development ]
2. Joint Director, Town Planning, ]
Konkan Division, Navi Mumbai ]
3. Panvel Municipal Corporation, Panvel ]
4. City Industrial & Development Corpn., ]
CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai. ] .. Respondents
Appearances in Writ Petition No.6746 of 2024
Dr. Milind Sathe, Senior Advocate with Mr. Mayur
Khandeparkar with Mr. Chinmay Acharya and Mr. Kevin
Pereira, i/by Mr. Balkrishna G. Tangsali, Advocates for the
Petitioner.
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Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Rahul
Soman, i/by Mr. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal, Advocates for the
Respondent no.5-Credai Banm-Raigad.
Mr. Pravin Samdani, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sagheer A.
Khan, Mr. Aqil Khan, Ms. Insha Shaikh, Adv. Sauda S.
Nachan, Adv. Afsha Khan and Mr. Dawood Khan,
Advocates, i/by Judicare Law Associates, for the
Respondent no.6-Okay Developers Pvt. Ltd.
Mr. Bharat R. Zaveri, Advocate for Respondent No.7.
Appearances in Writ Petition (Stamp) No.31132 of 2025
Mr. Anil Y. Sakhare, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Adil L.
Mirza, Advocate for the Petitioners.
Mr. Rahul Sinha with Mr. Soham Bhalerao and Mr. Harshit
Tyagi, Advocates, i/by DSK Legal, for the Respondent-
CIDCO.
Appearances in Writ Petition (Stamp) No.17210 of 2024
Mr. Anil V. Anturkar, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Yatin
Malvankar, i/by Mr. Vaibhav Thorave, Advocates for the
Petitioner.
Appearances in Writ Petition No.12870 of 2025
Mr. Mandar Limaye with Mr. Adil L. Mirza, Advocates for
the Petitioner.
Appearances in all the Writ Petitions
Mr. Ashutosh A. Kumbhakoni, Senior Advocate, Special
Counsel with Ms. Neha Bhide, Government Pleader,
Ms. Shruti D. Vyas, Additional Government Pleader and
Mr. Vaibhav Charalwar, 'B' Panel Counsel and Mrs. G.R.
Raghuwanshi, Assistant Public Prosecutor for the
Respondent-State of Maharashtra in all the Writ Petitions.
Mr. Prasad S. Dani, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sarang S.
Aradhye and Ms. Gauri Velankar, Advocates for the
Respondent-Panvel Municipal Corporation in all the Writ
Petitions.
Mr. R.M. Patne with Mr. Sameer Patil, Advocates for the
Respondent-CIDCO.
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CORAM : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, CJ &
GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.
Judgment is reserved on : 10th December 2025.
Judgment is pronounced on : 13th February 2026.
PER, GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.
The principal challenge in all these writ petitions is to
the Notification dated 7th October 2024 issued under section
37(1AA)(c) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning
Act, 1966 (in short, “impugned Notification” and “MRTP Act”)
and the insertion of clause 10.16 in the Unified Development
Control and Promotion Regulations (in short, “UDCPR”),
which reads as under:
“10.16 Area within Panvel Municipal Corporation-
In area of Panvel Municipal Corporation, 75% of the
total permissible TDR component as mentioned in
column 5 of the Table-6G in the Regulation No.6.3, may
be utilised on payment of premium at the rate of 60%
land rate mentioned in the Annual Statement of Rates
subject to following condition. Balance 25% to be
utilised in the form of TDR only.
Condition:-This provision shall only be applicable till the
sanction of the Development Plan of Panvel
Municipal Corporation under section 31(1) of
the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966.”
2. As the issue involved in all these writ petitions is
common, the petitions were heard together and are disposed
of by this common judgment.
Brief background leading to the passing of the impugned
Notification
3. On 2nd December 2020, the UDCPR was sanctioned for
the State of Maharashtra. These regulations became the
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development control regulations for the areas of the
respondent no.3- Panvel Municipal Corporation. On 28th April
2023, a representation was made by the respondent no.5 to
the Principal Secretary of the Urban Development
Department-the respondent no.1 highlighting the difficulties
faced on account of the non-availability of Transferable
Development Rights (in short, “TDR”) in the CIDCO areas
forming part of the respondent no.3. Pursuant thereto, the
Urban Development Department called for a report from the
respondent no.3. By its letter dated 5 th September 2023, the
respondent no.3 inter alia opposed the introduction of a policy
permitting consumption of the TDR component on payment of
premium on several grounds. On 19th January 2024, the
Urban Development Department addressed a letter to the
Director of Town Planning stating that representations were
received for permitting usage of TDR on payment of premium
and recommended that appropriate steps be taken to consider
the said representations. It is in this backdrop that on
15th March 2024, the respondent no.1 issued the notice (or
draft notification) under Section 37(1)(AA) of the MRTP Act
inviting suggestions and objections from the public at large in
respect of the proposed impugned Notification. The proposed
modification was to operate with immediate effect and was
made applicable until the sanction of the development plan of
the respondent no.3.
4. On 10th April 2024, the respondent no.3 again filed its
objections to the proposed amendment on several grounds. It
is inter alia recorded that if the FSI is allowed to be utilized on
the payment of premium instead of TDR, the demand for TDR
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will reduce and the respondent no.3 will not be in a position
to the get the landowners to surrender their plots. This will
also increase the financial burden on the respondent no.3.
