Meghalaya High Court
Date Of Order: 09.02.2026 vs State Of Meghalaya Through The … on 9 February, 2026
2026:MLHC:69
Serial No. 01
Daily List HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.Petn. No. 67 of 2025
Date of order: 09.02.2026
Flamingstar Sohkhlet
....Petitioner
- versus -
1. State of Meghalaya through the Commissioner and the
Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Department of
Home (Police)
Civil Secretariat, Shillong.
2. Smti Rilangshisha Nongrum
3. Smti Arbina Ryndem
....Respondents
Coram:
Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Revati Mohite Dere, Chief Justice
Appearance:
For the Petitioner : Mr N.M. Mansuri, Adv.
For the Respondent : Mr K.P. Bhattacharjee, GA
Ms A.P. Kharsahnoh, Adv. [for R2&3]
i) Whether approved for Yes
reporting in Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication Yes
in press:
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JUDGMENT
By this petition preferred under Section 528 of BNSS,
2023, the petitioner seeks quashing of the FIR dated 28th March,
2025 registered with the Rynjah Police Station, Shillong for the
alleged offences punishable under Sections 106 (1), 125(b) and
281 of BNS and consequently, the proceeding pending before the
learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Shillong, being G.R.
Case No. 44 (A) of 2025. Quashing is sought on the premise that
the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (legal heirs of
deceased – late Kennystar Lyndem) have amicably settled the
dispute and as such, the said respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have no
objection to the quashing of the FIR and the proceeding.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the FIR
and the proceeding pending against the petitioner be quashed
since post the filing of the charge-sheet i.e., during the pendency
of the proceeding, the petitioner and the legal heirs of the
deceased – late Kennystar Lyndem have resolved the dispute and
as such, the legal heirs i.e., the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 – the
wife and the mother of the deceased respectively, have given
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their consent to the quashing of the same. Learned counsel for
the petitioner further submitted that the offence is not heinous
in nature and that the accident arose due to an unforeseen
circumstance and since the legal heirs of the deceased i.e., the
respondent Nos. 2 and 3 do not wish to pursue the proceedings,
continuation of the same would cause unnecessary hardship to
the petitioner and will be an abuse of the process of the law.
Learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court
reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 : Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : Narinder Singh & ors v. State of
Punjab, and two judgments of this Court in Shri Derik Randall
Jyrwa v. State of Meghalaya & anr passed in Crl. Petn.
No.23 of 2019 on 19th August, 2019 and Shri Wisterly
Mawrie v. State of Meghalaya passed in Crl.Petn. No. 63 of
2024 on 25th February, 2025, in support of his submission
that quashing of an offence under Section 106 (1) of the BNS is
permissible with the consent of the parties i.e., the accused and
legal heirs of the deceased.
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3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and
3 supported the submission advanced by the learned counsel for
the petitioner.
4. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of the aforesaid
petition are as under:
The incident in question took place on 18th March, 2025
in the morning. It is the prosecution case, that a vehicle (Celerio)
bearing Registration No. ML05 X 9687, driven by the petitioner
and occupied by one co-passenger was proceeding from Mawlai,
Motsyiar, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong towards Tynring,
East Khasi Hills District, when the incident took place. It is
alleged that the petitioner lost control of the vehicle and it veered
on to the wrong side of the road and collided with a scooty
bearing Registration No. ML05 V 3065 which was driven by
Kennystar Lyndem (deceased), who was coming from the
opposite direction. In the said incident, Kennystar Lyndem
sustained grievous injuries and was taken to the hospital where
he subsequently, succumbed to his injuries. Post the incident,
the aforesaid FIR was registered against the petitioner alleging
the aforesaid offences. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed
Page 4 of 23
2026:MLHC:69as against the petitioner in the trial court. It appears that during
the pendency of the proceeding, the petitioner and the legal heirs
of the deceased Kennystar Lyndem i.e., wife and mother of the
deceased amicably settled the dispute, pursuant to which the
aforesaid petition has been filed. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3
have filed their respective affidavits giving their no objection to
the quashing of the FIR and consequently, the proceeding.
5. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the
criminal proceeding under Section 106 (1) of the BNS (earlier,
Section 304A IPC) can be quashed on the basis of the
compromise arrived at by the legal heirs/legal representatives of
the victim (deceased) with the offender under Section 528 BNSS
(earlier, Section 482 of Cr.P.C.)?
6. Section 106 (1) of the BNS deals with rash and negligent
driving. The said Section reads thus,
“[s.106] Causing death by negligence.- (1) Whoever
causes the death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment or either description for a term
which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to
fine; and if such act is done by a registered medical
practitioner while performing medical procedure, he shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
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term which may extend to two years, and shall also be
liable to fine.”