Around the same time, Writ Petition nos.6746 of 2024 and
Writ Petition (St) No.17210 of 2024 were filed challenging the
proposed amendment and this Court by an interim order
dated 3rd July 2024 stayed the implementation and operation
of clause 2 of the schedule seeking to implement the Notice
forthwith. However, the planning authority was permitted to
proceed with the process for the amendment of the
development control regulations.
5. On 6th July 2024, the proposed amendment was
published in both Marathi and English newspapers. Pursuant
thereto, suggestions and objections were received from
fourteen persons by the Joint Director of Town Planning, who
had been appointed as the Designated Officer under the
Notification. By a communication dated 29 th July 2024, the
Joint Director of Town Planning forwarded the said objections
to respondent no.3, calling for its remarks. On 7 th August
2024, the respondent no.3 opposed the proposed amendment
and reiterated the objections earlier raised in its letter of
10th April 2024. On the same day, a hearing was conducted
by the Joint Director of Town Planning, at which all objectors
were heard.
6. On 8th August 2024, the respondent no.3 published the
draft Development Plan, providing for various reservations
and amenities liable to compulsory acquisition. Upon
consideration of the suggestions and objections received from
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the public as well as the respondent no.3, the Joint Director
of Town Planning prepared his report and, by a
communication dated 9th August 2024, submitted the same to
the Director of Town Planning. The report was considered by
the Director of Town Planning who recorded his
recommendations and forwarded it to the respondent no.1 on
13th August 2024. Thereafter, upon considering all the
suggestions and objections, the respondent no.1 issued the
impugned Notification dated 7th October 2024.
Submissions of the petitioners
7. Writ Petition No.6746 of 2024 was initially filed
challenging notice dated 15th March 2024 since it was brought
into force with immediate effect. After the impugned
Notification, the writ petition was amended to challenge the
same and to incorporate additional grounds.
8. Dr. Sathe, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6746 of 2024 (prior to his
appointment as the Advocate General), submitted that the
impugned Notification was contrary to Section 126 of the
MRTP Act and was manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.
Section 126 of the MRTP Act provides for acquisition of
private land required for public purposes. Such acquisition
may be undertaken:
(a) by an agreement between the planning authority
and the landowner upon payment of an agreed
amount; or
(b) by granting TDR to the landowner in lieu of
monetary compensation; or
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(c) by compulsory acquisition under the provisions of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013.
9. It is submitted that the landowners are incentivised
under Section 126 to voluntarily surrender their plots in
exchange for compensation in the form of TDR. This also
reduces the financial burden on the planning authority. The
value of the TDR granted as compensation is equivalent to
twice the market area of the surrendered plot. The utilisation
of TDR is governed by Table 6G read with Regulation 11 of the
UDCPR.
10. Dr. Sathe submits that clause 10.16 was introduced on
15th March 2024 by way of a proposed amendment to address
an alleged insufficiency in the generation of TDR for the
respondent no.3. After the publication of the draft
Development Plan, large tracts of land within the jurisdiction
of respondent no.3 are now reserved for various public
purposes and may be acquired. The impugned Notification
seeks to dilute the value of TDR and in effect amends Table
6G by providing that, out of the permissible TDR component
specified in column 5 of Table G–ranging from 0.40 to 1.40
depending on the width of the abutting road, 75% of such
TDR may be utilised upon payment of a premium at the rate
of 60% of the Annual Schedule of Rates (Ready Reckoner
rate). By way of illustration, he submits that in the case of a
plot abutting a road having a width in excess of 30 metres,
the permissible FSI would be as follows:
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Pre-Amendment Post Amendment
Base FSI 1.10 1.10
Premium 0.50 0.50
+ 1.05(75% of 140)
1.55
TDR 1.40 0.35 (25% of1.40)
Total Maximum 3.00 3.00
11. Thus, out of a permissible TDR of 1.40, as much as
75%, i.e. 1.05 FSI, can be utilised merely on payment of such
premium. In contrast, TDR granted by way of compensation
has a value equivalent to twice the market value of the land.
This, according to Dr. Sathe, infringes the petitioners’ right to
property guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of
India. The impugned Notification is vitiated by Wednesbury
principles of unreasonableness. It does not take into account
the relevant factors such as availability of TDR and would
eliminate any demand for TDR in the market. As a
consequence, a landowner has no incentive to voluntarily
surrender the land reserved for public purposes, as the
compensation received by the landowner in the form of TDR is
virtually valueless.
12. Dr. Sathe submits that the development control
regulations framed under Section 22(m) read with Section 159
of the MRTP Act constitute delegated legislation and form an
integral part of the development plan as is held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in “Pune Municipal Corportaion v. Promoters
and Builders Association & Anr.” 1. Placing reliance on “Dental
1 (2004) 10 SCC 796
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Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti” 2, he submits that
clause 10.16 can be challenged on the ground that it is ultra
vires the MRTP Act as it alters the very substratum of
Regulation 11 and Section 126 of the MRTP Act. It has the
effect of increasing the base FSI. This constitutes a
substantial modification of the development plan. Such a
sweeping alteration could not have been introduced by way of
the impugned amendment, particularly when the draft
Development Plan has been published on 8 th August 2024.
The impugned Notification seeks to introduce a modification
to the UDCPR without following the mandatory procedure
prescribed under Sections 37 and 37(1AA)(a) of the MRTP Act.
The objections raised by the petitioner have not been
considered by the respondents. The amendment is drastic
and violates the petitioner’s rights under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
13. The action of the State Government is neither bona fide
nor in public interest and appears to have been undertaken at
the behest of the respondent no.5, an association of
developers, with the object of undermining the interests of
landowners. The justification advanced by respondent no.1
that the impugned Notification seeks to dismantle an alleged
cartel of landowners is untenable, as the issuance of the
impugned Notification itself is driven by the demands of
developers. Further, the specific objections raised by the
respondent no.3 in its letters dated 10 th April 2024 and
7th August 2024 have been disregarded by respondent no.1.
2 (2022) 6 SCC 65
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14. In addition to the above, Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar,
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition
No.6746 of 2024, submits that the impugned Notification
effectively takes away the statutory option conferred upon
landowners under Section 126 of the MRTP Act to accept TDR
as a mode of compensation. Once the value of TDR is
rendered commercially unviable, the statutory choice becomes
illusory. The impugned Notification also fundamentally alters
the underlying concept of TDR, which is intended to be
granted strictly in lieu of compensation for surrender of land.
TDR is not a tradable commodity in the hands of the State. It
cannot be monetised through payment of premium. Such a
mechanism is wholly alien to the MRTP Act and is therefore
ultra vires the said Act.
15. Mr. Anil Anturkar, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner in Writ Petition (Stamp) No.17210 of 2024,
submits that the challenge in this petition is limited for the
period between the draft notification/ notice dated 15 th March
2024 and the date of final notification dated 7 th October 2024.
The challenge to the retrospective implementation from
15th March 2024 and this petition survives even after the
impugned Notification is published. The petitioner filed
detailed objections to the draft amendment on 12 th April 2024
including on the ground that the same is ultra vires the MRTP
Act, but the same is not considered by the respondents.
Hence the petition was filed on 21 st June 2024. The learned
senior counsel submits that the proposed modification could
not have been brought into force by resorting to Section 154,
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bypassing the procedural mechanism under Section 37 of the
MRTP Act. Section 154 can be resorted to issue
administrative directions and not to make any legislative
changes. The immediate implementation was stayed by
interim orders dated 3rd July 2024 and 8th August 2024.
16. Mr. Anturkar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners in Writ Petition no.12870 of 2025, submit that this
petition challenges the validity of the final Notification dated
7th October 2024. Mr. Anturkar contends that the concepts of
“TDR” and “additional FSI” operate in distinct legal and
factual domains. The UDCPR recognises this distinction.
Additional FSI is generated upon payment of premium,
whereas TDR is granted as compensation for surrender of
land. The two cannot be conflated, nor can the regulatory
framework governing one be superimposed upon the other. In
the impugned Notification the “premium is for the utilisation
of TDR”, as distinct from “premium for grant of additional
FSI”. There is no provision in Section 126 which permits the
levy of premium on utilization of TDR. The UDCPR which is in
the nature of subordinate or delegated legislation cannot
transgress the limits of the parent statute, namely the MRTP
Act. Any attempt to impose or collect premium upon
utilisation of TDR, in the absence of express statutory
authority, is ex facie ultra vires, unconstitutional, and void.
Such levy lacks statutory foundation and legal competence.
Consequently, any demand or collection of premium for
utilisation of TDR, whether by resolution, circular,
administrative instruction, or decision of a statutory
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authority, is liable to be declared null and void. Reliance is
placed on the definition of “premium FSI” under Regulation
1.6(63), Regulation 1.8 (power to decide charges), and
Regulation 11.2 of the UDCPR, as well as the judgments of
this Court in “Bharti Tele-Ventures Ltd. & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr.3” and “General Officer Commanding-In-
Chief & Anr. v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav & Anr. 4″ and Amit
Maru and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra 5 in support of the
above submissions.
17. Mr. Anturkar submits that the imposition of premium
on utilisation of TDR results in unjust enrichment of the
planning authority and causes undue hardship to landowners
and developers alike, in violation of the principles of lawful
delegation, fair governance and Article 265 of the Constitution
of India, which mandates that no tax or levy shall be imposed
or collected except by authority of law.
18. Mr. A.Y. Sakhare, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioners in Writ Petition (Stamp) No.31132 of 2025,
adopted the arguments advanced by Dr. Sathe and submits
that the impugned Notification causes serious and irreversible
prejudice to the petitioners, inasmuch as it drastically
diminishes the value of TDR. The objections raised by the
petitioners have been ignored, and there is a complete lack of
uniformity in the application of the development control
regulations within the same municipal corporation area. He
submits that by a notification dated 26 th September 2016,
3 2007(4) Mh.L.J. 105
4 (1988) 2 SCC 351
5 2010 SCC Online Bom 774.
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twenty-nine revenue villages were merged into respondent
no.3 under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. The
petitioners’ lands are fully developed, fenced and have
internal roads. The TDR potential of the lands has been duly
identified and the Zonal Certificate classifies the land as
falling within an Industrial Zone. Despite this, the draft
Development Plan irrationally imposes extensive reservations
on the petitioners’ lands, thereby rendering them unusable
and effectively extinguishing their industrial potential. He
submits that the proposed modification pursuant to the
notice dated 15th March 2024 was objected to by the
respondent no.3, citing its adverse impact on the development
of rural villages. The draft Development Plan further reserves
more than 10,000 square metres of the petitioners’ land for
solid waste management and garden reservations, without
undertaking any feasibility study, environmental assessment,
or soil suitability analysis. Such reservations are contrary to
the mandatory statutory process prescribed under the MRTP
Act. On these grounds, the impugned Notification dated
7th October 2024 is liable to be quashed and set aside.