7. Admittedly, Section 106 (1) of the BNS is not
compoundable and as such, parties cannot settle the said
offence through compromise either privately or with the
permission of the court. Hence, the parties have approached the
High Court under its inherent powers under Section 528 of
BNSS (earlier, Section 482 of Cr.P.C.) as they seek to quash the
FIR/proceeding.
8. At the outset, we may note, that admittedly, the power to
compound an offence under Section 359 of BNSS (earlier,
Section 320 Cr.P.C.) and the power of the High Court to quash
an FIR/proceeding under Section 528 of BNSS (earlier, Section
482 of Cr.P.C.) are distinct.
9. The law with respect to quashing of FIR/criminal
proceeding under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a
compromise/settlement is well settled. In Gian Singh v. State
of Punjab, the three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in
paragraphs 48 and 57 observed that the power of the High Court
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in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from
the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences
under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It observed
that the inherent power vested in the High Court, is of wide
plentitude with no statutory limitation but the said power has to
be exercised with utmost care and caution i.e., to secure the
ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of any
court; that in what cases, the said power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised between the
offender and the victim, in view of the settlement of the dispute
between them, would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case; and, that no category can be prescribed. It was
further observed that however, before exercising the said power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the crime as heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity, like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be quashed
even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have
settled the dispute, as such offences are not private in nature
and have serious impact on the society.
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10. It was further observed by the Apex Court in Gian Singh
(supra) that criminal cases which are overwhelmingly and
predominantly having a civil flavour stand on a different footing
for the purpose of quashing, particularly, where the offences
arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
disputes or transactions, or offences arising out of
matrimony/family disputes, where the wrong is basically private
or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire
dispute. It was observed that in this category of cases, the High
court may quash criminal proceeding, if in its view, because of
the compromise between the offender and the victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of
the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and
prejudice, despite full and complete settlement and compromise
with the victim. In other words, the High Court is to consider,
whether, it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice
to continue the criminal proceeding, as continuation of the
criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of the process
of law, despite settlement and compromise between the victim
and the wrongdoer.
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11. Similarly, in Narinder Singh & ors v. State of Punjab
reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Apex Court in paragraph 29
observed as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would
be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement
between the parties and exercising its power under Section
482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing
the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with
direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in
those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties
have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on
that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is
filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions
which involve heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact
on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been
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committed under special statute like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes
should be quashed when the parties have resolved their
entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote
and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the
accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the
criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to
be generally treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone. However, the High Court would
not rest its decision merely because there is a mention
of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine
as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to
the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained,
whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts
of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in
respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the
High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong
possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept
the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
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in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court
to accept the plea compounding the offence based on
complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the
Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement
between the parties is going to result in harmony between
them which may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that
at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge
sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the
charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the
evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after
prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the
High Court should refrain from exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits
and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the
trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the
High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not
be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the
offender who has already been convicted by the trial court.
Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction
is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there
is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a
crime.”
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12. In Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and ors v. State of Gujarat & anr reported in (2017)
9 SCC 641, the Apex Court reiterated in paragraph 16 as under:
“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarised in the following
propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed
by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is
attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolvesPage 12 of 23
2026:MLHC:69ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and
no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving
mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or
the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a
serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the
trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of
public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in
so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences
involving the financial and economic well-being of the state
have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere
dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved
in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud orPage 13 of 23
2026:MLHC:69misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.”
13. In Daxaben v. State of Gujarat & ors reported in (2022)
16 SCC 117, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider in
an appeal, as to whether the criminal miscellaneous
applications filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC could
have been allowed by the High Court and an FIR under Section
306 of the IPC (abetment to commit suicide) could have been
quashed on the basis of the settlement between the complainant
and the accused named in the FIR. The Apex Court answered
the said question in the negative. In paragraphs 24, 38, 39, 49,
50 and 51 of the said judgment, the Apex Court observed as
under:
“24. The only question in this appeal is whether the
criminal miscellaneous applications filed by the accused
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could have been allowed
and an FIR under Section 306 IPC for abetment to commit
suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of ten years,
could have been quashed on the basis of a settlement
between the complainant and the accused named in the
FIR. The answer to the aforesaid question cannot, but be in
the negative.