19. Mr. Zaveri, learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.7 in Writ Petition No.6746 of 2024, adopts the aforesaid
submissions and supports the petitioners in the above writ
petitions. He submits that Section 37(1AA)(c) of the MRTP Act
is mandatory in nature. The State Government failed to place
all relevant facts before the Director of Town Planning as part
of the statutory consultation process. There was no
justification for applying the impugned Notification uniformly
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to the entire area of the respondent no.3. The insertion of
clause 10.16 is contrary to the provisions of the MRTP Act
and ought to be set aside. Reliance is placed on “Pushpam vs.
State of Madras6” to submit that the respondent no.1 did not
“consult” the Director of Town Planning as required under
Section 37(1AA)(c) of the Act.
Submissions of the respondents
20. Mr. Ashutosh Kumbhakoni, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent no.1 (State of Maharashtra) in
all the petitions, denied the aforesaid contentions and
opposed the petitions by placing reliance on the affidavits-in-
reply dated 3rd December 2024, 23rd July 2025 and
12th August 2025 filed in Writ Petition no.6746 of 2024.
21. With specific reference to the petitioner in Writ Petition
No. 6746 of 2024 (Pawan Rajarao Kadam), Mr. Kumbhakoni
submits that the petitioner lacks locus to maintain the
petition. The petitioner claims to be an agriculturist who has
been offered TDR under Section 126 for the surrender of his
land vide letter dated 21 st April 2023 issued by the Deputy
Director of Town Planning. However as on date, the petitioner
is not an owner of any TDR and there is no compulsion on the
petitioner to accept TDR. In the absence of any vested right,
the petitioner lacks locus to challenge the impugned
Notification. On this ground alone, he submits that the writ
petition ought to be dismissed.
22. Without prejudice to the above, and addressing the
6 66 L.W (part 2) 53
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merits of the challenge, the learned senior counsel submits
that in view of the issuance of the Notification dated
7th October 2024, the challenge to the notice dated 15 th March
2024 does not survive and has been rendered infructuous. He
submits that the impugned Notification has been issued after
following the due procedure prescribed under Section 37(1AA)
of the MRTP Act as is noted in the earlier part of this
judgment.
23. Mr. Kumbhakoni submits that in the area of the
respondent no.3 it was found that approximately 76.08% of
the land was not covered by any sanctioned development
plan. As a result, there was negligible generation of TDR,
leading to a serious imbalance between demand and supply,
with a likelihood of TDR being concentrated and cartelised. In
order to address this situation, the State Government
introduced clause 10.16. The said clause merely provides an
option to developers and does not force any landowner from
surrendering their land to the respondent no.3. He submits
that there is no diminution in the value of TDR, as utilisation
of TDR to the extent of 25% is mandatory. Even with respect
to the remaining 75%, the developers retain the option to
utilise TDR. The utilisation and valuation of TDR continues to
be governed by market forces of demand and supply. The
petitions are devoid of merit and ought to be dismissed.
24. Mr. Kumbhakoni concurs that the UDCPR constitutes
delegated legislation but submits that the scope of judicial
review in respect thereof is extremely limited. Regulation
10.16 has been introduced in the UDCPR in furtherance of
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the powers conferred under Section 22(m) of the MRTP Act,
which permits regulation of TDR through development control
regulations. There is no violation of Articles 14 or 19 of the
Constitution of India, nor have the petitioners demonstrated
that the impugned Notification is ultra vires the provisions of
the MRTP Act. In support of his submissions,
Mr. Kumbhakoni also placed reliance on the judgments in
“Pune Municipal Corporation and another. v. Promotors and
Builders Association & Another”, “Dental Council of India v.
Biyani Shikshan Samiti and Another“.
25. Mr. Girish Godbole, learned senior counsel appearing
for respondent no.5-CREDAI BANM-Raigad, and Mr. Praveen
Samdani, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent
no.6-Okay Developers Pvt. Ltd., in Writ Petition No.6746 of
2024, reiterated the submissions advanced by
Mr.Kumbhakoni and in addition, submitted that neither the
regulations nor the governing statutes prescribes any fixed or
guaranteed value for TDR which is a saleable and transferable
development instrument, the value of which is governed by
market factors. In support of this submission, reliance was
placed on “Green Garden Apartments CHS Ltd vs. Nitin
Chaudhari & Ors”7. The grant of TDR under Chapter 11.2 of
the UDCPR is not based on the Annual Schedule of Rates (in
short “ASR”), but on the exact area of land surrendered. In
terms of Chapter 11.2.4, TDR is granted in the range of two to
three times the area of the land surrendered. Therefore, the
methodology adopted by the petitioners of first determining
the notional value of TDR by applying ASR and thereafter
7 Interim Application (L) No. 5342 of 2025 in Commercial Suit (L) No. 5307 of 2025
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comparing it with 60% of the ASR value of land purportedly
sold by the respondent no.3 is flawed. The optional purchase
price fixed by the respondent no.3 is at 60% of the ASR. If
TDR available in the open market is cheaper, a developer is
always free to purchase such TDR from the market. The
impugned Notification seeks to address the chronic problem
of under-supply of TDR in the open market, which has
resulted in cartelisation and artificial inflation of prices by a
limited class of land-holders, thereby impeding housing
projects. The landowner whose land is sought to be acquired
continues to have multiple statutory options under Section
126 of the MRTP Act to claim compensation. It was
emphasized that the impugned Notification is not mandatory
and provides an option to developers either to utilise premium
FSI/acquire TDR up to the extent of 1.40 or to avail partial
TDR from the respondent no.3 against payment of premium.