***** ***** *****
***** ***** *****
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38. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to
grave and serious offences only on basis of an agreement
with the complainant, would set a dangerous precedent,
where complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons,
with a view to extract money from the accused.
Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go scot
free, even in cases of grave and serious offences such as
murder, rape, bride- burning, etc. by buying off
informants/complainants and settling with them. This
would render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498-
A, 304-B etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a
specific social purpose.
39. In criminal jurisprudence, the position of the
complainant is only that of the informant. Once an FIR
and/or criminal complaint is lodged and a criminal case is
started by the State, it becomes a matter between the State
and the accused. The State has a duty to ensure that law
and order is maintained in society. It is for the state to
prosecute offenders. In case of grave and serious non-
compoundable offences which impact society, the informant
and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to the
extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and
punishment of the offender. An informant has no right in
law to withdraw the complaint of a non- compoundable
offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous nature, which
impacts society.
***** ***** ***** ***** ***** *****
49. In our considered opinion, the criminal proceeding
cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. only because there is a
settlement, in this case a monetary settlement, between the
accused and the complainant and other relatives of the
deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the
deceased.
50. As held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi
Narayan, Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category ofPage 15 of 23
2026:MLHC:69heinous and serious offences and are to be treated as crime
against society and not against the individual alone. On a
parity of reasoning, offence under section 306 of the IPC
would fall in the same category. An FIR under Section
306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of any
financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse,
parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else.
51. It is clarified that it was not necessary for this Court to
examine the question whether the FIR in this case discloses
any offence under Section 306 of the IPC, since the High
Court, in exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC,
quashed the proceedings on the sole ground that the
disputes between the accused and the informant had been
compromised.”
14. Thus, from the aforesaid authorities, it is evident that the
powers of the High Court to quash criminal proceeding on the
basis of settlement are materially different from compounding
an offence in terms of Section 359 of BNSS (earlier, Section 320
CrPC). It is also clear that the plenary powers vested in the High
Court under Section 528 of BNSS (earlier, Section 482 of CrPC)
are to be exercised with utmost care and circumspection. It is
also clear that an FIR/criminal proceeding can be quashed on
the basis of compromise/settlement, where the dispute/offence
is essentially private in nature and continuation of criminal
proceeding would be an exercise in futility. For
settlement/compromise, the consent of the victim is essential,
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rather sine-qua-non. Quashing of a criminal proceeding based
on compromise, rests essentially upon the absence of grievance
by the victim against the accused. In a case relating to Section
106 (1) of the BNS (earlier, Section 304A of the IPC) involving
death due to rash and negligent act/driving, the primary victim
is the deceased. The deceased being the primary/real victim, is
in fact, the aggrieved party, who is no longer capable of
expressing or giving his/her consent. The Apex Court in Guru
Basavaraj alias Benne Settappa v. State of Karnataka
reported in (2012) 8 SCC 734, has observed that when a
number of people sustain injuries due to a motor accident and
a death occurs, it creates a stir in the society; and a sense of fear
prevails all around. The negligence of one shatters the
tranquility of the collective. It was further observed that when
such an accident occurs, it has the effect and potentiality of
making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in social
fabric. It has its impact on the society and the impact is felt more
when accidents take place quite often because of rash driving by
drunken, negligent, or for that matter, adventurous drivers who
have, in a way, no concern for others.
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15. In fact, in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi reported in
(2015) 5 SCC 182, the Apex Court had the occasion to take note
of the increasing number of road accidents in the country and
exhorted the lawmakers to revisit the sentencing policy in
Section 304A of the IPC. In paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the said
judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under:
“23. In the instant case the factum of rash and negligent
driving has been established. This court has been constantly
noticing the increase in number of road accidents and has
also noticed how the vehicle drivers have been totally rash
and negligent. It seems to us driving in a drunken state, in
a rash and negligent manner or driving with youthful
adventurous enthusiasm as if there are no traffic rules or no
discipline of law has come to the centre stage. The
protagonists, as we perceive, have lost all respect for law. A
man with the means has, in possibility, graduated himself
to harbour the idea that he can escape from the substantive
sentence by payment of compensation. Neither the law nor
the court that implements the law should ever get oblivious
of the fact that in such accidents precious lives are lost or
the victims who survive are crippled for life which, in a way,
is worse than death. Such developing of notions is a
dangerous phenomenon in an orderly society. Young age
cannot be a plea to be accepted in all circumstances. Life to
the poor or the impecunious is as worth living for as it is to
the rich and the luxuriously temperamental.