The impugned Notification cannot be characterised as ultra
vires the MRTP Act or arbitrary.
26. The Notification is stated to be in public interest, as it
facilitates affordable housing and simultaneously augments
the revenue of the respondent no.3, which can be utilised for
infrastructure development. Merely because the market value
of TDR held by certain parties may be affected cannot, by
itself, be a ground to strike down a piece of delegated
legislation. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Indian Express Newspapers
(Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India” 8 in support of the
submissions to oppose the petitions.
8 (1985) 1 SCC 641
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Reasons and Findings
27. Having considered the rival submissions and examined
the record, we find no merit in the challenge to the notice
dated 15th March 2024 or the impugned Notification dated
7th October 2024. We do not find that the said notice or the
impugned Notification is arbitrary, illegal and ultra vires the
MRTP Act.
28. It appears to us that Writ Petition no.6746 of 2024 pro-
ceeds on an incorrect premise that the petitioner’s land has
been compulsorily acquired. Paragraph 4 of the petition as-
serts as under:
“4. Land of the petitioner has been acquired compulsorily un-
der the provisions of section 126 of the said Act for the
construction of a road. The petitioner is to receive TDR in
lieu of compensation towards the acquisition of his land.
Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit “C” is a copy of the
notice dated 21st April 2023 issued to the petitioner by the
Deputy Director, Town Planning, Panvel Municipal Corpo-
ration proposing to acquire the petitioner’s land and offer-
ing him TDR as compensation.”
29. A perusal of Exhibit “C” to the said petition does not
disclose any element of compulsion. On the contrary, it seems
to be a communication requesting the petitioner to hand over
the land to the respondent no.3 for the purpose of
construction of a road to alleviate traffic congestion. We find
that the assertion of compulsory acquisition is incorrect and
cannot be accepted. However since we have extensively heard
the parties in all petitions, we have proceeded to decide this
matter on merits.
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Due process under the MRTP Act has been followed
30. The MRTP Act provides for the planned development and
use of land in various regions of the State. It contemplates,
inter alia, the constitution of Regional Planning Boards,
preparation of Development Plans by local authorities,
establishment of New Town Development Authorities, and the
making of provisions for reservations, allocations, and
designations of land for public purposes. Section 22 of the
MRTP Act enumerates the contents of a Development Plan.
Section 26 of the MRTP Act provides for the preparation of a
draft Development Plan and the publication of notice thereof.
Section 31 deals with the sanction of the draft Development
Plan and stipulates that, upon such sanction, the plan
attains the status of a final Development Plan. Section 37
prescribes the procedure for modification of a final
Development Plan, either by the concerned planning authority
or at the instance of the State Government. Section 37(1AA),
which specifically confers power upon the State Government
to effect modifications in a Development Plan reads as follows:
a. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (1A) and (2),
where the State Government is satisfied that in the public interest it
is necessary to carry out urgently a modification of any part of or any
proposal made in a final development plan of such a nature that it
will not change the character of such development plan, the State
Government may, on its own, publish a notice in the Official Gazette,
and in such other manner as may be determined by it, inviting
objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the
proposed modification not later than one month from the date of such
notice and shall also serve notice on all persons affected by the
proposed modification and the Planning Authority.
b. The State Government shall, after the specified period, forward a
copy of all such objections and suggestions to the Planning Authority
for its say to the Government within a period of one month from the
receipt of the copies of such objections and suggestions from the
Government.
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c. The State Government shall, after giving hearing to the affected
persons and the Planning Authority and after making such inquiry as
it may consider necessary and consulting the Director of Town
Planning, by notification in the Official Gazette, publish the approved
modifications with or without changes and subject to such conditions
as it may deem fit, or may decide not to carry out such modification.
On the publication of the modification in the Official Gazette, the final
development plan shall be deemed to have been modified
accordingly.
31. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs
75-78 of Indian Express, the challenge to a delegated
legislation must be confined to the grounds on which plenary
legislation may be questioned, i.e, MRTP Act in this case or
that it is arbitrary as due process required under the statute
is not followed or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Dental Council of India” has
succinctly summarized the legal position governing challenges
to subordinate legislation as follows:
“26. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of
this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers
(Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 :
1985 SCC (Tax) 121] : (SCC p. 689, para 75)
“75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the
same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a
statute passed by a competent legislature.
Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of
the grounds on which plenary legislation is
questioned. In addition it may also be questioned on
the ground that it does not conform to the statute
under which it is made. It may further be questioned
on the ground that it is contrary to some other
statute. That is because subordinate legislation must
yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned
on the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable
not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the
sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.”
27. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the
subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the
grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In
addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it
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does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It
may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary
to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on
the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness
should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but
should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.
28. It has further been held by this Court in the said case that
for challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of
arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is
not in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article
14 of the Constitution. It has further been held that it
cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not
reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant
circumstances which the Court considers relevant.
29. The judgment of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers
(Bombay) [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC
(Tax) 121] has been followed by a three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka [Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304] . It will be apposite to refer
to the following observations of this Court in the said
case : (Khoday Distilleries case [Khoday Distilleries
Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304] , SCC p.
314, para 13)
“13. It is next submitted before us that the amended Rules
are arbitrary, unreasonable and cause undue
hardship and, therefore, violate Article 14 of the
Constitution. Although the protection of Article 19(1)
(g) may not be available to the appellants, the rules
must, undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14,
which is a guarantee against arbitrary action.
However, one must bear in mind that what is being
challenged here under Article 14 is not executive
action but delegated legislation. The tests of arbitrary
action which apply to executive actions do not
necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order
that delegated legislation can be struck down, such
legislation must be manifestly arbitrary; a law which
could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an
authority delegated with the law-making power.
In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers
(Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC
641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] (SCC p. 689, para 75) this
Court said that a piece of subordinate legislation
does not carry the same degree of immunity which is
enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent
legislature. A subordinate legislation may be
questioned under Article 14 on the ground that it is
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unreasonable; ‘unreasonable not in the sense of not
being reasonable, but in the sense that it is
manifestly arbitrary’. Drawing a comparison between
the law in England and in India, the Court further
observed that in England the Judges would say,
‘Parliament never intended the authority to make
such Rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires’.
In India, arbitrariness is not a separate ground since
it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of the
Constitution. But subordinate legislation must be so
arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity
with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the
Constitution.”
30. In State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy [State of
T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517] after
considering the law laid down by this Court earlier
in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) [Indian Express
Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1
SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] , Supreme Court
Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [Supreme
Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989)
4 SCC 187 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569] , Shri Sitaram Sugar
Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [Shri Sitaram Sugar Co.
Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223] , St. Johns
Teachers Training Institute v. NCTE [St. Johns Teachers
Training Institute v. NCTE, (2003) 3 SCC 321 : 5 SCEC
391] , Ramesh Chandra Kachardas Porwal v. State of
Maharashtra [Ramesh Chandra Kachardas
Porwal v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC
722] , Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. [Union of
India v. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720]
and State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan [State of
Haryana v. Ram Kishan, (1988) 3 SCC 416] , this Court
has laid down certain grounds, on which the subordinate
legislation can be challenged, which are as under :
(Krishnamurthy case [State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy,
(2006) 4 SCC 517] , SCC p. 528, para 15)
“Whether the rule is valid in its entirety?
15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality
or validity of a subordinate legislation and the
burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is
invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate
legislation can be challenged under any of the
following grounds:
(a) Lack of legislative competence to make the
subordinate legislation.
(b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution of India.
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(c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of
India.
(d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it
is made or exceeding the limits of authority
conferred by the enabling Act.
(e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any
enactment.
(f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an
extent where the court might well say that the
legislature never intended to give authority to
make such rules).”
32. As held in “Pune Municipal Corporation”, the
Development Control Regulations have statutory force.
Further, as held in “General Officer Commanding-In-Chief”,
two conditions are required to be fulfilled before a rule can
have the effect of a statutory provision, namely; (i) it must
confirm to the provisions of the statute under which it is
framed and; (ii) it must come within the scope of purview of
the rule making power of the authority framing such rule. In
our view, the rule making power is available to the respondent
no.1 under sections 22(m) read with section 37(1AA) of the
MRTP Act. The next question which arises is whether the
steps mandated under Section 37(1AA) have been followed by
the respondent no.1? For the purpose of undertaking the
exercise contemplated under Section 37(1AA) of the MRTP
Act, the respondent no.1 appointed the Joint Director of Town
Planning as the Designated Officer. In accordance with sub-
clause (a), upon publication of the notice dated 15 th March
2024, objections and suggestions in respect of the proposed
modification were invited from the general public. In response
thereto, fourteen objections were received including objections
of respondent no.3 dated 10th April 2024. The Joint Director
forwarded all the objections and suggestions to the
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respondent no.3 by its letter dated 29 th July 2024, calling
upon the respondent no.3 to offer its remarks thereon.
Respondent no.3, by its letter dated 7th August 2024,
submitted its response and reiterated the objections earlier
raised in its letter of 10 th April 2024. On the same day, the
Joint Director afforded a hearing to all objectors. Upon
completion of the hearing, the Joint Director prepared a
report and forwarded the same to the Director of Town
Planning by his letter dated 9th August 2024. After
considering the said report, the Director of Town Planning
recorded his recommendations and submitted the same to the
respondent no.1 on 13th August 2024. In this backdrop we
find that the requirements prescribed under clauses (a), (b),
and (c) of Section 37(1AA) of the MRTP Act are complied and
due process has been followed by the respondent no. 1 prior
to the issuance of impugned Notification. We find no
procedural infirmity or arbitrariness in the decision-making
process of the respondent no.1.
33. For the same reason, we find no merit in the
submissions of Mr. Jhaveri. The judgment in “Pushpam” is of
no assistance as we find that the mandatory procedure under
the MRTP Act has been followed by the respondent no.1. The
said judgment was in the context of elections to Municipal
Councils and allotment of reserved seats in wards. The
government order was challenged on the ground that the
same failed to comply with the provisions of section 43 of the
District Municipalities Act which provide for consultation with
Municipal Council. Admittedly, there was no such
consultation with respect to suitability of allotment of a
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reserved seat to a particular ward. It was in that factual
background that the Court held that the government had
failed to comply with the statutory requirement of
consultation. We do not find such a situation in the present
case. As observed above, the impugned Notification confirms
to the requirements under section 37(1AA) of the MRTP Act.