24. Needless to say, the principle of sentencing recognizes
the corrective measures but there are occasions when the
deterrence is an imperative necessity depending upon the
facts of the case. In our opinion, it is a fit case where we arePage 18 of 23
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away by the passion of mercy in applying the principle that
payment of compensation is a factor for reduction of
sentence to 24 days. It is absolutely in the realm of
misplaced sympathy. It is, in a way mockery of justice.
Because justice is “the crowning glory”, “the sovereign
mistress” and “queen of virtue” as Cicero had said. Such a
crime blights not only the lives of the victims but of many
others around them. It ultimately shatters the faith of the
public in judicial system. In our view, the sentence of one
year as imposed by the trial Magistrate which has been
affirmed by the appellate court should be reduced to six
months.
25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe
that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There
is a nonchallant attitude among the drivers. They feel that
they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness
contributes to careless driving where the other people
become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe,
the pedestrians think of uncertainty and the civilized
persons drive in constant fear but still apprehensive about
the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves
as “larger than life”. In such obtaining circumstances, we are
bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinize,
relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304A, IPC.
We say so with immense anguish.”
16. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Baldev Singh v.
State of Punjab and another : CRM No. M-40769 of 2014
decided on 2nd June, 2016, was also called upon to consider on
a reference made to it by the learned Single Judge, whether an
FIR and proceeding emanating therefrom, under Section 106(1)
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of BNS (earlier, Section 304A of IPC) can be quashed on the basis
of a compromise/settlement between the legal heirs of the victim
and the accused? The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court after considering various judgments of the Apex
Court answered the said question in the negative.
17. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear, that proceedings
under Section 106(1) of BNS (earlier, Section 304A of IPC) where
the deceased is no more, cannot be quashed on the basis of a
compromise/settlement having arrived at between the accused
and the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased. This
practice of entering into a settlement/compromise more often
than not, involves monetary consideration to the victim’s family.
Criminal justice system is not a purchasable commodity. Where
there are serious public wrongs and where the society as a
whole, has a stake, the justice delivery system cannot be put at
naught by the accused, only because of his/her financial
capacity/position in society. If the same is permitted, the same
will be antithetical to the rule of law. If faith in the public justice
delivery system is to be maintained, any compromise between
the accused and the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased
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under Section 106(1) of BNS cannot be sustained. There cannot
be misplaced sympathy, based on settlement between the legal
heirs of the deceased and the accused.
18. The jurisprudential foundation for quashing criminal
proceedings on the basis of a compromise essentially, rests upon
the absence of any grievance by the victim concerned as against
the accused. Section 106(1) of BNS (earlier, Section 304A of the
IPC) pertains to death caused due to rash and negligent act.
Thus, where the deceased who is the real victim is no more and
is incapable of giving his consent, the question of a settlement
between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased would
not arise. In fact, if such a compromise is permitted on the
ground of mutual accord, the same would not only undermine
the public confidence in the justice delivery system but would
also ultimately shatter the faith of the public in the judicial
system.
19. As noted aforesaid, the Apex Court in Daxaben (supra)
has clearly refused quashing of a case under Section 306 of the
IPC on the basis of a settlement between the complainant (a
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family member of the deceased) and the accused, as permitting
quashing would set a dangerous precedent and financially
strong offenders would go scot-free. Thus, on a parity of
reasoning, a case under Section 106(1) of the BNS cannot be
said to be essentially private in nature warranting grant of
permission to the accused and legal heirs of the deceased, to
settle the dispute amicably. In fact, if a compromise is permitted,
it will give the accused who may be powerful, influential, having
clout of money, to happily settle the matter with the family of the
deceased, who may not be financially well off. Criminal justice
system cannot be used and abused by parties to permit a
compromise in cases such as this. It cannot be forgotten that
the plenary powers vested in the High Court are to be exercised
with due care and circumspection, befitting judicial propriety
and must serve the ends of justice.
19. As far as reliance placed on the judgments of this Court
by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the
judgments of the Apex Court were not pointed out and hence,
not considered. Accordingly, the said judgments are not binding
on this Court.
Page 22 of 23
2026:MLHC:69
20. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion
that the FIR dated 28th March, 2025 registered with the Rynjah
Police Station, Shillong and consequently, the proceedings
pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Shillong being G.R. Case No. 44 (A) of 2025, cannot be quashed
on the basis of compromise entered into between the accused
and the legal heirs of the deceased.
21. Petition is accordingly, dismissed.
(Revati Mohite Dere)
Chief Justice
Signature Not Verified Page 23 of 23
Digitally signed by SYLVANA
LIZ KHARBHIH
Date: 2026.02.12 10:24:27 IST