Scheme of the MRTP Act and the UDCPR
34. Section 126 of the MRTP Act provides for acquisition of
land required for public purpose specified in the draft regional
plan or any other plan or town planning scheme. The three
modes of compensation on such acquisition are (i) by an
agreement between the parties (section 126(1)(a)); or (ii) by
agreement in lieu of cash by grant of FSI/TDR (Section 126(1)
(b)); or (iii) by compulsory acquisition (Section 126(1)(c)). As
held by the Full Bench of this Court in Shree Vinayak
Builders”, the agreement in sub-clause (a) and (b) is by way of
mutual agreement and not the sole option of the authority:
“17. While concurring with the above proposition, we would like
to emphasize that the mode of acquisition of land under
section 126(1)(a) and (b) of the MRTP Act is by ‘an
“agreement”. The word agreement connotes offer and
acceptance and signifies that the agreement is not an
unilateral act but a bilateral act which is concluded with
communication of acceptance of the offer. Thus, acquisition
of land reserved for public purpose under section 126(1)(a)
and (b) cannot be by any unilateral proposal of the
Acquiring Authority to acquire the land with an offer of
compensation or FSI/TDR. It is a mutual agreement
between the Acquiring Authority and the land owner
whereunder the land is acquired by the concerned
authority by agreement either by paying an amount
agreed to or by granting, in lieu of any agreed amount, FSI
or TDR against the area of land surrendered free of cost,
and free of all encumbrances. That being so, the modes of
acquisition of land under section 126(1)(a) and (b) of the
MRTP Act, can be resorted to only when there is a26/33
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consensus between the parties; when the parties are ad
idem and not when there is dissension; not when they are
at variance. That means these modes of acquisition are
essentially at the choice of either of the parties and not
just the acquiring authority, and are taken to their logical
end when the consensus is arrived at between these
parties. In the absence of such concord, the only option
available to the Acquiring Authority is to take recourse to
section 126(1)(c) of the Act and make an application to the
State Government under the provisions 2013 Act.
19. There can be no dispute that section 126 clothes the
Planning Authority, Development Authority, or as the case
may be, any Appropriate Authority with the authority to
acquire the land reserved for public purpose.
Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 126
envisage agreement between the land owner/lessee and
the acquiring authority. The intention of the legislature, as
it comes out from the plain reading of these provisions is
that wherever possible, land acquisition by agreement,
either by payment of agreed amount or in lieu of such
amount by grant of FSI/TDR, should be encouraged as
these modes of acquisition are faster, more effective, and
more economic in the long run. Their object seems to be
three fold viz, efficacy, economy and expedition, and,
therefore, the parties to acquisition of land process under
the MRTP Act are given these options placing emphasis
upon agreement. This being the position, interpreting the
word ‘agreement’ as unilateral act or decision of the
acquiring authority, where the land owner has no say in
the acquisition, will be violative of the provisions of the Act,
the language of which is plain and unambiguous/Further,
such interpretation will set at naught the legislative intent
expressed in the statutory provision.”
35. In view of the above judgment, Mr. Kumbhakoni is right
in his submission that it is for the landowner whose land is
affected by a reservation, to decide whether such land is to be
surrendered in lieu of TDR. If the landowner chooses not to
avail of the option under Section 126(1)(a) or Section 126(1)
(b), the authority may then proceed in accordance with
Section 126(1)(c). Equally, there is no compulsion under
Clause 10.16 or any other provision of the UDCPR to utilize
TDR.
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36. The respondent no.1 has sought to justify the impugned
Notification in its additional affidavit dated 12 th August 2025.
It states that the area of the respondent no.3, as it exists
today, comprises of diverse regions, including areas that
earlier formed part of the Panvel Municipal Council. The total
area of the respondent no.3 is approximately 110.06 square
kms. Prior to its expansion, development plans were prepared
only for areas aggregating to 26.33 square kms, constituting
about 23.92% of the total area. Consequently, in the
remaining 76.08% of the respondent no.3 area, there was no
sanctioned development plan, resulting in absence of TDR
generation from such lands. The imbalance between demand
and supply of TDR and its concentration in a limited segment
also caused apprehensions of price cartelisation. It was in this
backdrop that representations came to be received from the
respondent no.5. The formulation of policies to address such
situations lies within the domain of the State. While it
continues to remain open to a developer to utilise TDR to the
full extent permissible under Table 6(G) of Regulation 6.3, the
amendment merely provides an additional option to carry out
development to the extent of 75% of the TDR component by
payment of premium. The balance 25% of the permissible
TDR component is required to be procured by a developer
from the open market or from landowners such as the
petitioner. The said provision is transitory in nature and is
intended to operate only until the final Development Plan for
the respondent no.3 is sanctioned under Section 31(1) of the
MRTP Act.
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37. We may note that the scope of judicial review in matters
concerning delegated legislation and town-planning policy is
limited. Such measures carry a presumption of
constitutionality, competence, and reasonableness. Unless
the impugned action is shown to be manifestly arbitrary, ultra
vires the parent statute, or violative of constitutional
guarantees, the Court would not substitute its own judgment
for that of the rule-making authority. It is well settled that,
while examining the validity of delegated legislation, the Court
does not sit in appeal over the policy underlying it. The
scrutiny is confined to an examination of the provisions of the
statute conferring the power to frame rules or regulations,
read in the context of the object and purpose of the Act. So
long as the delegate acts within the limits of the authority
conferred and the regulations bear a rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved, the Court would not enquire
into their wisdom or efficacy. The determination of policy and
the choice of computation or measures for implementing it lie
exclusively within the domain of the Legislature and its
delegate.
38. Apart from the option of 75%, under the impugned
Notification the developers likewise retain the liberty to utilize
TDR to the full permissible extent under the existing
framework. Regulation 6.3 of the UDCPR prescribes the
permissible FSI and the extent to which TDR may be loaded
on buildings. The impugned amendment does not alter the
base FSI nor does it disturb the fundamental TDR framework.
It does not change the character of the development plan. Out
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of 3 FSI, the permissible TDR is 1.40. By the amendment,
there is no change in the total buildable/permissible FSI. The
statutory distinction between “TDR” and “additional FSI”
remains unaltered, and no transgression of Section 22(m) or
any other provision of the MRTP Act is made out. Only an
option is given to the developer/owner to buy TDR to the
extent of 1.40 or take partial TDR from the respondent no.3
against premium. It is just one more source of acquisition of
TDR. The challenge founded on allegations of extinguishment
of statutory choice or dilution of vested rights is misconceived
and cannot be accepted.
39. We also find no merit in the contention that the
impugned amendment renders TDR illusory or valueless.
Neither the MRTP Act nor the UDCPR prescribes or
guarantees any fixed value for TDR. The value of TDR is
governed by market forces of demand and supply. A
regulatory measure that incidentally impacts commercial
expectations or market valuation cannot, by itself, be a
ground to invalidate delegated legislation under Article 14 of
the Constitution of India, particularly when the measure is
aimed at correcting distortions in the planning framework.
Similarly, the contention that such devaluation of land
violates the petitioners’ rights under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India is devoid of merit.
40. We are also unable to accept the submission of
Mr. Anturkar that the impugned amendment levies a
“premium for utilisation of TDR” in the absence of statutory
authority. The maximum permissible TDR of 1.40 remains
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unaltered. What the impugned amendment introduces is an
option in Column 5 permitting utilisation of up to 75% of the
permissible TDR component by sourcing it from respondent
no.3 upon payment of a premium. The utilisation of TDR
continues to be governed by Table 6(G). In substance, it is
only the “source” of TDR that has been modified, i.e, whether
it is procured from the open market or obtained from
respondent no.3. Section 2(9)(a) of the MRTP Act defines
“development right” to mean the right to carry out
development of land or building or both, and expressly
includes TDR in the form of the right to utilise FSI. Further,
Section 22(m) empowers the planning authority to regulate
development, including the imposition of fees, charges, and
premiums at such rates as may be fixed by the State
Government or the planning authority. In our view, the
amendment through the impugned Notice and the impugned
Notification falls squarely within the statutory framework. The
amendment does not impose a premium for utilisation of
TDR, as sought to be contended. Nor does it partake the
character of a tax within the meaning of Article 265 of the
Constitution. Since we are of the view that the final impugned
notification is valid, the challenge to the draft notification
dated 15th March 2024 does not survive. We have already
referred to the proposition of law in paragraph 31 of “General
Officer Commanding-In-Chief & Anr. v. Dr. Subhash Chandra
Yadav & Anr.“. We may only note that the said judgment was
dealing with rule 5-C of the Cantonment Fund Servants
Rules, 1973 which provided for the transfer of the services of
the employees of the Cantonment Boards from one post in
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one Board to another post in another Board within the same
state. In this context the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that for
a rule to have a statutory effect, two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely, (1) it must conform to the provisions of the
statute under which it is framed; and (2) it must also come
within the scope and purview of the rule-making power of the
authority framing the rule. The rule was struck down for
being beyond the rule-making power of the Central
Government as contained in section 280 of the Cantonments
Act which provided for power to make rules only for region in
respect to which a particular Cantonment Board has
jurisdiction. On facts the present case bears no similarity. We
do not find that the impugned amendment is beyond the rule
making powers as laid down under the MRTP Act.
41. The reliance by Mr. Anturkar in Bharati Tele-ventures is
misplaced as the challenge was to a demand or levy of
premium for installation of mobile tower or construction of a
cabin on the rooftop of buildings was on the ground that there
is no such power under Section 19-B read with Section 4 of
the Telegraph Act. In this context, the Division Bench
considering the sections 22(m) (as unamended) and 124A of
the MRTP Act held that section 124A did not cover the subject
matter of the notification as it related to those which can be
charged for development or use of the land. In the case of
Amit Maru, by an amendment to the DCR, the premium FSI to
the extent of 33% of the TDR component was allowed
optionally to be taken from the Corporation whilst keeping the
overall cap of the TDR within limit. The challenge was on the
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ground that under MRTP Act or under section 22(m), there is
no power to levy fee or a premium. It is in this context, the
Division Bench in paragraphs 79, 80 and 81 held that the
levy of premium was ultra vires. This judgment was delivered
on 10th June 2010. After the aforesaid judgment, the
legislature amended the MRTP Act [Maharashtra Act XXIX of
2010 w.e.f. 21st September 2010]. Section 22(m) has now been
amended to include the levy of fees, charges and premium.
This amendment is with retrospective effect from 11 th January
1967. Hence this judgment is of no assistance to the
petitioners.
42. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the impugned
notice dated 15th March 2024 or the impugned Notification
dated 7th October 2024 is neither ultra vires the provisions of
the MRTP Act nor violative of Articles 14, 19, 265, or 300A of
the Constitution of India. All the writ petitions, being Writ
Petition No.6746 of 2024, Writ Petition (Stamp) No.17210 of
2024, Writ Petition No.12870 of 2025 and Writ Petition
(Stamp) No.31132 of 2025, are accordingly dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs. In view thereof, Interim
Application No.14169 of 2024 and Interim Application
No.10964 of 2025 also stand disposed of as infructuous.
[ GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J. ] [ CHIEF JUSTICE ]
Digitally
signed by
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SNEHA SNEHA
ABHAY
ABHAY DIXIT
Date:
DIXIT 2026.02.13
20:35:14
+0530
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